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Abstract 
The research set off with the rationale of understanding the cause of the unusually high cost overruns 
experienced in highway projects, executed in the tropical wetland setting of the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. An expansive range of research from academe, revealed a strong dialectical debate between 
the theoretical and technical schools of thought, as to what propagates relatively higher cost overruns 
in public infrastructure projects. The theorists posit that optimism bias and deliberate 
misrepresentation by project planners, largely accounts for cost overruns in transportation 
infrastructure projects, and not geology/geotechnical risk as tendered by the technical school. Yet the 
literature continues to report inadequate geotechnical risk containment resulting in considerable post-
contract cost overruns in highway projects. As a result of this contradiction, and the lack of a robust 
empirical analysis to this effect, this research was carried out to explore the statistical validity of 
geotechnical risk factors in explaining cost overruns recorded in highway projects executed in the 
Niger Delta region. Using the case study research strategy, 16 interviews were conducted within the 
3 highway agencies in the region, longitudinal cost data was also gathered from 61 completed highway 
projects, along with geotechnical index data on the engineering properties of sub-grade soils at project 
locations. These were comprehensively analysed using an innovative multi-method approach: 
Thematic analysis; Documentary/archival analysis; Spatial analysis of geotechnical data sets, 
designed to quantitatively converge in a triangulatory log-regression model.  The results of regression 
analysis identified that latent pathogens such as heterogeneous ground conditions and non-
adherence to geotechnical best practices, amidst a wide array of unanticipated social constructs, 
account for the majority of the recorded variance between the initial estimates and the project’s final 
account.  The interplay of the emergent social constructs with the latent pathogens was further 
cognitively mapped out, using content analysis, to visually conceptualise the relative weightiness of 
the intricate complexity of the contextual dynamics, driving the unusually high level of cost overruns 
experienced in highway project delivery in the Niger Delta. The study concluded that the phenomenon 
of cost overruns in highway projects is multi-hydra headed, driven by a complexity of technical and 
contextual social variables, and not the simplistic explanations implied by the dichotomous arguments 
in the literature. It was thus recommended that tackling cost overruns in highway projects require far 
more than the scientific application of technical risk management tools, and should therefore, further 
incorporate concerted and specifically targeted efforts at curbing the intrinsic contextual triggers 
within, and external to highway organisations. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Study 
The cost performance of construction projects is emphasized by Baccarani (2004), as a key 
success criterion for project sponsors, against the background that construction projects are 
known for running over budget estimates. Inaccuracy in projected cost estimates, under 
conditions of uncertainty, typically expressed as cost overruns, is an issue of primary concern for 
clients, project managers, contractors, and all other stakeholders in construction works (National 
Highway Cooperative Research Program, 2004; Georgia Department of Transportation, 2007). 
Cost overrun is measured as actual out-turn costs, minus estimated costs, as a percentage of 
estimated costs (Cantarelli et al., 2010:6). The negative consequences of cost overruns in 
highway projects has led some to question the efficiency of public highway commissioners, 
through the developed and developing world, leading to questions about the ability of such 
organisations to initiate and deliver highway infrastructure projects. The phenomenon of cost 
overruns in highway projects has consequently attracted profuse scholarly attention over time, 
from researchers: Wachs (1989); Mackie and Preston (1998); Bruzelius et al. (2002); Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2002); Anderson et al. (2006), as well as numerous other recent works, who have led the 
discussion of the factors accounting for cost overruns in transportation projects. 
 
As the literature evidences, a multiplicity of factors may introduce the risk element in budgeted 
estimates, that potentially affects the cost effectiveness of project delivery at completion (Chou, 
2002). Therefore, the extent to which cost overruns can be subverted is bounded by the 
contextual risk settings, that are intrinsic in the factors accounted for in pre-contract estimates 
(Asmar et al., 2011).  One such limiting factor in highway projects, is ground conditions, which in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, has been shown to have had a significant impact on highway 
development (Oguara, 2002; Teme, 2002; Youdoewei, 2013; Ngerebara et al., 2014). The Niger 
Delta is an archetypal tropical Delta, crisscrossed by a myriad of streams, rivers and inland water 
channels (Oguara, 2002). As depicted in Figure 1.1, its terrain consists of varying geological 
formations, with a significant proportion having difficult expansive clayey sub-soils (Teme, 2002). 
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Figure 1.1: Map of Niger Delta Showing Heterogeneous Terrain   
 (Niger Delta Home Page, 2015) 
 
This implies that any form of construction work in this heterogeneous terrain will invariably 
encounter distinct technical and financial connotations (Oguara, 2002; Youdoewei, 2013; 
Ngerebara et al., 2014). Consequently, Oguara (2002) stressed that road development in some 
areas would require expensive specification, designs and specialized construction methods to 
account for this environmental configuration. Cost projection for road development by highway 
agencies in the region, implies a need to reflect these ground related factors during estimate 
preparation (Youdoewei, 2013; Ngerebara et al., 2014).  
 
Considering the significant impact that the terrain has on construction costs in the Niger Delta, 
the views of several authors in the local literature are convergent in underscoring the need to 
manage and analyse uncertainties associated with the difficult geology (Oguara, 2002; Teme, 
2002; Youdoewei, 2013; Ngerebara et al., 2014). This view, has also been emphasised in related 
studies exploring Niger Delta soils including the work of Arumala and Akpokodje (1987), Agbola 
and Olurin (2003), as well as Unoanwanaile (2009). The escalated costs associated with road 
construction has also been repeatedly reported by the Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC, 2006), a regional highway development agency, as being due to the mainly adverse 
ground conditions in the region. Given the potential correlation between escalating costs and the 
region’s geology espoused in the literature, it is clear that further research is required to identify 
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potential avenues of avoidable cost overruns due to ground conditions, from a scholarly 
perspective, to close this gap in existing knowledge, whilst also contributing to existing practice 
in the region by providing a road map to improvements in the financial management of highway 
infrastructure projects.  
 
The need for the study is evident, against the backdrop of the literature on geotechnical best 
practices, which shows that geotechnical input should form a fundamental basis on which 
highway project designs and estimates, be predicated throughout the phases of project 
development, in order to minimise cost overruns (Nicholson, et al., 1976; ICE, 1999; Venmans, 
2006). The Institution of Civil Engineers (1999) advised that project developers should assess 
‘what is known and unknown about a site’, and ‘what needs to be known’, via ground 
investigations, before initiating highway projects to avert cost overruns due to unforeseen ground 
conditions. Empirical studies, evaluating cost overrun trends and variation orders in completed 
highway projects, are convergent in stating that ground conditions, ranks high amongst the 
technical risk leading to underestimation/cost overruns in highway projects (NEDO, 1983; ICE, 
1991; Peacock, and Whyte, 1992; NAO, 1994; Isakson, 2002). 
 
At the conceptual phase of project development, both Evans and Peck (2008) and Romero and 
Stolz (2009), emphasized the need for adequate preliminary investigations to produce 
representative estimates that reflect likely geotechnical requirements inherent at proposed sites. 
This logically implies that variable ground conditions, typically present in the highly 
heterogeneous ground profile of the Niger Delta will have cost implications during budget 
estimation for highway projects. This is because, it is a requirement of best practice that a 
correspondingly varying profiling of estimates, in response to the likely variation in standard civil 
engineering design solutions, should be elicited. As such Romero and Stolz (2009) discouraged 
the use of ‘off the shelve’ historical cost figures. Given this, such practice was described as 
amounting to producing ‘no more than a guestimate’ which will eventually lead to significant 
budget shortfalls in the long run. Romero and Stolz (2009) thus asserted that it would be 
unrealistic for budgetary estimates to be uniformly forecasted, without due cognisance of the 
need for a differentiated costing profile in transportation projects, given their high degree of 
interface with ground conditions. It is thus suspected that an understanding of subsoil condition, 
and their engineering implications during the project financial evaluation process, is one of the 
knowledge gaps in the practice of highway agencies in the Niger Delta, that needs to be 
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overcome. This is necessary if these organisations are to generate conceptual estimates that are 
better aligned with later detailed estimates, tender estimates and final accounts for projects. 
 
At the detailed design phase, comprehensive and adequate ground investigations have been 
recommended as best practice by the ICE (1999).  With the ICE (1999), asserting that ground 
investigations must be conducted as operations of discovery, which are a fundamental 
prerequisite, to ensuring subsoil conditions are fully reflected in designs and contract cost 
predictions. Literature abounds which covers a wide range of the links between lack of site 
investigation, and unexpected costs that can occur thereof (Clark, 1998; Peacock, and Whyte, 
1992; Clayton, 1996; Ashton and Gidado, 2002; Isakson, 2002; Gransberg and Gad, 2014). Clark 
(1998) used case histories to investigate how construction works commencing in the absence of 
desk studies, and based on minimal ground investigation can lead to costs that could be saved 
if ground conditions had been properly investigated and formed the basis for both engineering 
designs and cost analysis. This assertion was also reinforced by Clayton (1996), who used 
project data to show a very high degree of correlation, between expenditure on ground 
investigations and cost overruns. Finally, Oguara (2002) opined that inherent to recognising the 
significant geotechnical challenges in the terrain of the Niger Delta, it would be logical that 
emphasis be placed on adequately investigating ground conditions, prior to designs, by highway 
agencies in the region. This was suggested as a primary step in resolving the issues associated 
with the infrastructure backlog, project abandonments and incessant road failures. 
 
At the tendering and contracting phase, ground conditions have been established in the literature, 
as a major financial risk in highway contracts (Peacock and Whyte, 1992; ICE, 1999; Isakson, 
2002; Romero and Stolz, 2009). Case law is rife with resolved and unresolved contractual 
disputes arising due to lack of adequate geotechnical risk containment during procurement. 
Adopting an appropriate mechanism for managing ground related risk in contracts has thus being 
noted as having the potential to constitute a risk containment measure, necessary to avert cost 
overruns. Best practice thus advocates that there is a need for the inclusion of ground 
investigation reports, accompanied by differing site condition clauses in bid documentation, and 
using multi-dimensional algorithms in contractor selection with explicitly defined geotechnical 
qualification requirements (Romero and Stolz 2009; Gransberg and Gad 2014). This was argued 
as necessary, for both parties to a contract (highway organisations and road contractors) to have 
a better informed basis of contracting, with costly delays, claims and variations leading to cost 
overruns, subverted.  
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As best practice, documented in the literature evidences, it can be deduced that various potential 
avenues for ensuring geotechnical input, necessary to minimise cost overruns, and as 
mechanisms of adding value for money invested on highway development in the Niger Delta, 
exists at: 
  
 The preliminary estimating phase (conceptual cost forecasts); 
 The design stage (appropriate designs); 
 The tendering and contracting phase (in terms of risk containment).  
 
Yet, the literature continues to report inadequate use of geotechnical risk containment in highway 
projects, resulting in considerable post-contract cost overruns. As a result of this confusion within 
the existing literature, and the lack of a robust empirical analysis to this effect, this study resolved 
to explore the statistical validity of these geotechnical risk factors in explaining cost overruns in 
highway projects, contextualised in the geologic setting of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. It is 
the researcher’s belief that the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, by virtue of its terrain, is an 
embodiment of a geologic setting representative of the intricacies of geotechnical risk, and what 
it foreshadows for the financial management of highway projects. The Niger Delta is thus used 
as a test bed for empirical verification in this study. The ultimate cost efficiency of highway project 
delivery in the Niger Delta, is thus hypothesized to be highly predicated on the approach adopted 
to managing the financial risks inherent in the deltaic ground conditions of the region.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The problem of high investments in road construction in the Niger Delta, has become a subject 
of grave concern to government. Sunjka and Jacob (2013) reported that presently, the budgetary 
allocation for roads in the region ranges between 60 -70% of annual capital expenditure on 
infrastructure. Yet, extensive areas of the Niger Delta basin are not traversed by roads, due to 
construction difficulties and complimentary costs associated with road construction in the region, 
mostly attributed to the prevalence of expansive clayey sub-soils (Oguara, 2002: Central Bank 
of Nigeria, 2003; Fatokun and Bolarinwa, 2011). This as reported, has consequently affected the 
ability of past governments to develop an adequate road network necessary to satisfy the need 
for rapid economic development in the region (Ngerebara et al., 2014). Mode of transportation in 
communities situated in these remote riverine sections of the region, is predominantly by canoes, 
as shown in Figure 1.2. The problematic terrain has been identified as contributory to this low 
level of road infrastructure development (Emujakporue, 2012; Ngerebara, et al., 2014). 
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Figure 1.2: Typical Transportation Mode in the Meander Belts of the Niger Delta   
                                                                                            (Africa Check Home Page, 2014) 
 
However, despite the environmental handicaps of the region, in recent times there has been a 
renewed drive to open up and link these remote areas of the Niger Delta to foster their economic 
development (NDDC, 2013). Consequently, a multiplicity of roads is being constructed 
concurrently across the Niger Delta by the various highway agencies in the region. 
1.2.1 The Facts and Figures 
The local literature, however, indicates that it is not the initiation of road projects that is currently 
a problem in the Niger Delta region. The fundamental problem being their completion, with 
funding shortfalls responsible for the vast majority of delayed or abandoned projects (Ayodele 
and Alabi, 2011; Ihuah and Benibo, 2014).  For local communities, these uncompleted road 
projects constitute a hindrance to vehicular and human traffic, as well as impact negatively on 
economic activities.  As Figure 1.3 shows, following abandonment, these partially complete 
projects are not securely protected until additional funds can be approved. Rather the partially 
constructed highway is unofficially handed over to the local community.  As a result, the 
incomplete structure degenerates, often to such an extent that the highway, designed to help the 
local community, becomes a death trap (Momoh et al., 2008; Emujakporue, 2012). 
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Figure 1.3: Degenerating Uncompleted and Abandoned Road Projects in the Niger Delta             
                            
Onokola (2012), noted the tedium associated with the disruption of economic activities, as the 
mobility of products and services such as farm produce from rural to urban centres, are stalled.  
The Central Bank of Nigeria (2013), estimated the annual financial loss due to the incompletion 
and abandonment of road projects, at approximately N80 billion ($533 million), with resultant 
additional vehicle operating costs of a further N53.8 billion ($360 million), cumulating in an 
approximate total loss per annum of N133.8 billion ($893 million).  This figure, according to the 
CBN (2013) is exclusive of the associated man-hour losses in traffic, psychological and physical 
trauma undergone in plying such roads, and other multiplier negative impacts on economic 
productivity. 
 
Okon (2009) determined the total length of roads, along with the number of other infrastructure 
projects initiated by the Niger Delta Development Commission’s (NDDC), a regional highway 
development agency in the region, between 2001 – 2008. Additionally, Okon (2009) established 
the actual number of projects or kilometres of road completed over this time period.  This data, 
presented in Table 1.1, illustrates the failure of highway agencies, such as the NDDC, to deliver 
these major infrastructure projects. For instance, the data evidences that only 28% of 
commissioned water supply and 42% of electrification projects actually achieved completion 
between 2001 and 2008. 
Table 1.1 Infrastructure Backlog of Uncompleted Projects in the Niger Delta (2001 – 2008) 
Infrastructure type         Total no. Initiated                    Completed 
 
Percentage 
Completed 
Roads     156 (3,000Km)                     780 Km 26 
Bridges   47 - 0 
Water Supply 283 78 28 
Electrification 316 137 42 
(Source: Okon, 2009) 
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A different study by Goddey (2011), also reported the number of infrastructure projects executed 
by the NDDC over the same time frame, as shown in Table 1.2.  
 
Table 1.2: Number of Physical Projects Executed by the NDDC (2001 – 2008) 
(Source: Goddey, 2011) 
The researcher notes that there are discrepancies in the number of completed projects reported 
in the two studies, for similar types of work, with by Goddey (2011) reporting lower completion 
rates that those determined by Okon (2009).  Yet it is also worthy of note that Goddey (2011) did 
not show the number of roads initiated relative to those completed, which has prevented the 
researcher determining the overall accuracy of Goddey’s figures. However, from Okon’s analysis 
it is clear, only 26% of the commissioned roads in this period have been completed. This dismal 
completion rate, further reinforced in a recent independent European Union (2011) evaluation of 
infrastructure projects in the Niger Delta region, again revealed a significant number of road 
projects in the region remain incomplete and abandoned by various tiers of government (Federal, 
State, and Local Government). An extract from the EU report is shown in Table 1.3. 
 
Table1.3: Abandoned and Uncompleted Road Projects in the Niger Delta (2000-2011) 
Communities Assessed Federal Govt NDDC State Govt Local Govt 
BAYELSA STATE Kolokuma / LGA 
(10 communities) 
14 0 16 1 
BAYELSA STATE / Sagbama LGA 
(10 communities) 
12 4 18 3 
RIVERS STATE / Obio-Akpor LGA  
(6 communities) 
3 7 13 1 
RIVERS STATE / Ahoada East LGA  
(9 communities) 
2 0 9 3 
TOTAL 31 13 56 8 
 (Source: EU Report, 2011) 
 
Despite the abysmal completion rates for road construction projects in the Niger Delta region, as 
Falade (2016) discovered, completion does not always indicate success. With most, if not all, 
completed highway projects recording exceedingly high cost overrun figures, a concern currently 
Projects Number Completed 
Water 22 
Electrification 12 
Jetties 6 
Road/Bridges 37 
Canalisation 1 
Shore protection 2 
TOTAL 176 
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being investigated by the Nigerian Senate.  In 2012, a Presidential Projects Assessment 
Committee (PPAC) was set up, which showed that between 2005 and 2011, 609 projects were 
initiated in the region of which 222 (37%) have been completed, 102 (16%) are on-going and 285 
(47%) have been abandoned. The report thus showed the abysmal performance of the Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC) since inception in 2001. The report further highlighted: 
“…the unjustifiable introduction of astronomical variations on the contracts sum of most 
projects over short periods of time, with some of these variations effected prior to project 
commencement” (PPAC, 2012:13).  
1.2.2 The Perceived Underlying Issues/ Need for the Study 
Whilst these statistics may be giving an impression of complacency or corruption on the part of 
the highway agencies in the Niger Delta, adverse ground conditions in the region have been 
repeatedly identified by the highway agencies as the explanation behind these extreme cost 
escalations.  Okon (2009) had quoted cost overrun figures as high as 500% associated with 
some of the completed highway projects in the Niger Delta region, and attributed this to the 
various geologic environments in the region, which bears significantly higher risks than other 
parts of Nigeria. Joseph (2012), as well as Ihuah and Benibo (2014) have equally corroborated 
this stance in empirical studies investigating the causes of project cost overruns, delays and 
abandonments in the Niger Delta region.   Vulnerability to ravaging environmental (flood and 
erosion) related disaster; adverse weather conditions; inaccessible and geo-hazardous 
impassable wetland terrain, were some of the distinct attributes of the region, cited as responsible 
for the current state of highway project delivery.  
 
However, several other empirical studies in the local literature (Mansfield et al., 1994; Okpala 
and Aniekwu, 1998; Ajibade and Odeyinka, 2006), have consistently identified issues related to 
lack of geotechnical best practices, such as: weak and insufficient technical studies and 
preliminary engineering, design and specification deficiencies as well as inaccurate budgetary 
and engineering design estimates as contributing to the high spate of project delays and 
abandonment in Nigeria.  
 
Despite these consistent referrals to lack of best practices, the scale of the problem experienced 
by highway agencies has not been established in the literature. As such whether adequate 
geotechnical evaluation is ensured, before the commencement of road works in the region 
remains in doubt, and would need to be established in the field work. This is logically linked to 
the rather robust body of literature centred on investigating the high incidence of premature road 
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failure in the region (Ajayi, 1987; Abam, 2005; Aigbedion, 2007; Emujakporue, 2012), although 
beyond the scope of this research. Sunjka and Jacob (2013), in a study investigating the causes 
of project delays in the Niger Delta, revealed changes in specifications and designs which were 
not considered originally, have impeded the time effective delivery of road works in the region, 
further reinforcing the researcher’s perception. It was suggested: 
            “Improper design stalls project execution in the Niger Delta because of the time it takes 
for such design to be reviewed, amended and accepted for construction works” (Sunjka 
and Jacob, 2013: 641). 
 
Validation of this assertion will thus be inferred in relation to the stipulated highway standard, 
recommended by the Federal Government for the construction of highways in Nigeria. The 
Transportation and Road Research Laboratory (TRRL, 1993) Overseas Road Note 31 guide, 
sets out a catalogue of design configurations suitable for the various subgrade soils inherent in 
the tropical setting of Nigeria. The application and level of adherence to this standard by highway 
agencies in the Niger Delta, which should logically be based on adequate ground investigation 
as a pre-requisite for detailed designs and costing for proposed roads, however is not known. 
This is therefore investigated as part of the field work. 
 
Claims and variations arising during construction phase for road works in the Niger Delta region 
have also been mostly linked to ground conditions in the literature, which have invariably 
negatively impacted on both project duration and cost (Dlakwa and Culpin, 1990; Sunjka and 
Jacob, 2013).  This is particularly the case in the coastal and meander zones of the Niger Delta 
which currently has a significant infrastructure backlog (EU Report, 2011; Ngerebara et al., 
2014).  Literature and physical evidence show that there exists a rather significant spate of 
extensive project delays and abandonment in these areas, which has retarded the economic 
development of the local riverine communities to be serviced by such roads (Ossai, 2012).  
 
Mansfield et al. (1994) further revealed that unclear definitions of contract terms and technical 
details by the client, were some of the factors causing significant cost overruns leading to delays 
and abandonment of highway projects in Nigerian public projects. Mansfield et al. (1994) 
specifically noted the consequent high level of financial risk exposure to the clients (highway 
agencies) in contracts awarded on a rather arbitrary basis. The basis of contract award and 
execution by highway agencies in the Niger Delta has thus being generally criticised, as being 
poorly packaged due to a lack of relevant technical know-how on procurement best practices, 
with contractors standing to benefit from this shortcoming (Okon, 2009; Sunjka and Jacob, 2013). 
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This was further reinforced by the World Bank’s (2000), in a Country Procurement Assessment 
Report (CPAR) for Nigeria.  Collectively these studies assert that there exists a need to align 
best practice into highway project delivery in the region.  
 
As a result of the extensive local literature supporting the link between geology, the lack of 
geotechnical best practices, and cost and time overruns, it can be argued that in the context of 
the Niger Delta, the prevalence of the outlined ground related issues in practice, would culminate 
in a significant disparity between initial budgeted estimates, design estimates, and tender 
estimates in relation to final cost. As the ICE (1991:12) succinctly enunciates: “The ground is a 
place where things are likely to go wrong, the worst the ground, the higher the risk”  
1.3 Suspected Gaps in the Practices of the Highway Agencies 
Based on the perceived discrepancies in the theoretical and practical approach to the 
containment of associated ground related risks in cost estimates, several “geotechnical cost 
drivers” have been identified, and constitutes the rationale of the study. The researcher has thus 
identified the following gaps in knowledge, suspected as existing in the practice of the highway 
agencies that need to be verified and addressed, as the primary cost overrun drivers contributing 
significantly to spate of project delays and abandonment in the geologic context of the Niger 
Delta. 
 
Table 1.4: Identified Cost Drivers/Potentials for Added Value in Highway Investment  
Project Phase Suspected Gaps in Knowledge Potential for Added Value 
Conceptual Phase Use of non-differentiated/uniform cost per 
kilometre of road length estimate that is not 
reflective of the typically heterogeneous ground 
profile. 
 
 Improved Accuracy of 
budget Estimates 
 
Design Phase Adequacy of ground investigations prior to 
highway design and detailed estimate 
preparation; 
 
Non-Adherence of pavement designs to the 
adopted National Highway Standard (TRRL, 
1993) in relation to sub-soils.  
 
More Appropriate Designs 
and Accurate Pre-Bid 
Estimates 
Tendering and 
Contracting Phase 
Non-inclusion of GIR and DSC clauses in 
contract documentation; 
 
Inadequate geotechnical criteria in contractor 
selection 
Better Risk Containment 
in Tender Estimates, 
which minimises claims 
and variations. 
     GIR: Ground Investigation Reports      DSC: Differing Site Condition Clause 
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Verification of these suspected gaps in knowledge, summarised in Table 1.4, which principally 
revolve around subsoil conditions of the Niger Delta region and relevant geotechnical practices, 
constitute the rationale of the study. In view of the current state of highway project delivery in the 
Niger Delta, these are thus presupposed as being the more profound technical factors, 
underlying the significant cost escalations, that need to be investigated. Scrutinising the practises 
of the highway agencies, therefore constitutes a first step, towards understanding the 
propagation of significant cost overruns in the Niger Delta, against the backdrop of the virtually 
non-existent literature, on the estimating and design practices specific to these highway 
agencies. Filling this identified gap in the local literature, thus establishes the central theme of 
the subsequent field work, necessary to provide a descriptive account of current practice, relative 
to the dictates of geotechnical best practice, to serve as a platform to evaluate the need for 
improvement.  
 
1.4 Aim and Objectives of the Study 
The aim of the study is to explain the propagation of cost overruns in highway projects using a 
geotechnical narrative predicated on the financial risk implications of the heterogeneous geology 
of the Niger Delta wetland.  Specifically, the study has the following objectives: 
1. To synthesize the background literature on investment in highway development in 
Nigeria, and the prevalence of delays and abandonment in project delivery, with 
emphasis on the Niger Delta region due to its peculiar geologic setting.  
 
2. To critically evaluate the theoretical and methodological lenses that have been used in 
previous studies, to explain the propagation of cost overruns in highway projects, as a 
platform for highlighting significant gaps which have implications for this study.  
 
3. To critically evaluate and select an adequate philosophical/methodological orientation 
relevant to provide rich insights into the phenomena of cost overruns in highway projects 
executed in the Niger Delta. 
 
4. To analyse the geotechnical characteristics of the heterogeneous configuration of the 
Niger Delta terrain, to highlight its inherent peculiarity for triggering cost overruns.  
 
5. To identify potential shortcomings in geotechnical practice, which can serve to trigger 
cost overruns in highway projects.  
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6. To examine the level of adherence/deviations in the practices of highway agencies in 
the Niger Delta, in line with the precepts of geotechnical best practice. 
 
7. To develop a statistically valid model and cognitive map of deduced geotechnical 
pathogens, predicted on the heterogeneous geologic configuration of the Niger Delta 
region, to account for the level of variance induced in cost overruns.  
 
1.5 Research Questions  
1. What is the background to Nigeria’s investment in highway development, and what are 
the peculiarities associated with the geologic setting of the Niger Delta region, that 
account for the prevalence of delays and abandonment in project delivery? 
 
2. What theoretical and methodological lenses have been used to explain the propagation 
of cost overruns in highway projects in previous studies, to serve as a platform for 
highlighting significant gaps, which have implications for this study.  
 
3. What philosophical/methodological orientation is relevant to provide rich insights into the 
phenomena of cost overruns in highway projects executed in the Niger Delta? 
 
4. What peculiar geotechnical characteristics of the heterogeneous Niger Delta terrain 
inherently compounds the propensity of highway projects to run over budget? 
 
5. What shortcomings in geotechnical practice, can potentially trigger cost overruns in 
highway projects?  
 
6. To what extent have the highway agencies in the Niger Delta region adhered to /deviated 
from relevant geotechnical best practices? 
 
7. How statistically valid are the deduced geotechnical pathogens, predicted on the 
heterogeneous geologic configuration of the Niger Delta region, in accounting for cost 
overrun trends in the Niger Delta, and how can these be cognitively mapped out?  
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1.6 Methods, Research Design, and Outline Structure of the Thesis 
The research objectives, designed to provide answers to the research questions are achieved 
using a multi-method mix of geo-spatial, qualitative and quantitative methods/approaches 
outlined in Table 1.5. 
 
Table1.5: Approach to Achieving Research Objectives/Answer Research Questions 
Research Objectives/Questions Method/Approach 
To synthesize the background literature on investment in highway 
development in Nigeria and the prevalence of delays and 
abandonment in project delivery with emphasis on the Niger Delta 
region due to its peculiar geologic setting. (Q1) 
 
 Literature Review 
(Descriptive/Explanatory) 
 To critically evaluate the theoretical and methodological lenses that 
have been used in previous studies to explain the propagation of cost 
overruns in highway projects, as a platform for highlighting significant 
gaps which have implications for this study. (Q2) 
 
Theoretical Literature Review 
(Critical Analysis) 
 
To critically evaluate and select an adequate 
philosophical/methodological orientation relevant to provide rich 
insights into the phenomena of cost overruns in highway projects 
executed in the Niger Delta. (Q3) 
 
 Review of literature on Methodology 
(Critical Evaluation) 
To analyse the heterogeneous configuration of the Niger Delta terrain, 
and the peculiar practicalities necessary for highway construction, as 
a case study justification of its inherent geologic distinctiveness for 
triggering cost overruns. (Q4) 
 
 Geologic Literature Vs Field Work 
Analysis: 
(Geo-spatial Statistical Analysis) 
To identify the specific mediums of financial risk containment of 
geologic risks, from best practice, which emphasize the need for 
adequate geotechnical input in highway projects, as potential triggers 
to cost overruns (Q5).  
 
Literature on Best Practices 
(Exploratory) 
 
 
To examine the level of adherence/deviations in the design/costing 
practices of highway agencies in the Niger Delta, in line with the 
precepts of the identified geotechnical best practices, as a basis of 
ascertaining the suspected gaps in knowledge presupposed as the 
underlying cost overrun drivers. (Q6) 
 
(Deductive) Interview Analysis 
(Thematic Analysis) 
 
To develop a statistically valid model and cognitive map of 
geotechnical best practice based drivers to cost overruns, predicted 
on the heterogeneous geologic configuration of the Niger Delta region, 
as basis of accounting for the level of variance induced by 
geotechnical triggers. Q7) 
Regression Analysis, Content Analysis 
and Cognitive Mapping  
(Data Triangulation) 
 
 
The overall structure of the thesis in terms of the configuration of the chapters follows, the 
conceptual outline of the research methodology projected by the researcher as a mind map 
relating the key elements of the study, as shown in Figure 1.4. However, a reflexive adaptation 
of the research design was warranted in response to unanticipated non-geotechnical themes that 
emerged during the analysis of the interviews, as highlighted in Figure 1.4. 
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Figure1.4: Conceptual Mind Map of the Research Design 
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An inductive thematic analysis of emergent barriers, beyond the initial aim of the study, was thus 
carried out to incorporate the unanticipated social constructs, as part of the research findings. As 
shown in the research design, the findings from the initial analysis: the exploratory geo-statistical 
analysis of cost overrun data versus geotechnical index variables, and the deductive thematic 
analysis of geotechnical themes from the interviews were triangulated using regression analysis 
to explain the variance in cost overruns explained. The unexplained variation due to the emergent 
themes were further analysed using content analysis to proportionally assign weightings, as 
basis of cognitive mapping. The outcomes of the study, were a log-linear regression model of 
geotechnical pathogens, and a visual conceptual projection of the interplay between the 
geotechnical and emergent socio-constructs, through the pre and post contract phases of 
highway projects in the Niger Delta. The chapters of the thesis as shown in Figure 1.5 were thus 
structured in response to this reflexive adaptation of the research design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Thesis Structure  
              The Core of the Research 
 Chapter 5: Exploratory Geologic/ Geotechnical Characterisation 
of the Niger Delta 
 Chapter 6:  Geotechnical Best Practices 
 Chapter 7: Background to Interview Analysis 
 Chapter 8: Deductive Interview Analysis 
 Chapter 9: Inductive Interview Analysis 
 Chapter 10: Geo-spatial regression Modelling, Content Analysis 
and Cognitive mapping 
 
The Lead-out 
(Wider Research Implications) 
 Chapter 11: Conclusion and Recommendations  
for further studies 
 
               The lead-in 
 Chapter 1: Introduction  
 Chapter 2: Geo-political background 
 Chapter 3: The theoretical basis of cost overruns in 
highway projects 
 Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
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1.7 Study Scope  
The study is confined to investigating highway projects executed in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria, which sets the spatial limits of in-depth analysis, with emphasis on the geologic 
conditions prevailing in the wetland terrain of the region. On this basis, a spatial definition of the 
region from a geotechnical perspective is used as a criterion for delimiting the geographic 
boundaries of the study area. Therefore, other definitions of the region, as used in geopolitical 
premise, are excluded from within the scope of the research.  
1.8 Limitations, Exclusions, Constraints and Reservations 
Some disciplines may rightly find their own fields of study inadequately represented in this 
research. This research, although transdisciplinary, is not an in-depth study of geotechnical 
engineering, geology, civil engineering, or contract law, but rather an attempt to apply scientific 
knowledge which overlaps between these different fields, in explaining the propagation of cost 
overruns in highway projects. The following are thus the limiting basic assumptions and intent of 
the research in the subject domains that the study cuts across, and which are set to define the 
intellectual realm of the study: 
 
 The study has been limited to road works, although a few instances of illustrations with 
building and other civil engineering works may be apparently used.  It does not provide 
a technical narrative directly applicable to bridges and other types of highway structures; 
 
 Ground related risk have adverse consequences for project cost; completion times; 
environment; health and safety. This study’s definition and focus on ground related risks, 
however emphasizes its cost implication, and is placed in the context of the need for 
geotechnical input as a medium of financial risk containment in the pre-contract phases 
of highway project estimate development. The study herein, is thus limited to exploring 
avenues of ensuring geotechnical input, predicated on the improved accuracy of 
construction cost, which has significant bearing on cost overruns;  
 
 The study, although noting the relevance of the technical aspects of planning, execution 
and reporting of ground investigations, excludes this aspect from the study. The 
supporting literature on the need for ground investigation is thus limited to its financial 
risk implications and relevance for improving the accuracy of estimates and does not 
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transgress outside this scope. It is therefore analysed only to the extent to which it 
supports or explains the researcher’s stance;  
 
 The researcher considers it pivotal to consider the contractual environment surrounding 
the incorporation of ground investigation reports as a medium of risk containment for 
highway projects. The literature in this section, although adopting a legal perspective, is 
explored only to the extent to which it borders on containing financial risks due to ground 
related uncertainties. The literature herein is limited and as such does not delve deeper 
into the legal intricacies of contract law, as this is outside the scope of the study. 
 
 Although procurement systems have not been a major focus within this research study, 
their significance upon the geotechnical risk allocation configuration, in the responsibility 
for carrying out of ground investigations cannot be overlooked. The study however limits 
discussions on procurement systems to the extent to which it affects ground 
investigation, the associated risk allocation and its implied connotation for cost overruns. 
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Chapter 2 
Administrative Background to Highway Development in the Niger Delta 
Region of Nigeria 
2.0 Introduction 
Before proceeding to critically analyse the theoretical underpinning of the study from the scholarly 
literature, this chapter sets the scene and context of the study by describing the regional and 
socio-economic background of the Niger Delta region, within the wider context of highway 
development in Nigeria as a developing country. Against this backdrop, the historical 
antecedents to the current institutional structure of highway development and administration in 
the Nigeria are traced. The existing development framework for investment in transportation 
infrastructure is captured, with emphasis on the budgetary practices evident in developing 
countries. A description of road infrastructure in the Niger Delta region evident in the literature, 
is used to provide a more substantive contextual setting, and to further highlight the inherent 
practical platform on which the need for the study is predicated. 
 
2.1 Road Infrastructure Investment in Developing Countries: The Context of Nigeria 
The limit, to which socio-economic growth can be fostered, is hinged on an efficient road network 
in a locality, which acts as a basic catalyst for civilisation (Roberts, 1999). 
Canning and Fay (1993) examined the economic impact of the level of development of 
transportation network on national growth, by assessing the marginal product of transportation 
infrastructure for 96 countries. His study revealed that the rates of return were normal, significant 
and moderate in developing, industrialized, and underdeveloped countries. In addition, the study 
revealed that although on a short term basis, transportation infrastructure had minimal impact on 
output, it promotes increased growth rate and output in the long-run. He thus concluded that: 
“Transportation infrastructure is indispensable in ensuring smooth economic operation, 
and its sufficient establishment is the genesis of economic advancement of a developing 
economy.  Countries with greater mobility are in better position to develop than others 
with scarce mobility” (Canning and Fay, 1993:21).  
 
Most European and developed economies of the world are characterised by quite dense road 
network, mostly created along with railways and canals, as a result of the demands on 
transportation created during the era of the industrial revolution (Millard, 1993). Consequently, 
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Millard (1993) stated that the proportion of new roads in these countries is not particularly large, 
most of which has been to provide a system of inter unban roads and to serve the need of an 
expanding urban population. Although new road building still continues till present times, Millard 
(1993) revealed that majorly activities of highway agencies lie in the maintenance and 
rehabilitation of existing roads.  
 
At the other extreme, is the scenario in developing countries, in which the building of new roads 
is a basic need for development, requisite to ensure the everyday mobility of people in the 
production and distribution of goods, and is therefore an emphasis of governments (Roberts, 
1999). Policy measures in these countries as reiterated by Oni and Okanlawon (2008) are 
principally focused towards creating a viable environment to stimulate economic development. 
Figure 2.1 is a statistic on the average annual expenditure on road construction as a percentage 
of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa, based on a report prepared by the African Infrastructure Country 
Diagnostic (AICD, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Average Annual Expenditure on road construction as a percentage of GDP in 
Sub-Saharan Africa                                                                    (Source: AICD, 2008)                                                                                                         
 
21 
 
The statistics show that the annual expenditure on road construction in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
between 0.75 to 4%, with an average of 2.5%, compared to the 1% average in developed and 
industrialised countries (AICD, 2008). According to David-West (2014), and Millard (1993), this 
is because whilst road building had reached an advanced level in developed countries, it was 
only just beginning in the developing countries, particularly the ex-colonial countries following the 
attainment of independence. A report by the African Development Bank (ADB, 2013) at the World 
Economic Forum stressed that road infrastructure apart from being fundamental to ensuring 
social well-being and cohesion of populations is a vital support for economic activities particularly 
for African countries. As such the report which focused on enhancing competiveness in the 
productive capacity of developing countries in Africa, revealed that the low level of road network 
development has had a negative impact of an estimated 2% reduction in the annual growth rate.  
Potential productivity increases of up to 40% with the provision of an adequate road network, 
was forecasted. It was stated that: 
          “Inadequate infrastructure has raised the transaction costs of business in most African 
economies. Today African countries exhibit the lowest levels of productivity of all low-
income countries and are among the least competitive economies in the world” (ADB, 
2013:32).   
 
The efficiency of road transportation thus plays a significant role in economic development. The 
nomenclature of the literature on transport sector investment in Nigeria, further corroborates this. 
Willoughby (2005) carried out an empirical study to establish the statistical relationship between 
road development and the level of economic activity. His study concluded that the maturity of 
road network in a country is a basic index of its level of development. Using a multivariate model 
of simultaneous equations, Adegbemi et al. (2012), also examined the contributory role of road 
infrastructure towards the productive economic capacity of Nigeria. Findings from the study 
indicated that there is a direct causal relationship between level of investment in infrastructure 
and economic growth. A more recent empirical study by Uma et al. (2014) analysed the economic 
impact of transportation network in Nigeria over the years, based on sub-sector output, using 
time series data for road transport, rail transport, air transport, and waterway, ranging from 1981-
2009.  The study findings revealed that road transport impacted most significantly on the real 
gross domestic product (RGDP) and recommended a crucial need for investments in road 
network development as a panacea for accelerating economic growth in Nigeria. 
 
Njoku and Ikeji (2012) however showed that there is an overall negative trend in the contribution 
of the transport infrastructure to GDP over the years, as depicted in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: Trends in Transport Sector Contribution to GDP    
Source: Njoku and Ikeji (2012) 
 
Ighodaro (2009) using a vector error correction model, statistically analysed the stages of road 
network development in the three earlier national development plans. His study also indicated 
that past efforts in road development had impacted more significantly on Nigeria’s economy 
within these time frames, compared to more recent times. 
 
2.2 Historical Perspective to Highway Development Investment in Nigeria 
Road systems have been traced to have begun in Nigeria in the early nineteenth century 
following post World War-1 efforts at development by the then colonial masters ruling the country 
(CBN, 2003). This was intended to facilitate trade activities via feeder road network for the new 
rail roads. History points to the fact that before this timeframe there were no existing motorable 
roads in Nigeria. From historical literature, the following eras of highway development in Nigeria 
can be discerned: 
 
 Earliest Pre-Colonial Times: The earliest documented effort at highway development 
according to Anyanwu et al. (1997). The total road length within this time frame increased 
from 6,160 km to 9,453 km.  
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 Pre-Colonial Expansion: After the initial road construction era in earlier times, there 
followed a phase of road network expansion to cover major cities and trade routes. As 
at 1951, the total road network had increased by a significant ratio with 15,785 km of 
bituminous roads and 75,200 km of earth/gravel roads in place. The Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN, 2003) however reported that roads constructed in this era were lacking in 
standard, were all single lane roads, constructed on weak subgrades, often with poor 
horizontal and vertical alignments, and characterised by sharp bends as well as poor 
drainage.  
 
 Post-Colonial Era: This was the era following the attainment of independence in 1960, 
during which various national development plans and programmes designed to improve 
the transportation sector, particularly focusing on road development, marked an increase 
in the aggregate economic activity. The National Transport Policy based on the rolling 
plans 1991 - 1999, reveals the priority given to road development in the transport sector 
budget based on percentage investment allocation. These development plans were 
predicated on the significant revenue accruing to the federal government, following the 
discovery of oil in the Niger Delta region. The total paved road density increased from 
about 17 km per 1000 km2 in 1960 to about 160 km per 1000 km2 in 1979. The quality 
of roads in this era improved with the construction of the roads carried out by foreign 
construction firms. 
 
 Post- Civil War: Following the outbreak of the civil war in the 1970’s and its eventual 
end, there was a renewed emphasis on road development in Nigeria. A total of 
N332.588, representing 68.59% of N485.189 million transportation sector budget, was 
invested principally on road construction in the Second National Development Plan (1970-
74). Subsequent rolling plans 1990-1993, 1994-1996 and 1996-1998 accounted for 
50.6%, 57% and 40.1% respectively (Ighodaro, 2009; Onokala, 2012; Oni and 
Okanlawon, 2013). 
 
 Contemporary Times: Road building in Nigeria has continued till date with a 
proportional increase in the ratio of paved to unpaved roads. The total road network in 
Nigeria as shown in Figure 2.3 is presently estimated at 200,000km and accounts for 
95% of both passenger and freight movements (Federal Ministry of Works, 2014). 
 
24 
 
 
   Figure 2.3: Nigeria’s Road Network                   Source: www.mapsofworld.com/Nigeria 
 
The major reason being the inadequacy of other forms of transportation principally the rail 
system, which became mostly non-functional since the 1970’s. Over this period, road transport 
has increasingly accounted for the highest percent of goods conveyed to the seaports, while 
other transportation modes: water and railways are minimally used, as depicted in Figure 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Analysis of Cargo Delivered at Nigerian Seaports (1991-2002)    
(Source: Oni and Okanlawon, 2013) 
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2.3 Administrative Framework for Highway Development in Nigeria 
The responsibility for road development in Nigeria is shared concurrently amongst the three tiers 
of government based on the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). As Figure 
2.5 shows, the different tiers of government have independent and segregated responsibilities 
for the construction and management of roads.  
              Table 2.1: Total National Road Network 
  
Figure 2.5: Road Ownership in Nigeria                                                   (Source: FMW, 2013) 
 
Roads in Nigeria are classified on the basis of administration. The total national road network is 
approximately 200,000km made up of 17%, 16% and 67% for Federal, State and Local 
Government respectively, represented as a pie chart in Figure 2.5 (Federal Ministry of Works, 
2013). The statistics from Table 2.1 indicate that 20% of the 197, 441km of roads are paved 
mostly in bituminous layers, while the majority of the networks are earth roads. The Federal tier 
of Government executed a higher percentage of the entire paved road network in the country. 
The 36 States and the 774 Local Government Areas are responsible for those not constructed 
by the federal government. In tandem with this administrative framework, road classification 
follows a hierarchical designation:  
 
 Trunk A and F Roads: - Trunk ‘A’ roads are roads constructed and maintained by the 
federal government and forms the major network around which other categories of roads 
are built. Trunk ‘F’ roads refer to highways initially owned and maintained by the state 
governments, whose ownership were subsequently transferred to Federal government 
and standards upgraded. This class of roads transverse the entire land mass of Nigeria 
as shown in Figure 2.6. They form a network of connectivity for ports, state capitals and 
Federal:
17%
State:16%Local 
Govt-
67% 
            
Type       
Federal 
(Km)        
State  
(Km)         
Local 
(Km) 
Total 
(Km)    
% 
Paved  
Roads             
29,741                   11,400             _____          41,141            20% 
Unpaved  
Roads         
05,600                   20,100            _____   25,700            13%. 
Urban 
Roads             
_____                     _____            21,900          21,900            11% 
Rural  
Roads              
_____ _____ 72,800         72,800            37% 
Village 
Roads           
_____   _____ 35,900          35,900           19% 
Total (Km)         34,341 30,500            130,600          197,441        100% 
 
Percentage 
 
17%                       
 
16%                
 
67% 
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links with neighbouring countries. The responsibility for these roads is vested in the 
Federal Ministry of Works (FMW). 
 
 
Figure: 2.6 Federal Road Network in Nigeria                                          (Source: FMW, 2013) 
 
 Trunk B Roads: These are the roads within the states connecting major towns and cities 
of the states. They also connect the cities of the states to federal highways and serve as 
the main arteries of traffic to and from district roads. Trunk B roads are maintained by 
the State Government and are usually of 3 or 2-lane with width.  
  
 Trunk C Roads: These are referred to as local government or community roads, and 
are required to be constructed with similar specifications as trunk B roads. Trunk C roads 
are designed to connect areas of production and market with higher order roads such 
as state highways. Approximately 60% of Nigerian roads are made up of trunk C roads 
as a medium of interconnectivity between neighbouring villages within the geographic 
boundaries of a state. These roads promote rural economy and equally serve as links 
between urban and rural areas in the transportation of agricultural produce. They also 
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include rural or feeder roads which are mostly unpaved manufactured routes, tracks and 
path-roads whose accessibility and utility is often seasonal. However, depending on the 
duration of the rains, these roads can be rendered completely unusable, and can have 
severe impact on the mobility of farm produce harvested from affected areas (Oni and 
Okanlawon, 2008). 
2.4 Geographic Setting of Highway Development in Nigeria 
Nigeria is a coastal state on the shores of the Gulf of Guinea located in West Africa, with Benin 
to the West, Niger to the North, Chad to the North East and Cameroon to the East and South 
East as shown in Figure 2.7. It is located between latitudes 4 – 140 north of the equator and 
longitudes 20 21/ – 140 30/ E of the Greenwich Meridian. It has an Area of 923m2 (356,669 sq. 
miles) placing it 14th in size among African countries.  
 
 
Figure 2.7: Map of Nigeria Showing Geographic Boundaries                 (FMW, 2013)                                                                
 
Nigeria is a country of physical contrast, owing mainly to the vastness of its land mass. This can 
be illustrated through the delineation of physical regions defining the geographic belts of Nigeria, 
naturally taken to be based on climate which in turn determines vegetation and soils.  
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Figure 2.8 Vegetation Map of Nigeria                                                       (Source: GAI, 2014)  
The implication of this variation in the overall climatic condition of Nigeria, is the differences in 
vegetative zones, shown in Figure 2.8, which are tied to a combination of rainfall and 
temperature. The ecology of the country varies from tropical forest in the south, to dry Savannah 
in the far North, showing a clear north- south zonation. In general mangrove swamp and 
rainforest are found in the south occupying about 20% of the area of the country, while grassland 
of various types occupies the rest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Map of Nigeria showing Land Form and Relief                   (Source: Iloeje, 1982) 
 
As shown in Figure 2.9, the highest lands are along the north-eastern border of the country, 
which rise to a maximum of 240m above sea level at the high plains of Hausa land, and is 
characterized by a broad expanse of level sandy plains, interspersed by rocky outcrops. The 
land declines steadily from the Northern highlands southwards to the coastal lowlands at the 
Niger Delta, of less than 80m above sea level, stretching inland from the coast for over 250m.   
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Figure 2.10: Aerial photograph of the Niger Delta Lowlands, Southern Nigeria   
Source: Niger Delta Home page (2015) 
 
As shown in Figure 2.10, these lowlands are dissected by innumerable streams and rivers, which 
are tributaries of the River Niger, the 3rd longest River of Africa, originating in the Futa Djalon 
Mountains, north-east of Sierra Leone. The River Niger flows southwards from the higher plains, 
where it slows down to deposit its silt-clayey sediment load, and merges with numerous 
interlacing distributaries of the Delta, which discharge into the Atlantic Ocean. About two-thirds 
of Nigeria thus lies in the watershed of the River Niger, with the Niger Delta occupying over 60% 
of 800km Nigerian coastline. 
  
Subsoil conditions in Nigeria thus display this physical variability in climatic conditions and 
geological structure, with the northern parts having good sub-soils and rocky grounds. The 
southern parts mostly have sedimentary soils which have moderately adequate stability, while 
the Niger Delta region towards the coast has the typical problematic fined grained deltaic marine 
deposits. The state of road infrastructure and level of highway development in the country is 
equally a reflection of this landscape variability, with a corresponding financial requirement for 
road development. Oguara (2002) described the state of road infrastructure in the Niger Delta, 
as being significantly worse than other regions of Nigeria. It was thus remarked that:  
 “The numerous meandering river systems and waterways, flood, erosion and other 
excess water related constraints constitute the major problems that hinder highway 
infrastructure development in the region” (Oguara, 2002: 23).  
 
 Oguara (2002) listed the peculiar issues identifiable with infrastructural development in the 
region: 
 Poor drainage;  
 Swampy terrain; 
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 Heavy rainfall; 
 High water table. 
 
Chapter five of this thesis further outlines the geographic context of the region, providing a more 
in-depth background of the hydro-geological formation of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, as it 
is currently known. This is to serve as a backdrop for highlighting the cost implication of the 
physical configuration of the Niger Delta, against which the historical antecedents to investment 
in highway development is predicated.   
2.5 Geo-Political versus Geologic Definitions of the Niger Delta Region 
The Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES, 1997:45), in its cartographic definition of the Niger 
Delta, limits the area on the basis of natural geological and geographical considerations (See 
Figure 2.11), to include from the: 
 
 “North {Apex} at the bifurcation of the River Niger into river Nun and Forcados;  
 West from Benin River estuary;  
 East: to the Imo River estuary and; 
 Southern-most tip at the estuary of the River Nun”. 
 
The total land area defined physically as being the Niger Delta area, based on the definition of 
its geographic limits by Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES, 1997), is approximately 
25,900km2, which is about 2.8% of the total land area of Nigeria. This is basically comprised of 
Rivers State and Bayelsa State, as shown in Figure 2.11.  
 
Figure 2.11: Geologic Definition of the Niger Delta                (Niger Delta Home Page, 2015) 
River 
Imo 
River 
Niger 
River 
Benin 
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However, other definitions of the Niger Delta region are evident in the literature in geo-political 
premise, based on the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan (NRDMP, 2001). Teme 
(2002), a leading scholar on the Niger Delta geology, in alluding to this stated: 
            “Other definitions of the boundaries of the Niger Delta, for selfish reasons of reaping the 
abundant natural resources that are contained therein, have emerged over the years as 
‘sensu lato’ definitions with rather poorly defined, incoherent and difficult-to-defend logic” 
(Teme, 2002:11). 
 
At present times, the definition of the Niger Delta region has become a political issue, due to 
proprietary rights over the oil wealth of the region, and so geo-political boundaries have emerged, 
extended beyond the geologic limits, to cover the 9 oil producing states of Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, 
Edo, Ondo, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Imo, and Abia (NRDMP, 2001).  Figure 2.12 shows the 
geopolitical definition extracted from documentary analysis of the NRDMP (2001), as used by 
the Federal Government in political premise. 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Political Definition of the Niger Delta                            (Source: NRDMP, 2001) 
 
These states now constitute the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), based on the 
geo-political definition of the NDRDMP (2001). Teme (2002), in describing the fan shaped 
geologic attribute of a typical delta, commented on this political definition, further asserting that: 
 
          “On this basis, the Niger Delta no longer has a bird foot configuration, and so is not 
supposed to be called a Delta” (Teme, 2002:11).  
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Due to the inherently geotechnical and geologic perspective of the study, the researcher adopts 
the geologic definition of the Niger Delta region, which will serve as an analytical basis for 
delineating a geo-spatial classification for its sub-soils. 
2.6 Past and Present Regional Highways Development Frameworks in the Niger Delta 
Successive institutional frameworks have been setup to address infrastructural deficiencies in 
the Niger Delta, charged with the responsibility for the construction of roads in the Niger Delta 
region. Several authors and reports have chronicled past regional developmental efforts aimed 
at road infrastructural development in the region, whereby projects were mostly fraught with 
prolonged delays and abandonments, leaving in their wake a monumental backlog of 
uncompleted road projects (NDES, 1997; Oguara, 2002; Okon, 2009; Oviasuyi and Uwadiae 
2010; Jacob, 2012). Typically, these include the Presidential Task Force (PTF) established under 
the 1979-83 military administration, whose set terms of reference to link the inland areas of the 
region, was not realised on account of funding shortfalls and poor planning (NDES, 1997; Okon, 
2009). The Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) was 
subsequently established in 1993, and inherited about 2000 abandoned projects from its 
predecessor, the PTF, initiated about 200 new schemes, and was defunct by 1999, leaving 
numerous unfinished projects (Okon, 2009).  
 
Developmental programmes covering a wide range of project types in the region are however 
still currently ongoing in the Niger Delta. Presently there are three contract awarding bodies 
charged with the statutory responsibility for the construction of Trunk B state and inter regional 
roads in the region:  
 
 Regional: The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC);  
 Rivers State: Ministry of Works (RMW);  
 Bayelsa State: Ministry of Works and Transport.  
 
Despite the various developmental bodies, highway development in the region is still significantly 
lacking mainly due to technical rigours and astronomical cost associated with highway 
development on the flood prone soils. The requisite application of modem costly technologies by 
highway agencies, along with technical ingenuity by engineers, which should be based on an 
adequate understanding of the sub-soils in the area, have thus being speculated as lacking, and 
has hindered highway development in the Niger Delta region (Oguara, 2002). Chapter five of this 
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thesis delves in-depth into describing the geologic configuration of the region, by analysing the 
technical rigours and financial implication of highway development, which has been a significant 
problem to successive state governments in the region. Further details on the organisational 
setup of the aforementioned highway agencies, and their approaches to highway project delivery 
are provided in chapter seven, based on the outcome of subsequent fieldwork. 
2.7 Present State of Highway Development in the Niger Delta Region 
Most parts of the Niger Delta region, particularly the coastal barrier islands, and mangrove 
swamp zones are yet to be linked up by roads, including fairly large settlements such as Bonny, 
Brass, Ogulagha and Escravos (Oguara, 2002; Ibaba, 2012). According to Ibaba (2012), there 
are no roads linking these areas to other zones, with communities in this zone linked to each 
other and to other zones through a network of waterways. Thus, the only available means of 
cargo and passenger transportation in some communities are by dugout canoes, motorized 
outboard and inboard engine boats, which are inadequate as shown in Figure 2.13. 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Transportation in the Niger Delta        (Source: Niger Delta Home Page, 2014) 
In Port Harcourt and Yenegoa, the administrative headquarters of Rivers and Bayelsa states 
respectively, which are the largest settlements in the lowland rainforest zone, movement of 
people and goods is mainly by road transport, though in most parts of the zone, the road network 
is in a poor state of disrepair (Abam et al., 2005).  In the recent past, the only trans-regional road, 
the East-West road that passes through the region, has being described as a death trap due to 
the advanced level of failure of the road (Emujakporu, 2012). This has constituted a concern to 
all stakeholders in the usage.  
 
34 
 
Inter-settlement movements in the riverine areas of these states have also been severely 
restricted due to the near total absence of inter-town links.  The few available roads are those 
within the towns and villages, a situation which has being frequently attributed to the terrain of 
these areas. Several authors have inferred that this is the fundamental factor which makes the 
development of land-based transportation difficult and which has also largely resulted in the 
several failed projects in the region. (Fashaye, 1992; Oguara, 2002; Ossai, 2012).  According to 
Ossai (2012:87): 
      “The existence of roads which is taken for granted in some parts of the country is a luxury to 
the people of the predominantly riverine Niger Delta, which has the least kilometres of roads 
in the federation. A development blamed on the several abandoned government road 
projects in the state due to the developmental constraints posed by the difficult terrain”. 
 
This issue of road infrastructure backlog is at the forefront of the current violent agitations in the 
Niger Delta, which has been publicised in the local and international media (BBC, 2016). 
Attempts via road networking by the various state and regional highway agencies, are thus being 
concurrently executed in these zones. Plans have been reported to be currently underway for 
the construction of new inter-city and inter-state highways including access roads to link 
communities as well as the rehabilitation and upgrading of older roads (NDDC, 2016). Some of 
these abandoned road projects as earlier accounted for in the report by the NDES (1993), and 
which are currently being revived in the state include: 
 
 The Ogbia-Nembe road project, which is now being undertaken in a collaborative effort 
between the Anglo-Dutch oil giant, Shell Petroleum Development Company SPDC and 
the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC);  
 
 The Sagbama-Ekeremor-Agge road project, which was being handled by the NDDC but 
was later taken over by the Bayelsa State government following the abandonment by 
construction firm; 
 
 The long abandoned Yenagoa- Oporoma road project passing through the vast 
mangrove stretch of Southern Ijaw council area is also another major road project which 
has being revived at the cost of N31 billion (NDDC, 2013).  
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Also, other new road networks designed to link communities in the hinterland by land are 
proposed to be initiated (NDDC, 2016).  Yenagoa the capital of Bayelsa state has being recently 
described as ‘a significant construction yard’, due to the flurry of ongoing construction works, as 
new layouts are being opened up, and wider roads being constructed. Some of the planned and 
yet to be constructed roads include the 46.20km Baen-Kpean-Ngo-Bonny Road in Rivers State 
and 65.3km Yenegwe-Kolo-Nembe-Brass road in Bayelsa State which had been delayed for a 
prolonged time. The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) has commenced the 
construction of several road projects in the region. Rehabilitation and dualisation of the 337km 
East-West Road in currently on-going, with plans for the construction of a 731km Niger Delta 
Coastal road being proposed to link all the states in the NDRMP, by the Ministry of Niger Delta, 
as shown in Figure 2.14.  
 
 
Figure 2.14: Proposed Intra-Regional Road Network in the Niger Delta           
 (Source: MND Homepage, 2015) 
 
It is therefore evident from the local literature, that most of the communities in the Niger Delta 
region are yet to be linked up by roads, which reflects the significant investment capital which 
will be required to open up the Niger Delta region. The need to adequately and judiciously 
manage future investments on road development in the region is thus evident. Equally, the basic 
underlying factors responsible for the past trend, of rather alarming rate of project delays and 
abandonment, need to be identified, if history is not to repeat itself in this new epoch of 
developmental effort taking place in the region. 
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2.8 Highway Project Delivery in the Niger Delta: Delays and Abandonment 
In recent times, increased investment figures in budgetary allocations projected for infrastructural 
development in the Niger Delta, has led to an increase in the volume of contracts for road 
construction, awarded to local contracting firms. A major concern amply portrayed in the literature 
due to the trend witnessed in past developmental efforts, revolves around: the mechanism of 
planning by government; project delivery and contractual management issues by the highway 
agencies; and project execution by indigenous construction firms (Mansfield et al., 2004; Joseph, 
2012; Ihuah and Benibo, 2014). This is due to the extensive delays and outright abandonment 
of road projects which has become endemic in the region (Ihuah and Benibo, 2014).  Figure 2.15 
shows the resumption of work on a major road, traversing the vast mangrove stretch of southern 
Ijaw local government area of Bayelsa State, in 2013, which had been previously abandoned by 
past government administrations for over 50 years. 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Resumption of Construction Work after over Five Decades of Abandonment                              
(Source: NDDC, 2013) 
 
However, several other road projects scattered in other zones of the region, which had 
experienced similar fates, have till date remained un-resuscitated (NDDC, 2013). Some the well-
publicised lengthily delayed and abandoned Trunk-B road projects executed in Rivers and 
Bayelsa States include: 
 
 The Buguma-Edo-Abalama-Abonema road; 
 The 10km Opume-Okoroba Road project;  
 The Akpilai/Ogbia-Nembe road; 
 The 22km Ogbia Nembe road.  
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Other than these well publicised major roads, innumerable delayed and abandoned lower-order 
trunk C roads are equally evident in the region, based on the findings of an independent report 
sponsored by the European Union, covering over 120 communities. Physical evidence 
discovered during the field work phase of this study shows that many of these abandoned 
community road projects have become flooded, and have also being overgrown by weeds, with 
the residents practically having to wade through the muddy waters to get to their various 
destinations. Drainages and ditches dug before the projects were abandoned, are most times 
left open with unsuspecting pedestrians and vehicles falling into them, particularly during the 
rainy season, when they are over-flown following very heavy downpour (Figure 2.16). 
 
Figure 2.16: Flooded Abandoned Community Roads in the Niger Delta                                                                                          
Often times, pedestrians have to cross over strategically placed wooden boards at the risk of 
their safety to get to their destinations (Figure 2.16). The proximity of this abandoned open 
channels to the roadway, which vehicular traffic, often in jams, have to drive through, also puts 
passengers on board at great risk. 
 
          Figure 2.17: Community Protest over the Abandonment of Road Project   
                                                                           (Vanguard Home Page, 2014) 
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In recent times, as captured in Figure 2.17, public protestations and violence has erupted in parts 
of the Niger Delta region, over this issue of project abandonment by affected communities 
(Joseph, 2012; Ihuah and Benibo, 2014). The problem is so endemic that legislative action is 
presently being undertaken to address this issue. Currently, a bill for an act to amend the Public 
Procurement Act No. 14 of 2007, has being proposed by the house of representative in Nigeria. 
This legislative move was made to ensure that all ‘dead’ projects were revived and new public 
projects are executed from inception to conclusion, within the stipulated contract award period. 
The bill is being proposed with a view to sanitise public sector project delivery in Nigeria.  
 
This central issue, which has largely defined the developmental landscape of the region, has 
thus being viewed and discussed from varied perspectives in the literature. Several factors have 
been adduced for this regretful state of affairs, ranging from poor project appraisal to inadequate 
supervision and management. (Joseph, 2012; Sunjika and Jacob, 2013; Ihuah and Benibo, 
2014). Commenting on this topical issue, Chukwu (2014:125) questioned whether:  
“poor planning, haphazard procurement, and incompetent project management [were] 
the key causes [of failure] or is it financial mismanagement? [Ultimately] at the heart of 
this failure is the absence of effective institutions and mechanisms for planning, 
monitoring and evaluation ... The end user which is the people and the community are 
the ones that suffer the brunt and carelessness”. 
 
Also issues emanating from the socio-cultural dynamics of political and unethical practices, such 
as lack of accountability, lack of political will, and corruption as speculated in government 
projects, have further constituted a source of public concern, frequently referred to and discussed 
in numerous international reports, media and scholarly literature.  
2.9 Causes of Delays and Abandonment in Developing Countries: The Nigerian Context 
Project delays have been described by Ubani and Ononuju (2013), as the non-achievement of 
planned project completion time, which consequently extends the stipulated duration of the 
project. Total abandonment is the permanent stoppage of works at the project site due mainly to 
difficulties surrounding the development (Ihuah and Benibo, 2014). The difficulties that cause 
project delay and abandonment in one setting, however may not be directly transferrable as 
applicable to others (Singh, 2010). It was argued that it is inappropriate for generalisation to be 
made on all developing countries, considering the diversity in geographic context, cultures and 
economy (Aiyetan, 2010; Singh 2010; Ihuah and Benibo, 2014). However, it is still necessary to 
explore the broader picture as obtainable in the wider context of Nigeria as a developing country, 
for similarities with other developing countries. From the literature several causes of project 
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delays have been identified from the client’s and contractor’s perspective, some of which have 
been noted by various authors as particularly evident in developing countries. These are 
summarised in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Delay and Abandonment Causes in Developing Countries 
Author Country Causes of Delays 
Chan et.al.(2002)  Contractor 
 Lack of contractor’s competencies;  
  Lack of understanding of risk and liability assessments; 
Client  
 Lack of the client’s competencies;  
  Lack of community integration 
  End users imposed restrictions on the project development. 
Faridi and El-Sayegh 
(2006)  
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
(UAE); 
Client:  
 Inadequate early planning, 
Contractor:  
 Poor supervision and site management 
Majid (2006) delays  
 
Indonesia Client: 
 Inaccurate cost estimate  
 Finance 
 Change orders 
Contractor: 
 Improper project planning, scheduling and site management 
Toor and Ogunlana 
(2008)  
. 
Thailand  Design related 
 Client’s Finance related 
 Contractor related  
Sweis, et al. (2008)  
 
Jordan Contractors: 
 Financial difficulties  
Client: 
 Frequent change orders  
Kaliba et al. (2008) Zambia Client 
 political pressures from government   
 political discontinuity 
 complex administrative structures 
Singh (2010) India Technical and Natural Factors: 
 Terrain; 
 Weather; 
 Design and scope changes. 
Contractual Failures: 
 Contract documentation; 
 Contract implementation. 
Organisational / Institutional Failures: 
 intra-organisational; 
 Inter-organisational. 
Economic Factors: 
 Inflationary;  
 Financial. 
Geographic/location factors 
 Urban/rural 
                                                                                                                    
The unceasing and rather alarming spate of public project delays and abandonment in Nigeria, 
has been reported to be seemingly higher than in most of the other developing countries, as 
Osemenan (1987:8), quipped: “Nigeria has become the world’s ‘junk-yard of abandoned projects, 
worth billions of Naira”. This situation has however not seemed to have improved, with Nigeria 
still remaining perpetually known for it (Ayodele and Alabi, 2011). According to a press release 
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in the Vanguard (2014: 4), by the lower arm of the legislature in Nigeria, the House of 
Representatives: “Over 11,800 projects have been abandoned by successive governments with 
about N7.28 trillion required to finance the abandoned projects”. These figures were quoted 
based on the findings of the Abandoned Projects Audit Commission, set up in 2011 by the 
Federal Government. Several authors in the scholarly literature have further carried out empirical 
questionnaire based studies to investigate the factors responsible for this situation, as 
summarised in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: Delay and Abandonment Causes for Public Projects in Nigeria 
Author          Causes of Delays 
Mansfield et al. (1994)  Political and institutional bureaucracy;   
 lack of clarity during planning; 
 Unethical practices; 
 Poor project management on the part of clients and contractors; 
 Cost overrun. 
  Inconsistency in government policies; 
 Local currency devaluation; 
 Unclear conditions of contract; 
 Cost overrun 
 inappropriate conceptual design and costing;   
 Corruption and disregard for local law and customs. 
Ayodele and Alabi 
(2011) 
 Inadequate project planning and funding shortfall; 
 Inflation; 
 Bankruptcy of contractor; 
 Variation of project scope 
 Political factor; 
 Incompetent project management; 
 Wrong estimate; 
 Inadequate cost control;  
 Faulty design; 
 Delayed payment. 
Hanachor (2012)  Improper financial analysis leading to cost overrun; 
 Deliberate Under bidding of projects; 
 Lack of technical analysis; 
 Project site or Location factors; 
 Lack of Social and needs analysis.  
Ubani and Ononuju 
(2013) 
 Ineffective project planning, and cost control; 
 Corruption and communication gap among project personnel;  
 Frequent changes in political power; 
 Mode of financing for completed work; 
 Degree of precision in this initial contract; 
 Inadequate project formulation;  
 Poor cost estimates; 
 Militancy and youth restiveness; 
 Land and legal disputes. 
Ihuah and Benibo 
(2014) 
 
 Payment remittance delay; 
 lack of adequate fund allocation; 
 leadership instability; 
 Inconsistence in government policies;  
 Unplanned urbanization;  
 Project management Incompetence; 
 Lack of stakeholders Involvement; 
 Improper project budgeting;  
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  Lack of proper need assessment;  
  Bureaucratic bottleneck;  
 Scope changes; 
 Materials increasing costs and lack. 
 
A central theme that has been consistently reported in all these studies, as responsible for the 
particularly dismal performance of public projects in Nigeria, is funding shortfalls, typically 
expressed as cost-overruns.                               
2.10 What Underlying Factors Specific to Highway Projects in the Niger Delta? 
Cost overruns of significant proportions, much higher than in other parts of Nigeria have being 
reported by past development boards in the Niger Delta region, as the fundamental reason for 
the very high level of road project delays and abandonment, historically chronicled in the 
literature (NDES, 1997). Aiyetan (2010) listed geographic and environmental factors as one of 
the reasons why causes of delays and project abandonment differ. The highly variable and 
contrasting physical landscape of Nigeria, specifically the peculiarities in terms of geography and 
ecology has thus being asserted as further negatively influencing project delivery in the Niger 
Delta (Oguara, 2002; Ngerebara et al., 2014).  
 
A survey of the local literature (NDES, 1997; Okon, 2009; Joseph, 2012; Sunjka and Jacob, 
2013; Ihuah and Benebo, 2014) specifically focused on investigating the causes of project delays 
and abandonment in the Niger Delta, listed the following factors, which though evident in Nigerian 
projects are more peculiar to the Niger Delta: Typically issues due to lack of skilled personnel 
and technical experts; Gross underestimation of cost; Inadequate site and project information; 
Vulnerability to ravaging environmental (flood and erosion) related disaster; Colossal waste of 
resources due to late identification and resolution of design and specification errors; Adverse 
weather condition; Inaccessibility and geo-hazardous impassable terrain to the project site, were 
stated as distinctive features more peculiar to the Niger Delta.  Andawei (2015) further developed 
a risk factor ranking, in order of their degree of impact, and concluded that inadequate design 
specification, a key technical responsibility of the client organization, had the highest impact in 
causing delays and abandonment in the Niger Delta.  
 
It is noted that most factors enumerated, are closely aligned with the physical configuration of 
the region, as well as technical issues emanating from the highway agencies. It was thus 
provisionally assumed that these are the primary factors leading to the unusually high cost 
overruns, which have continued to plague highway project delivery in the Niger Delta region, and 
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resulted in the immense waste of the significant financial resources, pumped into highway 
development by government. Oguara (2002:5), had also made a similar observation 14 years 
ago, and commented that: “investments on roads in the Niger Delta region are not based on an 
understanding of the geotechnical problems which can arise during construction, considering its 
inherent typical deltaic soils of the humid tropics”. Furthermore, several recent engineering-
geological research focused on the development of infrastructure in the Niger Delta, have 
consistently advocated for road construction to be scientifically rooted in an understanding of the 
terrain and its geotechnical intricacies, requisite for the management of funds currently being 
invested in highway development (Youdoewei 2013; Ngerebara et al., 2014; Otoko and Precious, 
2014). The researcher thus hypothesised that: Apart from other issues identifiable with public 
sector projects in Nigeria, more profound geotechnical issues, which are not adequately catered 
for by the highway agencies, makes highway delivery in the Niger Delta region prone to 
excessive cost overruns.  
 
2.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has taken a chronological, holistic and analytic perspective to investment in highway 
development in Nigeria, with particular emphasis on past developmental efforts specific to the 
Niger Delta, in recognition of its physical environmental constraints. The key findings from the 
background literature analysis in this chapter are thus: 
 
 The historical antecedents to investment in highway development in Nigeria, and specific 
to the Niger Delta, as a retrospective background to the current state of highway project 
delivery in the region;  
 
 The prevalence of project delays and abandonment in the Niger Delta (past and 
present), and the severity of their impact, evident in the current state of infrastructural 
backlog in the region; 
 
 The significant causes of project delays and abandonment in Nigeria, within the wider 
context of developing countries, and the peculiar technical factors notable in the Niger 
Delta region; 
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 The rationalisation that more profound practise based geotechnical issues, rooted in the 
geologic setting of the Niger Delta, beyond the generality of factors commonly reported 
in the literature as endemic in Nigeria’s public project delivery, may be fundamental to 
the prevailing menace of incessant delays and abandonment, leading to excessive cost 
overruns in highway projects executed in the region.  
 
It is the researcher’s belief, that to understand why delays and project abandonments leading 
cost overruns, are amplified in the Niger Delta region, would require an in-depth understanding 
of the geotechnical practice based underpinnings of these negative manifestations, within the 
highway agencies responsible for project delivery. As such providing an insider perspective, 
within the distinct organisational dynamics of the three regional and state highway agencies, 
currently responsible for highway infrastructural development in the geologic setting of the Niger 
Delta region, constituted the over-arching theme of the fieldwork analysis in this study. The 
fieldwork thus centred on investigating whether the technical requirements and relevant 
geotechnical best practices, which should logically be adhered to, as strategies, requisite to 
manage the high level of financial risk inherent in the wetland terrain of the Niger Delta, are 
adhered to. However, before these practice based issues are investigated, the subsequent 
chapter, critically analyses the theoretical perspectives in the scholarly literature, which explains 
the variables which trigger the phenomenon of cost overruns in highway projects. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Establishing the Explanatory Roots of Cost Overruns in Highway Projects: A Critical 
Theoretical Analysis  
3.0 Introduction 
Baccarani (2004) emphasises that the cost performance of construction projects is often 
identified as a fundamental measure of success for project sponsors.  Yet against this, a large 
number of construction projects documented in the public domain, have been censured for 
notoriously running over their original budget estimate. A practical index used for the evaluation 
of the level of accuracy of estimates is cost overrun (Bordat et al., 2004; Cantarelli et al., 2010). 
Cost overrun is the excess amount of money expended at the conclusion of a project, in excess 
of the initial projected cost figure. As shown in Table 3.1, Tan and Makwasha (2010) stated that 
there are three possible scenarios, where ‘ex ante’ (budgeted) cost figures either match or do 
not match ‘ex post’ (actual) final accounts. 
 Table 3.1: Cost Estimation Scenarios 
Ex ante = Ex post  Ideal  
Ex ante < Ex post  Under-estimation of funds leading to fund shortage  
Ex ante > Ex post  Over-estimation of funds leading to fund surplus  
                                                                      Source: (Tan and Makwasha, 2010)  
The ideal scenario, stated by Tan and Makwasha (2010), is where there is equality of ex-ante 
and ex-post, this, Tan and Makwasha attest is what every project should strive to achieve. 
However, this is rarely achieved, as most construction projects tend to significantly overshoot 
their initial budgets leading to delays, contractual problems, and in the worst case scenario, 
abandonment. Overcoming cost overruns has remained a major challenge for highway agencies. 
The consequences of cost overruns in highway projects has led some to question the efficiency 
of public highway commissioners through the developed and developing world, leading to 
questions about the ability of such organisations to initiate and deliver highway infrastructure 
projects. Cost overruns in highway projects thus remain a topical issue, with the media, technical 
press, and scholarly literature, rife with publications analysing cost overrun trends, identifying 
their primary causes, and offering broader explanations for this pervasive trend. This chapter 
reviews the literature on the problem of cost overruns in construction projects, and specifically in 
relation to their explanations in public highway projects. 
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3.1 Cost Overruns Statistics in Construction Projects 
Cost overrun trends in construction projects are evident in the literature, across national 
boundaries. On the UK construction industry, the Egan report (1998), one of the most widely 
referenced reports on the cost performance of the construction sector, showed that no less than 
50% of projects ran over their initial budget.  Within the same time frame in the United States, 
the General Accounting Office (1997) stated 77% of projects experience cost overruns, with 
some recording astronomically high levels of over 200%.  According to the National Audit Office 
(2012), the cost profile of the London Olympic Stadium crept up from £2.4 billion in 2005, to £8.9 
billion in 2010. Whilst Ahiagu Dugbai et al. (2014) presented some of the spectacular historic 
cases of excessive cost overruns recorded in building projects in the UK and Australia, as shown 
in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Historic Cases of Cost Overrun in Construction Projects 
Project Location Estimated Cost  
(in millions)   
Final Cost  
(in millions)   
% 
Overrun 
Sydney Opera House                Australia A$7                     A$102                                       1357 
Nat West Tower                         UK £15                      £115                                         667
Scottish Parliament                   UK £195                   £414                                         112
British Library                            UK £142                   £511                                         260
(Source: Ahiagu Dugbai et al., 2014) 
 
Yet, Ahiagu-Dugbai et al. (2014), further espoused that such unusually high levels of cost 
overruns were still being reported in recently completed construction projects.  For instance, they 
cited the case of an Australian programme where 20 capital intensive projects, some of which 
were still ongoing, had exceeded their initial budgets, by a total of A$3.275 billion.  Whilst the 
European Central Bank's new 45-storey glass and steel sky scraper headquarters in Frankfurt, 
Germany had by 2012, exceeded its estimated cost of £420m, by more than 100%, with a final 
account of £960m (BBC, 2012).  
 
Several notable highway projects have been shown in the literature to have also experienced 
cost overruns of significant proportions (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Odeck 2004; Creedy, 2006). 
Creedy (2006) reported that in the United States, a central artery tunnel project located in Boston, 
and popularly referred to as ‘The Big Dig’, was revealed to have incurred a significantly high cost 
overrun of over 600%, and attracted negative media exposure, resulting in derision from both the 
press and general public. The initial estimated figure of US $2.6 billion in 1982, was shown to 
have escalated to above US $14 billion, by 2002. The Edinburgh Trams project in Scotland has 
also been reported to have already far exceeded its initial budget by £400 million, from the 
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budgeted amount of £375 million (Ahiaga-Dagbui, 2014). Creedy (2006) reported that in 
Australia, under the Queensland government’s Road Implementation Program, most projects 
estimated at more than one million dollars had significantly exceeded their initial estimates. 
 
The Transport and Road Research Laboratory (TRRL, 1998) in investigating the phenomena of 
cost overruns in developing countries, revealed an equally large range of cost overruns above 
50%, for six out of twenty-one projects carried out. Three projects experienced overruns ranging 
between 20 to 50%, whilst four projects experienced overruns in lower ranges of 10 to 20%.  Two 
of these projects were however in an upper range of 100 to 500%. The African Infrastructural 
Country Diagnostic (AICD, 2008) studied the performance of road infrastructure investment 
budget focusing on twenty-four countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and found ranges of up to 700% 
evidenced in some of the analysed contracts. Morris (1990) reported that cost overruns recorded 
in India, for 189 out of 290 medium and large projects, ranged between 0 to 961%, with the 
majority averaging 80%, even after adjustment for increase due to high levels of inflation. 
 
Cost overruns, evidently appear to be persistent in all public construction projects, in the 
developed and developing world, and has maintained a steady presence. Flyvbjerg (2002, 2004) 
as well as a host of other scholars have opined that the situation is worse in transportation 
projects, and that on the average highway agencies record significantly high levels of cost 
overrun compared to other clients of construction works (Baccarani, 2004; Tan and Wakmasha, 
2010; Asmar et al., 2011).   
 
Several empirical studies in the literature show that time and costs are often exceeded by a 
significantly high margin for highway projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Bordat et al., 2004; 
Baccarini, 2004). Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) revealed that on a global scale, cost overruns remained 
consistently high, for major transportation infrastructure projects. Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) revealed 
that of 258 infrastructure project costs sampled worldwide worth $90 billion, with nine out of ten 
experiencing cost overruns. Cost overruns, were on average, 34% for tunnels and bridges, and 
20% for road projects. Flyvbjerg et al. (2002:290), consequently asserted: “Over the past 70 
years no tangible improvement has been evidenced in the accuracy of cost estimates”.  
 
In contrast, Odeck (2004) analysed cost overruns for road construction projects in Norway, 
revealing an average of 7.9%, and a range of underruns and overruns from −59% to 183% for 
420 road projects. Odeck 2004, further noted that the trend in cost overruns was relatively higher 
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for smaller scale road projects than in large scale projects. This finding had earlier being upheld 
by Morrison (1990), from a study in India.  Cantarelli et al. (2012), analysed several studies, 
highlighting the discrepancies in reported levels of cost overruns for different countries, which 
was attributed to the benchmark phase from where the cost overrun was being measured. It was 
stated: “Different studies use different moments for the year of decision to build and the year of 
completion as the basis for the estimated and actual costs, and hence the extent of the cost 
overruns differs” (Cantarelli et al., 2012: 51). The authors further noted that: 
“In the literature on cost overruns, hardly any attention is given to the project phases… 
literature has focused on identifying cost overruns but the moment when projects are 
most vulnerable to cost increases has not been studied. This is however of the utmost 
importance because it could improve our understanding of cost overruns considerably. 
… will help to distinguish between different explanations of cost overruns” (Cantarelli et 
al., 2012: 51).  
 
In response to this identified gap in the literature, the subsequent section analyses the 
developmental phases of highway projects, in relation to the critical phase that primarily 
propagates cost overruns, prior to delving in-depth into various explanations of cost overruns 
proffered in academe. 
3.2 Cost Overruns in Highway Projects: What Critical Reference Phase?  
Cost overrun is measured as actual out-turn costs, minus estimated costs, as a percentage of 
estimated costs (Creedy, 2006). Actual costs are defined as: “real, accounted construction costs, 
determined as being expended from the point of contract award, to the time of project completion 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2002: 285). “Estimated costs are defined as budgeted or forecasted construction 
costs determined at the time of the decision to build” (Cantarelli et al., 2010). Cantarelli et al., 
(2010), equally affirmed, that the estimate designated by highway authority, based upon which 
the decision whether or not to implement the project, becomes increasingly changed, to the 
estimate based on which a formal contract is awarded, and up to point of project completion. 
On this note, the literature shows a strong and still on-going debate on the basis to be used for 
estimating the level of cost overruns. Principally, project promoters are averse to the adoption of 
the initial phase of highway project development, which represents the ‘time-of-decision-to-build’ 
as a benchmark, on the premise that it constitutes an unfair basis for such assessment (Simon, 
1991). This is against the backdrop of the established fact that very early estimates exhibit the 
greatest amount of uncertainty (Oberlender, 1998; Schexnayder et al., 2003).  Figure 3.1 shows 
the distribution pattern of estimated costs, in development phases around the final costs, as 
projected by Schexnayder et al. (2003). 
48 
 
 
Figure. 3.1. Typical Bounds of Estimate Accuracy in Project Development Phases 
(Source: Schexnayder et al., 2003). 
Schexnayder et al. (2003) stated the plus or minus 40 percent confidence range, typically 
dispersed monotonically around the mean, for estimates generated at the conceptual phase, 
reflects the lack of definite project information.  Odeck (2004) was of a similar view, as Simon 
(1991), and supported this stance stating that the estimate generated at the detailed design and 
specification should be the basis on which planning approval and funding for projects ought to 
be sought. This argument was raised in view of the practice of parliament in the Norwegian 
context. Odeck (2004) recognized the highly challenging situation, often resulting from project 
cost underestimation at the planning stages and outline proposal phases, presented to the 
decision makers. Odeck (2004) asserted that decision makers in evaluating the viability of 
projects are misled, and will therefore base funding approval on this deceptive basis. Odeck’s 
(2004) argument was thus that at the detailed design, the actual viability of a project will be 
known, and noted early enough by the decision makers who can then resolve to choose one of 
the following three alternatives:  
 Not to implement the project at all; 
 To implement the project in another form; 
 To implement other project or projects. 
Odeck (2004), thus concluded, the detailed design stage should in effect be considered as the 
critical estimate phase, to be logically used for assessing the level of cost overruns. 
Several other authors have however argued otherwise, stating that the initial conceptual estimate 
is the most crucial estimate which should serve as a bench mark for assessing the level of cost 
overrun (Chou, 2005; Anderson et al., 2006; Creedy, 2006; Cantarelli et al., 2010; Asmar et al., 
49 
 
2011; Tan and Wakmasha, 2010).  Asmar et al. (2011), states that an estimate at this stage is 
ideally needed to provide information to highway agencies on which to base approval and funding 
decisions, as well as to establish a project baseline cost and budget. It was also noted by Sabol 
(2008), that the conceptual estimate represents the first point of effort made at assessing the 
potential cost of a project necessary to align decision‐making. Along similar lines of argument, 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), in furtherance of the assertions of Wachs (1989:4) almost three decades 
ago, provided a strong justification for this stance, stating: 
            “When the focus is on decision making, and hence on the accuracy of the information 
available to decision makers, then it is exactly the cost estimate at the time of making 
the decision to build that is of primary interest. Estimates made after the decision to build 
are by definition irrelevant to this decision”.  
The argument of these authors was rationalized on the following grounds: 
 The impossibility of assessing how informed the basis for decisions are and the 
uncertainty associated with budgets; 
 The deliberate concealment of project details and facts likely to reflect the true financial 
implications of a proposed project, termed as ‘Salami tactics’;  
 The need to have a uniform platform for consistent comparisons of projects. 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) noted that this preliminary phase was also used for computing cost 
overruns as the international standard. In line with these assertions, Evans and Peck (2008:18), 
further went on to state that: 
            “The cost estimate produced at the preliminary phase is the first cost estimate in the life 
of a project that should be able to be relied upon for program purposes and taken forward 
through future phases”.  
This was stated against the background of the Australian context, whereby for government 
funded projects, budgetary allocation has to be voted out for a project after the identification of 
the proposed scheme from annual development budget. Schexnayder et al. (2003:8) also 
reiterated that: 
            “Initial cost estimates are more useful in determining funding levels needed for long- 
range capital programs. This quantification of cost is the initial figure that allows the 
project to proceed to the next phases for final design and construction”. 
Turouchy et al. (2001), further stated that it is often thought of as the first estimate used for 
budgeting purposes and allocation of funds by highway agencies. Chou (2008), emphasized, the 
conceptual phase of cost estimation should be conceived as the most significant starting process, 
to influence the fate of a new transportation project.   
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Most of the studies in scholarly literature, as summarized in Table 3.3, adopt this initial estimate 
as the basis of cost overrun evaluation, convergently emphasizing the need for ensuring 
accuracy and supporting their stance with very sound and logical arguments. 
Table 3.3: Perspectives on Critical Cost overrun phase 
Authors Adopted Stance 
 Conceptual Phase Design Phase 
Hall (1980) #  
Simon (1991)   # 
Turouchy et al. (2001) #  
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002)  #  
Phaobunjong (2002) #  
Schexnayder et al (2003) #  
Odeck (2004)  # 
Donnell (2005)  #  
Evans and Peck (2008) #  
Tan and Wakmasha (2010) #  
Asmar et al (2011) #  
         
 
The multiplier impacts of inaccurate conceptual estimates, were further used as a case for 
supporting their arguments. It was asserted that on the flip side, very high conceptual estimates 
above the likely costs would mean insufficient funds for sponsoring other development schemes 
(Donnell, 2005; Tan and Wakmasha, 2010). This scenario, where budgeted figures are greater 
than the actual project costs, would imply an under-expenditure, resulting in fund carry-overs 
between financial years, and consequently funds not being efficiently utilized by the agencies. 
(Belli et al., 2001).  The Freiman curve in Figure 3.2, describes the scenario of over-estimation 
as self-fulfilling prophecies. 
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Figure 3.2: Freiman Curve Showing Estimating Scenarios (Source: Phaobunjong, 2002) 
 
Conversely, very low estimates leading to the pervasive trend of cost overruns, would imply that 
adequate funds are not voted out for a scheme, and the progress of works would be stalled due 
this shortfall.  Cusworth (1993) was of the opinion that the bureaucratic challenge associated 
with gaining further approval of funds, which is a consequence of the ‘functional nature of public 
service institutions’ will therefore slow down the pace of project completion. Cusworth (1993), 
outlined the various phases that budgetary shortfalls, emanating from inaccurate conceptual 
estimates have to go through, before they can be accommodated in future budgets (Figure 3.3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Budgetary Implementation Phases                                 (Source: Cusworth, 1993) 
 
As such, the bureaucracy associated with gaining further budgetary approval, requisite to 
accommodate such cost overruns, can lead to lengthy delays. One of the earlier authors in the 
literature, Hall (1980:34), in congruence with the Freiman curve, asserted that:  
         “Most of the planning disasters experienced in highway projects seem to be rooted with 
under-estimates at the preliminary phase”. 
Recording of Expenditure 
Measurement of Variation from Plan 
Revision of Budget 
Defence of Revisions and Feedback into Next Budget 
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For a transportation agency, Alavi and Tavares (2009) thus posited that inaccurate conceptual 
estimates can lead to adverse consequences, including the: 
 
 Disruption of plans, postponing, or cancelling scheduled projects to satisfy budgetary 
constraints; 
 Reductions in project scope, resulting in projects that do not fully provide the service 
initially intended; 
 Extensions in construction duration until additional funds become available. 
 
Alavi and Tavares (2009), opined, an eventual misallocation of design resources, thus creating 
false expectations with the public and other stakeholders, is inevitable. This is because any 
upward increment in the budgeted figure set aside for a project, would mean a corresponding 
deduction from funds voted for other projects. It was reported that in 2002, the Virginia 
Department of Transportation (VDOT) had to postpone or cancel 166 projects due to lack of 
funding, occasioned by cost overruns incurred on other projects (Turouchy et al., 2001). The UK 
Treasury (2013) in recognition of this pervasive trend, issued supplementary guidance to the 
Green Book, which advocates increasing conceptual estimates for standard civil engineering 
projects by between 3% and 44%.  
 
Considering the multiplier impact of cost overruns in public projects, and the significant waste of 
resources associated with this global phenomenon, this study identifies the need to provide an 
explanatory basis for cost overruns/underestimates experienced in highway projects, traced from 
the initial conceptual phase. 
 
3.3 Explanations to Cost Overruns Rooted in the Conceptual Phase of Public Projects  
Various events occurring from the initial phase, and along the subsequent phases of construction 
projects, provide explanations about a budget’s dynamic history (Love et al. 2012; Ahiagu-Dugbai 
et al. 2014). An extensive range of articles have been written on this basis overtime, listing 
factors, and offering various technical and theoretical explanations for this dynamism (Hall 1980; 
Wachs, 1987; Morris 1990; Mansfield et al.,1994; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, 2004; Baccarani, 2004; 
Bordat, 2004; Odeck, 2004; Kaliba et al; 2008; Akoa, 2011; Ahiaga-Dagbui et al.,  2014; Ubani, 
2015). Some studies have attempted to generate a typology of explanations and domains for 
classifying cost overrun factors, and rightly labelled issues of inaccurate estimates, geotechnical 
factors, and errors under the umbrella term of ‘Technical Explanations’ (Cantarelli et al., 2010; 
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Allahahium and Liu, 2012). This is relative to ‘Theoretical politico-economic and psychological 
explanations’, which have proliferated in the literature, based on the pioneering works of both 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and Wachs (1989).  Three interwoven theories: planning, 
decision-making and forecasting theories, have learnt credence to these technical and 
theoretical explanations (Cantarelli et al., 2010). These theories are rooted in the cognitive 
dynamics of estimation, planning, decision and policy making by people in institutional setting 
under high levels of uncertainty, and how this leads to the various successes and failures of 
projects.  
 
Technical explanations are founded in the fundamentals of best practice, which emphasize the 
need for adequate pre-contract preparation, via planning by clients before the execution of 
projects as a basis of reducing the impact of cost overruns in public projects (Brunes and Lind, 
2015). Higher levels of initial preparation for projects have thus being logically inferred as 
inversely correlated with lower cost overrun values (Tan and Wakmasha, 2010). Technical 
explanations thus rely primarily on forecasting theories to explain cost overruns (Cantarelli et al., 
2010). This is based on the need to project costs into the future as opposed to present values 
and occurrences. Slaughter (1995) commented that that there is nothing more certain than the 
unpredictability of the future. This paradox is descriptive of cost estimation particularly at the 
conceptual phase of project development, when only hazy and poorly defined details of project 
are available (Chou, 2005). Due to the fact that project attributes are often un-identical, 
experience and judgement will have to play a significant role in approximating future occurrences, 
attributed to the complex and ill-defined nature of construction process, leading to estimates 
often fraught with inaccuracy. Al-Tabtabai (1998:259) thus asserted the basic assumption 
underlying cost overruns is: 
“The assumption that the future is indistinguishable from the past, except for the specific 
variables identified as affecting the likelihood of future outcome. Accordingly, a forecast 
should only rely on past performance predictions as long as the pattern of changes in 
the environment is steady”. 
 
Forecasting related theories thus seek to better explain the build-up of errors unwittingly made 
due to inappropriate forecasting (Mackie and Preston, 1998; Cantarelli et al., 2010).  
 
However, several other studies have argued that technical explanations are insufficient to 
account for the level of cost overruns often experienced in publicly funded projects. This has 
given rise to a plethora of theoretical explanations in the literature (Wachs, 1989; Bruzelius et al. 
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2002; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, 2004, 2008; Cantarelli et al., 2010). Most of these explanations, as 
articulated and synthesised by Cantarelli et al. (2010), relate to non-technical factors, conceived 
as having a domineering influence on the occurrence of cost overruns in highway project 
estimates. Cantarelli et al. (2010), in examining the theoretical embeddedness of non-technical 
explanations, within existing theories of human behaviour and management, expounded that 
these class of explanations are derived from the theories of planning and decision making within 
organisations. Decision and planning theories often play out the dynamics of political and 
economic considerations, in the allocation of financial resources, as explanations of the outcome 
of a decision-making process. (Wachs, 1989; Cantarelli et al.2010). Cantarelli et al. (2010:793) 
cited such terms as “entrapment”, “sunk-cost effect” the “knee-deep-in-the-big-muddy” effect and 
the “too-much-invested to-quit” effect, as used in previous research, which refer to the “over-
commitment of decision-makers to an ineffective course of action”. Path inefficiency and 
dependency, is thus induced due to deliberate or optimistic decision or policy making, implying 
the presence of an outcome that would have paid off better.  
 
3.4 Technical Explanations 
Several factors have been identified in the literature, as accounting for cost overruns in 
construction works (Chang 2002; Lo et al., 2006; Kaming et al., 1997; Memon et al., 2011). 
Typically, most studies have identified technical risk and uncertainty related issues in all forms 
of construction works, which lead to cost overruns: 
 Design in terms of client related changes, incompleteness, or incorrectness of 
information; 
 Estimating and financial risk containment methods; 
 Managerial incompetency and team work related factors; 
 Time constraints and delays;  
 Unexpected ground conditions; 
 Organisational;  
 Skills related; 
 Contractual and procurement related; 
 Exogenous variables. 
Scholars from developing countries, in Asia (Morris 1990; Long, et al 2004) and Africa (Aibinu 
and Odeyinka, 2006; Kaliba, et al., 2008; Mansfield et al., 1994: Ubani, 2015), in addition to these 
commonly listed factors, have also listed issues with the sourcing of imported building materials; 
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payment inconsistency by highway agencies; high inflationary trend leading to the soaring of 
material prices, and lack of technical skills, as accounting for higher cost overruns. The average 
cost overrun found by Morris (1990) in a study of highway projects in India was 82%. Price 
escalation due to inflation over lengthy delays in the implementation of public sector projects in 
developing countries accounted for 20 - 25% of cost overruns, while the complementary 75 -80% 
were attributed to lack of planning foresight and technical factors.  
 
However, Lundmark (2011), Tan and Wakmasha (2010) and Brunes and Lind (2014) have 
identified the pre-contract phase of project preparation, as having the dominant impact on the 
level of cost overruns in transportation projects. Tan and Wakmasha (2010) attributed the 
significantly higher levels of cost overruns experienced in highway projects to the complex nature 
of infrastructure projects, which often creates a propensity of projects to run over budget. They 
opined that the accuracy of estimates is affected by uncertainties and risks inherent in projects. 
Inaccuracies in the assumptions or technical data used as inputs to cost estimating at the pre-
contract phase, was posited to be a major source of risk in projects, leading to cost overruns. 
Incompleteness of preliminary designs, engineering uncertainties and quantity surveys, 
inadequate site investigation of project locations, are some of the technical factors evident at the 
pre-contract phase, which trigger off post contractual issues leading to cost overruns.  
 
Evans and Peck (2008) were of the opinion that the diverse range of project types in the 
engineering field, including highway projects, which require cost estimates, necessitated formal 
estimating skills apart from the technical knowledge, and the ‘on the job training’ acquired by 
engineers in organisations. This was compared to the building sector, serviced by the quantity 
surveying profession, which subscribes to standards set out by the relevant professional bodies. 
As such the engineering background of, and the methodologies used by most estimators in 
highway agencies, which provided the technical know-how, were described as being insufficient 
to generate accurate estimates.  
 
Some other authors (Ogunlaya, 1989; Baccarani, 2004 and Sodikov, 2007), have also 
emphasized on the deficiencies in the approaches used in estimate preparation by highway 
agencies. These authors were of the opinion that it is the estimating methodologies and technical 
details used in generating estimates, that basically influence the accuracy of construction 
estimates. Inaccuracies in the assumptions or technical data used as inputs, thus form a major 
source of risk in project cost estimation for highway projects. Turouchy et al. (2001), Evans and 
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Peck (2008), Romero and Stolz (2009), as well as Tan and Wakmasha (2010), reiterated that 
early estimates, were often based on judgment, expertise, and experience, and less on rigorous 
technical investigations. Thus, as the project is developed, inconsistencies in the estimating 
method often led to marked differences in subsequent estimates.  
 
Young (1996), Chapman and Ward (1997), Creedy (2006) and Smith et al. (2006) views of cost 
overruns, emphasised the multiplicity of risk in projects, which they assert often lead to 
financial/economic loss, thus curtailing the realisation of project cost objective. Chapman and 
Ward (2006) extensively discussed the nature of the technical risks inherent in highway projects, 
and the need for adequate risk management and containment in project preparation, to subvert 
cost overruns. Whilst, Smith et al. (2006) stated, that in construction works, the output 
performance indices of time, cost and quality, are subject to risk and uncertainty, as the nature 
of highway construction works involves a high level of uncertainty, with a wide range of risk 
factors established as fundamentally affecting the accuracy of highway project cost estimates.  
 
The views of both Chapman and Ward (1997) and Smith et al. (2006), are further corroborated 
from a predominantly engineering perspective by the technical press. The body of literature on 
geotechnical risks underscores that irrespective of projects details, ground condition is a factor 
that has to be contended with in highway projects, and accounts for higher levels of cost 
overruns, due to the more complex interfaces of transportation projects with the ground. (ICE, 
1999, 2001; Whitman, 2000; Clayton, 2001; Venmans, 2006). The United States Department of 
Transport (USDOT, 2002: 23) in recognition of this, used the maxim: “all transportation projects 
are carried on earth, with earth or in the earth” to emphasize the importance of ground conditions 
in the construction of highway projects.  Rao and Ranade (2013:58) thus stated that: 
        “In the early stages of large infrastructure projects, a significant proportion of the risk 
exposure comes from the unknown unknowns. These may derive from complex interfaces 
with the physical environment into which the infrastructure is to be built such as the route 
of the transport link”. 
 
The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE, 2001:12) equally underscored this, and further drew 
attention to the paradox that: 
            “Ground conditions constitute the highest element of risks in construction works, yet it is 
the element of construction work about which much remains to be known”. 
 
       The ICE (2001), further explained, that this is largely due to the fact that, unlike material 
requirements in construction which can be specified, ground conditions are predetermined and 
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therefore beyond human control. Figure 3.4 represents the circle of concern on matters relating 
to ground conditions, showing the circle of influence for factors that can be controlled and 
exogenous ground related variables that can only be controlled within the limited decision 
interface. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Circle of Concern for Ground conditions                       (Source: ICE, 2001) 
 
Along similar lines, Clayton (2001) stated that issues relating to ground conditions therefore need 
to be clearly defined early on in the project, resolved at the pre-tender stage, and not allowed to 
spill into the contractual and construction phase, if significant cost overruns are to be avoided. 
 
3.5 Theoretical Explanations 
Various other perspectives on why cost overruns are so pervasive in highway projects have been 
expressed in the literature. This class of explanations seek primarily to disprove technical 
explanations, based on suspicions of unethical practices, deception, delusion and attitudinal 
issues of public officials in highway projects (Wachs, 1987; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Cantarelli et 
al., 2010). The term theoretical explanations, is thus used in this study to tag the schools of 
thought, which mostly rely on applying existing theories on human behaviour (Optimism 
bias/delusion, psychological stereotyping, rationality of decision making with the goal of utility 
maximisation, and politics), to understanding why public projects run over budget (Cantarelli et 
al., 2010). These perspectives however, are not clearly differentiated, often overlapping in the 
literature. Nonetheless, two distinct arguments can be discerned: psychological 
uncertainty/optimism bias and deliberate deception/strategic misrepresentation, which are 
argued from economic and political realms. Theoretical explanations which focus on the 
conscious manipulation of power and influence to foster self-interest, adopt the Machiavellian 
Circle of Concern 
Circle of Influence 
Decision Interface 
Random Exogenous Ground 
Related Variables 
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theory or agency theory of power and influence in decision making (Cantarelli et al., 2010).  
Psychological explanations on the other hand build on the sub-conscious aspects of human 
behaviour, via the fundamentals of optimism bias and stereotyping of public projects (Hall, 1980; 
Kahneman, 1994; Mackie and Preston, 1998; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Cantarelli, et al., 2010, 
2013).  
3.5.1 Psychological Explanations 
This school of thought espouses that psychological uncertainty and human decision making, 
relating to a reliance on heuristics and optimism bias are causing the problem, a finding strongly 
reinforced by the UK Treasury (2013) who issued supplementary guidance to the Green Book 
dealing specifically with optimism bias.   Psychological explanations are upheld by a limited 
number of studies who resort to deploying theories of psychological stereotyping of public 
projects as being inherently poorly managed; planning fallacy and optimism bias. Planning fallacy 
was described by Cantarelli et al. (2010:15) as: “the tendency to underestimate time, costs and 
risks of future actions, and at the same time overestimate the benefits of the same actions’. 
Whereas optimism bias, was defined as: “the systematic tendency to be overly optimistic” 
Cantarelli et al., 2010:10).  
 
Explanations of inaccurate forecasts and estimates, in terms of optimism bias and appraisal 
optimism, have been largely developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979a, 1979b), and later 
Kahneman (1994), based on experimental psychological research in the field of economics. 
Based on the outcome of the experiment, with students as participants, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979a, 1979b) generated theories on the overly optimistic tendency of human judgment, 
wherein risk was subconsciously downplayed, while potential benefits were overblown. Such 
optimism was opined as constituting a hindrance to the need for thorough planning in project 
preparation. These results by Kahneman (1994) were theoretically applied by Flyvbjerg 
(2008:18) to explain cost overruns in transportation projects, by asserting that they were key 
issues in policy and planning: whereby promoters and planners make investment decisions 
based on highly inaccurate and biased judgements, leading to combination of underestimated 
costs and overblown demand forecasts. As such cost-benefit analyses, based on which 
investment decisions were made, were tagged: “the consequence of inaccuracy to the second 
degree “(Flyvbjerg, 2008:19). 
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Hall (1980) also articulated that the high element of uncertainty in public works, which are mostly 
large scale, and challenging to manage, as likely to account for significant disparity in the levels 
of cost overruns between public and private investments. Hall distinguished between three 
categories of uncertainties, relating to the planning phase of public projects, which significantly 
impact on investment outcomes: uncertainty in the planning environment; uncertainty in related 
decision areas and uncertainty about value judgments. Uncertainty in value judgements was 
contextualised from the viewpoint of how society perceives the delivery of the output of public 
and private goods, and how this relates to planning failures. Hall (1980), concluded that 
psychological reasons accounted for why public projects have often been undertaken on a faulty 
investment premise, which has typically threatened the viability of a notable number of public 
projects. This conclusion was drawn, solely based on an empirical study, which identified cost 
overrun ranges to be significantly higher in public works, as compared to private works.  
 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) however questioned the validity of this physiological stereotyping, which 
perceives public proprietorship as inherently challenging, in direct contrast to the assumption of 
efficiency of private ownership, in curbing cost overruns.  This was based on an analysis of 
variance between a sample of projects subdivided into public, private and state owned 
enterprises. The result showed that public projects as compared to private projects did not show 
any significant difference in cost overruns. However, state owned projects, which were subject 
to closer public scrutiny, regulatory statutes and accountability evidenced lower cost overruns. 
The authors thus concluded that the roots of cost overruns were more complex than the 
perceptions of public proprietorship asserted by Hall (1980), further questioning the ethics of 
public officials. Ganuza (2003) also noted this trend and tries to account for the perception of 
public agencies, considered as incompetent, from the perspective of the deliberate scant 
attention often given to design details before contract award, as a form of strategic behaviour 
calculated to stimulate cost overruns. 
 
Along this continuum in the evolution of interesting psychological explanations, and theories 
based on the applied logic of optimism bias and planning phallacy, none of which have provided 
any form empirical evidence to validate their assertions about public infrastructure projects, thus 
emerged the theories of strategic misrepresentation, as depicted in Figure 3.5. This latter school 
of thought laid the blame for cost overruns in infrastructure projects on public officials, who were 
accused of deliberately misrepresenting facts when seeking for funding approval. According to 
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Flyvbjerg (2008, p 3), “Optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation are both deception, but 
where the latter is intentional, the first is not, as optimism bias is self-deception”.  
 
Figure 3.5: Explanatory Model of Cost overruns by Flyvbjerg (2008) 
 
Mackie and Preston, (1998) also stated that appraisal optimism by overly optimistic promoters 
and forecasters, could be unintentional or deliberate. This was opined as accounting for cost 
overruns, and the authors further listed 21 sources of error and deliberate bias in highway 
projects, which often led to inaccurate forecasts and inflated benefit-cost ratios. 
3.5.2 Strategic Misrepresentation 
Wachs (1989), the earliest recognised author of theoretical cost overrun explanations, sought to 
attribute cost overruns to strategic misrepresentation.  Indeed, Wachs opined that so called 
forecasting errors in the planning of transportation projects, were actually orchestrated and 
deliberate, in a publication titled “When planners lie with numbers”.  Wachs’ (1989:67) argued: 
‘the competitive, politically charged environment of transportation forecasting has resulted in the 
continuous adjustment of cost assumptions until they produce forecasts which support politically 
attractive outcomes’.  
 
Following the outcome of this earlier study, several authors principally Flyvbjerg set the trail in a 
line of publications, which sought to disprove technical explanations to cost overruns, on the 
premise of suspected strategic behaviour of the principal actors in public infrastructure projects. 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2002 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2005, 2007, 2008; Flyvbjerg et al., 2010). In these 
publications Flyvbjerg and his colleagues built upon the earlier arguments offered by Wachs 
(1989) by similarly questioning the trend of consistent underestimation in public infrastructure 
projects, as to whether they were ‘error or lies’.  Several other scholars, including Bruzelius et al. 
(2002), Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) and Ubani (2015) have also opined that the non-technical 
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explanations for cost overruns, are more likely to account for the significant variance between 
budget estimates and the final project outturn value. Arguing from the perspective of strategic 
misrepresentation, these studies have emphasized the non-technical dimensions of explanation 
to cost overruns, principally bordering on deliberate deception on the part of planners and 
politicians. Bruzelius et al. (2002:146), attributed cost overruns to “the rent seeking behaviour of 
special interest groups, and the tendency to underestimate tenders in order to get proposals 
accepted”. Altshuler and Luberoff (2003:34) opined that: “consistent underestimation is an 
example of the tragedy of the commons.... as it helps advance specific projects”.  
 
From the perspective of Cantarelli et al. (2013), contractors and other parties to a contract may 
as well be entangled in the complex web of explanations based on deliberate actions, which lead 
to the build-up of cost overruns in highway projects. The complexity of the interaction was 
hypothetically explained by Cantarelli et al. (2013) by the use of the concepts of ‘Game signalling 
theory’, to better theoretically explain the phenomena of cost overruns. The fundamental 
precepts of game theory are founded on the tenets of strategic behaviour, bounded in the 
interactive complexity of game signalling between the principal actors in public projects, namely 
the contractor and client, who are thus labelled ‘Agent’ and ‘Principal’ respectively (Cantarelli et 
al., 2013). Cantarelli and colleagues, mapped out a hypothetical model of how both parties to a 
contract, anticipate each other’s behaviour in setting price margins, during contractor selection 
and contract award phase of infrastructure projects, in an intricately psychological game of 
political and economic motives.  
 
Ganuza (2003), had prior to the advancement of the theory of Game signalling, forwarded a 
hypothetical theory of ‘Strategic ignorance under imperfect market conditions’ which also 
bordered on the dynamics of client-contractor relations, in setting pricing margins in the delivery 
of public projects. According to Ganuza (2003), changes in the designs and specifications during 
public procurement, accounts for most cases of cost overruns in public projects. This, led Ganuza 
(2003), to propose a model whereby most public agencies allocate a fixed amount to initial 
design, which are often altered and renegotiated after contract award, where imperfect conditions 
are stimulated, by deficiencies in the specifications. As such where contractors are horizontally 
differentiated, representing a perfect market supply condition, the sponsor feigns strategic 
ignorance by under-investing in initial design specification, to trigger homogeneity and intense 
competition. This reduces the comparative advantage of the more efficient contractors, and 
obtains lower bid values, which in the long run leads to inefficiency and significant cost overruns. 
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3.6 Critical Empirical Review of Studies Providing Cost Overrun Explanations 
The literature in the previous sections, has taken a kaleidoscopic view of the myriad of competing 
explanations, seeking to understand and elucidate on the fundamental reasons why public 
projects consistently run over budgeted cost. It is thus probable, that cost overruns in highway 
projects, may have wider reaching underpinnings, rooted in a variety of technical and non-
technical causes, as summarised in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: Dichotomous Explanations of Cost Overruns in Highway Projects 
Author Technical Explanations Theoretical Explanations 
Kahneman 
(1979a,1979b) 
 Optimism bias 
Hall (1980)  Poor value judgement 
  Societal perception of the delivery of 
public projects 
Wachs (1987)  Inherently and deliberately flawed nature 
of the forecasting techniques adopted 
Hinze and Gregory 
(1991) 
Larger size and complexity 
Simultaneous nature of execution 
translating to lower pre and post 
contract engineering 
 
Romero and Stolz 1993   
Kahneman, (1994)  Planning Phallacy: combination of 
Optimism bias and Appraisal optimism 
Chapman and Ward 
(1997) 
High level of risks and uncertainties  
Mackie & Preston, 1998 Errors Appraisal optimism and bias 
Clayton (2001) Ground conditions  
Turouchy et al (2001) Poor preliminary investigation and 
estimates 
 
Isakson (2002) High level of ground related risk 
factors surrounding transportation 
projects 
Pressure from conflicting interests, 
including politicians 
  Misleading or underestimated time and 
cost projections used as a basis for 
attaining funding approval 
Flyvbjerg (2002)  Deliberate Deception due to self-interest 
or political motives 
Physiological delusion due to economic 
motives 
Altshuler and Luberoff 
(2003) 
 Strategic Misrepresentation 
Ganuza (2003)   
Flyvbjerg (2004) Length of project implementation, 
geographic location 
 
Baccarani (2004) and 
Sodikov (2007) 
Poor estimating methodologies and 
technical details used in generating 
estimates 
 
Creedy (2006) High level of risks and uncertainties  
Smith et al (2006). High level of risks and uncertainties  
Sodikov (2007) Inaccuracy of initial estimates due to:  
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Lack of comprehensive historic cost 
data base 
lack of adequate preliminary 
information; 
High level of uncertainties; 
 Poor cost estimation methods based 
on judgment, expertise, and 
experience. 
Evans and Peck (2008) Inaccurate quantity surveys  
Lack of formal estimating skills in the 
engineering field (only on- the-job 
training) 
 
Romero and Stolz 
(2009) 
Inadequate preliminary investigations 
and estimates 
 
Tan and Wakmasha 
(2010) 
Inadequate preliminary investigations 
and estimates 
 
Cantarelli et al (2010)  Physiological and Political explanations 
Lundmark (2011) Poor pre-contract preparation  
Cantarelli et al (2013)  Strategic behaviour of principal actors 
(clients and contractors): Game theory 
Rao and Ranade (2013) Uncertainty (the unknown unknowns) 
and risk exposure 
 
Brunes and Lind (2014) Poor pre-contract preparation  
Ubani (2015)  Deliberate Deception 
  
Different authors have thus adopted different underlying technical and theoretical narratives, as 
explanations to cost overruns. This subsection therefore, questions the veracity of the different 
types of explanations provided by seminal authors offering technical explanations, as well as 
those refuting technical explanations, with arguments from theoretical perspectives. This calls 
for a closer look at their methodological underpinnings. The questions thus posed in this study 
in critiquing these wide proliferations of explanations, are thus: How well do these explanations 
hold up based on empirical data?  What is the evidence? Are they based on primary sources of 
data or mere fiction and speculation? 
 
3.6.1 Empirical Review of Technical Explanations  
Technical explanations as predominantly evident in the literature are mostly based on empirical 
studies, often using analysis of questionnaire surveys which sample the opinions of construction 
professionals or trends in cost overrun data (Mansfield et al., 1994; Aibinu and Odeyinka, 2006; 
Kaliba, et al., 2008; and Ubani, 2015). These studies often generate a long list of factors, which 
are sometimes subsequently ranked. Aibinu and Odeyinka, (2006) identified 44 factors, 
prioritising the 39 factors on a ranked profile, as a source of useful information for construction 
industry stakeholders, in curbing delays and cost overruns. Some authors including Cantarelli et 
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al. (2010); Akoa, (2011); Allahahium and Lui (2011) and Brunes and Lind, (2014) have taken the 
evidence one step further, by seeking to categorize and classify the myriad of technical factors 
occurring over the lifespan of projects, into a typology of causes, on the grounds that generating 
a long list of factors, without tracing their fundamental defining characteristics, was insufficient. 
For example, Allahahium and Liu (2011), analysed 90 causes of cost overruns, identifying five 
major triggers for cost overruns including: (1) Market volatility principally due to micro and macro-
economic variations; (2) novelty/unpredictable events such as unexpected ground conditions; (3) 
estimate distortion; (4) time pressures and  (5) project complexity.    
 
The methodology of listing factors, ranking, and categorizing causative variables on a typology 
basis, based on impersonal questionnaire surveys, which is the most rudimental and simplistic 
approach to explaining cost overruns, appears to have flooded the literature. Although this adds 
to the body of scholarly literature on cost overruns, and are methodologically valid, the researcher 
is of the opinion that these forms of empirical approach cannot be used as a basis of inferr ing 
specific cause-effect relationship on a project basis. This shortcoming of most technical 
explanations based on questionnaire survey, has also being noted by Ahiagu Dugbai et al. 
(2014:868), who described most of the studies on cost overruns, as replicative, stating:   
“It is argued that questionnaires alone may not be suitable for investigating complex and 
systemic problems like cost overrun on construction projects… It is no surprise that the 
same factors seem to come top of the list most of the time ... It will take more thoughtful 
research design, perhaps research conducted within the context of a particular project, 
to be able to partly circumvent these default responses that have yet to help mitigate or 
contain cost overrun in construction”. 
 
This characteristic feature of questionnaire based studies, limits the usefulness of the output of 
such research, in generating context specific explanations that can be relied on in practice. 
 
However, the researcher notes that a few of these studies although based on questionnaire 
surveys, are methodologically more robust (Memon and Rahman, 2013; Sharma and Goyal, 
2014), and have been used to develop explanatory relationships amongst costoverrun factors. 
For instance, Memon and Rahman (2013) investigated the effect of cost overrun factors based 
on survey responses of client, contractor, and consultant representative involved in handling 
small scale projects in Malaysia. A total of 54 survey responses were analysed using the Partial 
Least Square Structural Equation Modelling, a form of factor analysis, to model the relationship 
amongst various factors. The outcome of the analysis revealed latent factors which triggered the 
highest variance: contractor’s site management related factors, had the most significant effect 
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on small scale projects. Whereas Sharma and Goyal (2014) developed a fuzzy logic model for 
assessing cost overrun, based on a preliminary questionnaire survey, conducted to judge the 
level of importance of the identified factors.  A fuzzy logic model was then developed, and used 
in mapping out decision trees on an input and output basis, complemented by graphical 
representation of the variation induced in cost overruns by different combination of cost overrun 
factors, to understand their combined effect. Sharma and Goyal (2014) fuzzy model showed that 
the largest hypothetical variation in cost overrun will be largely due to inadequate planning and 
scheduling, followed by variation due to short bid preparation time and contractors’ experience. 
 
A discernible shortcoming of the models developed by both Memon and Rahman (2013) and 
Sharma and Goyal (2014) is that the data used in their analysis was not sourced in relation to 
specific projects or based of any form of project information, instead it was generated through 
opinion surveys. As a result, the studies relied solely on the opinions of the respondents 
surveyed, to infer abstract statistical inferences about general factors that lead to cost overruns. 
It is thus probable that these models can explain the relationships amongst the cost overrun 
factors, but may have little explanatory power to account for recorded cost overruns on a project 
specific basis. This can be rationalised based on the fact that technically projects are unique, 
which is in stark contrast to the underlying assumptions of the findings of these studies. 
Furthermore, matters of sensitive dependence arise, in the generalisability of the study by 
Memon and Rahman (2013) with respect to small scale projects in Malaysia, as the study is 
based on the assumption that projects of a similar size will experience similar issues. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned groups of technical studies, few others provide and analyse 
cost overrun data, to test specific project variables in accounting for the trend in the data, as 
explanations for the high level of cost overruns in publicly funded highway projects. Hinze and 
Gregory (1991), empirically tested for the effects of project size, location and complexity on the 
level of cost overruns experienced on projects executed by the Washington State Department of 
Transport.  Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), conducted a similar study on a world-wide basis, from a 
sample of 254 projects. Akoa (2011) study based in Cameroun, did same.  These studies 
concluded that the bigger sizes and complexity of infrastructure projects are correspondingly 
reflected in the increased levels of cost overrun.  
 
Hinze and Gregory (1991), further explained, that the simultaneous nature of projects execution 
by highway agencies, invariably implied lesser amounts of pre and post-contract engineering 
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hours available to each, thus accounting for the higher levels of cost overruns often induced in 
highway projects. Additional engineering, was thus stated as requisite, to overcome risks 
occasioned by the complex and simultaneous nature of highway project execution, which often 
creates a propensity for such projects to run over budget. Whereas, Flyvbjerg et al. (2004), 
asserted that the average length of implementation phase of transportation projects significantly 
impacted on the level of cost overruns recorded. This was inferred based on statistical analysis 
of 111 transportation projects: bridges tunnels; and roads, which showed that cost overruns 
varied in relation to project duration. Bridges and tunnels, with average duration of 6.6 years 
recorded higher cost overruns than rail and road projects with an average duration of 6.3 and 4.3 
years. Flyvbjerg et al. (2004:15) thus concluded, sluggish planning and implementation of 
transportation projects had direct financial repercussions, stating: “Sluggishness may, quite 
simply, be extremely expensive”. 
 
However, other studies, such as those by Odeck (2004) in Norway, revealed that larger cost 
overruns were experienced in smaller projects. Morris (1990) also arrived at a similar conclusion, 
as Odeck (2004), for 290 projects analysed in India. Yet, contrary to the findings of these studies, 
both Love (2002) and Love et al. (2013) revealed that cost overruns do not vary by project type 
or size.  The conflicting results, from various studies, further reinforces the need for more context 
based studies, and that studies aimed at developing generalizable theories on cost overruns, are 
not plausible, and will only be subject to rebuttal. A further discernible shortcoming of these 
studies is that conclusive inference is mostly drawn based on trend analysis and correlation 
analysis, which by virtue of reporting significant association between bivariate groups of 
variables, cannot be used to conclusively infer causality. The observations made by the 
researcher, had also being noted by Ahiagu- Dugbai et al. (2014:867), who stated that:  
“Just because two things strongly correlate does not necessarily mean that one causes 
the other. This would seem readily obvious, but can be easily overlooked. A correlation 
provides circumstantial evidence implying a causal link, but the weight of the evidence 
depends greatly on the particular circumstances involved”.  
 
3.6.2 Technical Studies Analysing of Cause-Effect Relationships Based on Project Data  
Quantitative analytical techniques, which analyse cause-effect relationships, are generally 
grouped as Mathematical models (An et al., 2007). Models are reductions of reality replicating 
an intricate system using variables within those systems (Ahiagu Dugbai, et al., 2014). 
Mathematical models have however been scantly used in the literature to infer causality in 
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relation to project cost overruns. The techniques which have being used to analyse cost overrun 
in a limited number of older and more contemporary studies include: Linear modelling techniques 
such as regression modelling, Networking and data mining techniques such as Artificial Neural 
Networks, Heuristics based models such as Case Based Reasoning /Reference Class 
Forecasting, Stochastic techniques such as Monte-Carlo simulations; and Logic based methods 
such as Binary Logistic modelling and Fuzzy Logic (Trost and Oberlender 2003; Attala and 
Hegazy 2003; Love et al., 2014; Ahiagu Dugbai et al., 2014; Lee and Kim 2015 and El-Kholy 
2015): 
3.6.2.1 Regression Models 
Approaches to parametric cost estimation based on statistics using linear regression 
analysis have been developed since the 1970s (An et al., 2007). As such an empirical 
estimation of cost overrun based on cost drivers requires statistical functions 
(Hendrickson 1998).  Cost overrun analysis using regression analysis generates the best 
fit parameter values for the cost overrun function based on which empirical cost 
inference can be made. Older studies such as Trost and Oberlender (2003) as well as 
Attala and Hegazy (2003) have used linear modelling techniques, based on regression 
analysis, to analyse cause-effect relationships in explaining recorded cost overruns in 
projects, and further tested the validity of these models with respect to their use in 
decision making for future projects, at specified levels of confidence. A more recent study 
by El-Kholy (2015) generated a regression based model, while comparing its predictive 
capacity to a Case Based Reasoning (CBR) model for similar data sets derived from 30 
projects.  The outcome of the study showed that the regression modelling had higher 
levels of accuracy to predict potential cost overrun in projects. 
 
3.6.2.2 Case Based Reasoning Models 
Case-based reasoning (CBR) models have high similarity to expert systems, being 
described as the foundations of artificial intelligence (An et al., 2007). CBR derives its 
logic from a rule-based reasoning dependent on experience or memory with adaptations 
made for deviations from the rule (Chen and Burrell, 2001). Kim (2004) stated that the 
CBR approach is similar to expert judgments, that rely on the use of experience to solve 
problems, following the logical steps: outline of the key attributes describing the current 
problem; identification of similarity of attributes in previous past problems; and prediction 
within the interface of similarity with subjective correlative adjustment. A CBR system is 
thus heavily dependent on structure and content of the input case base, which have to 
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be adequately indexed, organised and adapted for new cost estimating queries El-Kholy 
(2015).  
 
Although the use of CBR systems have been reported as having lower predictive 
capacities, they are very useful in decision making and feasibility studies, as such 
models learn from both past project success and failures in solving new problems, by 
adopting/adapting solutions that were used to solve old problems (Kolodner, 1992). El-
Kholy (2015) applied a CBR model to predict the likely cost overrun given the degree of 
similarity of the project characteristics to 20 past projects, using a similarity value of 
attribute, dichotomously assigned one or zero.  El-Kholy (2015) used this method to 
analyse cost overrun factors, whose presence as part of a future project, is indicative of 
a potential to result in a similar degree of cost overrun, useful in reference class 
forecasting and decision making to minimise cost overruns for future projects. 
 
3.6.2.3 Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial neural networks are expert non-parametric statistical estimators. The neural 
network model, rooted in artificial intelligence, has a "brain-like" structure, which can be 
used to make intuitive decisions similar to the human brain and find complex patterns 
within the data that often elude conventional analytical techniques (Turouchy et al., 
2001). The potential for using artificial neural network relies on the development of 
genetic algorithms from project data sets, through a process of network training designed 
to learn and identify trends and relationships in the project input data (Al-Tabtabai et al., 
1999). More data input thus optimizes the accuracy of the network model, as outliers 
and erroneous data are identified and selectively filtered out (Al-Tabtabai et al., 1999; 
Turouchy et al., 2001). The ability of the neural network to perform sensitivity analysis of 
a new input parameter to the computer database is an added advantage as it establishes 
the relative significance of each input parameter within the model, and how it affects the 
outcome variable (Turouchy et al., 2001).  
 
Ahiagu Dugbai et al. (2014) used data mining techniques based on artificial neural 
networks, to analyse the complexity of non-linear interactions amongst quantitative 
project variables such as compensation events, project duration, as well as qualitative 
information on tendering method, location, project type, fluctuation measure and 
project’s delivery partner. All analysed projects were completed at cost of between 
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£1,000 and £14 million, with a maximum duration of 22 months. Sensitivity analysis was 
further carried out to identify significant cost drivers in a selective elimination process, 
necessary to optimise the predictive capacity of the model. The least significant input 
factor identified was the location of the project, while the choice of the project’s delivery 
partner, was inferred by Ahiagu Dugbai (2014), as majorly influencing the ultimate extent 
to which the projects ran over budget. 
 
3.6.2.4 Probabilistic Based Methods: Monte Carlo Simulations and Analytic Methods 
Monte Carlo simulations have also been carried out to analyse the probabilistic effect of 
specific cost drivers on cost overrun, based on the data distribution of the analysed 
projects. The core focus of probabilistic techniques is on the quantification of the 
variability of construction cost overrun based on inherent risks and uncertainties 
associated with a project (Zwaing, 2014). This is necessary to gain sufficient knowledge 
about the distribution of the cost parameter of interest. Typically, Lee and Kim (2015) 
analysed change orders issued during the construction period, due to changes in scope 
made by the client and changes made due to design errors, which lead to significant 
cost overruns. This study investigated 9028 change orders from 237 projects that were 
completed between 2005 and 2011 in South Korea. It was shown that an average of 
4.57 of total project cost, was induced as cost overruns solely due to change orders. 
Love et al. (2014) developed a probabilistic Log-Logistic distribution of cost overruns for 
49 road projects (new roads including upgrades and elevated highways) in relation to 
rework occasioned by errors and omissions in contract documentation, leading to cost 
overruns. This was used to develop best fit statistical distributions so that probabilities 
of occurrence of cost overruns was determined, and used to provide a basis to assess 
the adequacy of the construction cost contingency bench marked, as not less than 
13.55%.  
 
It is thus self-evident, that the findings from this class of technical studies on cost overruns which 
rely on modelling to understand cause-effect relationship, have a robust and methodologically 
valid underpinning, rooted in the specifics of project data, with a direct applicability useful in 
monitoring and reassessing future projects, prior to initiation, as a basis of subverting cost 
overruns. The use of modelling techniques, thus provide logical and repeatable relationships 
between independent cost overrun drivers and cost overrun, for practical purposes of risk 
analysis and management by clients.  
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3.6.3 Empirical Review of Theoretical Explanations  
The preceding subsections, have taken a critical look at the methodological shortcomings of 
several groups of empirical technical studies, in explaining cause-effect relationships that lead to 
cost overruns. On the flip side of the argument, are the theorist, who make bold claims asserting 
why cost overruns are such a pervasive trend in public infrastructure projects. The researcher 
thus applies a similar critical analysis to spotlight the methodological validity of the studies driving 
this line of argument. An evaluation of several of these cost overrun studies based on theoretical 
explanations, indicate that political explanation, at the core of which is strategic 
misrepresentation, is the dominant discourse adopted by most studies in explaining cost 
overruns (Kain 1990; Pickerel 1992; Bruzelius et al. 2002; Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003).   
 
However, based on the critical analysis, the researcher notes, that the studies by Kain (1990) 
and Pickerel (1992), although underlain by the theory of strategic misrepresentation, were 
focused mostly on explaining the inaccuracies in transportation benefit forecasts. Kain (1990) 
described in detail, the use of unrealistic land use forecasts and optimistic ridership forecasts, as 
a form of appraisal optimism that was used by the Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART), to promote 
sponsorship for a 91-mile rail transit system. When alternative analyses indicated that the 
proposed $2.6-billion rail system would carry only slightly more riders than an unimproved bus 
system. Similarly, Pickerel (1992), made similar assertions as Kain (1990), for eight rail transit 
projects chosen over competing less capital-intensive options. However, Pickerel (1992) 
admitted that the accuracy of forecasts for the rejected alternatives could not be evaluated, to 
infer conclusively, that the errors in projected ridership and costs, led decision makers to make 
uniformed decisions. Although the interesting findings from these studies, support the notion of 
strategic misrepresentation, no form of research methodology or data sources deployed, were 
provided in the articles, for the researcher to access the validity and credibility of their findings. 
 
The study by Bruzelius et al.’s (2002) was fundamentally presented as form of speculative 
commentary on the dynamics of decision making in mega projects, rather than based on any 
form of data analysis. The key theoretical assertions in the study by Bruzelius et al. (2002) were: 
 The time frames typically involved in major project development and implementation, 
meant that different sets of political influences were often at work at the initial phase, 
when overly optimistic forecast are made, compared to the completion phase, when the 
full extent of cost overrun and unviability of the project is realised; 
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 Varied groups of project promoters can afford to advocate for the financing of projects, 
based on tax payers’ money, because they do not bear the financial risk; except for 
contractors, who still bear minimum risk, but reap significant reward, even when over-
optimistic tenders are forwarded; 
  “Real costs and real risks do not surface until construction is well under way” (p 145). 
Other studies revolving around this theme, are mostly text books, written on mega projects 
governance and investments, such as by Altshuler and Luberoff, (2003). It is thus, observed that 
the only empirical study out of the multiplicity of theoretical explanations evident in the literature, 
is the one by Flyvbjerg, et al. (2002), building on the arguments started by much earlier scholars 
(Hall 1980 and Wachs, 1989) and Bruzelius et al. (2002), promoting politically induced deception 
as a globally generalizable reason why public projects run over budget. The arguments from 
subsequent peer reviewed studies, after this time frame such as Cantarelli et al. (2010), although 
adopting the findings of Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), by emphasizing the systematic nature of cost 
underestimation, as a deliberate strategy used by government officials in getting funding 
approval, were expressed as opinions, and not drawn based on any form of valid statistical 
inference. The study by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), is thus spotlighted. 
 
The study by Flyvbjerg, et al. (2002:280) was based primarily on cost overrun data on 258 
projects, which displayed a statistical pattern to the differences in initial and final cost, skewed in 
the direction of underestimates, over time and project location. It was stated: 
“the pattern of cost underestimation … is of general import and is statistically significant 
… the pattern holds for different project types, different geographical regions, and 
different historical periods…the large-sample pattern of cost underestimation uncovered 
by us lends statistical support to the conclusions about lying and cost underestimation”. 
 
The ‘statistical support’ as referred to by Flyvbjerg, et al. (2002:285), in this analysis was: 
 
“If misleading forecasts were truly caused by technical inadequacies, simple mistakes, 
and inherent problems with predicting the future, we would expect a less biased 
distribution of errors in cost estimates around zero. In fact, we have found with 
overwhelming statistical significance (p<0.001) that the distribution of such errors has a 
nonzero mean”. 
Solely based on this simplistic analysis, which lacked the merits of demonstrable causality, 
Flyvbjerg, et al. (2002:279), drew a generalised global conclusion that cost overruns in 
transportation projects were the deliberate outcome of political manipulation, and as such 
discounted all forms of technical explanations, primarily geologic factors, which became a trail 
blazer and empirical reference point for subsequent theoretical studies on cost overruns. It was 
stated: 
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“This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost escalation 
in transportation infrastructure projects … it is found with overwhelming statistical 
significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether important infrastructure 
should be built are highly and systematically misleading”. 
 
Without any further inferential statistical test or supportive qualitative data, a visibly wild leap was 
made in drawing and generalising this theoretical conclusion, from an exploratory statistical trend 
analysis of project data, which reported that cost overruns were indeed a topical problem in 
transportation projects across the sampled locations, which had persisted over time. Several 
loopholes were thus spotted by the researcher, and other scholars in these premature 
conclusions. 
Flyvbjerg, et al. (2002) study, carried out based on exploratory statistical measures, which 
provided an initial quantitative perspective of the project data, did not provide any form of 
qualitative data from inside the governmental client organization to support the study’s 
assertions. Love (2015: 490) noted this, and commented thus:  
“Despite the considerable amount of research within the field of transport and planning 
in the past thirty years, limited progress has been made to improving the performance 
of projects. We contend that this will continue to be an issue as long as research efforts 
focus on the ‘outside view’ with emphasis being placed upon strategic misrepresentation 
and optimism bias. Understanding ‘why’ and ‘how’ projects overrun, particularly from 
both ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ perspectives, is pivotal to reducing the ir impact and 
occurrence”.  
 
The highly artificialised nature of Flyvbjerg et al.’s (2002) study, which solely relied on trends in 
the data, is a significant limitation in the methodological validity of the conclusion drawn. Ahiagu-
Dugbai et al. (2014:41) noting this shortcoming equally stated:  
“it is almost impossible to draw valid distinctions along a continuum of motivation when 
promoting a project from reasonable optimism, through over-enthusiasm, culpable error, 
to deliberate deceit using statistical analysis, as adopted in the Flyvbjerg’s works”. 
 
Ahiagu-Dugbai et al. (2014:41) further asserted:  
 
“Adopting a positivist perspective to understand a complex issue like construction project 
governance, which usually involves a complex interplay of construction professionals, 
planners, business strategy, institutional framework and politics, would merely be 
superficial at best and never actually provide substantial evidence to support the kind of 
conclusions reached by Flyvbjerg et al”. 
 
Flyvbjerg et al.’s (2002) conclusions are further challenged in the academic arena by several 
other authors including Osland and Strand (2010) and Love et al. (2012).  Arguing against both 
the theoretical and methodological validity of Flyvbjerg et al.'s assertions, Osland and Strand 
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(2010:80) challenged Flyvbjerg et al.'s research design, espousing “the research design did not 
support the general conclusion that the technical explanations can be ruled out” . It was argued 
that for the theory of deliberate underestimation, had little explanatory power, as its validation 
requires empirical data showing Cost Benefit Analysis for projects which should have been 
approved in place of the ‘better under-represented projects’.  While Love et al. (2012) using a 
case study of Australian projects empirically showed that unintentionally overlooked technical 
factors inherent in projects dynamics can be triggered leading to cost overruns in public projects. 
 
Further to this, Flyvbjerg’s study is not adequate to provide the depth of understanding on the 
intrinsic contextual issues of cost overruns within the settings of highway development in specific 
countries and regions. Cantarelli et al. (2012) also argued against the global generalisability of 
Flyvbjerg’s study, on the premise of the large differences in cost overruns revealed in various 
studies reported over time, which showed that cost overruns in country specific studies were 
either lower or higher than the statistics provided by Flyvbjerg. It was stated  
“the abovementioned findings do not support this expectation; some country specific 
studies have smaller average cost overruns and others higher average cost overruns 
compared to the worldwide study by Flyvbjerg et al” (Cantarelli et al 2012:50) 
 
The global generalisability of Flyvbjerg’s findings which though spanning 75 years, is mostly 
limited to developed countries in the Europe and North America. Developing countries, such as 
those on the African continent, which mostly do not have historical data spanning this time frame, 
were not included in the sample data. However, Flyvbjerg, et al. (2002) acknowledged that cost 
overruns appear to be more pronounced in developing nations. Following Flyvbjerg’s argument, 
if this is the case, the theory of strategic misrepresentation cannot be said to provide a valid 
explanation for this disparity in the extent of cost overrun experienced in the developed and 
developing world. To overcome some of the shortcomings of the study by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), 
in terms of geographical spread, Ubani (2015) attempted to replicate Flyvbjerg’s study in the 
context of Nigeria. However, several shortcomings were also noted in this study, foremost of 
which, is the statistical validity of conclusions based on the quantitative analysis of cost overrun 
trends in a very small sample of eight public projects.  
 
Extensive research also shows that private sector projects experience cost overruns, despite the 
lack of political motive, to strategically misrepresent cost. Classic examples such as the Channel 
Tunnel between France and the UK, as noted by Flyvbjerg et al. (2004), which should serve as 
the international model of private financing, however experienced a monumental cost overrun of 
80%, double the average recorded cost overrun range on publicly funded tunnels and bridges. 
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Following this line of logic, Love (2009) also statistically showed that re-work leading to cost 
overruns, were evident in both public and privately owned infrastructure. This calls into question, 
the veracity of Flyvbjerg assertions regarding public officials. 
3.7 Contextual Case Study Narratives Explaining Cost Overruns 
Against the backdrop of notable shortcoming, in terms of the lack of in-depth qualitative analysis, 
that is discernible in most technical and theoretical studies, the researcher has isolated the few 
relatively distinctive and methodologically robust case studies in the literature, offering qualitative 
narratives to explain the propagation of cost overruns, from inception to completion. These are 
explored in detail in the forthcoming sections of the chapter. 
3.7.1 Theory of Lock-in and Path Dependency by Cantarelli et al. (2010) 
Cantarelli et al. (2010), studied the behavioural form of ‘Lock-in’, as used in managerial premise, 
which is the outcome of sub-optimal decisions made by institutions that sets the pace for path 
dependency, irrespective of the availability of optimal alternatives. Cantarelli et al. (2010:793) 
thus described Lock-in, as “a form of psychological coping associated with the inability to 
withdraw from obligations made in the decision-making process”. Figure 3.6 represents the 
theoretical framework developed by Cantarelli et al. (2010), based on the literature, which was 
tested in the case studies. 
 
Figure 3.6: Theoretical Framework of Lock-in developed by Cantarelli et al (2010) 
As Cantarelli et al. (2010) demonstrates, in Figure 3.6, the solid lines represent the influence of 
unconscious lock-in, whereby decision makers deliberately justify earlier project approval 
decisions made, without attempting to explore the option of reversing that decision, in the face 
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of escalating cost.  On the other hand, conscious lock-in emerges when the project proponents 
are trapped in their decisions, as there are no viable alternatives, and therefore irreversibly 
committed to seeing the project through to completion, even with evidence of escalating cost. 
 
Two case-studies for large scale rail projects, HSL-South and Betuweroute, in the Netherlands 
were designed by the author to test the assertions that psychologically, lock-in often led to cost 
overruns in publicly funded projects. Several indicators of lock-in were thus developed as 
indicated in Figure 3.6, such as ‘inflexibility and closure, ‘sunk capital’ in terms of time and cost, 
and the ‘need for justification’, for testing in the case studies.  From the documentary analysis of 
several reports, principally those prepared by an investigative committee set up by the Dutch 
government, and annual progress reports in relation to the timeline and history of the projects, 
six of the test indicators were noted as evident in the case study projects. Typically for the 
Betuweroute project, the investigative reports contained statements such as “the Betuweroute 
was put on the agenda before any research was carried out on the alternatives” and the solution 
was decided upon at a very early stage of the process”, an indicator of ‘inflexibility and closure, 
at the initial planning phase. Cantarelli et al. (2010) research, further revealed that several other 
alternatives, that could have been implemented, were not considered or were proposed far too 
late.   
 
 
Figure 3.7: Decision level Time Line                            Source: Cantarelli et al (2010) 
 
Content analysis of the various reports based on the indicators, was thus used to draw conclusive 
evidence on the role of lock-in in accounting for the over-commitment of the projects despite their 
escalating cost of the projects from inception to the decision to build (Figure 3.7).  
 
Figure 3.8: Project Level time line                                               Source: Cantarelli et al. (2010) 
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Cantarelli et al. (2010), however concludes that conscious lock-in, as intentional strategic 
behaviour, did not necessarily disprove technical explanations, which were asserted as equally 
as important, as technical issues, explained the cost growth recorded on the analysed projects 
afterwards on the project timeline (See Figure 3.8). 
  
Cantarelli et al.’s (2010) qualitative case study is a commendable context specific departure from 
other theoretical studies. However, a discernible shortcoming evident within the research design 
was the sole reliance on secondary information, from government reports and documents, which 
despite demonstrating cost growth in the projects, was inconclusive of practically demonstrating 
causality, with respect to the actual cost overrun recorded on completion. There was no form of 
primary data collection, such as interviews with the decision-makers or technical professionals 
in the institutions that executed the case study projects. The weakness and incorrect case study 
design, is thus evident, as Yin (2014), the seminal author of case studies, makes explicit the 
need for triangulating multiple strands of data within case study designs, to enhance internal and 
external validity This is considered methodologically relevant to draw more conclusive evidence 
of the effect of the identified factors on the levels of cost growth, amidst a possible array of other 
project specific incidentals. 
3.7.2 Latent Pathogens Framework by Love et al. (2012) 
Love et al. (2012) carried out a qualitative case study of cost overrun explanations in public 
building projects (Hospitals and schools), using a narrative, specific to the design of social 
infrastructure building projects.  
 
 Figure 3.9: Latent Pathogens Leading to Cost Overruns by Love et al. (2012) 
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The objective of the study was to understand the chain of intermediary events and actions of 
project participants that culminated in cost overruns, and whether any form of strategic 
misrepresentation was evident. A narrative framework was conceptualized (See Figure 3.9), 
showing that when a project commences, design consultants often proceed with highly optimistic 
intent of producing error-free design documentation. However, revisions are frequently 
undertaken on the initial design documents produced. As such, most design organizations have 
adopted circumstantial market-driven strategies, that define the quality of consultancy service 
offered relative to fees, to stay afloat in the competitive environment. It was stated: 
“Management within architectural firms focus on the administration of contracts and 
offices rather than the management of projects and practices” (Love et al., 2012: 3).  
 
Design quality offered in practice was thus conceptualized as a function of how fees are 
negotiated, with competitively procured services, yielding restricted consultancy services, in the 
face of the disproportionate and impracticable demands often imposed by the public sector. This 
latent condition, combined with the limited time frame available during the initial conceptual 
phases, activates trade-offs during the performance of tasks: design shortcuts against fee 
maximization, thereby setting off an additive chain of concomitant errors which creates significant 
‘error traps’. Such significant errors when discovered latter during the construction phase, may 
necessitate rework and variations, with the resultant resolution of conflicts and contractual 
disputes, leading to cost overruns.  
 
Pathogens as represented in the framework thus represent “the latent conditions that lay dormant 
within a system until an error comes to light” (Love et al., 2012: 3).  Such pathogens may thus 
be considered part and parcel of the everyday functioning in an organization, which are 
considered normal practice, because they have been in existence over a considerable period of 
time. But in actuality, such practices negate or significantly deviate from best practice. Love et 
al.’s framework thus maps out the practices within design organizations, that constitute the latent 
issues, which combine with errors to result in active failures. Several forms of pathogens were 
identified by Love et al. (2012: 3) as leading to errors in design organizations: 
“Practice: arising from people’s deliberate practices; Task: arising from the nature of the 
task being performed; Circumstance: arising from the situation or environment the 
project was operating in; Organization: arising from organizational structure or operation; 
System: arising from an organizational system”. 
 
Typical deliberate practices cited by Love et al. (2012: 3) as existing in design consultancy firms, 
was:  
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“the recycling of design details, specifications, and other contract documentation to 
reduce time and save money, without giving due consideration to the project’s bespoke 
nature”  
As such, design errors in the original contract documentation prepared by consultants, termed 
‘Latent organisational and circumstantial Pathogens’, serves as the blue print which fosters 
dysfunctional contractual climate, where corner cutting measures in consultant’s practices, and 
remedial tasks that ought to be taken, where stifled by their efforts at self-preservation. Using 
this narrative, twenty-four in-depth interviews with project participants who had been involved in 
the selected projects were conducted by Love and his co-authors. Allowing the researchers to 
gain an in-depth understanding of the contextual design based cost overrun triggers and errors, 
that each project experienced over its life span. From the data, Love and his colleagues 
developed the explanation for cost overruns within social infrastructure projects undertaken in 
Australian. This qualitative study by love et al. (2012) led to the following other principal findings 
traced as common to the projects studied: 
 
 Value for Money was subconsciously downplayed as clients did not adequately plan for 
project risks, whilst being over optimistic, as a fixed budget had already been set for the 
projects; 
 Initial project estimates were under-estimated by clients who did not account for potential 
hikes in material and local labour rates due to inflationary pressures; 
 A series of design related errors occasioned by client’s change related demands and 
pressures were placed on consultants, who were awarded contracts on the basis of 
lowest bid; 
 A culture of risk avoidance by clients and consultants, compounded by the typical 
inclination to adopt the lowest bid system of contracting and poor project management 
provided, served as a catalyst for the consultancy firms to exploit unethical avenues to 
maximize their fees and profits. 
 
Love et al. (2012) further emphasised that no evident form of strategic misrepresentation by 
clients were discerned, but a rather that of optimism bias, against the backdrop of political 
expediency and community pressures to satisfy user needs and to douse criticism by political 
opposition. It can further be inferred from the findings of Love et al. (2012), that in the Australian 
context, technical explanations as well as theories of game signalling advanced by Cantarelli et 
al. (2013), and efforts at risk avoidance, hypothetically conceptualised by Ganuza (2003), prevail, 
and not the assertions of strategic under-estimation by clients, asserted by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002).   
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Although the commendable empirical work of Love et al. (2012) generated a systematic 
qualitative framework of cost overrun explanations, emerging from primary data, it is lacking in 
the quantitative cost overrun data analysis, necessary to compliment the qualitative findings. As 
Yin (2014) prescribes, data from multiple sources strengthen the analytical generalisability and 
external validity of case studies, against the backdrop of its notable critique. This is also 
necessary, to overcome the several critiques which plague the output of purely qualitative 
research, resounded by advocates of methodological pluralism in construction management 
research (Dainty, 2007). These shortcomings may thus undermine the external validity of Love 
et al.’s study, as being no more than ideographic. Furthermore, Love et al.’s study uses a 
technical narrative contextualised in the development of building infrastructure in the Australian 
setting, which may limit the generalisability of the developed framework to developing countries 
or the specific context of highway projects.  
3.7.3 Relay Race Project Governance Evolution Framework by Gil and Lundriganm (2012) 
Gil and Lundriganm (2012) carried out comprehensive case studies on three mega projects that 
experienced massive cost growth in the UK, namely: London’s Crossrail project, the London 
2012 Olympic Games project, and BAA’s Heathrow Terminal two. The study was based on 60 
in-depth interviews with project leaders and all other key stakeholders, organised site visits, and 
archival project data. The cases were used as models of relay-races in mega projects, where the 
transitory phases of projects, represent points of handover of the baton of project leadership from 
the principal client to other key stakeholders (See Figure 3.10). 
Figure 3.10: Relay Baton Handovers                           Source: Gil and Lundriganm (2012) 
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Gil and Lundriganm (2012) thus conceptualised a ‘relay race’ framework for understanding cost 
growth, founded in the dynamics of project governance, amidst conflicting stakeholder interest 
and competitive strive for leadership in mega projects, which fosters design changes. This was 
explained as characteristic of mega projects, where ‘the client is a multi-headed organization 
because the different clients may feel entitled to be in control’ (Gil and Lundriganm 2012:4).  As 
such with differences in skills and competence of the race team (leaders), inconsistencies are 
generated, which pose a critical managerial challenge that often culminates in cost overruns, 
over the project phases, as shown in Figure 3.11. 
 
Figure 3.11: Contestants in Mega Project Leadership      Source: Gil and Lundriganm (2012) 
 
The concept of the relay race is such that at the initial inception phase of a project, the proposal 
tendered by a scheme promoter, may have been initially rejected (depicted in yellow lines as an 
idea bouncing off in Figure 3.11), but later gains acceptance (the idea gains momentum: red line) 
within a sponsoring public agency (referred to as the principal). The idea now has to be 
developed, and presented to decision makers for approval, who are conceptualised as having 
limited in-house technical abilities. This then implies that specialists with higher level of technical 
and managerial skills, have to be employed to put together a compelling case for the proposal to 
be approved. Aside from this technical requirement, the views of various stakeholders, future 
financial sponsors, and the general public, has to be incorporated, to facilitate the lobbying 
process. This shifts the emphasis from the more technical focus, and in the process, the project 
will significantly evolve, with changes in design and scope warranted by trade-offs and 
simultaneous negotiations necessary to gain political will. The time lag over which this takes 
place is the gestation period, during which generated controversies surrounding the proposed 
scheme will have been doused, with corresponding radical changes to the scheme made.  
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This thus sets the stage for elasticity in the project cost profile, as the project decision makers 
with lower levels of technical competence, invariably determine changes to the scope of projects 
and approve budget outlays. It was thus stated: 
“Crucially, the promoter-led early negotiations at gestation with relevant stakeholders, 
and which are instrumental to gain political and financial endorsement for the scheme 
and support judgment calls, will frame the future institutional and organizational context 
under which the megaproject will be delivered, governed, and eventually operated” (Gil 
and Lundriganm (2012:7) 
  
Over the usually long gestation periods often associated with mega projects, inflation and other 
project and location specific incidentals may set in and further compound the issue. The project 
after approval falls back squarely under the managerial jurisdiction of the public agency, who 
now have to negotiate for technical competence with the project delivery agent (main contractor: 
blue line) to ‘manage the fragmented supply chains (dark brown line) that will ultimately design 
and deliver the project. The design and delivery phase now marks a new era of negotiations and 
shift in technical competence, as the contractor often re-negotiates the initially approved outlay, 
from a position of technical expertise (supplied by the agent’s delivery partner: dashed blue line), 
in the light of his perception of risks inherent in the project and new information which may have 
emerged over the period of gestation. Requisite changes to designs will now have to be made, 
and financial commitments renegotiated.   
 
Gil and Lundriganm (2012), thus concluded that over this period of multiple re-negotiations and 
design evolution, the project will have experienced significant cost growth. This matched the 
empirical evidence gathered and analysed in the three case studies. The London’s Crossrail, 
London 2012 Olympic Park, and BAA’s, were shown by Gil and Lundriganm (2012) to have all 
experienced strikingly similar relay race narratives, accounting for the significant disparity 
between their final costs and initial approved budget figures. 
3.7.4 Core and Periphery Hybrid Meta-Organisation Theory by Lundriganm and Gill (2013) 
Lundriganm and Gill (2013), further argued that megaprojects are a hybrid form of meta-
organization, with cost overruns intricately dependent on its hierarchical technical decision 
making core, enveloped in a permeable membrane, which allows for osmotic diffusion from 
peripheral actors to exert influence over designing and building activities. Lundriganm and Gill 
(2013: 1), thus described public agencies as open systems, where by the organisations have to 
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adapt and align their product (projects) to the environment (stakeholders and political) they are 
designing for, and which they cannot control, stating: 
“At the core, a flat collective shares control over the system-level goal and design 
requirements; its membership mirrors the organization…At the periphery, a transactional 
collective… that has no technical rights over the requirements… megaproject’s designs 
are processed by a diffuse network of self-interested actors: land owners; planning 
authorities; private firms; funders, over whom no single entity has formal authority”. 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Core and Periphery Framework                   Source: Lundriganm and Gill (2013) 
 
Using the same set of case study projects (London’s Olympic, London’s Crossrail, and Heathrow 
Airport’s Terminal-2) as the relay race theory, the authors conceptualised two distinct 
developmental paths as shown in Figure 3.12. Either one of which mega public projects need to 
go through, which makes them distinctive, and thus account for the recorded levels of cost 
overruns. These were referred to as ‘parading’ and ‘the hard way’. Lundriganm and Gill (2013: 
1) thus stated that 
“These developmental paths underlie the evolution of the megaproject organization 
towards a configuration to fit the environment”  
 
Through a longitudinal study of the development of the case study projects, it was shown that 
the Olympic project adopted the parading the route, in which lobbying and informal pledges 
between the core (technical actors) and the periphery (stakeholders), led to the speedy approval 
of the project, leaving it with renegotiated designs and escalated financial commitments. 
However, the hard way, which is sticking strictly to the initial technical proposal, was adopted by 
the other two projects, still had a similar effect on cost growth, due to the lengthier gestation 
period: 
         Core member 
         Periphery member 
         Periphery boundary 
         Core boundary 
KEY 
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“Heathrow T2, a relatively ‘small’ megaproject took approximately the same time as the 
Olympics in gestation, whereas the Crossrail gestation took almost four times more after 
two decades of failed attempts….” (Lundriganm and Gill, 2013:5). 
 
It was thus concluded that: 
 
“The environment will change and hence the core must adapt the requirements and its 
own configuration to stay fit” (Lundriganm and Gill 2013:5). 
 
Lundriganm and Gill (2013) thus stated that this important distinction between megaprojects core 
and the peripheral settings, often results in a ‘meta-organization of managed ecosystems’, even 
though temporary, can last decades from the embryonic stage, through gestation, to delivery, 
and lead to significant cost overruns.  
 
3.7.5 Project Uncertainty Framework by Johansen (2015) 
Johansen (2015) asserted that the ‘concept of uncertainty’ in projects largely accounted for 
underestimation leading to cost overruns. This was based on case studies of seven large projects 
in the energy sector and five projects in the public sector in Norway. Interviews and surveys 
regarding the uncertainty management of these projects were conducted, with questionnaires 
distributed to a representative selection of participants related to the projects. The questionnaires 
were distributed to 2701 persons, and overall there was a response rate of 29.7%. Johansen 
(2015) concluded that cost estimates normally increase over time due to organizational and 
project specific uncertainties. 
 
The cost overruns experienced on the projects, Johansen (2015), revealed were not necessarily 
indicative of their successes or failure, but rather were representative of reflexive adaptions in 
response to uncontrollable uncertainties, that arose during project execution, necessary to fulfil 
the project objectives (as illustrated in Figure 3.13). His argument was however that there was 
undue emphasis in the literature on cost overruns in projects, from clients’ perspective, which 
represented a narrow front-ended debate.  
 
Uncertainty from the owner’s, project manager’s or contractors’ view thus do not solely account 
for project underestimation/cost overruns. His assertion was thus that there are a multitude of 
controllable and uncontrollable contextual factors in projects which cannot be captured 
irrespective of the state of the art risk analysis tools deployed. 
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Figure 3.13: Project Uncertainty Framework                                      Source: Johansen (2015) 
 
Uncertainty in a single project can be due to the technical solution, the building process, the time 
needed to deliver activities and the objectives, the cost of the different components, which are 
controllable. However, different uncontrollable uncertainty factors played a part in the execution 
of the projects, such as strategic uncertainty and contextual uncertainty that happen because of 
changes in the organization and changes in the local and the global environment within which 
the project were executed, even when the projects were able to ‘stick to the plan’ for as long as 
possible.  
 
Johansen (2015), thus concluded that managing uncertainty with small time, and cost buffers as 
well as handling a lot of foreseen and unforeseen uncertainties in a complex environment, with 
various stakeholders with different expectations and demands is a difficult task that led to cost 
overruns in the projects analysed. Johansen’s (2015) uncertainty framework shares the 
characteristics of Gil and Lundriganm (2012; 2013) Relay Race versus Core and Periphery 
theories, which emphasize the multiplicity of risks and often competing/clashing interest groups 
in public projects, as accounting for cost overruns in public projects. 
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3.7.6 The ‘Vicious Cycle of Short-Funding and Delays' Narrative by Morris (1990) 
The preceding empirical narratives have all being conceptualised within the context of the 
developed world. The only case study found, which is contextualised in a developing country, 
and which provided a qualitative narrative explaining cost overruns in public projects, despite a 
comprehensive literature search by the researcher, is a relatively older study by Morris (1990) in 
India, carried out 26 years ago. Nonetheless, the findings from Morris (1990) less contemporary 
study, is considered by the researcher, to have significant implications for this study, by virtue of 
its setting in a developing nation. 
 
Morris (1990) noted that for public sector projects in India, cost and time overruns were unusually 
very high. Cost overruns were on average 92% while time overruns were 192%. Morris (1990) 
carried out a case study of public projects, and analysing project cost overrun and time overrun 
data, as well as individual project reports on the cases, provided by the Committee on Public 
Undertakings (CPU) in India, to account for the wasted `capital in infrastructure projects. It was 
argued that a vicious cycle of events, accounted for project cost overruns in publicly funded 
infrastructure projects. This argument was raised in response to an on-going debate on economic 
stagnation in developing countries. It was queried:  
“Are the delays and cost escalation due primarily to bureaucratic styles of functioning? 
How far are the individual enterprises responsible? Are there genuine problems arising 
out of technical difficulties, inadequate experience, of learning by doing, additional costs 
of technological self-reliance, additional costs arising from price preference for domestic 
contractors and suppliers which cannot be set right by administrative reform alone? It is 
important to have the answers to these questions before the appropriate policy initiatives 
are made to push the Public Sector in the direction of greater efficiency” (Morris, 1990: 
155). 
 
The principal contentions and findings of the study by Morris (1990) were thus:  
 
 Short funding of projects was the primary trigger for cost overruns. This was revealed 
from the analysis of sectorial pattern of capital outlay in annual budgets for different 
sectors, which provided evidence that the Indian Government was spreading thin, its 
financial resources, with the transportation sector accorded the lowest budget due to its 
priority status. The evidence showed that ratio of throw-forward, which is the equivalent 
of anticipated cost less accrued expenditure, was predominantly excessive. As such 
funds adequate for the full and timely completion of three to four projects were spread-
out too thinly to accommodate up to six to seven projects. This practice thereby stretches 
project completion times for committed projects beyond the anticipated completion time, 
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a period over which inflation would also creep in. Even with significant backlog of 
uncompleted projects, further projects were being initiated; 
 
 Content analysis of 94 out of the 99 available project reports revealed such phrases 
alluding to inadequate project preparation, planning and implementation:  
"Project monitoring is absent’; ‘Planning is non-existent/weak’; ‘Much divergence 
between the project report and the Project as it was actually implemented’, ‘Project 
report not backed up by ground surveys’; ‘Estimates were based on inadequate 
data"(Morris, 1990: 158); 
 
 The trend analysis in the pattern of cost overruns, revealed that the high priority sectors, 
such as petroleum and natural gas, displayed half the national average cost overrun. 
Infra-structural investments like roads and railways on the other hand mostly 
experienced more than 100% cost overrun, with a capital (waste) factor' in excess of 
250% due to delays. Morris (1990) although acknowledging other technical factors as 
major underlying factors accounting for cost overruns, thus stated the political expedient 
tendency of public authorities in developing countries to initiate a large number of 
projects, only to short fund them all, except for the ones accorded a high priority;  
 
 It was further concluded that poor performance in the principal sectors of the economy 
like power, coal and steel, have also triggered a chain reaction effect which has led to 
loss of output and to higher costs leading to delays and cost overrun elsewhere in the 
economy, particularly infrastructure projects.  
 
The interesting theoretical narrative offered by Morris (1990:154), as explanatory to cost 
overruns in public projects is thus quoted: 
“Factors internal to the public sector system and Government largely account for the 
delays and cost overruns… Appraisal by the Government very often is devoid of 
meaning when the emphasis is only on the form of the project proposal rather than on 
its content- a tendency quite usual in bureaucracies. Since the public enterprises 
particularly those in the core sector have large dealings with each other, a vicious circle 
of delays has been built up. The politically expedient tendency to take up large numbers 
of projects and short fund them all, except those with the very highest priority, is perhaps 
the most important factor in delays. The Government's ad hoc approach in according 
high priority to certain sectors- oil and natural gas, and petroleum- while perhaps 
overcoming the problem in these sectors have compounded the problem elsewhere, 
particularly in the infra-structural areas”. 
 
Mansfield et al. (1994) also made a similar assertion as Morris (1990) within the context of 
highway development in Nigeria, pointing major technical shortcomings in Nigerian highway 
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delivery, based on questionnaire analysis. The authors described the typical scenario in Nigeria 
which often led to funding shortfalls: “Projects are rushed at their commencement, with political 
sensitivities overriding the need for detailed preparation of project plans and estimates” 
(Mansfield et al. 1994:256). However, this was expressed as an opinion, and was not based on 
any form of qualitative data collection or analysis.  
 
The narrative provided by Morrison (1990), is further noted, as contextually very distinctive from 
all the other empirical narratives analysed by the researcher, although no form of supplementary 
primary data collection was sourced, apart from documents/archival data, was evident in the 
study. The dynamics of under-development and shortcomings in the technical capabilities of 
public agencies, plays out a lot more in Morris (1990) study, which underscores the basis of the 
researcher’s fundamental rationale for carrying out this research: that the institutional setting of 
public project delivery in the developed and developing world are very different. This study is 
thus framed within the lenses of the geotechnical difficulties, experienced by public highway 
agencies in the delivery of highway infrastructure, in view of the peculiar geologic setting of the 
Niger Delta region, which may trigger cost overruns, juxtaposed against the backdrop of the 
politico-economic setting of Nigeria as a developing nation. 
 
3.8 Critical Literature Synthesis: Moving Beyond Abstract Postulations/Superficiality to 
Context Specific Studies, with In-depth Qualitative Narratives and Quantitative Outcomes 
 
The varying explanations for cost overrun experienced on public highway projects, critically 
analysed in the literature review, can be broadly dichotomised into: 
 Technical explanations which point out how projects fall short of the requirements of best 
practice, along with how unintentional errors in forecasting, coupled with 
uncertainties/unpredictable events, can invariably lead to cost growth.  
 Theoretical explanations which attribute the prevalence of high levels of cost overruns 
to the inherent internal dynamics of public sector investments which tend to deliberately 
or subconsciously downplay technical requirements.  
 
From the critical analysis of the literature, it can also be discerned that out of this lot, there are a 
plethora of methodologically simplistic empirical technical studies, which either list out factors, 
generate a typology of explanations, or carryout correlative studies on cost overrun trends and 
project. The researcher also notes that several of the quantitative empirical studies mostly deploy 
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exploratory statistical tools to deduce conclusive inference. Typically, the use of correlation and 
factor analysis, which should be used as a preliminary exploratory tool to detect association, 
structure or collinearity amongst groups of variables, is often used as an inferential statistical tool 
to draw conclusions on cause-effect relationships.  
 
On the other hand, in the bulk of theoretical research on cost overruns, the high level of abstract 
theorising without the merits of empirical evidence in the literature, as well as the lack of texture 
and context, required to understand project specific causes of cost overruns, and how these 
varying explanations complement and link to each other, in accounting for recorded project cost 
overruns, is a notable shortcoming. No project specific narrative account of events from empirical 
data, is tendered.  
 
It would thus appear that most explanations for such a ‘practical project information oriented 
concept’ as cost overruns, which requires a clear narrative of the network of causal events 
(process) that led to the specific quantity of cost overrun (outcome), are in a state of lock-in. This 
shortcoming was noted by Love et al. (2012), as depicted in Figure 3.14, whereby each node 
represents an event or circumstance that triggers the next in the chain of events.  
 
Figure 3.14: Counterfactual Causal Chains/Case Histories Leading to Cost Overruns 
                                                                         Source: Love et al. (2012) 
 
Providing details of how events unfold in a counterfactual path dependent analysis, useful to 
provide a history to projects, is mostly lacking. Methodological inertia in artificialised opinion 
survey, lack of rigour, and imaginative theorising without concrete facts, are thus dominant in the 
bulk of the existing literature. The lack of demonstrable causality, context and outcomes by 
majority of technical and theoretical research on cost overruns, thus constitutes the argument of 
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more contemporary scholars researching on cost overruns (Love et al. 2012; Ahiaga-Dagbui et 
al. 2014; 2015; Love, 2015).  
 
Ahiaga-Dagbui et al. (2015), described the bulk of research centred on investigating the 
phenomena of cost overruns as ‘superficial, replicative and stagnated’, often more generating 
questions than answers. Ahiaga-Dagbui et al. (2015), further stated that the inferences drawn 
from most empirical studies were lacking in depth, based on simplistic correlative analysis which 
did not demonstrate cause and effect relationship with the recorded cost overruns in projects, 
and only just managed to scratch the surface of this complex phenomena plaguing construction 
projects. Ahiagu-Dugbai et al. (2014), argued that there needs to be more useful and robust 
research, targeted at understanding the propagation of cost overruns on a project specific basis, 
which could serve as platforms for Reference Class Forecasting (RFC) during decision making 
in future projects.  
 
Ahiagu-Dugbai et al. (2014:40), thus underscored the need to fill in this evident gap in the 
literature on cost overruns, stating: “More robust explanations of overruns need to factor-in 
process and product, as well as sources of changes to scope”.  
  
Figure 3.15: Generic Model of Explanation to Cost Overruns by Ahiagu-Dugbai et al. (2014) 
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 Calling for further research to bridge the gap between theory of cost under estimation and cost 
overruns recorded in practice as shown in Figure 3.15, Ahiagu-Dugbai et al. (2014) identified the 
need to account for the network of interactions amongst factors and drivers accounting for cost 
growth, in other to provide less disjointed and holistic explanations to cost overruns. Love (2015), 
further reiterated this stance by advocating the need for studies which incorporate the insider 
perspectives (Practice) within highway organisations, to complement the outsider perspective 
(Theory). 
 
 A few distinctive empirical theoretical narratives as outlined in the literature review, have 
however used more comprehensive frameworks as context specific theories, explaining cost 
growth from the inception to the completion of public projects: 
 
 Morris’ (1990) Vicious short-funding and delays vicious cycle in India 
 Cantarelli et al’s (2010) Theory of lock-in and path dependency in the Netherlands;  
 Love et al’s (2012) Latent pathogens narrative of social infrastructure in Australia; 
 Gil and Lundriganm (2012) “Relay Race” framework of project governance in the UK 
 Lundriganm and Gil’s (2013) Core and periphery framework in the UK 
 Johansen’s (2015) Uncertainty framework in Norway 
 
Quantifying the contributory powers of the cost overrun factors identified in these theoretical 
frameworks, however, is also a necessary prelude to improving the accuracy of cost estimates, 
by isolating and catering for the identified cost overrun variables. This underscores the need for 
generating complementary quantitative explanatory cost overrun models. The trend in the 
literature reveals innovative approaches which have been sparsely used to investigate and model 
cost overrun relationships in projects. Typically: the use of probabilistic simulations to set 
contingency margins; data mining as a precursor to network modelling of non-linear cause-effect 
relationships accounting for project cost overruns; regression modelling to define the magnitude 
of cost overrun inducible by specific project variables; as well as the use of CBR models to aid 
in decision making for future projects, has been demonstrated by various studies.  
 
These modelling techniques have however never been used in the literature to develop 
explanatory models of cost overrun trends in tandem with contextual narratives. It is thus 
observed that the few sparse, more methodologically robust studies, either mostly provide valid 
qualitative theoretical explanations (process) or quantitatively analyse project data and recorded 
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cost overrun outcomes in projects (product). No study has been identified by the researcher as 
incorporating and linking both strands to the argument on cost overruns in highway projects, 
relevant to provide more comprehensive contextual explanations. This study in furtherance of 
the incisive observations of Love et al. (2012), as well as Ahiagu-Dugbai et al. (2014) identifies 
the need for more comprehensive and context based qualitative approach, complimented by the 
utilisation of project cost data modelling techniques. Further to these observations, Cantarelli et 
al (2012:50) emphasises the need for context based studies, specifically in relation to individual 
countries, stating:  
“Without a general tendency in country specific studies towards lower or higher average 
cost overruns…, it remains difficult to make inferences about individual countries ... This 
therefore supports the need for further research into country specific cost performance 
of transport infrastructure projects”. 
 
These evident shortcomings in the literature, sets the agenda for this research. This study 
attempts to fill the identified gap in the literature, by investigating geotechnical explanations to 
cost overruns, using a robust and thoughtfully designed mix of methods  
 
3.9 Theoretical Framework 
Considering the numerous studies in the local literature, identifying the potential limitations in 
Nigerian engineering practice, the researcher has adopted Love et al. (2012) latent pathogen 
theory, and the ‘Vicious Cycle of Short-funding and Delays' Narrative by Morris (1990), as the 
theoretical framework for this study. It is thus hypothesized that: Geotechnical pathogens will 
often lay dormant within the linear process configuration of design and cost estimating in highway 
organizations, but will be unintentionally triggered, culminating in significant cost overruns during 
the post-contract phase, as the project team deal with their delay effect and funding requirement. 
Geotechnically induced latent pathogens, as plausible explanations for cost overruns are thus 
specifically investigated in this study. Therefore, although other triggers to cost overruns are 
acknowledged as present in highway projects, the study primarily sets off to investigate 
geologic/geotechnical factors that explains cost overruns. The researcher thus seeks to explore 
explanatory perspectives that are reflective of poor geotechnical input in pre-contract 
preparation, and how these account for increased cost overruns, using a technical narrative more 
applicable to highway projects, and contextualised within the geologic setting of the Niger Delta 
region.  
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3.10 Chapter Summary 
Cost overruns in highway projects have been shown to be a topical issue, which has attracted a 
lot of negative public and media attention. A wide array of studies, have thus dwelt on, and 
analysed why cost overruns, seem to be an ever present feature of construction projects, 
particularly in those executed by public agencies. This chapter, has taken a comprehensive and 
critical outlook at the various approaches that have been used to explain the phenomena of cost 
overruns in public projects, with a view to establish the theoretical and methodical lenses through 
which past studies have been conducted. The outcome of the critical analysis, has revealed that 
several gaps in the literature exist in terms of: the lack of robust evidence to support the 
assertions that geotechnical risks impact on cost overrun levels in highway projects; the limited 
contextual specificity of studies; the paucity of methodologically robust explanatory approaches; 
and the exclusivity and cluster in the geographical spread of qualitative narratives, to the 
developed world, which is mostly not reflective of developing nations such as those on the African 
continent. In response to these identified gaps, this study is structured, as a distinctive and 
significant departure from previous studies on cost overruns. Chapter four provides a detailed 
outline of the research methodology, adopted in this study, necessary to provide explanations to 
the unusually high level of cost overruns recorded by highway agencies in the peculiar wetland 
terrain of the Niger Delta. This is against the backdrop of the techno-economic and Institutional 
setting of Nigeria as a developing country. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Research Methodology  
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the research methodology, which is the overall framework that served as a 
guide on all aspects of conducting this study. A distinction is however made between the terms 
Method and Methodology, which are often used interchangeably. Research method refers to “a 
more or less consistent and coherent way of thinking about and making [collecting] data, way of 
interpreting and analysing data, and way of judging the resulting theoretical outcome”  (Morse 
and Richards, 2002:10). Whereas Creswell (2003: 5), defines research methodology as: “A 
strategy or plan of action that links methods to outcomes and governs our choice and use of 
methods. A proposition reinforced by Farrell (2011), who described methodology as the design 
of research at a strategic level.  
Others, such as Saunders et al. (2009:34) definition of research methodology, however, 
emphasises less on the practicalities of conducting a research, and more on its underlying 
theoretical underpinning, referring to it as: “The theory of how research should be undertaken”. 
With Holden and Lynch, (2004:397) contending that that: “Research should not be 
methodologically led, rather that methodological choice should be consequential to the 
researcher’s philosophical stance”. 
This implies that the logic and philosophical underpinnings of a study should be encompassed 
in the research methodology, and should therefore inform the specification of the research 
methods that are practically deployed in the investigation of a problem (Dainty, 2008). Creswell 
(2003) thus recommends that the research methodology should serve as a basic guide on all 
aspects of a study, from shaping the broader philosophical ideas that are brought to a study, 
down to the specifics of data collection and analysis.  
Conceptualisation of the research methodology of this study, therefore, was projected in multiple 
and interactive layers, as an interwoven synthesis, of informed decisions made at the 
philosophical, strategic and practical levels. (Gajendran, 2011). As Farrell (2011:23) 
underscores, “there is need for a detailed description of each step of the research process”, the 
components of the research methodology adopted in this study, are presented and explicitly 
defined exhaustively, in a hierarchical order, visualised in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: Research Methodology of this Study 
It therefore followed that in the discussion of the research methodology of this study, these multi-
layered interactive constituents had to be clarified, and a logical justification provided, to support 
the choices made at each layer. The elements of the research methodology adopted in the 
conduct of this study, are thus presented in a coherent flow of well-articulated philosophical 
arguments and theoretical positioning, grounded in an existing and widely recognised body of 
knowledge, covering all aspects of academic enquiry at doctoral level.  
4.1 Research Philosophy 
The term ‘Philosophy’, as used in general premise, refers to a ‘system of beliefs and assumption 
about the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existences’ (Oxford Dictionary, 2014). 
Philosophy in the domain of academic enquiry, provide the framework for how a research project 
is conducted, based on the researcher’s beliefs and assumptions, concerning what is valid as 
knowledge, and what process should be used to attain that knowledge (Guba and Lincoln, 2005; 
Saunders et al., 2009). For instance, Saunders et al., (2009:107) espouse:  
Research Type 
Research Reasoning 
Philosophy 
Method 
Geostatistical/Them
atic/Regression/Cog
nitive Mapping 
Exploratory/Descriptive /Explanatory 
Inductive-Deductive 
Critical Realism 
Mixed Methods 
Primary-secondary 
Case Study 
           Interview, Documents, Archives 
 
Qualitative and Geo-Spatial 
Quantitative Archival Analysis 
Data types 
Research Strategy 
Data Collection 
Analysis 
Techniques 
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“Our values can have an important impact on the research we decide to pursue and the 
way in which we pursue it. This may not lead to any form of discord, but it may mean 
that some observers accuse us of untoward bias.   
  
As such, the philosophy of a research, though mostly an abstract entity, emanates in the way the 
work is written (Holden and Lynch, 2004). A vast array of terminologies has been used by 
different authors in the scholarly literature, to describe and explain the philosophy of research: 
Knowledge claims; Philosophical assumptions; Epistemologies and ontologies; Paradigms; 
Knowledge claims; World views (Crotty, 1998; Mertens, 1998; Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Creswell, 
2003; Creswell and Clark, 2011).  
 
Typically, within the context of social enquiry, Blake (2005) described research paradigms, as 
the broader philosophical and theoretical traditions, which have served to provide a platform for 
addressing and understanding social issues. Blake (2005), consequently asserted that, research 
paradigms provide a platform for the application of logic, in the linkage of people’s experiences 
and perceptions, within the wider context of the social world in which they inhabit. In this context, 
Blake (2005) used the term ‘research paradigms’, to describe the theoretical underpinnings of 
enquiry, which is shaped by particular ways of viewing the social world, and the comprehension 
that stems from such views. Creswell and Clark (2011), however, described the terms World 
view and Paradigm as being synonymous with the term research philosophy. Creswell and Clark 
(2011), traced the terms back to their origin in the 1970’s, when Kuhn defined paradigm as a set 
of generalizations and beliefs common to a specialised discipline. Creswell and Clark (2011), 
further, distinguished it from current usage, by describing research philosophy as the 
commonality in the shared beliefs and values of researchers, and how this affects the way 
research is conducted. 
 
It is therefore necessary that the philosophical stance taken, and assumptions made, about how 
and what will be learnt, in the process of conducting this research, is explicitly elucidated, as it 
informed the overall structure of the study, reporting, as well as the manner in which data was 
collected, analysed and interpreted.  
4.2 Elements of the Research Philosophy  
There are four major dimensions of research philosophy, about which core assumptions 
concerning the conduct of this research, were made: ontology, epistemology, axiology and 
rhetoric (Creswell, 2003; Grey, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009).  These ontological, epistemological, 
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axiological and rhetorical strands, thus shaped the reasoning about how this research was 
conducted. They are thus defined apriori, as the basis on which the subsequent critical evaluation 
of the research philosophies was made in section 4.3, necessary to select and adopt the most 
suitable orientation for the study, in providing a robust explanation, for the phenomenon of cost 
overruns experienced in highway projects.  
4.2.1 Ontology 
Grey (2009) explains ontology as an understanding of what reality is, i.e. the perception of what 
exists out there in the world (Hughes, 1990). It is thus a reflection of what the researcher views 
as being reality. At the ontological level of research philosophy, Saunders et al., (2009) mapped 
out two extremes of this scale; Objectivism and subjectivism, which frame the lenses with which 
researchers look at social phenomena (Grey, 2014).  The objective school of thought isolates 
reality from social external influences, as opposed to the subjective, which emphasizes that 
reality is shaped by social forces. Hughes, (1990) therefore summarised the question of ontology, 
as hinging on the nature and significance of empirical inquiry, as to whether or not the world is 
factual.  
 
With this outlook, an ontological stance of either to: adopt a singular (A world exists out there 
independent of our knowledge); or multiple (There are several ways of viewing the world), 
perception of reality, was taken. This decision was however made, in tandem with the intrinsic 
nature of the phenomenon being investigated: ‘Cost overruns in highway projects’, with a view 
to provide a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of it.  
4.2.2 Epistemology 
This relates to the fundamental belief of a researcher concerning what constitutes knowledge. 
Epistemology is focused on how people identify knowledge and the standards that determine 
what can be said to be knowledge. Hughes (1990) used the phrases: “What counts as fact?”, 
and “What is the character of our knowledge of the world?” to describe epistemology. 
Epistemology of research thus hinges primarily on what is considered acceptable knowledge for 
a particular field or a particular study (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
In this vain, the researcher’s perception of the nature of knowledge, and what is considered valid 
as constituting knowledge, dictated the approach to this study. Therefore, the legitimacy of 
knowledge as adopted in this study, was established at the epistemological level (Grey, 2014). 
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This inherently manifested in terms of the level of bias introduced in this study i.e. whether the 
researcher maintained an objective distance from the facts, or infused a subjective presence 
(researcher’s/participants’) into the research, as later elucidated. 
4.2.3 Axiology 
The axiological strand of the research philosophy revolves around what values go into conducting 
the research (Heron, 1996; Creswell, 2003; Saunders et al. 2009).  Axiology emphasizes the role 
of values on the conduct of a research and its effect on the credibility of research outcomes, as 
either being value laden or value free (Saunders et al., 2009). Researchers thus clearly recognize 
and acknowledge the impact of their values on study outcomes, if value laden.  
 
The axiology of the study, thus defined how the values of the researcher were either been 
expressed in the study or conducted independent of the researcher’s values (Grey, 2009). As 
subsequently elaborated, it informed the choices made by the researcher in collecting evidence, 
and the mode of reporting the study findings. The axiology of the research therefore, was 
articulated explicitly in all facets of the research.  
 
Axiology as such, covers issues of rhetoric in terms of reporting findings, and how validity was 
ensured within the context of this study. Brinberg and McGrath (1985:19) described rhetorical 
issues within the process of research as:  
                  “The identification, selection, combination and use of elements and relations from the 
conceptual, methodological and substantive domains of a research study to ensure 
validity of research findings”. 
 
Brinberg and McGrath (1985) explained that rhetoric can be inferred, from the way a research is 
conceptualized and articulated. As it is dependent on the value or worth attached by the 
researcher, as to what is considered important in the subject domain, it determined which 
measures were logically taken to ensure generalisability, or a lack thereof, in this study. Typically 
claims to generalisability are not made in reporting findings, if the philosophical basis of the 
research assumes multiple realities and acknowledges subjectivity as to what constitutes 
knowledge (Blake, 2005). In this vain, such study outcome may be considered ideographic, and 
analytic generalizations, nested within the confines of the specific setting, which adds to the 
knowledge domain may be made (Yin, 2014). 
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4.3 Research Philosophies 
There are major philosophical positions or knowledge claims adopted by researchers in the 
conduct of research. Various authors (Creswell, 2003; Grey, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009) have 
categorised these philosophical positions using varying terminology, often with some level of 
fuzziness, lacking in explicit distinction.  For instance, Creswell (2003) outlined four distinct 
philosophical stances or theoretical perspectives in research, namely: Post-Positivism; 
Constructivism; Advocacy/participatory and Pragmatism. Whilst Grey (2009) suggested the main 
philosophical positions include: Positivism; Interpretivism (Phenomenology, Symbolic 
Interactionism, Hermeneutics and Naturalistic Enquiry); Critical Enquiry; Feminism and Post-
Modernism. Finally, both authors views are challenged by Saunders et al. (2009) who discussed 
these philosophical views on the basis of four categories: Positivism; Realism; Interpretivism and 
Pragmatism, defining the relativity of epistemological and ontological stances, as an onion bulb.  
                                                                          
Despite these different world views discussed, Positivism and Interpretivism, are consistently 
discussed in the literature, in relation to their contrasting ontological, epistemological and 
axiological stances, with a third world view, Pragmatism, presented as a combination of both 
approaches in the more recent literature (Saunders et al., 2009; Creswell and Clark, 2011). The 
debate in the literature, thus appears to be centred on the two extremes of positivism and 
interpretivism, as to what is reality, and what therefore should constitute knowledge. Positivism 
is repeatedly cited in the array of research philosophies, owing to the fact that it is the foremost 
research approach, while Interpretivism and pragmatism have emerged as distinct classes of 
post-positivists philosophies.  On this basis therefore, the discussion of the literature on the 
multiplicity of philosophical stances, has been delineated and synthesized along these three 
broader divisions of the Positivist, Interpretivist and Pragmatist perspectives. 
 
4.3.1 Positivist/ Post-Positivist Philosophical Stance 
Grey (2009) reported that positivism was the dominant philosophical stance in the 1930’s, 
through to the 1960’s. This philosophical stance is based on the epistemological view that, the 
world exists externally and independent of the researcher, and that knowledge comes from 
observing the world around us (Creswell, 2003; Blake, 2007). It has been described as a 
theoretical stance analogous to working with observable facts, similar to the research tradition of 
the natural scientist or the physical sciences (Sanders et al., 2009).   
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A term used by Blake (2007) to describe positivism was ‘Empiricism’. Blake (2007) described 
positivism as being based on the key assumption, that knowledge can only be produced by the 
objective usage of the human senses, and that this is the only sure and reliable basis on which 
research can be conducted.  Saunders et al. (2009) suggested that following the positivist 
tradition, the trained researcher should carry out a study scientifically, using and applying 
standard established procedures. Blake (2007) described the positivist philosophical stance as 
“Having an undistorted contact with reality”. Additionally, Blake (2007) further stated, this 
ultimately depicts value neutrality, necessary to yield an accurate representation of reality. In this 
way the researcher is seen as a ‘subject’ trying to study an ‘object’. 
 
In the 1980’s the core principle of the positivist school of thought was broadened to reflect post-
positivist views. This was based on an intellectual movement, which defied the absolute finality 
of the positivist tradition. This post-positivist stance challenged the traditional notion of absolute 
truth of knowledge, based on the reasoning that the positivist tradition was not applicable 
particularly when studying the behavior of humans. Saunders et al. (2009) description of Realism 
appears synonymous with this post-positivist stance. The proponents of this school of thought, 
asserted that knowledge is conjectural, and that absolute truth can never be found, as it 
continuously changes in the light of new findings emanating from social reality.  
 
The key attributes of the post-positivists philosophical stance are summarised by Creswell 
(2003): 
 That knowledge is imperfect and therefore refutable; 
 That research is a process of continuous refinement of knowledge in the light of stronger 
evidence; 
 Rationality, data and evidence are the defining basis of what constitutes knowledge; 
 The reduction of ideas into discrete numeric measures of observation is pivotal;  
 The generation of generalizable causal statements is the central focus of inquiry; 
 Objectivity is central to ensuring reliability and validity. 
4.3.2 Interpretivism 
This is the major philosophical stance that has been identified in the literature as critical, and 
starkly opposing the positivist stance. Hammersley, (1993) historically traced the evolution of 
interpretivism, as being the outcome of a long history of criticism of the hypo-deductive logic of 
the positivist tradition. This was based on the disparity between the laws of science and social 
100 
 
reality, which therefore warranted different methodological approaches (Grey, 2014). The central 
argument proffered by the Interpretivist group was: 
        “Rich insights into this complex world are lost if such complexity is reduced entirely to a 
series of law-like generalisations” (Saunders et al., 2009:116). 
 
On this premise, Crotty (1998) emphasized the focus of the interpretivist on the qualitative 
uniqueness of individuals’ perspectives, as opposed to the positivist perspective, which seeks to 
establish consistencies in data as a basis of generating laws.  Interpretivism therefore, relies on 
the subjective meaning given to reality by the participants in a study. As such reality is conceived 
as being multi-faceted, from the view points of the human beings, regarded as the key social 
actors that define reality (Descombe, 2007). Creswell (2003), described the researcher in this 
vain, as striving to derive meaning from the complexity of views, as opposed to narrowing down 
to a few categories of ideas. 
 
The terms ‘social construction of reality’, ‘constructivism’ and ‘constructionism’ all refer to 
interpretivist philosophical stance, which emphasize that reality is socially constructed or 
interpreted (Creswell, 2003; Blake, 2007; Saunders et al., 2009). Grey (2009:21) used the phrase 
“Culturally derived and historically situated” to describe the Interpretivist philosophical 
perspective to research. As Creswell (2003) reiterates, meaning and interpretation of subjects in 
such studies, are culturally and historically negotiated, through the process of interaction, and 
not simply imprinted on individuals. 
 
It would however appear that, there is a diverse range of classifications in the literature on 
philosophical approaches, that by implication should be inclusive in the interpretivist world view. 
Some authors have categorised all anti-positivist philosophical stances as being Interpretivist 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Yet some have isolated and listed interpretivism as one of the numerous 
world views, alongside others such as feminism, critical theory and realism (Blake, 2007; Grey, 
2009). Creswell (2003) however, grouped philosophical approaches that advocate for specific 
social and marginalised causes under as participatory/emancipatory world views, as distinct from 
those of the Interpretivist. This was rationalised, in view of the shortcomings of the interpretative 
approach, in addressing specific social issues about marginalised groups of people in society.  
 
In the researcher’s view however, all the other philosophical perspectives which rely on the need 
to emphasize the values of the researcher and the participants can be grouped under the broader 
perspective of interpretivism.  This, in the opinion of the researcher, is because the key 
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distinctions noted amongst these philosophical groups, are the differences in the levels of 
involvement of the researcher and the participants, as well as the specifics of the subject matter 
being investigated. Along similar line of logic, Blake (2007) analysed the differing stances 
adopted by researchers within the context of socially constructed knowledge. The author 
described the researcher in this scenario as being an ‘insider’ and a ‘learner’, while noting the 
distinction in terms of the researcher’s stance as to ‘being for’, ‘being with’ and ‘partnering with 
or conscientizing with’ the participants. Creswell (2003), also explained the researcher’s stance 
as being either ‘collaborative’ or ‘understanding’ and geared towards change or theory 
generation. The descriptive views of the more commonly listed non-positivist philosophical 
stances in literature are briefly outlined: 
 
4.3.2.1 Phenomenology 
The philosophical stance of phenomenology, according to Grey (2014), is that the 
comprehension of social reality can only be gained through the richness of the experiences of 
participants in a study. Grey (2014:67) further stated that, a fundamental requirement of 
phenomenology, “is the laying aside of preconceptions and common-sense believes” in order for 
new meanings to evolve, unadulterated. Descombe (2007) used the phrase “adopting the stance 
of a stranger” to describe the approach of the phenomenologist. Saunders et al. (2009) also 
alluded to the researcher’s position as being required to figuratively “enter the world of our 
research subjects and seeing reality from their viewpoints” (Saunders et al. 2009:116). 
 
Thus emphasis is placed on obtaining authentic reflections of the phenomena being studied 
(Descombe, 2007). This is done to a sufficient depth, relevant to capture even the slightest 
nuances in the phenomena.  The need to explore the individual construction of personal 
experiences in-depth, is underscored as a key feature of phenomenology. With Descombe 
(2007) emphasizing the central focus, to be exploring multiple realties. Phenomenologists, 
according to Descombe tends “to live with and even celebrate the possibility of multiple realities  
(Descombe, 2007:79). Therefore, to the phenomenologist, the world exists only in the way it is 
experienced and interpreted from the differing perspectives of participants. 
 
4.3.2.2 Symbolic Interactionism 
Grey (2009) traced the emergence of symbolic interactionism in the 1930’s , to the 
discontentment of some philosophers in the conceptualization of human behaviour. It was 
considered necessary for research to explore the reality of human practices and lived experience. 
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This approach emphasises the continuous interpretation of social reality. To the symbolic 
interactionist, human interaction is not induced by cause-effect relationships, but is largely set in 
a symbolic linguistic world. Different symbols thus hold different meanings, dependent of the 
value system inherent in the socially contrived setting. This is in the light of human interaction 
which leads to a corresponding re-adjustment in the human perception of the social world around 
us (Saunders et al., 2009). A central theme in this philosophical approach is the derivation of 
meaning (Grey, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009). Meaning is seen as being regularly revised, based 
on experience, and is therefore not stable (Grey, 2009). As such Grey (2009) stated that the 
meaning of making in the process of interpretation, is the core of human interaction. Close 
observation of subjects in the field setting, is typically a necessary approach to achieving this 
because a symbolic interactionist explains the actions of individuals as an outward manifestation 
of the meanings that are attached to social reality (Grey, 2009).  
 
4.3.2.3 Feminism 
The feminist approach to research is one of the philosophical schools, that Creswell (2003) 
discussed as being of an advocacy/participatory based stance. This approach is used to explore 
the wide range of issues surrounding women, policy and institutional frameworks, within the 
context of the oppression, which women are seen as being subjected to (Creswell, 2009). The 
central debate of the feminist, is that of dominance and complimentary oppression, on the parts 
of men and women respectively, which has shaped their knowledge of the world (Grey, 2009).  
 
Creswell (2009) summarised the generic characteristics of the feminist philosophical research, 
typical of most forms of advocacy research: 
 Change oriented; 
 Liberation from the shackles of unjust societal imposed constraints; 
 The objective of empowerment; 
 Collaborative relationship between the researcher and the participants. 
 
The underlying assumption of the feminist school of thought is that: the feeling of superiority 
amongst men is regarded as having to a significant degree, distorted their view of the world 
(Grey, 2009). This is opposed to women who are operating from the level of being dominated, 
and thus have a relatively undistorted and objective perception of reality. On this basis therefore, 
Grey (2009) stated that the feminist group have challenged what ideally ought to constitute 
knowledge, claiming that objectivity and rationality are constructed around a predominantly male 
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vantage point. The feminists thus advocate for a shift in this approach, to embody the deeper 
experience of reality enabled by the oppressed feelings and emotions of women. 
 
4.3.2.4 Critical Theory 
The philosophical stance of the critical theorist is similar to the feminist, with the core difference 
being the specificity of the subject of debate. Creswell, (2003) classified this research approach 
as one of the advocacy based philosophical positions. Grey (2009) however discussed critical 
philosophy as being quite distinct from other research stances. The author described it as a 
meta-physical process of investigation, which calls on both the researcher and participants to 
question their basic value system.  The author described this as “false consciousness” with a 
requisite need for its discarding to generate a neutral mentality.  According to Guba and Lincoln 
(1994:) critical theory is a “Virtual” reality shaped by social, economic, ethnic, political, cultural, 
and gender values, crystallised over time”. The critical theorist thus challenges conventional 
social structures and advocates for individuals in society to transcend these boundaries 
(Creswell, 2003). It is principally empowerment driven and focuses on revisiting currently held 
values and assumptions in relation to power structures in society (Grey, 2009).  
 
4.3.3 Pragmatism/Critical Realism  
Creswell and Clark, (2003) referred to pragmatism as “the third major philosophical movement”. 
Pragmatism as the name implies, is a philosophical position which is practical in nature. It thus 
relegates the philosophical debate of singular or multiple realities, in terms of epistemology and 
ontological arguments, to the background. John Dewey is considered the pioneer author of this 
philosophical movement, which criticised traditional epistemologies on the basis of the “too stark 
a distinction between thought, the domain of knowledge, and the world of fact to which thought 
purportedly referred” (in Thayer, 1952). Dewey (1890) thus queried "Is Logic a Dualistic 
Science?" and coined the phrases "theory of inquiry" or "experimental logic" as more amenable 
to the practicalities of carrying out research (in Hickman and Alexander, 1998). To the pragmatist 
therefore issues emanating from the dialectical epistemological, ontological debates should take 
a backseat to the more cogent issue of the research problem and how best to provide an 
understanding of it. (Creswell, 2003; Saunders et al., 2009; Grey, 2014). Creswell and Clark, 
(2011) stressed that the focus of pragmatism is on the research questions and the consequences 
of the research, which should ideally be of primary importance. Whereas, Grey, (2009), stated 
that, the practicality of the need to provide answers to different research questions, may warrant 
different philosophical approaches. This is on the grounds that a philosophical approach adopted 
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for one research question, may be inappropriate if applied to another. The use of pragmatism as 
a world view therefore accommodates the use of both subjective and objective knowledge. 
 
Tashakari and Teddlie (2003), noted thirteen different authors who clearly stated the need for a 
philosophical stance that was all encompassing, without the need to engage in philosophical 
arguments. This was rationalised on the premise that pragmatism has a trajectory that is rooted 
in practice and thus devoid of the divergence implicit in other philosophical perspectives. Hughes 
and Sharrock (1997) asserted that, most modern-day realism and empiricism have adopted 
variants of the pragmatist philosophy, by relegating philosophical arguments to the background, 
rather focusing on the specifics of the problem being investigated and the relevant methods to 
tackle them. It was thus stated that: “There is certainly no reason to feel bound by stipulations 
about a unified method or a unified ontology for science, for on these arguments no such creature 
exists” (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997:94).  
 
There are however authors who have expressed the need for caution in adopting pragmatism as 
an all embracing world view, without explicitly defining the underlying ontological and 
epistemological stance of the researcher, describing it as more akin to intellectual laziness. 
Typically, Holden and Lynch (2004:401) stated that. “if a researcher perceives ontology and 
epistemology to be irrelevant, then how can they ensure that their methods are really appropriate 
to the problem in hand? Conceivably the problem could be better investigated with a method 
from an alternative philosophical stance”. Moore (1905), in the wake of the rising acceptance of 
pragmatism inspired by John Dewey works, reviewed a compilation of studies by critics who 
challenged the philosophical position of pragmatism. The major issues cited were: looseness in 
the use of the term ‘practical purpose’; the implied subjectivity/relativity of the position; and the 
lack of a unifying prescriptive principle (Moore, 1905).  
 
The theoretical application of the pragmatic world view, is thus still subject to debate in the 
literature. In more recent works, Greene and Caracelli (1997) argued that the use of multiple 
world views gives rise to irreconcilable differences in research, and rather emphasized the need 
for a differentiation of world views with respect to specific parts of a study. Similarly, Creswell 
and Clark (2011) advocated that the multiple philosophical stances used within a particular study 
needs to be explicitly defined within the research.  
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Critical realism has been argued to be a variant of the pragmatist philosophy, albeit one with a 
clearly defined ontological and epistemological positioning: that social reality exists not only in 
the mind, but in the objective world and can thus also be objectively studied  (Huberman and 
Miles, 1985;1995). Typically, Lipscomb, (2011:1) expounds: “Pragmatism has been advanced 
as one means by which the Gordian knot of theoretical dispute can be cut and critical realists 
have, in recent years, also asserted same”. The critical realist philosophical positioning also 
termed ‘transcendental realism’ by Huberman and Miles, (1985), albeit controversial, is however 
backed by a rigorously argued intellectual justification by its proponents. The justification of the 
pragmatic-like philosophical positioning of the critical realist, as reinforced by its proponents: 
Huberman and Miles (1985); Frazer and Lacey, (1993); and Campbell (2002), is thus rationalised 
beyond the pragmatist mantra, ‘practicality of the research’, which has evoked major criticism 
from both the positivist and constructivist traditions.  
 
Critical realism evolved from the post-positivism movement of realism, which views ‘reality’ as 
“whatever it is in the universe that causes the phenomena we perceive with our senses” (Frazer 
and Lacey, 1997:133). It was further stated that there is no objective or certain knowledge of the 
world, admitting to the possibility of alternative valid accounts of any phenomenon. Saunders et 
al. (2009) described realism as a predominantly objective positivist stance, but one which is 
conditioned by social reality. The authors distinguished between direct and critical realism on the 
basis of how the human senses perceives reality. Thus from the critical realist’s position, human 
knowledge of reality is a result of social conditioning, and cannot be understood independently 
of the social actors involved in the knowledge derivation process (Dobson, 2002). Other authors 
such as Groff (2004: 23) concur with this description of critical realism, but emphasise more on 
its empirically inclined post-positivist nature typical of all forms of realism, espousing: critical 
realism offers a “point of entry into epistemology and metaphysics for practicing social scientists”. 
Whilst Carter (2000:1) is of the view that “critical realism attempts to reconcile the threatened 
divorce between social theory and empirical research”. Critical realism, which is thus more 
common in the social sciences, entails the concomitant retention of both an empiricist ontological 
view and a constructivist epistemological relativism (Campbell, 2002). It recognises that diverse 
valid perceptions and understanding of a research phenomenon is tenable.   
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4.4 Positioning Construction Management Research within the Philosophical Debate 
Construction management research, as a form of social research is confronted with the 
fundamental issue of determining a core philosophical orientation, to be considered as adequate 
and best suited to enquiry about construction phenomena (Dainty, 2008; Fellows and Lui, 2015). 
Dainty (2008) stated that construction management, as an emergent field of research, is yet to 
have a recognised methodological orientation, characteristic of other more established domains, 
and therefore builds on the traditional philosophical assumptions of related natural and social 
science research. The term “Methodological pluralism”, was thus used to describe the use of 
multiplicity of philosophies and methods, compatible with the study of construction phenomena 
(Dainty, 2008). This subsection analyses the extensive scholarly debates, advancing and 
advocating the competing philosophical positions, that inherently lend themselves as potential 
lenses useful to view and understand construction phenomena. The underpinning argument 
being that, the differences in world views, will yield marked differences in the type of knowledge 
generated. Bryman (1988:34) in the context of organizational research, typical of the construction 
industry, thus espouses “different research paradigms will inevitably result in the generation of 
different kinds of knowledge about the industry and its organizations”.  
 
Fellows and Liu (1997), traced the historical antecedent and dominance of the reductionist 
approach to carrying out positivist quantitative studies in construction research, as aligning itself 
more to the natural sciences. Typically, Panas and Pantouvakis (2010, investigated the various 
forms of positivist approach typically deployed in construction productivity studies. These were 
noted as mostly, the development of experimental frameworks, such as field experiments or 
laboratory tests, controlled experiments, comparative evaluations, based on statistical or 
probabilistic analysis. Data collection techniques utilized were mostly from archival sources for 
quantitative project data and questionnaires aimed at eliciting quantifiable data, useful for 
verifying hypotheses, often formulated on the basis of a literature review. 
 
However, promoters of interpretivism view construction management research as a social 
science research, and advocate for studying construction phenomena as being socially contrived 
(Hartmann and Dorée, 2010; Gajendran, 2011). Their stance was thus: gaining rich insights into 
human behavior, is necessary to understand the actions of key professional players in the 
construction industry, which lends itself to multiple world views.  Dorée (2010), opined that 
Construction Management as a discipline should strive to solve sociotechnical problems by 
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proactive engagement with its socially driven knowledge base. In line with this constructivist view, 
Dorée (2010), asserted that social construction of knowledge, which is relative and non-objective, 
offers a rich, epistemological basis for carrying out construction research. A distinction, was 
further made between cognitive and social constructivism, with the former alluding to 
understanding gained through the dynamics of personal experience via social engagement, and 
the latter, being knowledge shaped by cultural influences.  
 
Seymour and Rooke (1995), as well Seymour et al. (1997), further questioned the predominant 
philosophical leaning of the construction industry to quantitative studies, with their underlying 
positivist viewpoints, which signifies that the role of interpretivism was largely unexplored and 
downplayed. Gajendran (2011) investigated the potential philosophical orientations amenable to 
study the informal settings of the construction projects and organisations. Typically, it was 
revealed that such anti-positivist world views as Constructivism, Critical Theory, Hermeneutics- 
Emancipation, Critical Realism and Pragmatism presented viable alternative paradigms, to study 
the complex interrelationships commonly enacted, as a consequence of a project team’s formal 
and informal activity. In view of this, Gajendran (2011) emphasized the consequence of the stiff 
philosophical positions, often taken by most researchers in the construction industry, as rich 
insights into the complexity of social forces in organisations and projects are not captured, 
severely limiting the depth of understanding provided. Gajendran (2011:90) thus concluded:  
“Multiple philosophical points of departure, matched to a range of alternative 
methodologies, is indicative of the desirability of blending to reflect the peculiarities of 
each context under investigation… presents opportunities to conduct rigorous in-situ 
investigations, leading to authentic and deep insights that would otherwise remain 
unseen”.  
 
Several derivative forms of interpretative philosophy, have however been applied to study the 
complexity of construction phenomena in a scant number of studies. Some studies capture the 
characteristic inter-connectivity of the construction industry, by conceptualizing complexity and 
systems frameworks, as a theoretical basis for applying interpretivism (Bresnen 1986; Baccarini 
1996; Bresnen, et al 2005; Marrewijk et al. 2008; Remington, et al 2009). Typically, Bresnen et 
al. (1986) used an ethnographic approach to study the complexity of internal administrative 
arrangement, uncertainty, and the interrelationship between organisations in a contractual 
setting, noting the dual motivational drivers underlying such interaction. It was thus explained 
that the duality in the orientation of the construction industry stems primarily from: the client's 
need for an integrated trajectory of the project organisation; and the contractor’s firm’s need to 
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meet up, in the fast paced and rapidly evolving technological setting of the construction industry. 
Others, such as Gorse and Emmitt (2007, 2009), Baarts (2009) as well as Pink et al. (2010) delve 
in-depth into the socially contrived behavioral and linguistic underpinnings of the actors in 
projects, such as those relating to safety practices on construction sites or understanding of 
invisible routes of communication by migrant workers, which is more akin to phenomenology or 
symbolic interactionism. Yet O ‘Leary (2004:47) tows the philosophical logic of the critical 
theorist, stating “without an appreciation of how attributes, positions of power and privilege, and 
worldviews conspire to create subjectivities, researchers in the construction industry, can easily 
fall into the trap of judging the reality of others in relation to their own reality”.  
 
The use of such interpretative methods, is however not without flaws and criticism. The criticism 
of these methods, stemming primarily from its high dependence on the articulate skills of the 
participants, who provide the information, and the interpretative value laden posture of the 
researcher; as well as issues of generalisability. Dainty (2008) reported that 19 of 107 sampled 
research papers in ‘construction management and economics’, used single and focus group 
interviews, three of which used observation/visual data, while another three deployed textual 
analysis of documents.   Hammersley and Gomm (2005) critiqued the sole adoption of singular 
methods, particularly interviews, with its limited methodological validity, due to the likelihood of 
eliciting responses geared towards promoting self-preservation, rather than the objectivity of 
facts being sought. Criticism thus surrounds the sole use of interpretative philosophies in 
construction industry research, with some authors dismissing it as inappropriate for scientific 
enquiry, by being ‘too subjective’, ‘journalistic’, ‘more akin to consultancy’ and ‘not rigorous’ 
(Runeson, 1997; Harriss, 1998, Raftery et al.,1997). Others however, accept that it’s the only 
feasible and practical means to access contextual meaning and form to social processes, within 
projects and organisational settings in the construction industry (Seymour and Rooke, 1995; 
Seymour et al., 1997; Hartmann and Dorée, 2010; Gajendran, 2011). 
 
These criticisms, and the aftermath of the incisive publications by Seymour and co-authors, 
propagated a need to amalgamate these dichotomous methodological orientations, beyond the 
isolated positivist versus interpretative philosophical realms, to straddle both methods of 
research. Dainty (2008), however, noted the still slow awakening in the consciousness of 
construction management researchers, in the direction of mixed method studies, unlike research 
in the management sciences. Only 12, out of 107 sampled published papers, using mixed 
methods. Within the 76 purely quantitative papers, limited reference was made to using 
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exploratory interviews (Dainty 2008). Only a scant number of studies were noted as “drawing 
upon a greater diversity of methods to enrich their understanding of the actuality of practice from 
the perspectives of those who work in the sector” (Dainty 2008:7) These figures therefore indicate 
that, construction industry researchers still mostly tow the logic of the positivist, to understand to 
the complexity of socially derived organizational issues, leading Dainty (2008:9) to query their 
ability to provide ‘a rich and nuanced understanding of industry practice’.  
 
Dainty (2008) thus recommended the use of triangulation of multi-method inferences, that 
incorporate multiple philosophical orientations as the only valid alternative, to escape such 
methodological dilemmas. This philosophical movement, typically pragmatism, was reinforced 
by Mingers (1997:9), using a practical analogy:  
“Adopting a particular paradigm is like viewing the world through a particular instrument 
such as a telescope, an X-ray machine, or an electron microscope. Each reveals certain 
aspects but is completely blind to other... Thus, in adopting only one paradigm one is 
inevitably gaining only a limited view of a particular intervention or research situation … 
it is always wise to utilize a variety of approaches”. 
 
However, Barrett and Sutrisna (2009) advocate for critical realism, which equally affords the use 
of multi-methodologies, for instance within the context of a case study, with grounded theory 
incorporated as a further strategy, to maintain both objective and subjective realities of the 
constructs associated with a study.  
 
4.5 Adopted Research Philosophical Stance in this Study: Critical Realism 
It is often argued that the selection of a research philosophy by the research community is mostly 
an intuitive decision, often in line with the researcher’s ontological and epistemological stance 
and preference, which may not necessarily ensure the rigor and robustness of the research effort 
(Holden and Lynch, 2004). Some other researchers, for example Panas and Pantouvakis 
(2010:77), have predicated the selection of an appropriate methodology, by identifying those 
typically deployed in similar studies, with the ultimate objective of “Preserving research validity 
and establishing of a seamless methodology that could be repeatedly applied”. The researcher 
however, is of the opinion that stereotyping or basing methodological and philosophical 
decisions, on the existing philosophical traditions or predominant trend in previous studies, would 
amount to methodological stagnation, which will stifle innovation and creativity in the long run.  
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Various opinions have been expressed on the criteria for choosing a research philosophy (Grix, 
(2001; Holden and Lynch, 2004; Rooke and Kaguoglo; 2007; Gajendran, 2011).  According to 
Holden and Lynch (2004): It is our contention that research should not be methodologically led, 
rather that methodological choice should be consequential to the research philosophical stance 
and the social science phenomenon to be investigated. However, Grix (2001:23) asserts 
“methods themselves should be seen as free from ontological and epistemological assumptions, 
and the choice of which to use should be guided by the research questions” . In line with the 
suggestions of Holden and Lynch (2004), and Gajendran (2011), the researcher is of the view 
that the most appropriate philosophical orientation should be objectively defined, devoid of 
personal or discipline based paradigmic preferences, in relation to their merits for achieving the 
research aims and objectives. Rooke and Kagioglou (2007), although in predominantly 
interpretative premise, further reinforces the researcher’s stance by asserting that a fundamental 
requirement in research is its ‘Unique Adequacy’.  Unique Adequacy, a criterion for adjudging 
reliability and validity in qualitative research, means that: “the methods of analysis used to report, 
should be derived from that setting. The implication of this logic for this research and academic 
enquiry in the construction industry is that the method of analysis should not necessarily be 
determined a priori, being ‘transplanted in-situ’ from similar studies in the knowledge domain, but 
should rather emerge from the peculiarities of the problem and context under investigation. The 
challenge for the doctoral researcher is thus making critical and informed decisions on the 
appropriate research methodology, and the underlying epistemological, ontological and 
axiological assumptions, which gives credence to the research output, while ensuring its original 
contribution to an existing body of knowledge (Grix, 2001). 
 
The choice of an appropriate research paradigm is therefore critical to producing meaningful 
outcomes. Gajendran (2011:90) alluded to several other considerations in choosing a 
philosophical/methodological stance, stating that: 
 The subtlety of the paradigm variations demands deep engagement with the literature 
to perceive the differences…  
 Researchers need to carefully evaluate and respond to critiques of the chosen worldview 
and why it will deliver meaningful outcomes.    
 The need to accommodate the practicality of the research design, as aligning the 
conceptual research design to the operational research design is a frequent challenge 
faced by researchers. 
 
Taking into consideration, the guidance offered by Gajendran (2011), and having analysed the 
different philosophical stances evident in the literature, the researcher makes an informed choice 
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in the selection of a research philosophy, in tune with what is considered most appropriate to 
achieve its objectives, while factoring in the practicality of the methods implicit in the choice. The 
researcher adopts the philosophical stance of the critical realist, via the amalgamation of 
ontological positivism, which rejects the view of multiple realities, with epistemological 
constructivism, in acknowledging the role that values and societal ideology play in the derivation 
of empirical knowledge.  
 
However, in adopting the critical realist philosophical stance, the researcher is not unaware of its 
criticism, mostly accused of being ‘logically contradictory’ (Nune, 2013). From the physical and 
social sciences, proponents and advocates of the critical realist philosophy have erected 
categorical philosophical defences in readiness for such criticism, (Frazer and Lacey, 1993; 
Campbell, 2002). To the constructivists, such justification was provided by Frazer and Lacey 
(1993:182) “Even if one is a realist at the ontological level, one could be an epistemological 
interpretivist . . . our knowledge of the real world is inevitably interpretive and provisional rather 
than straightforwardly representational”. Critical realism was thus further conceived by Lawson 
(2003) as a methodologically valid lens for the social sciences, on the issues of ontology and in 
relation to the nature of the study phenomena (sensory abstractions or real/tangible?). To the 
positivist, it was contended by Campbell (2002:29) that “all scientists are epistemological 
constructivists and relativists in the construction of scientific knowledge”. More specifically in the 
engineering sciences, Panas, and Pantouvakis (2010) noted that in the construction of 
quantitative experimental frameworks and models during productivity studies, scientific data 
needs to be primarily sought through human subject, who are inherently subjective in their 
representations.  
 
In the selection of a research philosophy therefore, Saunders et al. (2009) described the 
relationship between the different research philosophies or world views as a continuum rather 
than them being parallel and distinct.  The author represented this in an onion form and explained 
that any research by its nature will locate its approximate location on the relative scale of 
philosophical stances. Realism was thus located as at midpoint between the extremist positions 
of the positivist and the interpretivist.  
 
The researcher towed the preceding line of logic of the critical realist, as the appropriate 
philosophical lenses through which the aim of this research and its objectives was achieved. The 
need to capture the peculiarities of the wetland conditions in the Niger Delta (a physical entity), 
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the techno-economic dynamics of the developing world (A techno-socially constructed entity) 
coupled with the geotechnical drivers (Technical) embedded within organisational practices 
(Socially driven), dictated that the altercation between the empiricist and subjective philosophies 
be squashed. This choice was further informed by the necessity of incorporating multiple 
perspectives from project participants in highway organisations, inherently manifest in their 
accounts, which had to be sourced and interpreted by the researcher to understand the 
complexity of the phenomena of cost growth leading to cost overrun in highway projects. 
 
The researcher thus does not take any rigid philosophical stance but rather focused on providing 
answers to the research questions. Philosophical flexibility was thus warranted. Ontologically the 
reality of the concept of construction cost overruns is project specific, and can be measured 
precisely. However, epistemologically, inaccuracy of cost estimates leading to cost growth, has 
a wide range of differing explanatory perspectives, and has being established in the literature to 
be closely linked to subjectivity inherent in the organisational context of highway agencies. The 
philosophical basis of this research, thus has a predominant leaning towards an interpretivist 
epistemology as shown in Figure 4.2, to understand the phenomena of cost growth, while 
retaining the singular ontology of the reality of cost overruns in highway projects, typical of critical 
realism.  
                                                       Ontology                                            
                           Singular                             (Reality of Cost overruns)                           Multiple 
 
 
 
 
 
               
                             Value free                                                                                        Value laden 
                                                                  
Figure 4.2: Research Philosophical Position 
 
The theoretical appropriateness of relying more heavily on the interpretative world view as 
opposed to the positivist view at an epistemological level, is defined by the need to gain 
knowledge on the propagation of cost overruns through human subjects, who are the executors 
of projects, as well as the need to factor in the organisational dynamics surrounding highway 
projects. As Saunders, et al. (2009:115) asserts: “Focusing on practical applied research, 
                           RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
POSITIVISM                                              INTERPRETIVISM                                                    
 
       Epistemology (How to understand) 
     Critical Realism 
Axiology 
(Value) 
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integrating different perspectives to help interpret the data”, thus making the adoption of a purely 
positivist approach to cost overrun research impractical.  
  
Axiologically, the values of the researcher were therefore manifest in the research as the 
researcher sought to interpret and derive meaning from the varying participant’s descriptive 
explanations of their organisations’ approach to the management of ground related risk. The 
potential for subjectivity as the respondents describe the design and costing approaches in the 
highway agencies, further underscores the role that values play in the knowledge derivation 
process of this research. This defining characteristic of the study, further made knowledge 
derivation on the pure empiricist basis of positivist philosophy, inappropriate. Subjectivity that 
may be attached to the interpretation of results by the researcher on this basis is therefore 
acknowledged. 
 
Grey (2009) summarised the applicability of positivist and interpretivist approaches, as being in 
line with truth seeking and perspective seeking methods, respectively. The latter is the 
fundamental ideology of the study, and not the basic underlying axiom of the former: ‘The 
impersonal development of theory for generalizations. Claims to generalizability of findings from 
this study are thus not made on this premise. Unlike positivism, in which scientific knowledge is 
statistically generalised to a population, the critical realist perspective adopted in this study 
strives for theoretical generalisability of the socially derived knowledge, that is how the analytical 
outcomes of this empirical study can fit in or ‘nestle’ with or within existing theories (Yin, 2014).  
The position of the critical realist stance of this study is thus also distinct from pure constructivism, 
which asserts that reality is socially constructed, and thus as individualistic perceptions, cannot 
be generalised.  
 
The ability of the critical realist to infer causality within a predominantly interpretative 
epistemology, further defined its appropriateness to understand the context specific explanations 
for the propagation of cost overruns in highway projects, which is fundamentally driven by 
actions/inactions of the human actors in highway organisations. According to Huberman and 
Miles (1985:21), critical realism is an “an approach designed to yield verifiable knowledge of 
human group life and human conduct”. This is predicated on the critical realist assumption that 
there are ‘reasonably stable law-like links of causality’ amongst social constructs, whereby 
human actors in social and historical setting have always exhibited ‘sequences and regularities 
that link phenomena together’ (Huberman and Miles 1994:429). Objectivity straddling a multi-
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perspective interpretative understanding of the human factors in organisational practice, that 
drive the more technical concerns about ground related risks, is thus a core requirement, 
necessary to infer causality in this cost overrun research.   On this basis therefore, in the adoption 
a critical realist philosophical stance, to provide a multi-methodologically robust explanation for 
cost overruns experienced in highway projects executed in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the 
researcher pre-supposed and acknowledged the:  
 Differences of opinions on the ongoing geotechnical practice in highway organisations 
and their contractual affiliates; 
 Role that the geology of project location, particularly in wetland terrain, has to play; 
 Contextual geo-political institutional dynamics of highway development in the Niger 
Delta; 
 Underlying technological constraints in the developing world; 
 Value laden role of the researcher in interpreting and reporting findings, which 
underscores the need for triangulation of findings from various sources.  
 
Having established the broader philosophical stance, which guided knowledge acquisition in this 
study, subsequent sections evaluate and justify the choices made in relation to the other more 
logic based and practical elements of academic inquiry, further down the conceptual hierarchy 
of the research methodology.  
 
4.6 Research Type 
Yin (1994), relates the nature of the research questions in terms of ‘how’, ‘why’, ‘when’, ‘what’ 
and ‘where’ to the type of research: exploratory; explanatory; or descriptive, being conducted. 
‘What’ questions are predominantly exploratory which seeks to explore a phenomenon in more 
detail, ‘How’ and ‘why’ questions are mostly linked to explanatory studies while ‘when’ and 
‘where’ research questions are more descriptive. This study was thus concerned with not only 
the what’s, but the how’s and why.  This research was exploratory, as it sought to understand 
the specific nature (What) and extent to which (How much) geotechnical risk impacts on cost; 
was descriptive in identifying the critical phases (when) in highway projects where the 
susceptibility for cost overruns due to ground related risk occurs; and was explanatory in inferring 
causal links between the identified factors and cost overruns. This was necessary to establish 
causality, in lieu of the study aim, further defined by its critical realist positioning.  
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Although it may be argued that the phenomenon of cost overruns in highway projects is not a 
novel concept that should warrant an exploration, this study explored the peculiar heterogeneous 
and predominantly wetland geologic setting of the Niger Delta as a test bed for understanding 
financial risks due to the ground. In tandem, it provided an in-depth descriptive account of how 
lack of geotechnical best practices can further exacerbate the propensity of highway projects to 
run over budget. The exploratory phase of the study is thus implicit in the identification of 
geotechnical pathogens, through a practiced based technical literature review, and statistical 
exploratory analysis of the spatial geotechnical field data on Niger Delta soils.  
 
The descriptive element of the study described the design and costing practices currently being 
deployed by the highway agencies in the study area. According to Hendrick et al. (1993) a 
descriptive study provides a picture of a situation as it occurs. Grey (2009), equally opined that 
descriptive research is relevant to give a snapshot of a situation, person, or event or to show 
relationship within a defined structure. The descriptive phase of this study thus began with an 
extensive background literature review on the prevailing geographic and geologic setting of 
highway development in the study area, to serve as a background to field work findings. The 
fieldwork results further described the details of design practices of highway agencies in the 
Niger Delta, processes, and functions inherent within their respective organisational structures 
for ensuring geotechnical input. 
 
The explanatory perspective of the study centred on the study’s aim of explaining the high level 
of cost overruns incurred in highway projects, and the prevalence of lengthy delays and 
abandonments in the Niger Delta region. Such explanations were sought from the local literature, 
the scholarly literature, and the literature on geotechnical best practice. Ketokivi (2010) posited 
that an explanatory perspective to research underscores the role that theoretical explanations 
play in scientific inference. Grey (2009) points out that typical explanatory studies ask the “why” 
type of questions. Explanatory studies seek to provide factors or reasons accounting for a 
descriptive study (Huberman and Miles, 1994; Ketokivi, 2010). As Huberman and Miles 
(1994:429) asserts: There is need, not only for an explanatory structure, but also for a careful 
descriptive account of each particular configuration. On this basis therefore this research is 
considered a normative study, designed to evaluate what happens in practice, in relation to what 
ideally ought to be in theory, from a geotechnical perspective, in order to provide an explanation 
for the current trend of unusually high cost overruns in highway projects. The research thus 
ultimately investigated how applicable current theory emerging from academe, the intricacies of 
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the wetland geology of the Niger Delta, and the technical requirements of geotechnical best 
practice, explained cost overruns in highway projects. 
 
4.7 Research Reasoning/ Approach to Theory Generation 
The process of knowledge acquisition in research is defined, and categorised based on the 
logical manner of reasoning behind an inquisition (Huberman and Miles, 1995; Yin, 2014). 
Saunders et al. (2009) explained deductive reasoning as the development of theory in a 
research, which is subsequently subjected to rigorous testing, analogous of experimental types 
typically deployed by physical scientist. In this way of reasoning, there is a search for causal 
relationship which defines the basis of subsequent testing (Creswell, 2003). Ketokivi (2010) used 
the terms ‘Logical coherence’ to describe deductive reasoning in research, in explaining that 
deductive reasoning follows logical analytic steps from the general, down to the specifics in a 
coherent manner. 
 
Inductive research on the other hand, explores a phenomena and allows the trends and theories 
to emerge from the data. Ketokivi (2010) thus explained that inductive reasoning runs in direct 
opposition to deductive based reasoning emanating from the specifics and leading to wider 
generalisations. On this premise, Ketokivi (2010) further described inductive reasoning as an 
‘ampliative form of reasoning’, stating that conclusions arrived at from the process of induction 
serve to amplify knowledge claims without established analytical foundations in the knowledge 
domain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Deductive/Inductive Based Research Reasoning in this Study 
 
This research was both deductive and inductive in approach as shown in Figure 4.3, necessitated 
by its critical realist philosophical underpinning. Critical realism according to Huberman and Miles 
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(1994) calls for both deductive and inductive reasoning to establish causal connections in 
credible ways, by providing descriptive accounts as evidence to back up the plausibility of such 
explanation.  
 
This research was commenced from a principally deductive based approach using a geo-
statistical exploratory analysis of data on the engineering properties of subsoils approximated for 
project locations. This served as a basis for inductively identifying geotechnical pathogens from 
the technical literature as well as noting unresolved arguments, which constituted the basis of 
drafting the interview guide, used to elicit related information in the subsequent field work, and 
in further qualitative analysis of the collated textual data.  
 
The researcher used a deductive/inductive approach to interpret data revealed from interview 
sessions carried out with participants. This is because although this research is not structured 
on the basis of established predefined theories, the deductive reasoning deployed in the 
interpretation of the interview data is structured along established standards of best practice, 
deduced from the exploratory analysis of the geotechnical best practices in the literature. This is 
in line with the suggestion of Yin (2003: 56):  
         “Since established theory is often the basis for formulation of initial research questions and 
objectives, the same theoretical perspectives can be deployed to direct the research 
reasoning of the study”.  
 
However, the purely inductive element of this research, is more evident as the researcher sought 
to gain knowledge based on previously un-anticipated themes and trends which emerged from 
the qualitative interview data.  The findings from the deductive-inductive interview analysis, were 
then further analysed deductively, by quantitatively transforming and modelling the qualitative 
outcome of the interview analysis. Regression analysis is used to explain how much variation in 
the cost overrun experienced in the sampled highway projects, was induced by the deduced 
geotechnical themes, while content analysis was used to relatively assess and rank the 
weightiness of the emergent themes. The researcher’s conceptualised flow of logic linking the 
evidence sourced from multiple sources, is depicted in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Multiple Sources of Evidence in this Case Study 
Geo-Spatial Analysis 
(Geotechnical Field Data) 
 
Archival Analysis 
(Project Data Analysis) 
Interviews Analysis 
(Deductive-Inductive) 
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This requisite higher level of abstraction, concretised within the context of this research is 
captured in Figure 4.5, which portrays the complex but holistic interaction between the multiple 
sources used, to elicit qualitative and quantitative information as a basis of triangulation. This is 
considered relevant to adequately capture the intricate complexity of the issues driving the 
phenomena of unusually high cost overruns in highway projects executed in the Niger Delta. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Approach to Theory Generation in this Research    
 
Triangulation of the analytical findings thus serves as the basis of theory generation, directed at 
explicitly defining the financial impact of geotechnical risk, predicated on ground conditions in the 
Niger Delta, while factoring in the socio-political dynamics inherent within the highway agencies 
in the region. 
 
4.8 Research Method 
Research methods are dichotomised on the basis of being either qualitative or quantitative in 
approach. In tandem with making philosophical choices, is the decision on methods to deploy in 
other to achieve the research objectives (Walker, 1996). Birley and Moreland, (1998) asserted 
that methods are predicated on the background philosophical underpinnings or paradigms which 
frame the study. Thus methods relying on the positivist world view typically adopt quantitative 
methods, while those relying on an interpretative stance tend to favour the use of qualitative 
methods. Other authors such as Guba and Lincoln (1985), have also made a distinction between 
research methods, by highlighting fundamental axioms of research at the philosophical level 
which serve to distinguish between quantitative and qualitative research methods. These are 
summarily presented in table 4.3. 
Theory 
Regression Model and 
Cognitive Map of Cost Overrun 
Drivers 
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Table 4.3: Five Axioms of Quantitative vs. Qualitative Research Methods 
AXIOM QUANTITATIVE QUALITATIVE 
Ontology Singular reality Multiple realities  
Epistemology Objective view Subjective view 
Axiology Value laden Value free 
Causal connection Applicable Not applicable  
(Entities exist in a state of simultaneous mutual 
dependency) 
Generalisation Necessary Not necessary  
(Ideographic Knowledge: Claims to generalisation are 
not made) 
                                                                                                           Source: Guba and Lincoln (1985) 
 
Guba and Lincoln (1985) used the term ‘Naturalistic inquiry’ to describe qualitative research, 
asserting that qualitative research, unlike quantitative research have more complex interaction 
amongst the variables of the study.  This is further explained by the hermeneutic circle which 
emphasises that qualitative research in its natural setting relies on understanding the whole and 
that the smaller bits of the enquiry are part of a whole and therefore do not operate in isolation 
(Bontekoe, 1996; Schwandt, 2001).  Guba and Lincoln (1985) also listed major distinctive 
defining analytic characteristics indicative of qualitative research, some of which have also been 
identified within the context of this study by the researcher. This is presented in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: Typical Characteristic of Qualitative Research identified in this Study 
Typical Characteristic noted by 
Guba and Lincoln (1985) 
As Identified Within the Context of This Research 
Natural Setting Organisational Research context of this study provides the natural 
setting in investigating design and estimating practices of the highway 
agencies. 
Human Instrument Data obtained from multiple informants and perspectives. is filtered 
through the researcher’s interpretation 
Utilisation of Tactic Knowledge -  Researcher’s Intuition guides the data acquisition process in the 
interviews. 
Multiple Realities-           
 
Not Applicable. The researcher adopts the stance of a critical realist, 
and thus posits that the drivers to the phenomena of cost overrun in 
highway projects are not abstract entities, that can only be subjectively 
conceptualised, but are project specific technical and social variables in 
organisations, which exhibit cause-effect relationships that can be 
objectively studied, and inferred from the different participant accounts 
and narratives of the project actors. 
Purposive Sampling  
 
Researcher purposively sample respondents that can provide the 
requisite technical insider information on the prevailing design and 
costing practices of highway agencies in the Niger Delta   
Inductive Data Analysis  
 
Researcher starts from data analysis deductively, but reflexively reverts 
to an inductive mode, to uncover emerging subtleties evident in the 
practices of highway agencies in the Niger delta, which have broader 
implication in theory and audience of practitioners and policy makers. 
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Emergent Flexible Designs -  Recurring unanticipated social constructs emerge as themes from the 
data with researcher’s increasing familiarity with the data, which are 
reflexively infused into the analysis. 
Ideographic Interpretation -  Researcher acknowledges the role of personal values in the 
interpretation of the data from the participants. 
Focus Determined Boundaries The analytic boundaries of the qualitative data generated from 
interviews are explicitly defined and constrained in relation to the study 
objective of explaining the propagation of cost overruns in highway 
projects, relative to ground conditions in the Niger Delta, and thus does 
not transcend outside this analytic realm. 
Adapted from Guba and Lincoln (1985) 
 
At a less generic and more practical level, attributes which are typically descriptive of qualitative 
research methods, were noted by Descombe (2009), who also distinguished qualitative from 
quantitative research on the following basis, as shown in Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5: Attributes of Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Numeric unit of analysis Textual unit of analysis 
Statistical analysis Descriptive analysis 
Large scale studies Small scale studies 
Specific focus Holistic focus 
Researcher detachment Researcher involvement  
Predetermined research design Emergent research design 
 Adapted from Descombe (2007) 
 
Descombe (2009), thus described qualitative studies on the basis of the type of data analysed 
which is typically textual or graphical. As such documents, images, reports, observations and 
voice recordings transcribed into text are the basis of detailed descriptive analysis of study 
phenomena and theory generation.  Descombe (2007) also noted that qualitative research, by 
virtue of its level of in-depth analysis of a phenomenon, is usually associated with small scale 
studies which are relatively more focused in terms of scope. This enables the researcher to be 
more actively involved in the field and to use subjective judgement to generate theories in line 
with emerging trends in the data collected. 
 
Quantitative methods on the other hand entail analysis of numeric data generated from a 
sampling procedure representative of study populations, using statistical tests to enable 
generalisation of theories generated (Descombe 2007; Saunders et al., 2009; Creswell and 
Clark, 2013). The numerical nature of quantitative studies makes them amenable to statistical 
analysis, with reliability further enhanced by larger sample sizes (Saunders et al., 2009). The 
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objective of such statistical analysis is to isolate the effect of specific factors in relation to other 
factors of interest, often by isolating factors from their contextual background. Quantitative 
studies thus entail the need for researchers’ detachment in the inquiry process, to isolate 
subjective influences from interfering with the research process (Descombe 2007). This can be 
contrasted with qualitative studies which strive to enhance and relay as much background 
information as possible (Huberman and Miles, 1994). Quantitative studies thus rely on the 
objectivity underlying the instruments of data collection as a basis to verify predetermined 
theories. 
 
Table 4.6 is an outline of the attributes of this research following the scales defined by Descombe 
(2007), which also shows that this research exhibits several characteristics of a qualitative study, 
further justifying the researcher’s adoption of a predominantly interpretative stance at an 
epistemological level, but with a mixed method analytical approach.  
 
Table 4.6: Characteristics of this Research  
Characteristics Study Attributes 
Unit of analysis Numeric and Textual (Mixed) 
Analysis Descriptive and Quantitative (Mixed) 
Scale of study Small (Qualitative) 
Focus Holistic focus (Qualitative) 
Researcher position Involvement (Qualitative) 
 
The need to analyse both textual data from participants’ accounts and documents, quantitative 
data on cost overrun from project archives, as well as numerical geotechnical index data on Niger 
Delta soils, in this research, is indicative that this research is a mixed method study, requisite to 
provide methodologically robust explanations for cost overruns. Mixed-method approach in cost 
overrun research is however a rarity, as previously noted in the review of the methods used in 
the empirical literature on cost overruns. As Dainty (2009:10) noted:  
 
“The apparent lack of methodological diversity, coupled to a lack of adventure towards 
interpretative research designs, suggests a research community rooted in 
methodological conservatism and disconnected from the debates going on in many of 
the fields from which it draws”.  
 
However, in a related subject domain, such as construction productivity studies, mix method 
studies are more common.  Several construction productivity studies deploy mixed-methods 
based on empirical qualitative work, and archival productivity data which are quantitatively 
modeled (Panas and Pantouvakis, 2010). For example, Al-Sudairi (2007) used qualitative data, 
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from observation data in the form of timed video recordings with in-depth interviews with 
construction operatives, to simulate data models linking contextual human factors to lean 
construction on sites. Cottrel (2006) also analyzed both qualitative data on technical as well as 
human project management factors such as experience vision, commitment to explain 
quantitative site productivity data, via the use of multiple regression analysis.  
 
The bulk of current applications of methods in empirical cost overrun studies, substantially 
deviate from the principles of methodological pluralism advocated by Dainty (2009) for the 
construction management research community. It had been noted by the researcher that data 
elicitation techniques in most cost overrun studies relied primarily on either the use of 
questionnaires or document analysis, with no form of qualitative narrative.  Dainty (2009:7) also 
noted this in the broader orientation of construction management research, stating that: 
“An enduring adherence to the positivist paradigm will do little to enable construction 
management researchers to grasp the meaning of social action from the perspective of 
the actors involved”. 
 
It is thus the researcher’s conviction that methodological pluralism, applied to cost overrun 
research, would yield less artificialized and more methodologically valid explanations for cost 
overruns, which describe context and show causality. Dainty (2009:6) assertions further 
reinforces the researcher’s stance: 
“Researchers use the real-world context of the construction industry as sites for 
developing research questions ... It could be reasonably expected that their 
methodological positions and the methods adopted may have broadened and diversified 
to reflect the multiple traditions from which it draws upon”. 
 
Mixing of methods is however, not without challenges, as quantitative and qualitative research 
are dialectically underpinned by divergent, almost incompatible, paradigmic assumptions. 
Descombe (2007) recognising the challenges of mixing methods, suggests that a more practical 
approach to defining the qualitative and qualitative aspects of research in a mixed method study 
would be in terms of the types of data and how it is treated analytically. For this study, the mix of 
methods deployed is shown in Figure 4.6.  
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Figure 4.6:  Methods of the Study in this Research 
 
It is thus obvious that this research cannot be clearly categorised on the basis of the dichotomy 
often used in research. The study by virtue of its design displays dual characteristics typical of 
both a qualitative and quantitative study. Commenting on the propensity of most practical applied 
research to demonstrate such attributes, Descombe (2007) further went on to clarify that in 
practice these methods are not mutually exclusive, and the dichotomy is therefore not completely 
distinctive, but rather a question of relativity in terms of the extent to which the research adopts 
one method relative to the other.  On this basis, mixed methods, which is a hybrid of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods is adopted to suit the practicalities of this research.  
 
The rising popularity of mixed methods is due to the inherent limitations of the individual 
quantitative and qualitative research methods (Dainty, 2007). Several other authors (Yin, 1994; 
Creswell, 2003; Creswell and Clark, 2013) have posited that mixed methods have the advantage 
of overcoming the shortcomings of both qualitative and quantitative research methods. Creswell 
(2003) stated that the mixing of methods neutralizes the biases of each individual method. The 
adoption of mixed methods in this research thus gives the researcher the requisite flexibility to 
utilise all available research tools to achieve the study objectives.   
 
4.9 Research Strategies 
Research strategy can be defined as the means of designing an enquiry, in order to turn research 
questions into projects. This essentially frames the overall study approach (Robson, 1993).  This 
crucial element of scholarly enquiry, Robson (1993) further stressed, should be addressed with 
adequate consideration given to the plethora of issues and possibilities from the wide range of 
available research strategies. As listed in Table 4.7, these strategies are typically associated with 
Regression Modelling to triangulate 
Quantitative and Qualitative findings 
Quantitative/Qualitative 
Quantitative 
Qualitative/Quantitative 
Geo-quantitative quasi-experimental exploration of 
spatial geotechnical data versus cost overrun data 
Understanding theory from the literature and 
describing current practice based on interview 
data, to complement experimental results 
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qualitative or quantitative research, with the notable exception of case studies, whose 
applicability traverses both types of research method. 
 
Table 4.7: Research Strategies in Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Experiments Ethnography 
Surveys Phenomenology 
Case Studies Grounded Theory 
 Case Studies 
 
Strategies utilised in quantitative methods, adopt a positivist philosophical perspective of 
objectivity. As such quantitative researches are mostly associated with experimental type 
studies: true experiments and less rigorous quasi-experiments, and surveys which require the 
generation of theory to enable generalisations (Creswell, 2003). 
 
Qualitative research strategies, characterised by an interpretative stance, are more closely 
associated with attitudinal studies of individuals or in organisational research, often requiring the 
researcher to be closely linked to the study site and the participants (Bryman, 1989). They are 
therefore humanistic and interactive with the researcher being highly participatory (Creswell, 
2003). Qualitative research is predominantly associated with strategies such as ethnography, 
grounded theory, phenomenological research and even case studies, which have been shown 
to be adaptable to both quantitative and qualitative studies (Yin, 2014).  
 
The researcher in this study, in view of this variety of options makes a conscientious choice as 
to which strategy can best serve to achieve the aim and specific objectives of the study. The 
basis of this decision however stems from the applicability of each type, in relation to the research 
questions or study objectives (Saunders et al., 2009). It was thus stated that:  
“The general principle is that the research strategy or strategies, and the methods or 
techniques employed, must be appropriate for the questions you want to answer” 
(Robson, 1993: 23). 
 
This is because for any choice made there are basic underlying set of assumptions, advantages 
and disadvantages which must be evaluated (Saunders et al., 2009). The noticeable overlap in 
applicability between these various research strategies has been noted by both Yin (2003) and 
Saunders et al. (2009), leading the authors to espouse that in the selection of an appropriate 
research strategy, the question is more about relativity: How well can it lead to achieving the 
125 
 
research objectives? Consequently, the following section of the methodology will be devoted to 
evaluating the range of possible research strategies that are potentially amenable for studying 
the generality of research questions that this study seeks to answer.  
 
The evaluation begins with the purely quantitative strategies before appraising the qualitative 
approaches. Ethnography and phenomenology listed amongst the purely qualitative research 
strategies are however excluded from the detailed evaluation, based on their abstract nature and 
emphasis on cultures and peoples’ lived experiences, which is beyond the scope of this research 
and due to their philosophical incompatibility with the empirical nature of the critical realist stance 
adopted in this study. The evaluation of the purely qualitative strategies herein is thus limited to 
grounded theory, due to its fundamental applicability to all qualitative research. Case study 
research which straddles both methods of research concludes the evaluation.  
4.9.1 Experiments  
The deployment of an experimental strategy is often associated with the empirical approach of 
conducting research (Robson, 1993). Experiments have been defined as an empirical 
investigation which is conducted under simulated conditions, as a means of eliciting defining 
properties or relationships existing between identified variables (Descombe, 2007). Descombe 
(2007) identifies three fundamental criteria for the use of experiments, these include: 
 The underlying assumption of causality in the variables; 
 The deployment of controls as a mechanism for exclusion;  
 Empirical observation of a phenomena and detailed measurement. 
 
It is therefore clear that the basic rationale for undertaking experiments is to establish cause-
effect relationships amongst variables, which will form a platform for the formulation of 
generalizable theories. The repeatability, precision and credibility which are requisite of 
experiments, however cannot be feasible in a research of this nature. This is because of the 
impracticality of being able to manipulate the variables under study: Ground conditions in the 
Niger Delta region and the geotechnical practices in highway agencies, to suit an experiment 
type research. Within the context of this research, experiments therefore, do not provide an 
adequate strategy for investigating the phenomena of cost overruns in highway projects. 
 
Also the highly objective nature of experiments does not make it amenable to carrying out this 
research, which recognises the subjective influence of human beings as the key medium through 
126 
 
which information would be gathered. The artificial and intensively structured nature of 
experiments therefore cannot serve to achieve the study objective of understanding the practices 
of highway agencies in terms of the level of adherence to geotechnical best practices. This study 
is not artificially contrived, but is carried out in a real life scenario, which is set in the social context 
of the highway organisations.   
4.9.2 Surveys 
The word survey can assume different meanings depending on the context of its usage. 
Descombe (2007) highlighted a definition of survey, from the geographical perspective of 
surveyors, as the need to obtain data, which can be applied to mapping out the social world. 
Surveys in a research context however have been generally used to refer to the collection of 
standardised information from a population or sample most commonly with the aid of 
questionnaires or structured interviews (Robson, 1993). Carrying out surveys is a principal 
strategy that provides quantitative measures of trends, attitudes or opinions based on samples 
derived from a wider population (Creswell, 2003).  Surveys do not incorporate any specific 
methods of data collection but rather can be carried out using different tools (Descombe, 2007). 
Types of surveys include postal and internet questionnaire surveys; face-to-face surveys 
(interviews), observations and documents. Each of these types of surveys have basic 
advantages and disadvantages, and it therefore falls to the researcher to weigh the options in 
the light of the kind of information sought (Robson, 1993; Descombe, 2007). 
 
Surveys can be conducted as cross-sectional or longitudinal studies. Surveys often conducted 
on the spot within a specified time frame with the general intent of bringing things up to date are 
cross-sectional in nature (Yin, 2014). They thus provide a structured and instantaneous snapshot 
of a specific event at a specific point in time. This is as opposed to longitudinal studies where 
research spans a longer time span. The choice of conducting longitudinal survey research is 
usually with the intent of tracing the development of changes in phenomena over time, typically 
required for time series analysis (Yin, 2014).  
 
The representativeness and size of samples in a survey research are critical issues that define 
the level of generalizability of research findings (Creswell, 2003). Descombe (2007) thus 
emphasized that one key characteristics of a survey research is “Wide and inclusive coverage”. 
This inherent advantage of the survey research strategy makes it a potential strategy for most 
research in terms of its wider coverage. However, although the comprehensiveness of a survey 
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may cover a wider range of participants due to larger sample size, the depth of information 
obtainable from surveys is often limited (Yin, 1994).  
 
The data to be potentially gained through the use of survey is allowed to ‘speak for itself’ leaving 
out the finer details (Descombe, 2007). Implications of using survey as the strategy for this study, 
would thus be that context would be lost, a major shortcoming spotted by the researcher, as a 
significant gap in the bulk of the previous research on cost overruns. Characteristic features in 
organisations, such as how the hierarchy of authority impacts on design and estimating practice, 
facts which can only be relayed via the richness of data from descriptive narratives, will be missed 
out. As such holistic background information on the complex inter-related design and costing 
processes, functions and job designations within the organisational structure of the highway 
agencies, which can affect the understanding of the study phenomena, may not be elicited from 
surveys which produce structured responses.  
 
In the context of this study, the empirical nature of survey research, which lends itself more to 
objectivism on an axiological scale, leaves out the interpretative element which is the driving 
philosophical root of this enquiry. This lack of ‘texture’ and ‘feel’ by virtue of the highly structured 
and objective format of survey questions, will thus prove to be a major shortcoming for this study. 
A more in-depth approach is therefore deemed appropriate, to achieve this study’s objective, of 
assessing the geotechnical adherence evident in highway projects executed in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria.  
4.9.3 Grounded Theory 
The origins of grounded theory can be traced back to the work of Glaser and Strauss (1967). 
Their development of the grounded theory approach was in direct opposition of the logico-
deductive methods of science which entailed the testing of preconceived theories based on 
empirical field work (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Their criticism of the scientific method was on 
the premise that such theories often do not fit in with real life scenarios and therefore remain 
ungrounded.  The authors thus advocated the development of theories that were firmly rooted in 
the practical reality of a phenomena, particularly in the study of people and their interactions. 
 
Grounded theory as a research strategy is closely linked with the symbolic interactionism 
philosophical reasoning (Graham and Thomas, 2008). On this basis grounded theory advocates 
for a continuous adjustment in the perception of reality on the basis of new meanings derived 
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from human interaction. According to the original version of grounded theory advanced by Glaser 
and Strauss (1967), the researcher is expected to approach the study with an open mind, without 
relying on any preconceived notions. The accumulated bulk of existing theories are therefore not 
relevant at the onset of the research. This has however been a point of considerable debate in 
the literature, on the grounds of the practicality of any researcher being able to achieve this state 
of ‘blankness’ (Descombe, 2007).  
 
Strong views were expressed by other researchers in opposition to the notion of blankness, as 
being philosophically impossible because to a large extent, it is these preconceived notions that 
would have led the researcher to conduct the research (Descombe, 2007). This initial extremist 
position of ‘blankness’ was thus later modified by Strauss and Corbin (1990) who acknowledged 
that prior experiences and theories should have a role. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), 
this was due to the acknowledged fact that any research must have a ‘beginning focus’ from 
which to start.  However, it was stressed that such theories should be viewed as ‘provisional’ in 
relation to the study being conducted, pending the outcome of the research. Thus it was stated 
that: 
       “The initial questions and areas of observation are based on concepts derived from literature 
and experience. Since these concepts do not have proven theoretical significance to the 
research, they must be considered provisional” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:180).  
 
Although the need for empirical fieldwork is emphasized in the deployment of grounded theory, 
it is necessary that theories be allowed to emanate from the field and not to be generated at a 
high level of abstraction and then tagged on to present situations (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
The emphasis is thus that theory should be systematically generated, and gradually developed 
based on emerging trends which can then be generalised. The collection of data should therefore 
be systematic and not just amassed with expectation that the data would speak for itself 
(Descombe, 2007). This systematic nature of data collection is carried out at the first instance on 
a broader platform. Subsequent data collection become increasingly directional and focused, in 
line with the flow of conceptual categories that is seen to be emerging from the data (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990). The selection of instances that would be included in a grounded theory 
research is thus dictated by the patterns of concepts that can lead to theory development 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
 
On the basis of these fundamental requirements outlined above, the potential applicability of 
grounded theory to the purely qualitative element of in-depth interviews used in eliciting 
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information describing current practices is still limited by the inherently theory driven nature of 
grounded theorising. Another challenge posed through the adoption of a grounded theorist 
approach to qualitative data analysis, is that grounded theorists carry out continuous theoretical 
sampling based emerging theoretical categories. This is carried out up to the point of theoretical 
saturation, a stage in the research at which the addition of further instances does not add any 
new perspective to the research (Graham and Thomas, 2008). This requirement to systematically 
reduce the scope and number of instances studied in grounded theory researches, in effect 
practically constrains in its applicability by the limited instances in the context of this study. This 
is because the analytic boundaries of the qualitative analysis, in this study is confined to 
understanding and explaining how ground related risk, due to the deltaic terrain, in highway 
projects are managed.  An inference that will be made from the interpretative analysis of practices 
prevailing in the existing three highway agencies in the study site (The Niger Delta terrain). This 
will in effect directly impact on the availability of cases to utilise as a basis of achieving theoretical 
saturation. 
 
Another shortcoming identified in the potential adoption of grounded theory for use in this 
research is its limitation to purely qualitative researches. This research by virtue of its design, as 
dictated by the study objectives, is fundamentally a mixed methods study and therefore grounded 
theory as an overall research strategy will not be all encompassing enough, to adequately 
address the quantitative strands of the study. The need to evaluate numerical as well as textual 
data from the field work, thus refutes the fundamental purely qualitative premise of grounded 
theorising. 
4.9.4 Case Study 
A case study is the study of a specific phenomenon using singular or multiple settings to describe 
and provide an account of the events, experiences and processes occurring within each setting 
(Descombe, 2007). The applicability of using case studies as a research strategy has being 
linked to diverse settings. Yin (2014) illustrated the use of case studies in political, individual, 
group and organisational settings. Its wide applicability equally transcends various subject 
domains including sociology, planning, psychology, construction, business and economic 
studies. Yin (1994) attributed the wide spread usage of case studies to the distinctive need to 
unravel and understand complex social phenomena.  
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Yin (2003) also stated that case studies can be used as a pilot, preliminary or main study, pointing 
out the most common characteristics typical of case study research irrespective of its intended 
usage: 
 Real life context; 
 Multiple sources; 
 In-depth study; 
 Theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis; 
 Empirical enquiry. 
An attribute of the case study, as a research strategy, is thus its ability to retain the 
wholesomeness of the real life contextual background of research, which is necessary to give 
research its meaning. This focus of case studies, on relationships and processes within the 
context of a social setting, makes it very applicable to the organisational context of this research.  
 
In emphasizing another major attribute of case study research, Robson (1993) contrasted survey 
methods with case studies in terms of the level of information obtained from participants. Surveys 
typically require a limited amount of information from respondents due to their highly structured 
format, while case studies depend on collecting extensive information from identified informants. 
In research where depth of information rather than breath is emphasised, Robson opined that 
case studies offer a distinct advantage. This distinguishing quality of depth afforded by the use 
of case study, is noted by Descombe (2007), as being due to its central focus on the instance 
being investigated. The aim of a case study is thus skilfully worded by Descombe (2007:36) as 
being “To illuminate the general by looking at the particular”.  The in-depth study afforded by the 
use of case study is based on the fact that research efforts are all directed to the ‘case’, which 
can lead to the discovery of more details. Robson (1993) defines the ‘case’ to be the situation, 
individual, group, organisation or the prevailing phenomena that has warranted the study.  
 
The underlying logic of ‘replication’ typical of empirical enquiry in case studies, concomitantly 
means that the case may be extended to cover multiple instances. The rationale behind using 
one case or a few selected cases arises out of the need to focus attention on typical instances 
as opposed to mass studies, is to uncover useful insights which may simply have been glossed 
over. The generalisability of theories generated from case study research are thus directly 
correlated with the number of cases studied. Multiple case studies are thus deemed to have 
higher levels of generalizability than single case studies, as they enable cross-case comparisons. 
Cases selected on this premise must therefore be comparable. 
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Yin (2003b:5) also stipulated three fundamental conditions that must be used in deciding the 
applicability of case study as a research strategy: “Nature of research questions (‘How’ and 
‘Why’); The extent of control the researcher has over actual behavioural events; The degree of 
focus on contemporary issues”. Typically, the case study approach is logically deemed 
appropriate to provide answers to ‘How are estimates for road projects in the Niger Delta region 
prepared at the pre-contract phases of highway projects?’ The case study approach thus has the 
potential to provide holistic answer to this research question posed to satisfy the study objective 
of eliciting information on the level of geotechnical input in evident in the existing estimating 
practice of highway agencies in the Niger Delta region. With respect to the degree of control the 
researcher has over actual behavioural events, the researcher has no influence directly or 
remotely on the costing and design practices prevailing in highway agencies in the Niger Delta. 
The information sought are practices that are ongoing, and thus cannot be manipulated by an 
external observer (the researcher) outside the case. The ‘degree of focus in a research: on 
contemporary or historical events’, posited as the third criterion by Yin (2003) has however been 
argued by other authors, who noted that although case study research is predominantly 
associated with contemporary phenomenon they can also be historical (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). Irrespective of this argument, this central issue of cost overruns in highway 
projects is a very topical one, which has attracted, and is still receiving attention from scholars, 
construction professionals, stakeholders as well as continuous local and international media 
exposure.  
 
Yin (1994) stresses that the most outstanding characteristic of a ‘case’ or ‘cases’ in a case study 
research must be its significance, and further outlining the criteria for such significance: The 
unusual nature of the case or one which is of public interest; the theoretically or practical ly 
significant underlying issues; or the technically distinctiveness of the situation. On this critical 
point, the peculiar nature of the Niger Delta terrain as well as its practical significance for the 
financial risk management of highway projects, justifies the selection of the case study site. The 
geo-spatial analysis of the geology of the Niger Delta, in chapter five of this thesis underscores 
this. 
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4.9.5 Selected Research Strategy: Case Study 
Experiments and surveys are deemed inapplicable to the context of this research in lieu of their 
purely positivist philosophical under-pinning, which is devoid of context, and restrictive of the 
depth of evidence that can be sourced. As such the restrictive, artificialized and highly structured 
nature of positivists methods, with their implied logico-deductive approach negates the 
wholesomeness which the researcher considers pivotal to investigating and understanding the 
interrelated processes and functions in cost estimating, designs and contracting for highway 
projects. This is because in the context of this study, the distinction between the study 
phenomena and its context is highly blurred and thus cannot be divorced from one another to 
suit the structured format of experiments and surveys. 
 
From a philosophical perspective, the interpretivist philosophical root of grounded theory aligns 
more closely to the philosophical underpinning of this research, than the positivist underpinning 
of experiments and surveys evaluated. However, the purely ‘theory building from qualitative data’ 
objective of grounded theorising, which Corbin and Strauss (1990) explained as ‘seeking to 
develop a well-integrated set of concepts from the data, that provide a thorough theoretical 
explanation of phenomena under study’, is a limitation in this research. This is because, although 
the study seeks ‘to provide explanations for cost overruns’, the relevant application of the existing 
body of theoretical propositions in cost estimating, highway designs and geotechnical 
engineering to the data is implied. Furthermore, although grounded theory might have presented 
a possible alternative on the basis of its philosophical compatibility with the interpretative strand 
of the study, its applicability is restricted in the quantitative strand of the pragmatist critical realist 
philosophical underpinning of this research. 
 
The need for a more encompassing research strategy, that is compatible with the critical realist 
philosophical stance adopted in this study, therefore made the adoption of experiments, surveys 
or grounded theory, as an overall research strategy for this study, inappropriate. Based on the 
overall assessment of the applicability of all the research strategies, the case study approach 
was deemed the most philosophically, technically and practically compatible with achieving the 
objectives of this study. The specific attributes of the case study strategy, which served as the 
criteria for its selection are thus its: Appropriateness and wholesomeness in investigating the 
study phenomena; Ability to incorporate requisite multiple sources and research techniques; and 
compatibility with adopted pragmatist philosophical critical realist viewpoint of this study. These 
are discussed in further detail: 
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4.9.5.1 Appropriateness/Wholesomeness in investigating the Study Phenomena  
In the context of this study, the depth of information needed to achieve the objective of the study, 
lends itself to using a case study research strategy, as depth rather than breadth of information 
is emphasised. Yin (1994:13) provided a technical definition of a case study as: “An empirical 
enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context”. Yin (1994) 
compared this distinguishing feature of a case study to those of experiments, where there is a 
clear cut purpose of stripping off the context. As such although surveys to a certain extent can 
investigate a phenomenon and its context, its ability to investigate the context is extremely 
limited.  Adopting a case study approach was thus considered the most logical choice for the 
purpose of providing a robust and in-depth explanation of cost overruns experienced in highway 
projects, executed in the Niger Delta region, against the backdrop of its peculiar geologic 
configuration. It is thus considered as being the most suitable holistic approach, necessary to 
demonstrate the far reaching impact of geotechnical pathogens on the current state of highway 
project delivery in the study area. 
 
4.9.5.2 Capacity to Incorporate Multiple Data Sources and Research Techniques 
One tangibly discernible characteristic of case study strategy, considered requisite in this study, 
apart from its ability to explore in-depth a single phenomenon while retaining its natural setting, 
is its ability to incorporate a variety of methods (Yin, 2003b). This distinguishing quality of case 
study research, to accommodate different qualitative and quantitative data and techniques, 
yielded the richness of evidence which the researcher considered pivotal to achieve the study 
aim.  This salient feature of a case study research enabled the researcher to source data from 
multiple sources. This study deployed a systematic quantitative analysis of project cost data, as 
well as geotechnical data, prior to a detailed qualitative evaluation of textual data. Adopting the 
case study strategy thus provided a platform for incorporating these diverse data types.  
 
The methodological pluralism implied by this mix of data types (Numerical and textual) represents 
a shift away from the conventional positivist viewpoint of most construction industry research. 
Dainty (2008) recommended a paradigm shift in the ideology of construction industry research, 
which should materialise in an increase in the use of qualitative methods beyond the 
predominance of quantitative empiricism evident in most scholarly text.  
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4.9.5.3 Compatibility with the Adopted Critical Realist Philosophy of this Study 
Based on the study’s critical realist underpinning philosophical positioning, the epistemological, 
ontological and axiological implications of this stance as earlier clarified, is more of relativity in 
positioning, between the extremities on the continuum of philosophical spectrums. On this basis 
therefore, purely positivism based (Experiments and Surveys) or wholly interpretivism based 
(Grounded theory) research strategies are rendered incompatible with the philosophical stance 
of this study. The critical realist philosophical viewpoint, which is the guiding principle shaping 
the design of this research, can only be justifiably operationalised in this study by the adoption 
of the case study research strategy.   
 
Further establishing the compatibility of the case study research strategy, is the fact that although 
it acknowledges the social construction of knowledge, it is guided by theoretical propositions, 
which retains the element of empiricism necessary from the critical realist lenses, to infer 
causality in relation to cost overruns in highway projects. It is therefore logical and apt to adopt 
the philosophically hybrid orientation of the case study research strategy, on the grounds of its 
compatibility with the critical realist philosophical positioning of this research. 
 
4.10 Adopting the Case Study Research Strategy: Measures of Reliability and Validity 
From the preceding kaleidoscopic evaluation of the various research strategies, in terms of their 
potential suitabilities, the case study approach has been selected. This is on the basis of its 
comprehensive applicability to investigating the organisational settings of highway agencies, as 
a necessary medium for conveying the complexity of the interactive processes and functions 
driving cost overruns in highway projects. In operationalising the case study, to achieve the aim 
of the study therefore, it becomes essential that the validity and reliability of the study output 
produced from its adoption is not undermined by issues of validity and reliability. (Bryman, 
1989:54) recommended that:  
          “When a measure is devised, it should not be presumed to be appropriate and adequate; 
rather it is necessary to establish that it meets the researcher’s aims and that it has 
adequate measurement properties”  
 
Reliability and validity basically define the appropriateness and consistency of a measure over 
time, which is its replicability as accurate and true reflections of the concept being measured. As 
such measures should be taken to address issues of:  
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 Construct validity;  
 Internal validity;  
 External validity;  
 Reliability.  
 
Qualitative research, however emphasizes the relevance of social conditioning to the reasoning 
process and its role in our understanding of a phenomena. Raoke and Kaguoglo (2007) thus 
recommended that qualitative data and output should be justified and validated using some other 
supplementary methods following the three fundamental tenets of qualitative research: 
 
 Postulate of Adequacy; 
 Postulate of Consistency; 
 Postulate of Subjective Interpretation. 
 
Ketoviki and Mantere (2010:316) in attempting to resolve this philosophical argument, in the 
context of organisational research, stated that ‘incompleteness of inductive reasoning’ is a 
dilemma often faced by researchers in attempting to draw theoretical conclusions from empirical 
data with a requisite level of credibility. He attributed this dilemma to several factors, including: 
 
 Theoretical and pragmatic proliferations; 
 Difficulties in placing the research argument in the context of the broader theoretical 
debates relevant to demonstrate study contributions; 
 Lack of standards particularly in qualitative premise; 
 Sheer complexity of social interaction in the interpretation of results. 
 
These arguments and issues which have been going on throughout the history of western 
philosophy have remained unresolved till date in contemporary epistemology (Ketokivi and 
Mantere, 2010).  The central contention in the literature, to which criticism of the mode of theory 
construction from qualitative data analysis is hinged, arises from the “Postulate of Subjective 
Interpretation” which limits the generalisability of theory constructed from the analysis of 
qualitative data to noting more than an ideographic interpretation. Ketokivi and Mantere, (2010) 
concluded that irrespective of this argument, all knowledge claims that are rooted in empirical 
data are derived as variants of forms of inductive reasoning typical of qualitative researches. It 
was thus recommended that rather than dwelling on this dichotomy, ‘a cooperative attempt 
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should be used in illuminating the argument’ as a justification of research contribution (Ketokivi 
and Mantere, 2010:332).  
 
Yin (2003b), recognising the need for ensuring reliability and validity of findings, thus stated that 
irrespective of the numerous advantages of case study research, it has also attracted similar 
negative criticism as most forms of qualitative research, which often times portrays it as an 
unreliable. The issue of construct validity was noted by Yin (2014) as especially challenging, as 
researchers may not have adequately defined the specific concepts being studied in the case 
study, as they relate to the study objectives. Further to this, researchers may not adequately 
operationalise the concepts where adequate parameters (Postulate of adequacy) in the evidence 
are not measured. Yin (2014) also highlighted that issues of internal validity of inferences 
(Postulate of subjective interpretation) made from data subjectively analysed also constitute a 
concern, which may undermine the adequacy of the case study findings in providing explanation 
for the phenomena being studied. External validity of findings, beyond the specific domain in 
which the case study is conducted, is also an issue often associated with case studies (Yin, 
2014). The replicability of the case study findings, which shows how credibly the case study was 
conducted (Postulate of consistency) is a concern that needs to be adequately addressed to 
ensure reliability (Yin, 2014). Lack of rigor, bias and low generalizability, are the major challenges 
of the case study approach commonly referred to in the literature. Yin (2014), thus underscored 
the need for adequate measures to address these key issues, to ensure reliability and validity of 
data and research output, from the point of conceptualising the research design, down to the 
specifics of data collection and analysis. 
 
Following the hybrid interpretative-positivist tradition typical of a critical realist philosophical 
positioning, Yin (2014) identified the following measures that can be taken to ensure validity and 
reliability of a case study research. This is summarised in Table 4.8:  
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Table 4.8: Measures of Reliability and Validity in Case Study Research 
Measures 
recommended 
Case Study Tactic 
 
Construct validity 
(Postulate of Subjective 
Interpretation) 
 
 Use of multiple sources of evidence 
 Establishing the chain of evidence from data 
 Use of multiple key informants  
 
Internal validity  
(Postulate of Adequacy) 
 
 
 Do pattern matching 
 Do Explanation Building 
 Address Rival Explanations 
 Use Logic models 
 
External validity  
(Research Design) 
 
 Use theory in single case study design 
 Use replication logic in multiple case-study design 
 
Reliability 
(Postulate of 
Consistency) 
 
 Use case study protocol 
 Develop case study data base 
(Source: Yin, 2014) 
Following this line of logic, the measures of validity and reliability posited by Yin (2014) are 
ensured in this case study research, to establish the credibility of the study’s contribution (in 
Table 4.9). 
 
Table 4.9: Measures of Validity and Reliability adopted in this Case Study  
Measures 
Recommended 
As applied to this Research  
 
Construct validity  
 
 
 Definition of concept, case and context being studied; 
 Identifying units of analysis and acquiring data to measure them. 
 Use is made of multiple sources of evidence from interviews, documents and 
archives; 
 Use of multiple key informants with multi-disciplinary perspectives; 
 The chain of evidence is increasingly established from the data, from the 
exploratory statistical analysis of archival data to the descriptive qualitative 
analysis of interview data; 
 
Internal validity  
(postulate of 
adequacy) 
 
 Pattern matching via thematic analysis of qualitative data; 
 Use of step-wise regression modelling in explanation building; 
 Use of cognitive mapping to visually converge all sources of evidence; 
 Addressing key rival and complementary explanations to cost overruns. 
 
 
External validity  
(Postulate of 
Consistency) 
 
 Use of theoretical framework derived from the literature as proposition in the 
singular distinctive case study of the Niger Delta region 
 
Reliability  
 
 
 Preparation of pre-designed interview templates, ethical consent and 
introduction letters as part of case study protocol 
 Detailed outline of data collection methods 
 
Data Collection 
Research 
Design 
Data Analysis 
Data Collection 
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4.10.1 Construct Validity: Research Variables, Design and Approach to Theory 
Construction  
Yin (2014) emphasized that theory development is central to conducting case studies. The 
researcher’s impetus for the study, was based on the perception of a strong link between the 
phenomena of significant cost overruns and the deltaic terrain of the study area, as depicted in 
Figure 4.7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Researcher’s Conceptualisation of Study Phenomena 
 
This study researches the phenomenon of ‘unusually high cost overruns’ typical of highway 
projects in the Niger Delta, a region which is geographically known for its extremely poor terrain 
and variability in subsoil types.  As earlier clarified, case studies are typically useful to research 
theoretically or technically distinctive cases, where there is a deliberate emphasis on the 
contextual conditions. Yin (2014) emphasised that the completeness of a case study is further 
enhanced by an explicit distinction between a “case” and its context, and that the spatial 
boundaries of the context or case should be defined. Highway project development in Niger Delta 
region, is studied as a single case study, due to its geologic distinctiveness and extremity in 
documented cost overrun levels, perceived as being predominantly tied to the shortcomings in 
the geotechnical practice of the three highway agencies operating in the region.    
 
This study thus places particular emphasis on the ‘contextual geologic conditions of the case’, 
which the researcher considers a major impact factor in accounting for cost overruns. The 
‘context’ of the ‘case’, is however purposively limited to the spatial boundaries of present day 
Rivers and Bayelsa States, due to their embodiment of the definitive geologic characteristics of 
a delta, clarified in the literature, and which is of particular importance in the study.  
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Figure 4.8: Embedded Single Case Study Design showing Elements of the Case  
 
The unit of analysis, towards which all data collection effort is targeted, is thus ‘Highway projects 
in the geologic setting of the Niger Delta’, with embedded units as shown in Figure 4.8. The 
singular distinctive case of the ‘Niger Delta region, is thus selected and used to understand the 
propagation of high cost overruns in highway projects, triggered by latent geotechnical pathogens 
inherent in the ‘ground conditions’ (Embedded unit of analysis 1) as well as due to prevailing 
‘geotechnical practices’ (Embedded unit of analysis 2). The specific case selected for 
investigation, ‘Highway development in the Niger Delta Region’, embodies the extremities of 
geology and cost overruns, around which the core arguments (study and counter) in this study 
revolves: 
 
 The study argument: Pathogens may be unintentionally triggered due to lack of 
geotechnical best practices by highway organisations, which will be further exacerbated 
by poor subsoil conditions at project sites, leading to significant cost overruns. 
 
 The counter argument: Deliberate deception by project proponents and planners, not 
geology or geotechnical risk, is the only statistically valid explanation for cost overruns. 
 
This study argument has thus guided all aspects of the components of the design of  this case 
study, as Yin (2014) prescribes, from the: initial propositions conceptualised from the literature 
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on geotechnical best practices; research logic, unit of analysis, as well as setting the criteria for 
interpreting finding from the fieldwork. As such with this underlying motivation, the researcher 
sought to understand the extent to which the highway organisations accommodate ground 
conditions, implied by the peculiar terrain of the region in highway designs and estimates. This 
in essence forms the basis of generating theory which ties the loosely argued logic of the 
pathogenic effect of geotechnical drivers on cost overruns, evident in the literature, as well as 
refuting the counter argument.  
4.10.2 Internal and External Validity: Operationalising the Case Study from Data to Theory  
Having clarified the concepts and variables under investigation in this case study research, it 
becomes necessary to explore the practical issues of validity associated with the mixed method 
approach taken as a route, to operationalise the case study from data to theory. This is because 
case study research can be associated with both quantitative and qualitative researches 
(Bryman, 1989). Typically, case studies in most organisational settings are carried out from an 
interpretivist or positivist viewpoint on the philosophical spectrum (Sexton, 2007). In the context 
of organisational research, Bryman (1989:25) distinguished qualitative case studies from 
quantitative case studies in terms of the “level of emphasis on interpretations of individuals 
working in the organisations”. Bryman (1989:26) stated that for qualitative case studies:  
        “The research process often starts with a set of loose concepts, ideas and relationships 
between issues perceived as relevant and important in relation to the knowledge domain 
based on the investigators preoccupation ... with theoretical reflections filling in the gaps 
during data collection”. 
 
Quantitative case studies however, model the research process to closely mimic a scientific 
approach in which data on organisational attributes is collected and analysed with researcher’s 
impersonal detachment typical of experimental or survey research to establish verifiable facts 
(Bryman, 1989). Typical of a positivist approach, hypotheses are formulated, based on which 
statistical tests are carried out on numerical measures of the organisation. A positivist approach 
to theory construction in organisational studies, according to Bryman (1989) thus requires that 
all efforts are usually directed towards: 
 Generating quantifiable attributes (Variables) to test the hypothesis;  
 Establishing and demonstrating causality (Theoretical explanations/ Internal validity); 
 Ensuring generalization beyond the specific confines of the specific context (External 
validity); 
 Achieving replication/reliability (minimising the impact of researcher’s biases/values on 
credibility of research outcome). 
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Following this line of logic, and in tune with the critical realist philosophical underpinning of this 
research, the case study approach used to generate theory in this study, is a hybrid merger of 
the requirements of both qualitative and quantitative research. Theory in this case study, which 
assumes a critical realist orientation, is therefore generated qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Theory on Embedded Unit of Analysis 1 (how deltaic ground conditions induces cost overruns) 
is generated quantitatively, while theory on Embedded Unit of Analysis 2 ( linking geotechnical 
practices in organisations to the high level of recorded cost overruns) is generated qualitatively.  
Figure 4.9 shows the researchers approach to data generation and triangulation of sources 
leading to theory construction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Practical Approach to Theory Construction in this Study  
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documentary/archival sources. The incorporation of data from multiple sources is designed to 
improve the internal validity of the case study design, in terms of ensuring that premature 
conclusions are not drawn from circumstantial evidence, and the external validity of the study 
output. Dainty et al. (1997) advocated for triangulation of data to give different but convergent 
perspectives to the theoretical explanation of the phenomena under investigation. Dainty et al. 
(1997) explicitly rationalised this need on the following grounds: 
 
 The systematic combination of different methods and data types reduces the possibility 
of the researcher drawing erroneous premature conclusion through an over-reliance on 
a single data set or technique; 
 Increased generalisability of theories generated from social negotiation to having a wider 
resonance in the body of knowledge; 
  Not being bounded by the empirical parameters of a study; 
 Enhanced understanding of the study phenomena based on the holistic consideration of 
the various strands linking the evidence from various levels of enquiry. 
 
The researcher’s approach to theory building follows the prescription of Yin (2014), whereby 
level-1 inferences, which are lower order theories generated from the different multiple sources, 
corroborate each other to yield a level-2 inference, which is an analytically generalizable theory, 
at a conceptual level higher than the case studied. This study in achieving triangulation, 
therefore: 
 
 Generates a first Level-1 theory, by collecting numerical data on the spatially dispersed 
geotechnical index variables on subgrade soils at project locations, and cost overrun 
trends from archives. These are analysed geo-statistically in a quasi-experimental 
fashion, as an exploratory step to understand the inherent propensity for the deltaic 
ground conditions at project sites to induce cost overruns in highway projects. the 
findings from this phase builds up and links to further understanding what latent triggers 
exists in practice; 
 
 Generates a second Level-1 theory, by collecting textual data on the geotechnical 
practices of the highway agencies during design and costing processes, with respect to 
managing risks due to the deltaic ground conditions at project sites. The qualitative data 
is deductively analysed, relative to standards of geotechnical best practice, to gain a 
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further in-depth understanding of the underlying issues accounting for the inference 
made from the preliminary geo-statistical analysis; 
 
 Generates a third level-2 theory, in reflexive adaptation to unanticipated social constructs 
emerging from the qualitative data. Theory in this regard is thus further generated from 
the qualitative data using a purely inductive approach, similar to the approach of 
grounded theorising. 
 
 Triangulates all the level-1 theories from the quantitative and qualitative strands of the 
case study to yield two ‘level-2 theories: A Regression Model explicitly accounting for 
the variance in cost overruns induced by geotechnical pathogens; and a Cognitive map 
visualising the complexity of the interplay between geotechnical pathogens and 
emergent social constructs, represented as an array of barriers to geotechnical best 
practice in highway project development in the Niger Delta region.  
 
The case study findings are subsequently analytically generalised back to serve as a ‘working 
hypothesis’, useful in studying the impact of geotechnical pathogens in triggering cost overruns, 
typical of similar heterogeneous wetland geology and socio-cultural setting. This empirically 
corroborates and advances the validity of geotechnical explanations, amidst the strong dialectical 
debate in the literature, which features other rival as well as complementary explanations, in 
accounting for cost overruns in highway projects. The implications of the case study findings in 
refuting the chief rival explanation to cost overruns is addressed, and the wider policy implications 
of the research are discussed. The unanticipated theoretical concepts which emerge from the 
study, as reflexively analysed and cognitively mapped out with the initial geotechnical themes, 
are infused as part of the study findings, forming a basis of recommendations for further studies. 
4.10.3 Reliability of Data used as Evidence in this Case Study  
Specific details on the approach to data management in ensuring reliability of evidence tendered 
in this case study research, is further provided in the subsequent more practical aspects of the 
overall research design, in terms of the:  
 Data types;  
 Methods of data collection;  
 Structure of interviews; 
 Sample size of interviews;  
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 Mode of participant recruitment; 
 Mode of conduct of interviews; 
 Analytical techniques 
 
4.11 Data Types 
Sanders et al. (2009) stated that the answers to most research questions are usually derived 
from a concurrent analysis of both secondary and primary data. However, with limited levels of 
available secondary data, reliance is placed on fundamentally generating primary data. Within 
the context of this research, use will be made of both primary and secondary data sources based 
on the nature of the research questions relevant to achieve the objectives of the study. 
 
Primary data is defined by Nachmais and Nachmais (1992:291) as “Data collected in a contrived 
or natural setting in which the participants are aware of being studied, or data that is collected 
personally by the researcher”. As such primary data produces a contemporary; unpublished; 
unique and first-hand account of events. Primary data for this study was obtained from interview 
sessions conducted with participants linked to the highway agencies. This constituted the 
principal source of data deployed for the qualitative strand of this case study, which provided a 
first-hand description of the design and costing processes within the highway organisations, and 
thus the level of geotechnical input in projects.  
 
Secondary data refers to data collected by others for purposes, which differ from the original 
research objective (Descombe, 2007). Secondary data includes both raw data without any 
attempt made at processing the data: letters; dairies; manuscript; notes; records; field work 
reports, as well as published summaries compiled in a systematic format (Saunders et al., 2007).  
Secondary data could be recent or historical which serves as the basic distinction between 
documentary and archival sources. Documentary and archival sources, which are sources of 
secondary data, are unobtrusive.  
4.12 Reliability of Secondary Data Sources in this Case Study  
Alternative documentary sources exist that can be availed for research purposes. They can be 
visual, audio or written sources, although the written sources are relatively more commonly used.  
Descombe, (2007) listed a wide range of written documentary sources such as: Government 
publication and official statistics; Newspapers and magazines; Records of meetings; Letters and 
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memos; Diaries, as well as web pages and internet. A note of caution is however sounded by 
Descombe (2007) when using secondary sources to ensure a high standard of reliability. 
Researchers are therefore advised to cross check for the authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and unambiguity of documentary sources before using them as reliable 
sources of evidence in research.  
 
However, Yin (2009) indicated the strength of documentary analysis as being unobtrusive and 
therefore, devoid of manipulation to align with the case being studied. Yin (2009) stated that most 
organisations collect and store a variety of data to support their operations: However, issues of 
confidentiality and access are typical with organisational documents. Descombe (2007) who 
although expresses the need for caution in the deployment of secondary data, stated that 
documents and archives are a useful and reliable source of information in research, which can 
be used as an independent source of evidence in parallel with questionnaires, interviews or 
observation or as supportive sources of evidence.  
 
Documentary and archival data for this case study were obtained from: the project records of the 
three highway agencies being investigated; a research institute which sources geotechnical 
information on the engineering properties of sub-grade soils at various locations in Nigeria, 
although in limited amounts; and privately sourced geotechnical investigation reports from 
consultancy firms located in the Niger Delta region, to supplement the data obtained from the 
research institute. This was further complimented by a literature survey of geo-spatial studies on 
the geology of the Niger Delta, available from the extensive work already carried out on local 
soils.  
 
Information obtained from these sources principally constituted the bulk of the secondary data 
which to a large extent shaped the quantitative dimension of the case study. The collated 
geotechnical data was filtered to correspond with project locations and analysed with project 
information and cost overrun data from archives of the three highway agencies in the study area 
for completed highway projects, to establish the chain of evidence.   
 
4.13 Primary Data Collection  
The tool for the collection of primary qualitative data in this study is the use of interviews. The 
research by virtue of its design, relies on the need to collect qualitative data principally from 
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human participants.  Saunders et al. (2009) defined an interview as a purposeful discussion 
between two or more people. Descombe (2007) however opined that an interview is much more 
than a conversation and involves much more technicalities than an ordinary conversation. 
Descombe (2007) distinguished interviews from conversations on the following basis: 
 The ethical necessity of consent on the part of the interviewee; 
 Interviewee’s words are treated as records; 
 The topic of discussion is defined by the interviewer. 
 
Descombe (2007) advocated that interviews were particularly suited for use in the exploitation of 
complex and subtle phenomena, as opposed to straight forward factual information in which 
questionnaires can prove to be efficient. The qualitative aspect of the research sought to describe 
and understand in detail, the approach to designing and costing highway projects, by the highway 
agencies.  
4.13.1 Structure of Interviews 
Interviews may be: in-depth; semi-structured; structured as shown in Figure 4.10, based on the 
level of formality and structure used in conducting the interviews (Saunders et al., 2009). Each 
of these interview formats may be warranted by different situations and with underlying issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Interview Structure used for Collecting Primary Data                  
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out to the respondent on the basis of which options for structured responses to the questions are 
provided (Saunders et al., 2009). The structured nature of these interviews demands that the 
questions and any preliminary explanations of the interview questions be presented in an 
identical format to each respondent to avoid bias. Structured interviews are also referred to as 
‘interviewer administered questionnaires’, and are deployed mainly for the collection of 
quantitative data (Descombe, 2007). Structured interviews are useful as a tool of data collection 
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for eliciting the kind of in-depth qualitative information the researcher considers necessary to 
understand the practices of the highway agencies.  
 
At the other extreme on the scale of formality and structure, are the un-structured interviews 
which are conducted as completely open discussions. Saunders et al. (2009) explained that the 
interviewer in using this format opens the interview with a broad outline of the topic of the 
interview, and from then onwards the conversation is allowed to flow freely to cover any related 
issues. Although there is no pre-structured list of questions to administer, the interviewer has to 
have a clear vision of the issues to be covered in relation to a topic. The interviewee in this 
circumstance is referred to as the ‘informant’ and as such will dictate the pace and directional 
flow of the interview. This type of interview provides a platform for exploring the beliefs, behaviour 
and attitude of the respondent in relation to a specific topic and is thus considered less useful for 
the purpose of this study which focuses on the organisational processes and not the people. The 
researcher was thus of the opinion that since the research is not focused on attitudes or believes 
of individuals but rather on their professional evaluation of the current technical organisational 
processes, the use of unstructured interviews would not best serve the research objectives.  
 
Semi-structured interviews are only partly structured research interviews, but with a high degree 
of flexibility in format. On this basis of its flexibility and usefulness with respect to providing 
answers to the research questions, this form of structure was used to draft the questions in the 
interview guide used in this study (Appendix A). This thus defined the structure of the interviews 
conducted in this study. The researcher set out to interview the respondents with a general 
outline of questions on the themes that that the study covered, as deduced from the literature 
review. However, there was a degree of flexibility in the nature of the questions asked. The 
primary purpose of the interviews was thus reflected in their semi-structured format, which was 
principally targeted at eliciting information relevant to assess the prevailing level of geotechnical 
input in the progressive phases of highway development.  
 
The flexibility of a semi-structured form of interviewing presented its apparent advantages in this 
study. As such depending on the on the respondent or the specific organisational context, certain 
questions were asked which were omitted in other contexts. Additional questions not originally 
part of the interview protocol were also introduced to probe unanticipated issues that occurred in 
the course of the interview and which the researcher considered crucial to the study. This 
discretionary method of interviewing was thus tailored to suit the prevailing context of the 
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individual interviews to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of the geotechnical 
issues driving the phenomena of cost overruns in highway projects. The flow of conversation was 
directed along specific paths that the researcher was interested in, but the respondents has more 
room to freely express their opinions on issues discussed. This led to a better understanding of 
current practice and enabled the researcher to induce inferences on the prevailing level of 
adherence to geotechnical best practices. The usefulness of this flexibility was further evident as 
a plethora of unanticipated themes, discernible from repeated trend and patterns in the interview 
conversations, emerged. The structure, flexibility and in-depth nature of semi- structured 
interviews were therefore significant advantages in this research. 
4.13.2 Conditions of Entry: Ethical Conduct and Mode of Participant Recruitment  
Prior to the field work, the researcher had prepared a synthesised draft of the data requirements 
of the research, as part of the university requirement of obtaining ethical approval. On this basis 
participant information sheets, consent letters, risk assessment and a draft of the interview 
protocol were submitted and ethical approval gained. The ethical approval given by the research 
board of the University of Salford is contained in the Appendix E. The interview sessions were 
thus conducted in consonance with the ethical requirements of the University of Salford.  
 
To recruit participants from the highway organisations introductory information letters (AA-
OMC1-Nov’14, in Appendix) explaining the nature and purpose of the research were sent to the 
respective highway organisations. This was complimented by personal contacts and insiders 
within the targeted highway agencies, necessary to facilitate the approval process. Winkler 
(1987), who spent nearly one year of a three-year project negotiating access, advocated the use 
of early planning and arrangements, friends and contacts within target organizations as tools for 
overcoming the problem of access. Early planning by the researcher was thus key to ensuring 
that the necessary permission was obtained from the organisations.  
 
On gaining approval, the research project information was provided and consent sought from the 
delegated personnel within the relevant units of each organisation (AA-PCF1- Nov’14 and AA-
PIS1-Nov’14, in Appendix). The delegates which were chosen in relation to their job description 
and within the highway agencies, were thus relied on as the primary source of information on the 
design and estimating practices in their organisations. It was also necessary to eliminate other 
subjective influences, such as the hierarchical ranking of the staff, to ensure that subjective 
influences by virtue of their ranking did not bias the information gained.  
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The information provided from interviews conducted within the organisational settings of the 
highway agencies, was further complimented by information provided by external registered 
consultants and contractors, employed by the agencies but outside the organisational settings of 
the highway agencies.  Participants interviewed outside the confines of the organisational 
structure of the highway agencies were recruited on the basis of their: Professional links to the 
highway agencies (Consultants); and the contractual relationship with the Highway agencies 
(Contractors). Another principal criterion used in selecting respondents, external to the highway 
organisations investigated in this study, was their level of experience and qualifications 
necessary to provide the required technical information on the designs and costing practices of 
highway projects executed within the Niger Delta. Individuals assessed as possessing the 
requisite level of professional experience and academic qualifications in relation to the outlined 
criteria were recruited on the basis of their consent (AA-PCF1- Nov’14, in Appendix). The 
perspectives and views of the consultants and contractors outside the organisational structure of 
the highway agencies, were thus incorporated as a further measure to ascertain the reliability of 
data gained from within the highway organisations.  
 
Information letters outlining the nature of the research and the relevance of their professional 
opinions to the study were thus forwarded (AA-PIS1-Nov’14, in Appendix). Recourse however 
had to be made to the use of the LinkedIn professional network, where the profiles of four (4Nr) 
of the respondents were assessed, to gain online access to them. This was achieved through 
live chatting, after the interview protocol had been made available to them for viewing.   
 
4.13.3 Proposed Sample Size 
On the preceding outlined basis therefore the designated number of respondents 12(Nr) from 
the three highway agencies was constituted to comprise: 
 Quantity surveyors – Two (A management level and an operational level staff) from each 
of the three highway agencies (6Nr);  
  Civil engineers      - Two (A management level and an operational level staff) from each 
of the three highway agencies (6Nr).  
 
Respondents were also sampled external to the highway thus:  
 
 Consultants: Three respondents, one each randomly selected from the list of registered 
consultancy firms provided by the highway agencies constituted the three (3Nr) sample 
size of interviews carried for the consultants group.  
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 Contractors: Three road contracting firms, one each were selected from the list of 
registered contractors provided by the three highway agencies, and constituted the 
sample size for the contractors group. The firms were also selected based on the 
information provided by respondents from the highway agencies as to the volume of 
road contracts executed by these firms and which established their relationship with the 
highway agencies.  
 
Descombe (2007) appraises the appropriateness of this method of sampling to where the 
researcher possesses prior knowledge of the people, events or organisations. On this basis it is 
recommended to “hand pick” respondents who are likely to provide the most valuable 
information. As such within and outside the organisational structure of the agencies, the 
participants in the interviews were purposively recruited on the criteria of their professional 
demographics, to elicit information on the ‘unit of analysis 2’ of this case study (costing and 
design of highway projects executed in the Niger Delta).  
4.13.4 Mode of Interview Conduct  
The interview sessions, which lasted for an approximate duration of 45 minutes, were conducted 
over the telephone and online through life chatting on the LinkedIn professional network for as 
opposed to face-to-face interviews. However, some of the interviews conducted over the 
telephone lasted over one hour, in the light of unanticipated information that emerged in the 
conversation, and which the researcher considered vital to explaining why cost overruns were 
so unusually high for highway projects executed in the Niger Delta.  
 
Telephone and internet based interviews can be distinguished from face-to-face interviews in 
terms of the distance between the interviewer and participants which according to (Bryman, 
1989). can be conceptualised on two levels: 
 Physically in terms of literal distance which be as much as thousands of miles; 
 Figuratively, in terms of the lesser personal effects of interviewer’s social characteristics 
on the interaction and respondent’s replies” (Bryman, 1989: 44-45). 
 
The choice of the telephone interviews, supplemented by internet based interviews, was based 
on this apparent advantages over personal face-to-face interviews, in addition to other 
advantages which were noted by Bryman (1989). These included the:  
151 
 
 Relatively less expensive nature 
 Enhanced speed of execution 
 Considerably more coverage afforded 
 Relative ease with which they can be scheduled and supervised. 
 
These advantages were particularly evident in this study, based on the fact that the researcher 
on establishing initial contact with the respondents, noted that a higher percentage of them were 
more accessible online, and via the telephone. This may be attributable to the relative ease of 
telephone and internet access in modern times. Recourse to the use of other online video 
conferencing tools was however limited by technological constraints posed by the low level of 
advancement in Information Technology (IT) based communication in the study area.  The 
combination of these two relatively accessible media of communication used in the study, 
afforded the researcher far more coverage. This is demonstrated by the total sample size of 18, 
with 16 of the interviews conducted representing a high response rate of 89%. This statistic 
further broken down represents 83.3% 10 of 12Nr response rate within the highway organisations 
and a 100% (6 of 6Nr) response rate from outside the highway agencies. This high response 
rate is attributed to the fact that access to the respondents was easily managed. This was due 
to the fact most of the respondents 10 out of the 14Nr interviewees via the telephone, preferred 
to be interviewed after work hours in the evenings between 17:00 to 20:00 Hours. This 
demonstrated ease of scheduling the interviews to suit the respondents’ preferences, would not 
have been absent with face to face interviews, which would have presented practical difficulties 
for the researcher due to the geographical dispersion of the interview sites. This is apparent, 
based on the fact that the respondents were situated in different locations in the difficult 
predominantly wetland terrain of the Niger Delta with the implied transportation issues. The 
interview locations are also distributed amongst several organisational settings, (Three Highway 
agencies; three Contracting firms; three Consultancy firms), each of which would have protocols 
and formalities in accommodating and scheduling face-to-face interviews. The use of face- to-
face interviews would thus have constituted a hindrance to speed and ease with which the 
interviews were conducted and supervised. 
 
It has been opined that people are as honest over the telephone as they are in face-to-face 
contact (Descombe, 2007). This was also noted by the researcher, in that the four interviews 
conducted during working hours of the organisations, typical of face to face interviews, were 
much more restrained compared to those carried out after work hours. As such the acclaimed 
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superiority of face to face interviews over telephone interviews is put to question (Bryman, 1989; 
Descombe, 2007). The telephone and internet based interviews thus still retained some of the 
personal element of face to face interviews, despite the fact that the visual element is foregone. 
The researcher is also of the opinion that that the visual element is not of particular importance, 
but rather is more prone to the established effect of visual social interactions in interviews 
(Bryman, 1989). This opinion is further reinforced by the fact that the primary purpose of the 
interviews was to elicit information relating to technical details of designs and estimating, and not 
the behavioural or attitudinal characteristics of the respondents.  
4.14 Reliability of Qualitative Data from Interviews 
All necessary measures, relevant to improve and ascertain the reliability and accuracy of 
qualitative data collected during the field work, were thus taken via the: Piloting of Draft Interview 
Questions; Use of Multiple Informants; Appropriate Distribution of Professional Demographics. 
The practical details of these measures as applied in the field work are thus described in detail 
below.  
4.14.1 Piloting of Draft Interview Questions 
Preliminary piloting of initially drafted interview was carried out to ensure that the questions were 
structured in clear, simple and unambiguous language, using appropriate technical terminology 
(Bryman, 1989). This was considered imperative to ensure that respondents could readily 
comprehend questions and did not attach more than one interpretation to the questions asked. 
Piloting of the interview questions was also useful in ensuring that the structure of questions 
would elicit responses necessary to gain the required information. As such questions that were 
initially poorly presented were restructured, based on the comments raised in the pilot study. A 
copy of the initial draft interview questions is attached as part of the appendix. The justification 
for the revision is attached also in the appendix, with the final interview template. 
 
4.14.2 Use of Multiple Informants 
Within the organisational structure of the highway agencies, reliability of data was achieved by a 
cross comparison of information provided by the different cadre of respondents: (Management 
and operational professional staff) from within a particular agency, with subtle discrepancies duly 
noted. This method is an adaptation of the use of ‘Key Informant Research’ which is common 
with organisational studies, used to retrieve factual data rather than attitudinal data. Multiple 
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informants from each highway organisation were thus used to elicit relevant information, as 
opposed to using one key informant, selected to speak on behalf of the organisation. The 
rationale for adopting this approach is based on findings from a number of older organisational 
research studies in the literature (Philips 1981; Hickson et al., 1986; Bryman, 1989) that have 
pointed out the limitations of using a single informant. Typically, several issues were raised, such 
as: 
 Whether it is possible for a single informant to provide accurate information on the 
organisation as a whole? 
 The possibility of variability of status of the informant affecting the reliability of information 
provided, which may have implications for the comparability of data. 
 The potential for error, ignorance bias or deliberate distortion of facts from a single 
informant. 
However, it is recognised by the researcher that although aggregated accounts from the multiple 
participants may not completely eliminate this identified shortcomings, it greatly minimises them. 
4.14.3 Appropriateness of Professional Demographics 
The adequacy of the respondents’ demographic information, with respect their professiona l/ 
academic backgrounds and experience, was ensured in the selection of potential participants as 
measures of reliability and validity. As such the years of experience and professional 
qualifications of respondents, was elicited as part of the demographic information. This was 
considered necessary to demonstrate the specificity of the experience in relation to the 
information being sought. As such, it established the reliability of information provided by 
respondents from the consultancy and contracting firms.  
4.15 Data Protection 
The audio taped interview conversations were handled with the utmost level of discretion. Audio 
tapes were locked up for the duration of their use and will be destroyed along with all back-up 
copies made, at the conclusion of the research. Data collected online were equally handled with 
discretion. Only the researcher and the supervisor had access to the raw data collected. Personal 
computers were also pass-word protected, with controlled access to data files as a further 
measure to ensure security of transcribed data from interviews. Prior to transmitting the 
transcribed data, personal information and all forms of respondent identity were removed and 
replaced with codes before further encryption. 
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4.16 Data Analysis 
Data analysis in this study was carried out in several distinct but linked phases, with previous 
phases progressively leading to latter phases, as a strategy of explanation building advocated 
by Yin (2015), to ensure internal validity in explanatory case studies. The multiple analytical 
techniques deployed for this purpose are briefly outlined, although further detailed breakdown of 
the approach deployed at each phase is provided in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
 
4.16.1 Exploratory Geo- Statistical Analysis  
The researcher began the analysis from the exploratory phase of the study, by developing a 
geotechnical classification of subsoils in the Niger Delta, as a form of quasi experimentation. 
Broad conceptual geomorphic categorisations of Niger Delta soils, as used in engineering 
geologic application, were synthesized from the local literature, to highlight its geologic 
heterogeneity. Based on the synthesized geotechnical classifications, cost overrun data for the 
geologic zones identified as having similar subsoil characteristics, are analysed using a quasi-
experimental design approach, for significant differences in the level of project cost overrun 
incurred on highway projects. Analysis of Variance of cost overruns incurred on a sample of sixty-
one completed highway projects, spatially distributed amongst the synthesised zones, was thus 
carried out to infer whether the differences in the geology of project locations has any bearing on 
the level of cost overruns recorded in the highway projects, executed by the 3 highway agencies 
operating in the region. 
 
Further to this, the various engineering parameters, which represent the suitability of sub-grade 
soils in the Niger Delta, as bearing media in highway construction, are inferred as the factors 
which are latent in the geologic setting. Geotechnical data on sub-grade soils referred to as ‘Index 
properties’, which provide quantitative parameters that reflect the properties of soils, as 
applicable to highway designs, are used to extrapolate the basic engineering suitability of the 
sub-grade soils at the spatially dispersed project locations in the Niger Delta region. This 
explorative geotechnical phase was useful to show the inherent capacity of the geologic 
configuration of the Niger Delta terrain, to compound the cost overrun propensity of highway 
projects. This served as a backdrop to understanding the level of geotechnical risk the terrain 
possesses, and which should ideally be catered for by adequate geotechnical practices. 
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On this basis, a descriptive spatial geotechnical analysis of Niger Delta soils was carried out, 
using standard engineering classification of sub-grade soil types, and their financial implications 
as bearing media in highway construction analysed.  A set of hypotheses to statistically test for 
association between these geotechnical index variables, relating to the stability and expansivity 
of soils, and cost overruns are tested using correlation analysis, which subsequently forms an 
integral part of the stepwise regression modelling used latter in explanation building.  This 
constituted the preliminary geospatial exploratory phase, upon which the descriptive qualitative 
phase, targeted at eliciting information on the prevailing geotechnical practices of the highway 
agencies, was built.  
4.16.2 Descriptive Qualitative Analysis (Deductive) 
Further to the initial exploratory analysis, the researcher identified geotechnical best practices 
from the literature, to account for the deduced disparity in cost overruns levels, revealed from the 
geo-spatially distributed pattern of the cost overrun data.  A conceptual framework of 
geotechnical pathogens, identified from the literature on geotechnical best practices, was 
developed and served as a basis for drafting the interview template. The interviews were used 
to elicit information on the prevailing level of adherence to geotechnical best practice by the 
highway agencies, during the design and estimate phases of project development. The elicited 
data was thematically analysed, relative to the standards of geotechnical best practices. This 
were inferred as the primary triggers to cost overruns, as they exhibited a pathogenic latent 
effect, which exacerbated the inherent propensity of the wetland terrain of the Niger Delta. The 
analysis was carried out using the NVIVO-10, qualitative data analysis software, after 
transcribing the interview notes. 
4.16.3 Descriptive Qualitative Analysis (Inductive) 
Other non-geotechnical social constructs which were unanticipated, however emerged from the 
interview data, and were reflexively infused into the qualitative analysis.  The inductive interview 
analysis was carried as a second stage of qualitative data analysis, whereby the researcher re-
read the interview transcripts and matched patterns repeated occurring across the data. The 
analysis in this regard was thus carried out without a prior literature base similar to grounded 
theorising. A multiplicity of social constructs was inductively inferred as the barriers to 
geotechnical best practice, and by extension contextual drivers to cost overruns. 
4.16.4 Explanatory Regression Modelling and Cognitive Mapping 
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This phase was further structured to build on findings emanating from the results of the previous 
sets of analysis. This entailed the triangulation of output from: the geospatial factors deduced 
from the quantitative archival project data on cost overrun and subsoils variables; together with 
the qualitative findings on the geotechnical themes inferred from the interview analysis, using 
regression modelling. A multiple log regression model was generated, by a step-wise introduction 
of categorical dummy variables to represent the assessed levels of geotechnical practice, which 
varied depending on the class of project and the executing highway agency. This was further 
juxtaposed on ground conditions at the respective projects locations, as indicated by the 
quantitative spatial geotechnical data on sub-grade soils.   
 
Regression modelling was thus used to infer causality, explicitly quantifying the proportion of 
variance in the cost overrun data, accounted for by the inherent geotechnical properties of subsoil 
at project locations, and the variance induced due to lack of geotechnical best practice. Some of 
the variation in the recoded cost overruns however remained unexplained. The unexplained 
variation in the regression analysis, was attributed to the emergent social constructs. This served 
to tie up the multiple stands of analysis, and establish the chain of evidence pointing to how the 
levels of geotechnical input account for cost overruns in estimates. The triangulated findings 
were thus presented as a quantitative model, which explicitly showed how poor geotechnical 
practices and the geology of project location in the Niger Delta, accounted for a greater 
percentage of the variance in cost overruns recorded on highway projects. 
 
Cognitive Mapping was subsequently used to map out the interplay between the geotechnical 
pathogens and emergent themes, which are represented as the barriers to geotechnical input, 
in accounting for the unusually high levels of recorded cost overruns in the Niger Delta. The 
emergent barriers to geotechnical are however relatively weighted and ranked using content 
analysis, based on the number of coding references made to each emergent node. The result of 
the cognitive mapping is a visual projection of the intricate complexity of the interplay, and the 
counter factual phase dependent relationship between the core geotechnical factors and the 
corresponding emergent barriers, with nodes relatively sized to reflect their ranking. 
 
4.17 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has articulated all the elements of the research methodology of this study, from the 
higher order philosophical underpinnings of the study, down to the more practical issues of data 
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collection and analysis. Critical arguments and justification of the choices made at each level of 
the hierarchy of the research elements has also been provided. The case study approach has 
been adopted as the research strategy in this study. In more practical terms, broken down into 
the specific processes and phases as applied to this study, the research methodology translates 
into the following case study research design represented as a flow chart in Figure 4.11. 
 
Figure 4.11: Overall Case Study Research Design 
 
Figure 4.11 thus shows an outline of the various practical phases of the case study, and the 
systematic stages used in developing an explanatory model of latent geotechnical pathogens 
and contextual drivers to highway project cost overruns, predicated on the geologic context of 
the study area. The subsequent chapter is a detailed geo-spatial quantitative analysis of the 
geologic configuration of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, as an exploratory phase of the study, 
highlighting the magnitude of ground induced financial risk to highway project delivery.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Exploratory Geo-Statistical Analysis of Latent Geologic Cost Overrun 
Drivers  
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter of the research is focused on exploring the geologic peculiarities of the Niger Delta 
region (Unit of Analysis 1), which has made it a significant geographic area of scholarly interest 
in this research. This chapter describes the difficult terrain of the Niger Delta region, in relation 
to the poor engineering index properties of subsoils, and statistically explores this geotechnical 
undertone as a potential trigger which creates a propensity for cost overruns in highway projects. 
The heterogeneous geologic configuration of the area, in terms of its geomorphology is thus 
descriptively analysed based on available local literature, supplemented by the researcher’s 
geotechnical field work data. Exploratory statistical tests of significant difference and correlation 
analysis, are further used to analyse recorded cost overrun data for 61 completed highway 
projects. The ultimate goal of the geo-statistical analysis was to establish spatial cause and effect 
relationships, between the heterogeneous geologic setting of the Niger Delta and cost overrun 
trends evident in highway projects. 
5.1 Geomorphology: Heterogeneous Geologic Configuration  
The Niger Delta is the 9th largest Delta in the world with an area of 19,135 square kilometres. It 
is one of the largest wetlands in Africa. The whole basin is dissected by numerous creeks, 
streams, marshes and lagoons. The terrain of most parts of the Niger Delta is characteristically 
poorly drained, from the inundation of the adjoining lowlands forming swamps and coastal islands 
as shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Mangrove/Freshwater Swamps in the Niger Delta          (Source: NDRDMP, 2006) 
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However, the upper northern limit of the Niger Delta, is characterized by tropical rainforest 
woodland as shown in Figure 5.2. This is the zone with the most extensive dry land, and the 
population distribution is denser, with far larger settlements than other wetland zones. This 
heterogeneous configuration of the terrain thus has correspondingly varying geotechnical 
implications for highway development. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Tropical Rainforest in the Niger Delta                           (Source: NDRDMP, 2006) 
 
The silted and marshy grounds of the swamps are representative of the difficulties of undertaking 
any major construction in the area. Most of the soils encountered are soft and present sub-grade 
problems due to high water tables (Oguara 2002). Several scholars researching on the geology 
of the Niger Delta: (Akpokodje, 1987,1989; Oguara, 2002; Teme, 2002; Youdoewei, 2013; 
Ngerebara et a/., 2014), have consequently underscored that most parts of this variable 
geological setting, runs in the negative as regards construction works, with the technical and 
financial undertones tremendous.  
5.2 Highway Projects Cost Overrun Levels in the Niger Delta: Project Data  
Cost and locational data from a total of 315 Infrastructure projects (buildings, canalisation, shore 
protection, and road projects) awarded from 2002 till date, were obtained from the available 
archival records of the three highway agencies responsible for highway development in the 
region, represented as HA1. HA2 and HA3. 148 of these infrastructure projects were road 
projects executed at various locations in the Niger Delta (Rivers and Bayelsa States), 61 of which 
were completed, while 87 were a mix of currently ongoing, delayed and abandoned projects.  
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Figure 5.3: Data Filtration Criteria for Analysis 
 
The project data was filtered down on the basis of the study scope to only road projects. 
Furthermore, only the completed road projects were analysed, for their levels of cost overruns, 
necessary to test the study hypothesis. No other form of selective sampling was adopted. Table 
5.1 shows details of project data for the completed highway projects in the Niger Delta, awarded 
from 2002, while Table 5.2 shows the descriptive summary statistics for the cost overrun data on 
the 61 completed road projects.  
 
Table 5.1: Project Cost Overrun Data for Completed Highway Projects 
S/No 
 
Location (LGA) 
 
Agency Date of award 
 
Budget Estimate 
(N in Millions) 
Final Cost 
(N in Millions) 
Percentage cost 
overrun 
1 Ahoada west HA1 5-Nov-09       800.00  1,300.57 62.59 
2 Eleme HA1 15-Dec-04         15.47      29.27  89.25 
3 Obio-Akpor HA1 10-Dec-04       355.68   1,923.34  440.74 
4 Ikwerre HA1 10-Dec-04    1,102.35   3,739.86  239.26 
5 Khana HA1 2-Jul-07    2,861.83   3,198.63  11.76 
6 Asari-Toru HA2 10-Jun-02  11,204.16      19,287.24  72.14 
7 Degema HA3 30-May-10    2,063.00        3,397.01  64.66 
8 Ekeremor HA3 10-Dec-04       508.47           780.86  53.57 
9 Akukutoru HA3 20-Dec-06    1,847.34        6,428.21 247.97 
10 Sagbama HA3 26-Sep-06         45.57           108.34 143.78 
11 Ogbia HA3 10-Dec-04       791.72      1,974.40  149.37 
12 Ekeremor HA2 10-Dec-04      1 45.56           228.34 56.86 
13 Southern-Ijaw HA1 2-Jan-02         27.35            65.04  137.78 
14 Brass HA2 10-Dec-04         51.08            96.52  88.95 
15 akassa – brass  HA2 10-Dec-04        18.14            31.89  75.75 
16 Andoni HA2 10-Dec-04         13.00            25.75  98.07 
17 Gokana HA1 10-Dec-04    1,016.98   1,417.50  39.38 
18 Ahoda East HA1 1-Feb-02         38.36        87.56 128.24 
19 Oyigbo HA1 10-Dec-04       295.89   1,050.58  255.05 
20 Port Harcourt HA1 4-Nov-02       332.88      923.71  177.48 
21 Port Harcourt HA1 10-Dec-04       966.00   1,913.09  98.041 
22 Etche HA2 17-Aug-06     5,203.57  7,820.99  50.30 
23 Abua HA2 10-Dec-04       943.09  1,972.99 109.20 
24 Gokana HA2 12-Dec-08         23.14           32.55 40.67 
25 Ikwerre HA2 11-Jul-07         18.47          27.98  51.53 
26 Emuoha HA2 10-Dec-04         24.65          34.17 38.60 
27 Ikwerre HA2 10-Dec-04         37.90          50.52  33.29 
28 Port Harcourt HA2 10-Dec-04       600.00        842.42 40.40 
29 Omuma HA2 2-Jan-02       245.14         533.02  117.43 
30 Obio-Akpor HA3 10-Dec-04       761.23     1,612.34  111.80 
31 Obio-Akpor HA3 1-Jan-03       816.50     2,210.94  170.78 
32 Obio-Akpor HA3 10-Dec-04    2,625.00     6,261.46  138.53 
33 Etche HA3 10-Dec-04       427.00         793.23  85.768 
34 Port-Harcourt HA3 10-Dec-04       427.00     1,230.72  188.22 
35 Asari-Toru HA3 10-Dec-04       427.00         786.88 84.28 
36 Ndoni HA1 10-Dec-04       836.93      3,235.61 286.60 
61 Completed 
Road Projects 
 
315 
Infrastructure 
Projects 
 
148 Road 
Projects 
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37 Yenegoa HA1 10-Dec-04       464.19       4,879.96  951.26 
38 Yengoa HA1 10-Dec-04    2,500.00      4,319.86  72.79 
39 Sagbama HA1 10-Dec-04    3,479.90      4,479.91 28.73 
40 Nembe HA1 28-May-12    9,667.78   29.42  204.32 
41 Okrika HA1 10-Dec-04    2,069.07     5,763.29  178.54 
42 Asari-toru HA2 6-Sep-01    3,396.21        12,133.83  257.27 
43 Sagbama HA2 6-Sep-01         15.18           1 61.66 978.57 
44 Kolokuma HA3 10-Dec-04         56.29           96.28  71.06 
45 Ogbia HA3 10-Dec-04    3,062.38      12,930.41  322.23 
46 Bonny HA1 30-Dec-05         14.37           19.49 35.64 
47 Brass HA1 25-Jan-07         14.50           29.48 103.34 
48 Southern Ijaw HA1 10-Dec-04          2.32            16.51  613.21 
49 Egbema HA3 5-Nov-09       586.13        11,871.55  1925.40 
50 Sagbama HA3 20-Dec-06    1,200.26       1,200.26  0 
51 Kolokuma HA3 1-Jan-03       275.60          729.65  164.74 
52 Ogbia HA2 7-May-02       780.46       12,941.74  1558.20 
53 Akuku-Toru HA1 10-Dec-04    3,359.74        6,713.02 99.80 
54 Bonny  HA1 5-Nov-09    9,668.00     26,421.86  173.29 
55 Okrika HA1 2-Jan-02    1,735.10       3,989.53 129.93 
56 Andoni HA1 10-Dec-04    4,175.68       8,675.68  107.76 
57 Opobo=Nkoro HA1 10-Dec-04    3,546.65        5,585.02 57.47 
58 Yenegoa HA3 13-Jun-07       427.00     1,283.18 200.51 
59 Ndoni HA3 2-Jan-02       427.00     1,401.77 228.27 
60 Kolokuma HA3 10-Dec-04       427.00     1,464.47  242.96 
61 Ogbia HA3 23-feb-06       427.00     1,369.66 220.76 
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Summary Measures 
 
Table 5.2 shows that the mean cost overrun for the projects executed at various locations in the 
Niger Delta is 216.47% over initial estimates which shows the unusually high cost overrun levels 
recorded on the sample of 61 highway projects executed in the Niger Delta. The standard error 
of the mean however is 43.30%, which represents the likely variability around the mean value of 
the cost overrun recorded across various locations, taking into consideration differing samples 
of 61 previously executed highway projects. However, the analysis shows that at a 95% 
confidence level, the mean value of cost overrun will likely still fall between130% to 303% The 
minimum value of this range of cost overruns, estimated under this level of probability, is still 
 Statistic Std. Error 
 
Cost 
Overrun 
Mean Percentage Cost Overrun 216.4657 43.29592 
   
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 129.8610  
Upper Bound 303.0704  
5% Trimmed Mean 157.6045  
Median 111.8076  
Variance 114346.732  
Std. Deviation 338.15194  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 1925.40  
Range 1925.40  
Interquartile Range 148.92  
Skewness 3.653 .306 
Kurtosis 14.378 .604 
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remarkably high compared to the levels of cost overruns evident for highway projects reported 
in the literature. 
Based on the analyzed data set, the standard deviation of 338.15%, shows a considerable level 
of dispersion of cost overruns at various locations around the mean, which is not reflected in the 
interquartile range of 148.92 around the median. This indicates that the dispersion is not evenly 
distributed, but is heavily skewed (3.65), as the median of cost overrun percentage, 111.81 is 
much lower than the mean value (216.47) of cost overrun. The negatively skewed shape of the 
data is shown in the frequency histogram (Figure 5.4), with percentage cost overrun values at 
the project locations predominantly clustering around values much lower than the mean. 
  
Figure 5.4: Frequency Distribution and Box-plot of Cost Overrun Data 
 
The box plot in Figure 5.4, shows a five-number summary: the median, the 25th and 75th 
percentiles, and the minimum and maximum observed values of cost overrun. that are not 
statistically outlying. Outliers and extreme values outside this range are thus noted. The 
skewness of the data thus may be due to the very conspicuous outliers noted, in order of 
increasing magnitude for project No: 3; 48; 43; 37; 52; and 49, located at Obio-Akpor, southern 
Ijaw, Sagbama, Yenegoa, Ogbia and Egbema, which has dragged the mean value to be much 
higher than the median. It is however noted the by the researcher that 5 out of the 6 outliers 
occur for projects in riverine areas. It is also noted that there is a wide variability in the cost 
overruns values with an approximate difference of 1925% in cost overruns values between the 
minimum of 0.00 occurring in Sagbama, an upland location, and the maximum of 1925.40 % 
occurring in Egbema, a riverine location. These observations made from the descriptive phase 
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of the analysis served to reinforce the researcher’s predisposition, based on which further 
inferential geo-statistical tests were carried out on the sample project data.   
5.3 Heterogeneity of the Niger Delta Terrain: Any Cost-Overrun Implications?  
The environmental condition of most parts of the Niger Delta makes the use of conventional 
pavement designs, materials and construction methods particularly in the riverine locations, 
inappropriate.  This may imply that highway design and construction in these zones as compared 
to the uplands would ideally require expensive specification for works, ultimately increasing the 
cost of construction projects so many folds. The subsequent analysis thus seeks to explore if 
there is statistical association between subsoil factors and cost overruns. The researcher’s 
approach thus, is to statistically analyse the more quantitative descriptive properties of sub-grade 
soils in the region, with the level of cost overrun incurred at project locations. This is rationalised 
against the logic that the key financial inputs of material, labour and plant costs requisite for the 
construction of roads in the Niger Delta are reflective of the implied design and construction costs 
requisite at project locations, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5.5: Cost Implication of Road Construction in the Niger Delta       
By implication, the variable geomorphology and the geotechnical characteristics/indices of 
subsoil will form the primary set of predictive variables shaping the cost profile of the financial 
inputs of material, labour and equipment necessary for the construction of roads at various 
locations. Therefore, any design and cost estimating assumptions in highway procurement, 
made on a homogenous basis will not reflect the final costs of projects, and will consequently 
induce a corresponding level of cost overrun or under-run. The logical cost-overrun implications 
of the heterogeneous geologic setting of the Niger Delta soils for road construction can thus be 
viewed from: 
Geomorphology and 
Geotechnical properties of 
Subgrade Soils 
Pavement Structural Design 
and Material Specification 
Considerations 
Construction and Method 
Related Cost implied by the 
Terrain 
 
MATERIAL, LABOUR AND PLANT COST 
164 
 
 The point of relatively higher design and specification requirements necessary to adapt 
the subsoil conditions in the swampy and coastal zones, than in the uplands; 
 The point of additional cost/expenditure that may likely be incurred during the 
construction phase for projects situated in the riverine meander and coastal belts as 
opposed to the upland areas of the region.  
The subsequent subsections thus explore and analyse the cost overrun implications of the 
geologic variability of the terrain, as it relates to the geotechnical practicalities of road 
construction in the Niger Delta. This is with a view to test if the potential impact of the 
heterogeneous geomorphology of the region, can explain the significant level of cost overruns in 
the sample of completed highway projects. 
5.4 Difficult Expansive Soils of the Niger Delta (The ‘Chikoko’ Clay)  
The general geology of the Niger Delta consists of various types of sub soils.  Sub-soils in the 
riverine areas of the Niger Delta, predominantly consists of extremely soft deltaic marine clay 
locally referred to as ‘Chikoko’, with a dark grey, dark brown to black coloration (Otoko and Pedro, 
2014). Fatokun and Bolarinwa (2009:3), in identifying the major problem soils of Nigeria, 
described those existing in the sub-soils of the Niger Delta as: “Composed of ‘Peat, Organic silts 
and Clays characterized by dark colours and strong odour which are highly compressible with 
low strength”.  
 
Figure 5.6: Geographic Distribution of Expansive Problem Soils in Nigeria    
 Source: Fatokun and Bolarinwa (2009) 
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Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of problematic expansive alluvium soils in Nigeria, and its 
prevalence southwards in the Niger Delta region. These chikoko soils have been shown to be 
highly undesirable in their natural forms for road construction, as shown in Figure 5.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Highway Construction in the Niger Delta Mangrove Swamp Forest          
(Source: NDRDMP, 2006) 
This is due to their characteristic swelling and shrinkage potential, with corresponding changes 
in water content, as seasons change from rainy to dry. Thus any structure, including a road 
pavement, constructed with or placed on such soils, exist to grapple with typical geotechnical 
problems, in the absence of adequate ground engineering. 
 
Several scholars (Omotosho and Ogboin, 2009; Youdoewei and Nwankwala 2010, 2013; Otoko, 
2013; Youdeowei, 2013 and Ngerebara et al., 2014) have attempted to map out and study 
specific areas in the  region. Notable works have being published on the developmental needs 
of the Niger Delta terrain, from a geotechnical and geological perpectives.  Whilst related studies 
evaluating the suitability of sub-soils for road infrastructure development include technical reports 
by George
 
and Atuboyedia (2007), Fatokun and Bolarinwa (2009) and the Nigerian Building and 
Road Research Institute (NBRRI, 1998)  
 
These field work based studies have collectively stressed that the geotechnical difficulties 
inherent in the Niger Delta, due to the wide spread occurrence of ‘chikoko’ soils, calls for 
adequate geotechnical measures in designs and during construction to ensure an adequate 
margin against the behaviour of these naturally weak soils. The effort and methods requisite to 
improve the geotechnical properties of soils, and to attain the standard minimum level of 
compaction and engineering requirements of the underlying soils, has cost implications which 
varies with the occurrence of these highly expansive soils. These assertions were thus tested 
based on cost overrun data. 
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5.5 Inferential Analytic Procedure 
The Inferential data analysis was carried out on the basis of the researcher’s hypotheses 
structured in relation to the preceding logic, using the statistical tests outlined in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Hypotheses and Statistical Tests used in the inferential Quantitative Analysis 
S/No Hypothesis Statistical Test 
1 There are significant differences in the levels of cost overruns incurred for 
highway construction in the differing geologic settings of the Niger Delta  
µz1 ≠ µz2 ≠µz3  
One-Way ANOVA  
2 There is a significantly higher cost overrun impact of the lack of 
geotechnical input for projects executed in the coastal and swampy 
geologic setting of the Niger Delta (Zones 2 and3) compared to the 
Uplands (Zone 1). 
µZ2>µZ1 
µZ3>µZ1 
Turkey-Kramer 
Multiple comparisons 
3 Percentage cost overruns are significantly associated with geotechnical 
properties of subsoil at project locations in the Niger Delta region. 
 
Correlation Analysis 
 
These statistical tests were thus carried out with a view to exploring if latent geologic drivers 
inherent in the heterogeneous geomorphology of the region, accounted for the unusually high 
cost overruns recorded in highway projects. The analysis was however underpinned by a 
preliminary local literature synthesis on the spatial classifications and nature of the Niger Delta 
geology, which was supplemented by secondary geotechnical fieldwork data, obtained from 
detailed ground investigations carried out by geotechnical firms and from institutional sources. 
 
5.5.1 Hypothesis 1 and 2: ANOVA Test and Turkey-Kramer Multiple Comparisons  
The ultimate goal of the analysis for Hypothesis 1 was to capture whether the variable terrain of 
the Niger Delta, was reflected in the levels of cost overruns currently experienced in highway 
projects, using a quasi-experimental approach.  
 
 Ho: There is no significant difference in the percentage cost overruns between 
road projects executed in the various geographic zones of the Niger Delta  
 H1: There is a significant difference in percentage cost overrun between road 
projects executed in the various geographic zones of the Niger Delta 
 
The treatment variable for hypothesis 1 was thus ‘Ground Condition at project location’. It was 
thus an underlying assumption that all projects executed in a particular geo-zone have similar 
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geotechnical challenges. For the purpose of testing this hypothesis, the population was 
subdivided into smaller stratums on the basis of the geomorphic divisions of the Niger Delta 
physical territory, as synthesized in the subsequent subsection, to replicate the average zonal 
subsoil conditions, which correlate with the regional geotechnical characteristics of the Niger 
Delta. This is because there are several ways in which specific zones of the Niger Delta region 
can be delineated spatially from a geographic perspective, depending on the purpose of the 
classification. The purpose of the classification used in this study, was to analyse for significant 
differences in cost overrun levels that can be attributed to the geologic variability of the terrain. It 
was therefore assumed that the prevalence of expansive chikoko clays in significant proportions 
in any zone, may be reflective of the cost-overrun propensity of subsoils at specific project 
locations.  
 
The classification scheme adopted by the researcher, utilized the physiography of the region, as 
a basis for the analysing the cost overrun implication of the distinct geologic environments. The 
physiographic zones as referred to in this analysis adopted the definition of the United States 
Department of Transportation (2006: 5) 
           “A region, all parts of which are similar in geologic structure and climate, and which has 
consequently had a unified geomorphic history with a pattern of soils, relief features or 
landforms differing significantly from that of adjacent regions.  
 
The one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was considered most appropriate, for the 
purpose of comparing the mean percentage cost overruns incurred by highway agencies for 
completed highway projects in the physiographic zones of the Niger Delta, so as to isolate the 
effect of subsoil geology. The probability distribution used in this test, was the F-Distribution, 
suitable to test several population means simultaneously. The ANOVA test was thus used to 
determine whether the sample means came from a single population or populations with different 
means. The underlying strategy of this test was to estimate the sample variations and then to 
find the ratio of this estimates. If the ratio is one, then logically the two estimates are same and 
therefore come from a single population. On the other hand, as the ratio differed from one, then 
it was concluded that the samples are not the same. The F distribution therefore, revealed that 
the ratio was much too large to have occurred by chance, on the basis of which it was attributed 
to the treatment source (Ground conditions). This ultimately led to the inference that the variation 
in cost overrun levels, occurred due to the inherent differences in ground conditions, and by 
implication the differing levels of geotechnical risks latent in the geologic zones. The format for 
the computation of the F value is summarized in the Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4: ANOVA Table 
Source of variation Sum of squares Degrees of freedom Mean square F 
Treatment (Differences in 
ground conditions between 
geo-zones) 
SSE k-1 SST/k – 1=MST MST/MS
E 
Error SST n– k SSE/n – k= MSE 
Total SStotal n- 1   
Where: 
 SS total is the sum of squares total =∑X2 – (∑X2)/n 
 SST is the sum of squares treatment = ∑ (tc2/nc) – (∑X)2/n 
 SSE is the sum of squares error = SS total – SST 
 k is number of treatments  
 n is sample size  
 MST is mean square treatment 
 MSE is mean square error 
 nc is no of observations per treatment (The number of observations for each zone is 
determined by the number of completed projects located in the LGA’s, as delineated 
following the geo-classification criteria synthesized in the subsequent section).  
 tc is treatment total  
  
The decision rule was based on the critical value as determined by the F statistic at the 0.05 level 
of significance. The criteria being that; if the null hypothesis is not rejected, it is concluded that 
there is no difference in cost overrun, and if the null hypothesis is rejected, then we conclude that 
there is a significant difference in cost overrun between the projects executed in the various 
zones. 
 
At this point, it was not known which of the geo-zones had a higher level of cost overrun or by 
how much. The approach deployed for this detecting this was the ‘Turkey Kramer Multiple 
Comparison Procedure’, useful to determine which pair of zones significantly differ in the levels 
of cost overruns. This test enabled simultaneous comparative examination between the sub-
groups in the ANOVA test, as all pairs of geo-zones, were relatively tested in pairs, for the most 
significant disparity in cost overrun. The underlying computational strategy was based on the 
differences between all pairs of mean costs within the zones. A “critical Range” was then 
computed using Equation 5.1. 
Q u = √
𝑀𝑆𝐸
2
∗ {
1
𝑛𝑗
+
1
𝑛𝑗1
}
  2
....................................................................................Equation 5.1 
 Where   Qu = Upper Tail Critical Value from a Studentized Range Distribution 
               MSE= Mean square error 
               nJ and nj1 = Number of sample units in Pairs of mean building cost 
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The pairs of means were then compared against the corresponding critical range. A specific pair 
was thus declared significantly different, whereby the absolute difference in the sample means, 
was greater than the critical range.  
 
The following sub-sections provide a detailed breakdown of these analysis procedures followed, 
which were predicated on a literature analysis of geologic mapping based spatial studies, that 
was used to disaggregate the Niger Delta soils into the subzones used in the ANOVA test. This 
form of quasi-experimentation was thus deployed by the researcher, as a basis of devising a 
spatial quantitative concept, delineating distinct geologic settings which would likely have 
differing cost implications for highway projects.  
5.5.2 Geo-Classifications of the Niger Delta Region in the Literature 
Based on earlier studies carried out on geography of Nigeria by several scholars (Ayaode, 1973; 
Okoye, 1975; iloeje, 1982; Durotoye, 1983; Udo, 1985; Ganier, 1989), and taking all the relevant 
aspects of the geography of the Niger Delta region into consideration, physiographic regions can 
be delineated. On this basis, divergent views and classifications have been proposed and 
adopted for developmental and academic purposes. Physiographically, the Niger Delta has been 
subdivided into climatic, vegetation as well as ecological regions, each having its own geographic 
personality. This is because, the Niger Delta is a heterogeneous region, and its geography can 
be analysed from various viewpoints.  
 
Early scholarly works, typically by Iloeje, (1982), attempted to develop a physiographic 
classification for the coastal margin areas of Nigeria, and defined the region to include swamps, 
alluvium, lagoons and estuaries.  Attempts have also been made by planning bodies in the region 
to incorporate these perspectives for development purposes. The Niger Delta Regional 
Development Master Plan (2002) facilitated by The Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC), in partnership with the state governments, local government areas, oil companies, and 
communities in the region, classified the Niger Delta region into the following five distinct 
ecological/vegetation zones: 
 Barrier island/Mangrove forest and coastal vegetation; 
 Fresh water swamp forest; 
 Lowland rain forest; 
 Derived savannah; 
 Montane region. 
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It is however of useful note from the study view point that the spatial and geographic definitions 
used to define the physical boundaries of the Niger Delta region to arrive at the above 
classification is politically driven and cannot be used as a true definition of the physical attributes 
of what should ideally constitute a ‘Delta’ (Teme, 2002; Oguara, 2002). Consequently, Oguara, 
(2002) recognised only four of the ecological zones that have being established in the Niger Delta 
region by planners on the basis that the montane region, which lies to south-east, falls outside 
the boundaries of the geologic Niger Delta as earlier defined:  
 
 Coastal barrier islands;  
 Mangrove swamp forest;   
 Freshwater swamp forest; 
 Lowland rainforest swamp. 
 
This classification however, still cannot serve to bear out the underlying objective of the study, 
which seeks to highlight the geotechnical disparities amongst the various regions for design and 
construction cost purposes.  Geological or geo-morphological regions, as proposed in the 
scholarly literature on Niger Delta geology, are thus considered more appropriate (IGST, 1996; 
NDES, 1997; NDDC, 2001; Oguara, 2002; Teme, 2002; Ngah and Youdoewei, 2013).  
One of the earliest published geologic classifications of the Niger Delta soils was by Allen (1965). 
Numerous geomorphologic units were noted by this pioneer author as shown in Figure 5.8.    
Figure 5.8: Geologic Classification of the Niger Delta (Allen, 1965) 
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Short and Stauble (1967), however classified the Niger Delta soils into 5 major units, which have 
been more frequently cited in latter and more recent scholarly literature, by several authors 
including: Akpokodije (1987); Ngah and Youdeowei (2013); Ngerebara et al. (2014). 
Figure 5.9: Geologic Classification of the Niger Delta (Short and Stauble, 1967) 
Short and Stauble (1967) noted five distinct geomorphic units in the Niger Delta, within the three 
broader main environments: continental; transitional and marine environments, as shown in 
Figure 5.9. The five geomorphic units include:  
 Beaches and bars; 
 Freshwater swamps/Alluvial plains; 
 Mangrove swamps; 
 Dry land with abundant swamp zones; 
 Dry flat land. 
 
Durutoye (1983), defined the Niger in his characterisation of the geomorphology of the coastal 
margin region of the Niger Delta, as consisting of three geomorphic units: 
 
 The upper flood plain: This being the first unit of the Niger Delta, is a fresh water flood 
plain in which sandy river channels are flanked by levees which descend laterally into 
forested back-swamps, with cut-off meanders or ox-bow lakes, and point bar ridges 
marked by dense bush. 
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 The lower flood plain: This second unit has tidal flats which are colonised by brackish 
mangrove swamps, and marked by a reticulate drainage pattern, resulting from the 
network of branching distributaries. The level of the back-swamps lies between high and 
low tides, and are thus regularly inundated. 
 Barrier Island: This forms the third unit and lines the coastal area of the Niger Delta and 
is separated by tidal channels of the numerous discharging distributaries of the River 
Niger. These islands consist of a series of low beach ridges, two to three meters high, 
aligned parallel to the coast. 
 
Akpokodije, (1987), one of the pioneer local researchers on Niger Delta soils, was amongst the 
foremost group of scholars who attempted to classify the Niger Delta soils for engineering 
purposes. The author divided the Niger Delta into four different zones, each with quite dissimilar 
stratigraphic and geotechnical characteristics. His classification was derived for the superficial 
soils of the region useful for road construction purposes, taking into account geomorphology and 
the geotechnical variations: 
 Reddish brown sandy clay loam (RBSCL-1); 
 Brown sandy Clay loam soil (BSC-2); 
 Light grey fine sand and silty clay (LGFSC-3); 
 Dark Organic/peaty clay (DOPC-4). 
The approximate distribution of these soil types is shown below in Figure 5.10. 
Figure 5.10: Geotechnical Zones of the Niger Delta after Akpokodje (1987). 
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Akpokodije, (1987) described the foundation suitability of soil type 3 and 4 as being relatively 
low, and in addition stated that: 
         “These soil profiles vary significantly within short lateral distances as a result of the 
frequent, erratic and lenticular occurrences of highly compressible organic clay and/or 
peat-clay mixtures [Chikoko soils]” (Akpokodje, 1987:121).  
 
This classification was developed, in recognition of the need for a detailed and more 
comprehensive study of the region, as a strategy to incoporate resilence in dealing with the 
recurrent twin harzards of flood and erosion in the region. In his study, Akpokodije, (1987) 
advocated for the development of a comprehensive engineering geological mapping of the Niger 
Delta region to outline the major problem soils in the region. 
 
The Institute of Geosciences and Space Technology (IGST), Port Harcourt (1996) later 
developed a classification of Niger Delta soils in their research on flood and erosion in the region. 
IGST (1996) identified the following six geomorphic units of the Niger Delta as shown in Figure 
5.11. 
Figure 5.11: Geomorphic Units of the Niger Delta after IGST (1996)   
 
Teme, (2002) divided the Niger Delta into 3 hydro-meteorological zones:  
 Upper Delta zone (fresh water); 
 Middle delta zone (transition or mangrove);  
 Lower delta zone (Barrier ridge islands). 
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This classification was developed in an attempt to highlight the impact of water on the behaviour 
of rocks and soils in the region in portrayal of the major foundation types commonly used for 
building construction in these zones.  
       
A more recent study by Ngah and Youdeowei (2013) identified five major geomorphologic units 
(in Figure 5.12). The coastal plain sands were described as the dry flatland and plain, as 
compared to the purely marshy terrain of the swamps which are either fresh or salt water 
swamps. The salt water swamp zone contains the largest stretches of mangrove forest. The 
‘Warri-Sombrero deltaic plains is a mix of relatively drier land interspersed with numerous 
swamps. While the coastal beaches refer to the existing stretch of sandy beaches adjoining the 
coastal front, some of which are no longer active. 
 
Figure 5.12: Geomorphic Units of the Niger Delta after Ngah and Youdeowei (2013) 
 
This classification aligns closely with the earlier classifications by Short and Stauble (1967) and 
IGST (1996) in terms of similarity of its configuration on a broader scale. The only notable 
difference in this classification discerned by the researcher, is the merging of the ‘fresh water 
alluvial soils’ and the ‘Fresh/salt water transitional’ under the ‘Fresh water swamp’. The fresh 
water swamp zone which consists mainly of marshy back swamps, alluvial plain soils and 
meander belts predominantly falls within Bayelsa State. As can be deduced from this 
classification, the largest stretch of dry land in the Niger Delta falls within Rivers State i.e. the 
coastal plain soils in the with large patches of fresh water swamp soils. These constitute the 
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riverine areas of the state. Salt water swamps and beach soils are prevalent in coastal 
communities for both states with progression towards the Atlantic coast. 
5.5.3 ANOVA Groupings: Synthesized Geo-classification of the Niger Delta  
It can thus be seen that greater difficulties emerge in the classification of the Niger Delta sub-
soils, and opinions differ on the types of zones that can potentially be used to delineate 
geotechnical regions applicable to highway projects, as summarily captured in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5: Classifications of the Niger Delta Soils 
Authors  Classification 
Short and Stauble (1967)  Beaches and bars 
 Freshwater swamps/Alluvial plains 
 Mangrove swamps 
 Dry land with abundant swamp zones 
 Dry flat land. 
Durutoye (1983)  The upper flood plain;  
 Lower flood plain;  
 Barrier Islands. 
Akpokodije (1987)  Reddish brown sandy clay loam (RBSCL-1) 
 Brown sandy Clay loam soil (BSC-2) 
 Light grey fine sand and silty clay (LGFSC-3) 
 Dark Organic/peaty clay (DOPC-4) 
 IGST (1996)  Freshwater Alluvial Soils (Upper Deltaic Plain); 
 Sombreiro Warri Deltaic Plain Soils;  
 Coastal Plain Terrace Soils;  
 Freshwater/Saltwater Transitional Soils; 
 Tidal Flat Soils;  
 Beach Ridge Soils. 
Teme (2002)  Upper Delta zone (fresh water); 
 Middle delta zone (transition or mangrove); 
 Lower delta zone.  
Oguara (2002)  Coastal barrier islands; 
 Mangrove swamp forest;  
 Freshwater swamp forest; 
 Lowland rainforest swamp. 
Ngah and Youdeowei (2013)  The coastal plain sands;  
 The Sombreiro-Warri Deltaic plain;  
 The freshwater swamps;  
 The saltwater or mangrove swamps;   
 The coastal beaches. 
 
This study therefore attempted this exercise here, in choosing a basis for the geotechnical 
classification of the Niger Delta sub-soils, while being fully aware of its implications, from these 
scholarly articles that have tried to analyse and classify them. The regions so adopted, based on 
the geomorphology of the region, sought to achieve spatial distribution as well as reflect 
geotechnical variations within the study area.  To achieve this aim, the researcher adopted Teme 
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(2002) broader three subdivisions of the region as correlated with IGST (1996) six more 
distinctive geomorphic units in the study, from the perspective of geomorphology. The researcher 
also noted that the geotechnical characteristics of the subgrade soils are better descriptively 
analysed by Akpokodje’s (1987) classification, which was specifically derived for the purpose of 
engineering designs.  However, this classification and soil groupings so derived by Akpokodje’s 
(1987), transcends beyond the spatial limits of the Niger Delta region as defined by the NDES 
(1997), whose geologic interpretation of the region is adopted in this study to cover only Rivers 
and Bayelsa State (shown in Figure 5.13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Map of Disaggregated Niger Delta Showing Rivers and Bayelsa State  
 
The reddish brown sandy clay loam (RBSCL-1) falls outside this spatial boundary and describes 
the typical lateritic soils found in neighbouring states that compose the political Niger Delta. This 
soil group is therefore not recognised in this study. On this basis only 3 major soil groupings from 
Akpokodje’s (1987) classification are applicable to defining the zones of the Niger Delta in this 
study. 
 
 Zone 1(BSC): Sand-clayey subsoil strata of the dry, flat plains;  
 Zone 2 (DOPC) Organic peaty Two-layer clay sand sequence of the fresh water back 
swamps;  
 Zone 3: (LGFSC) Three-layer slightly organic sand-clay-sand sequence of the Tidal 
Flat/saltwater swamp and coastal beaches/ridges.  
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Akpokodje’s (1987), geotechnical description of the soil types in each zone is further 
corroborated by the trend in information obtained on field geotechnical data, as mapped out, 
based on the Unified Soil Classification System (USCS). Figure 5.14, based on the available field 
work information, geotechnically characterises up to 70% of the sub-grade soils of the Niger 
Delta, using the USC system, and superimposes the three applicable zones from Akpokodje’s 
(1987) and Teme (2002) classification. As can be discerned, most of the sample points of the 
upper delta are low plastic clays (CL) which have moderate geotechnical implication for road 
construction. Towards the middle and lower delta however, the soils become predominantly 
highly plastic clays and silts, which grades into highly plastic silts and organic silts, with very high 
geotechnical implications for highway construction. 
 
Figure 5.14: Engineering Classification of Niger Delta Sub-Grade Soils 
 
 
Figure 5.15: Casangrade’s Plasticity Chart                                         Source: Coduto (2007) 
Engineering Classifications of 
Subgrade Soils in the Niger Delta 
  Delta State 
  Unavailable soil data 
Zone 1: Upper Niger Delta 
Zone 2: Middle Niger Delta 
Zone 3: Lower Niger Delta 
  Atlantic Ocean 
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The geotechnical description of the soil types shown in Figure 5.14, is derived using the 
Casangrade’s Plasticity Chart (Figure 5.15), an international engineering standard for describing 
soils. From the point of view of highway design and costing, three broad conceptual geomorphic 
categorisations of Niger Delta soils in engineering geologic cost application were therefore 
discerned, as synthesized in Table 5.6.  
 
Table 5.6:  Geotechnical Regions of the Niger Delta as adopted in the Study 
Geo-Zones Sub-Soil types                              Stratigraphic Sequence/ Description 
Upper Deltaic (Zone 1) 
(Dry land interwoven patches of 
fresh water soils) 
Coastal Plain Terrace Soils Dry plain sandy/clayey subsoil strata  
(Brown Sandy Clays) Deltaic Plain Soils 
Middle Delta (Zone 2) 
(Fresh/Salt Water Back swamps) 
Freshwater Alluvial Soils Two-layer clay sand sequence 
(Dark organic peaty clays) 
 
Fresh water Transitional Soils 
Lower Delta (Zone 3) 
(Salt water swamp and sandy 
coastal soils) 
Tidal Flat/saltwater swamp  Three-layer, sand-clay-sand 
(Light grey slightly organic sands and 
clays) 
Beach Ridge Soils 
 
There is of course a certain amount of overlap, and the broad divisions here as adapted from the 
literature and diagrammatically approximated in Figure 5.16, are aimed at highlighting the likely 
geotechnical implications for road pavement designs and costing in the different local 
government areas (LGA) listed in Table 5.7.  
 
Figure 5.16: Niger Delta Showing LGA’s in the Adopted Basis of Geo-Classification 
Table 5.7: Geo-Classification of LGA’s in the Niger Delta 
Zone 1 
 
Zone 2 
 
Zone 3 
 
179 
 
Zone 1: Dry land interwoven with patches 
of fresh water soils  
Zone 2: Fresh/Salt Water Back-swamp  
peaty soils 
Zone 3: Coastal Salt water swamp and 
sandy beach soils 
1.Port Harcourt 
2.Obio-Akpor 
3. Etche 
4. Ikwerre 
5. Omuma 
6. Oyigbo 
7. Eleme  
8. Tai 
9. Khana 
11. Ahoada east 
12. Ahoada West 
13. Abua 
14. Gokana 
15.Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni 
16. Okrika 
17. Ogu-Bolo 
18.Asari toru 
19. Ogbia 
20.Sagbama 
21. Kolokuma-opokuma 
22. Yenegoa 
23. Nembe 
 
24. Ekeremor 
25. Brass 
26. Southern Ijaw 
27. Degema 
28. Bonny 
29. Andoni- 
30. Opobo Nkoro 
31. Akuku-toru 
 
 
This geo-zoning, used to analyse for the disparity in the geo-technical characteristics of the sub-
grade soils, is further used to analyse the cost-overrun implications of the inherently differing 
levels of geotechnical risks, posed to highway project execution in these zones.  
5.5.4 The One-way ANOVA Testing for Significant Differences in Cost Overruns between 
the Geo-Zones 
                     H0: µ1=µ2= µ3               
                     H1: µ1 ≠ µ2 ≠µ3 
This hypothesis is tested on the grouped sample data (Table 5.8), based on the F distribution at 
the selected 5% level of significance, as a basis of making inferences about the impact of ground 
conditions.  
Table 5.8: Cost Overruns in the Geo-Zones 
Upper Delta: Zone 1-Uplands Middle Delta:  Zone 2- Back-swamps Lower Delta Coastal: Zone 3 
% Cost Overrun % Cost Overrun % Cost Overrun 
62.60 286.60 99.81 
89.25 951.26 173.29 
440.74 72.79 129.93 
239.26 28.74 107.77 
11.77 204.33 57.47 
39.38 178.54 35.64 
128.25 257.28 103.35 
255.05 1925.40 613.21 
177.49 1,558.20 137.78 
98.04 322.23 88.96 
50.30 1,925.40 75.75 
109.20 0.00 98.08 
40.67 164.74 72.14 
51.54 71.07 64.66 
38.61 200.51 53.58 
33.29 228.27 247.97 
40.40 242.97  
117.44 220.76  
111.81 149.38  
170.78 1650.32  
138.53   
85.77   
188.23   
84.28   
85.77   
Mean: 117.35 Mean: 393.80 Mean: 132.39 
180 
 
5.5.5 Testing of Statistical Assumptions 
The deployment of these analytical measures, however, was subject to satisfying the basic 
underlying assumptions of parametric statistical tests of significant differences: Homogeneity of 
Variance and Normality. These key assumptions which are critical to assess the appropriateness 
and use of the statistical tests for analysing the sample cost data, are evaluated. This is because 
significant deviations of the sample data from these assumptions can impact the accuracy of 
analysis output. 
 
The assumption of homogeneity of variance was tested for using the ‘Modified Levene’s test’ 
(NIST, 2012). Levene’s approach is a potent tool useful for checking the homogeneity of 
variances in statistical tests which require that grouped data have unequal variances, which has 
been modified in present use. (Gastwirth et al., 2009). The modified Levene’s test for 
homogeneity of variance, tests the equality of the variances in the cost overruns between the 
geo-classification. It is based on the idea that if the variation in the cost overruns in each zone 
does not differ, an analysis of variance of the absolute differences in cost overrun from the 
median value in each zone, can be used to test the null hypothesis of equal variances (NIST, 
2012). The modified Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance, was carried out on the grouped 
cost overrun data, graphically represented in Figure 5.17, and reported in Table 5.9. 
 
 
Figure 5.17: Error Bar Chart and Mean Plot of Group Samples 
 
Table 5.9: Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Levene Statistic                                    df1                                df2                                              Sig. 
12.145 2 58 .000 
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The Levene’s statistic rejected the null hypothesis that the group variances are equal, implying 
that the mean and level of variation in cost overrun clearly differed for the three geo-zones. 
Therefore, the violation of the ANOVA assumption, of equality of variance across groups, does 
not hold for the data. The one-way ANOVA is still fairly robust to the violation of this assumption 
if the samples are of equal or near equal sizes. As shown in Table 5.10, the sample sizes for 
each zone are not equal, which reinforces the need for the equality of the variances. 
 
Table 5.10: Descriptives for Cost Overruns in Geo-Zones 
 N Mean % Cost 
Overrun 
Std. Deviation Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval for Mean Minimum Maximum 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Zone 1 24 117.3535 94.91760 19.37497 77.2734 157.4337 11.77 440.74 
Zone 2 21 393.7971 517.46407 112.91992 158.2503 629.3439 .00 1925.40 
Zone 3 16 132.3865 138.79635 34.69909 58.4271 206.3458 35.64 613.21 
Total 61 216.4657 338.15194 43.29592 129.8610 303.0704 .00 1925.40 
 
The assumption of normality was tested using descriptive measures and visual analysis. Figure 
5.18 provides a quick, visual summary of the data and factor-groups. The Normality Q-Q plots 
and box plots provide some evidence about the shape of the distribution (NIST, 2012).  
 
Figure 5.18 (a and b): Normality Plots of Project Data before and after Transformation 
 
As shown in Figure 5.18a, the sample data violated the assumption of normality. The implication 
of this outcome was two-fold: either a transformation of the data is carried to induce normality; 
or a non-parametric test for significant differences such as the Kruskal Wallis one-way ANOVA 
is used (Gregory and Dale, 2009).  The former was carried out as a first option, since the non-
parametric equivalent is not as powerful as the ANOVA test. A logarithmic transformation of the 
cost overrun data was thus computed to bring the distribution of values closer to normal. The log 
transformation, in Figure 5.18b, visually appears to have made the sampling distribution to better 
approximate a normal distribution.  
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Table 5.11: Descriptive Summary Measures before and after Log Transformation 
 
 
The descriptive summary output in Table 5.11 as well as Figure 5.19 also showed that the 
skewness and kurtosis were greatly reduced, and the mean and median were much closer 
together, as outliers and extreme values have been pulled in. 
 
 
Figure 5.19: Box-plots showing Cost Overrun and Log-transformed Cost Overrun Values 
 
The log-transformed cost overrun values were thus used for further analysis in the computation 
of the F-statistics. However, all other diagrammatic descriptive representations of the data and 
interpretation of results afterwards were presented using the back-transformed cost overrun 
values. The ANOVA analysis, showing the analysis output for the data as transformed, is 
presented in Table 5.12. 
 
Table 5.12: ANOVA Analysis Output for Log Cost overrun 
 Sum of Squares 
Actual vs Log 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups (1009241.097) 11.714 2 5.857 7.728> 3.23 .001< 0.05 
Within Groups (5851562.808) 43.202 57 .758   
Total (6860803.905) 54.917 59    
 Cost overrun 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Cost 
overrun 
Mean 216.4657 43.29592 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 129.8610  
Upper Bound 303.0704  
5% Trimmed Mean 157.6045  
Median 111.8076  
Variance 114346.732  
Std. Deviation 338.15194  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 1925.40  
Range 1925.40  
Interquartile Range 148.92  
Skewness 3.653 .306 
Kurtosis 14.378 .604 
Log-cost Overrun 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Log cost 
overrun 
Mean 4.8390 .12455 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound 4.5898  
Upper Bound 5.0882  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.8002  
Median 4.7413  
Variance .931  
Std. Deviation .96477  
Minimum 2.47  
Maximum 7.56  
Range 5.10  
Interquartile Range 1.18  
Skewness .597 .309 
Kurtosis 1.031 .608 
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5.5.6 Inference 
The significance value of 0.001 in Table 5.12 is less than 0.05, and the F-Value of 7.728 is greater 
than the critical value of 3.23. Thus, the null hypothesis of equality of means across the geo-
zones is rejected, and the alternate hypothesis was accepted: It was thus inferred that: 
 
There are significant differences in percentage cost overrun between highway projects 
executed in the various geo-zones of the Niger Delta. 
 
The ANOVA results thus established that cost-overruns experienced on highway projects 
execution, differ amongst the three geo-zones of the Niger Delta, likely due to the differences in 
the level of geotechnical risks inherent in these distinctive zones. However, at this point in the 
analysis, the zonal pairs where the most significant difference lies, was not yet known. 
 
5.5.7 Tukey Krammer-Multiple Comparison  
The structure and nature of the differences in cost overrun level, is explored using the Turkey 
Kramer multiple comparison procedure. The post-hoc analysis output of the Tukey Honestly 
Significant Difference (HSD) test output is shown in Table 5.13. 
 
Table 5.13: Multiple Comparisons of Log-Cost Overrun Using Tukey HSD 
(I) teraincoded (J) teraincoded Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Zone 1 
Zone 2 -.98291* .26359 .001 -1.6172 -.3486 
Zone 3 -.83033* .28098 .018 -.8065 .5458 
Zone 2 
Zone 1 .98291* .26359 .001 .3486 1.6172 
Zone 3 .15257 .29201 .064 .1499 1.5553 
Zone 3 
Zone 1 .83033* .28098 .018 -.5458 .8065 
Zone 2 -.15257 .29201 .064 -1.5553 -.1499 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
The result of the HSD analysis equally tallies with the contrast test run concurrently for the log-
cost overrun data under the assumption of equal variances as shown in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14: Contrast Coefficients for Pair-wise Comparisons 
 
Contrast Teraincoded 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Value of 
Contrast 
Std. Error T Df Sig. (2-tailed) 
1 1 -1 0 -.9829 .26359 -3.729 57 .000 
2 0 1 -1 .1526 .29201 2.920 57 .065 
3 1 0 -1 -.8303 .28098 -.464 57 .001 
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Both the post-hoc and contrast tests are significant at the designated 0.05 level for the pair-wise 
comparison of:  
 Zone-1(Uplands) versus Zone-2 (Back swamps);  
 Zone-1(Uplands) versus Zone-3 (Coastal). 
 
This indicated that percentage cost overruns between these pairs varied significantly. However, 
for zones 2 and 3 i.e. the back-swamps versus the coastal zones, percentage cost overruns did 
not vary significantly. This was equally displayed in the range test of homogenous subsets 
analysis output returned simultaneously with the post-hoc test shown in Table 5.15.  
Table 5.15: Homogenous Subsets 
 
Homogenous subsets 
Teraincoded N Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 
Zone 3 16 4.6069  
Zone 2 20  5.4595 
Sig.  .887 1.000 
                                                        Figure 5.20: Hierarchical Array of Pair-wise comparisons 
 
These differences as deduced from the magnitude of the mean differences or absolute values of 
the contrast, are captured in hierarchical order in Figure 5.20. Projects located in the back-
swamps and coastal areas, evidently experienced significantly higher levels of cost overruns 
than the uplands. This analysis output directly reflects the trend in cost-overruns induced due to 
the heterogeneous terrain of the Niger Delta. 
5.6 What Latent Geotechnical Variables Account for the Significant Differences in Cost 
Overruns Experienced Between the Geo-zones? 
Various engineering parameters are used to assess the suitability of sub soils as bearing media 
for construction works (Coduto, 2007). For road construction, the engineering properties of the 
superficial sub-grade soils are the determinant design variables that influence the cost of 
construction (USDOT, 2002), and can thus be inferred as the factors which are latent in any 
geologic setting. The Nigerian standard of road designs, the Transportation and Road Research 
laboratory (TRRL, 1993) stipulated by the Federal Ministry of Works, as a guide, principally 
requires that the CBR, which is a reliable composite geotechnical index of sub-grade strength, 
be tested under simulated dry and wet conditions (Ngerebara, 2014). High CBR values indicate 
good strength of any given soil type material. Very low CBR values of less than two are typical 
Zone 2/1: Backswamps/uplands 
 
Zone 3/1: Coastal /uplands 
 
Zone 2/3: Backswamps/Coastal 
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of highly plastic clays with volume instability. Six CBR classes; S1 to S6, are specified in this 
guide. The poorest soil class being S1 having a CBR value of 2% typical of the swamps, with the 
best soils having values above 30%. The structural catalogue of the TRRL (1993) defines six 
CBR classes (S1 to S6) as follows: 
  CBR, 2.0 %            (S1) .......... Very soft ground; 
  CBR, 3.0 – 4.0%   (S2) ..........  Soft ground; 
  CBR, 5.0 - 7.0 %   (S3) .......... Medium hard ground; 
  CBR, 8.0 - 14.0% (S4) ............Hard ground; 
  CBR 15- 29%       (S5) ............Hard ground; 
  CBR  30               (S6) ............Hard ground; 
The combined thickness of the pavement structural layers, from sub-grade to surfacing, based 
on these subsoil designations stipulated by the guide, increases from 200 to 300mm for S6 (Hard 
ground) soils, up to 650-1000mm for S2 (Soft ground) soils. The implication of this variation in 
design requirement, is its influence on the volume of construction materials needed.  The CBR 
index, thus gives an indication of the financial sensitivity of highway designs in response to 
changing subsoil profiles.  
 
This directly reflects the cost overrun implication of using homogenous designs without ground 
investigations, irrespective of changing soil profiles, typical of the heterogeneous terrain of the 
Niger Delta, characterised by extreme variation in soil types.  As such, if the problematic marine 
clays/peat (Chikoko) soils, rated as very poor, with its characteristic shrinkage and swelling 
potential, abound to varying degrees in the geo-zones, are not properly investigated, the remedial 
re-engineering measures, as noted by several authors including Oguara (2002), Youdoewei 
(2013) and Otoko (2014) would imply additional costs of either: 
 Excavation to remove such poor soils to the extent of prevalence, and replacement with 
adequate fill materials; 
 Compaction and preloading with locally available free draining material; 
 Stabilisation in place with chemical additives to achieve the required minimum strength 
characteristic for the sub-grade.  
Typically, the first alternative will basically entail importing good quality laterites with high CBR 
values from burrow pits located in more stable terrain. Importing the laterites required to replace 
the poor soils in marshy areas, will thus be subject to the availability of source sheds, and the 
haulage distance from these source locations, which are often situated in the coastal plain soils 
of the upper delta, transported to construction sites in the swamps and along the coast.  
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The CBR is an aggregate index for rating the strength of sub-grade soils. It however correlates 
very well with other more specific descriptive and quantitative geotechnical properties of 
expansive soils, which differ more conspicuously in values dependent upon the local geology 
(Coduto, 2007). The values of these engineering parameters can thus be inferred as typically 
representative of the level of constraint posed by the physical characteristics of sub-soils in the 
Niger Delta. These other parameters, useful for gauging the suitability of expansive soils in 
engineering geological application, have thus being sourced by the researcher, as part of the 
secondary data gathered during the fieldwork. They are therefore statistically analysed in 
subsequent subsections, as latent geotechnical cost overrun drivers in the geologic setting of the 
Niger Delta, which may be triggered by poor levels of ground investigations, leading to the 
evidenced disparity in cost overrun levels between the geo-zones. 
5.6.1 Descriptive Geotechnical Parameters of Sub-grade soils: Grain Size Distribution 
Grain size analysis is used in geotechnical practice to identify the sizes of the various particles 
which make up a soil sample. Grain size analysis thus produces a grain size distribution of soil 
particles (Coduto, 2007). Uniform graded soils are referred to as poorly graded or gap-graded, 
on the basis that the ideal mix of the various size range of particles is not present in a soil sample, 
but rather the distribution of particle sizes is skewed. Such poorly graded soils predominantly 
contain one particle size all (mostly small or mostly large). Soils consisting mostly of gravel 
(particle sizes >2 mm) and sand (particle sizes between 0.1 –2 mm) are referred to as coarse 
grained while silt (0.01 –0.1 mm), and clay (< 0.01 mm), which are the typical grain size of Niger 
Delta soils, are fined grained soils.  Youdoewei (2013) explained that poorly graded soils will 
have relatively low densities and low strength, since the number of particles per unit area and 
interlocking frictional forces is small, and therefore reduces their structural stability for road 
construction. In such soils, it was thus explained that modifications of the natural properties of 
the sub-grade soils may be required.  
 
To identify such poor soils in engineering application, two common classification systems, 
developed by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) 
and the Unified Soil Classification System (USCS), are used.  They are thus utilised for the 
purpose of geotechnically classifying soils and describing the approximate properties of sub-
grade soils at the locations of the completed highway projects, using standard designations, 
representing different soil particle size mixes.  
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Table 5.16: The AASHTO Classification System 
Group AASHTO Symbol Typical Symbol 
Group A-1 Group A-1-a Stone or gravel fragments 
Group A-1-b Gravel and sand mixtures 
Group A-3 Group A-3 Fine sand that is non plastic 
Group A-2 Group A-2-4 Silty gravel and sand 
Group A-2-5 Silty gravel and clay 
Group A-2-6 Clayey gravel and sand 
Group A-2-7 Clayey gravel and silt 
Group A-4 Group A-4 Silty soils - Low plasticity 
Group A-5 Group A-5 Silty soils- High plasticity 
Group A-6 Group A-6 Clayey soils -Low plasticity 
Group A-7 Group A-7-5 Clayey soils - Medium plasticity 
Group A-7-6 Clayey soils -High plasticity 
Group A-8 Group A-8 Peat and other highly organic soils 
(Source: Coduto, 2007) 
The ASSHTO classification system as shown in Table 5.16 has 8 major groups: A1~ A7 (with 
several subgroups) and organic peaty soils A-8, with a corresponding progressive decrease in 
the suitability of the sub-grade soils from A1 to A8. A1-to A3 soils are generally rated as excellent 
to good sub-grade material, as they contain mostly coarse grained soil particle sizes such as 
sand, while A4 to A7 soils are silts/clays and are rated as fair to poor, while the A-8s are less of 
soils, being mostly plant and animal remains. 
 
 
Figure 5.21: The USCS Soil Classification Designation Symbols   (Source: Coduto, 2007) 
 
However, based on the USC classification system, coarse grained soils, defined as having less 
than 12% fines are classified using sieve analysis, while soils having more than 12% fines are 
classified using the plasticity chart as shown in Figure 5.21. This form of engineering 
classification of soils, utilises relevant parameters as obtained from a grain size sieve analysis 
and plasticity (Fluidity of soils in response to added moisture) of soil samples plotted on a 
plasticity chart to derive the appropriate designation for the soil types.  The A-line of the plasticity 
chart differentiates silty soils from clayey soils, as well as organic peats from inorganic soils, 
•Liquid limit symbols: 
•H: High LL (LL>50) 
•L: Low LL (LL<50) 
 
•Gradation symbols: 
•W: Well-graded 
•P: Poorly-graded 
 
•Symbols: 
•G: Gravel 
•S: Sand 
•M: Silt 
•C: Clay 
•O: Organic 
•Pt: Peat 
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based on the percentage of fine gained soils. The rating of soil types using this classification for 
excellent to good subgrade soil rating, ranges from well graded gravelly soils (GW) to poorly 
graded sandy soils (SP) to sandy clays (SC) on the coarser upper rating. The fined grained soils 
which are rated as poor subgrade materials range from low plasticity silty soils (ML) to highly 
plastic clays(CH) and low plasticity organics and to peat at the lowest extreme as shown in Figure 
5.21. 
 
Extracts from geotechnical field data obtained, have thus been used in Table 5.17 to approximate 
the average descriptive rating of the suitability of sub-grade soils for the sample project locations 
as geographically dispersed in the Niger Delta. The distributive mix of subsoils at the project 
locations have been described using the AASHTO and USC classification system.  
 
Table 5.17: AASHTO and USC Description of Subgrade Soils at Project Locations 
 
Project 
No 
Per cent Passing B.S. Sieve  
AASHTO 
CF/N 
 
 
USC Soil Description 
 
General Rating as 
Sub-Grade Material 
2 mm 
(No 10)  
425 Micron 
(No 40)  
75 Micron 
(No 200) 
1 99.0 74.4 46.0 A-2-4 Inorganic clay silt Excellent to Good 
2 
99.8 79.0 04.1 A-3 Inorganic silt, fine sands, rock flour with 
slight plasticity  
Excellent to Good 
3 100.0 79.1 37.5 A-2-4 Inorganic clay silt “ 
4 
95.7 58.5 5.1 A-3 Inorganic silts rock flour, silty fine sands 
with slight plasticity  
“ 
5 99.5 87.6 10.0 A-3 Inorganic clayey silt “ 
6 100.0 0.02 49.0 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey of high plasticity Fair to poor 
7 100.0 75.5 48.6 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey silt Fair to poor 
8 99.9 90.8 43.9 A-8 Inorganic clayey silt Poor 
9 99.9 71.9 36.4 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey of high plasticity  Fair to poor 
10 99.9 99.9 70.7 A-8 High plasticity clay with organic matter Poor 
11 
100.0 00.9 5.5 A-3 Inorganic silts, rock flour, silty fine sands 
with slight plasticity 
Excellent to Good   
12 00.6 98.0 93.0 A-8 High plasticity organic clays and silt Poor 
13 99.9 99.1 95.6 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey silt “ 
14 99.8 99.4  74.0 A-6 “ “ 
15 99.9 98.4 95.4 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey of high plasticity “ 
16 99.9 00.5 96.1 A-8 “High plasticity organic clays and silt Poor 
17 90.0 95.3 79.8 A-7-6 “  Fair to Poor 
18 09.8 79.8 19.4 A-3 Inorganic clayey silt Excellent to Good 
19 00.0 81.4 15.1 A-2-4 “ “ 
20 09.4 70.0 41.8 A-2-4 “ “ 
21 100.0 83.9 25.3 A-2-4 “ “ 
22 09.5 91.0 58.9 A-3 “ “ 
23 
00.0 81.7 33.9 A-3 Inorganic silts rock flour, silty fine sands 
with slight plasticity 
“ 
24 100.0 96.2 50.5 A-3 “ “ 
25 99.0 74.3 21.5 A-3 “ “ 
26 90.8 54.8 20.3 A-3 “ “ 
27 100.0 88.7  47.7 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey of high plasticity Fair to Poor 
28 100.0 75.4 29.1 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey silt “ 
29 90.9 66.0 22.7 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey silt “ 
30 100.0 75.0 40.8 A-7-6 Inorganic silts “ 
31 99.8 67.7 29.0 A-7-6 “ “ 
32 100.0 80.0 39.6 A-2-4 Inorganic clayey silt Excellent to Good 
33 99.9 81.2 43.0 A-2-4 Inorganic clayey of high plasticity “ 
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34 100.0 3.5 39.4 A-2-4 “ “ 
35 98.8 50.7 19.6 A-2-6 Inorganic clayey silt  
36 100.0 71.7 33.7 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey of high plasticity Fair to Poor 
37 100.0 84.5 51.1 A-2-6 “ Excellent to Good 
38 99.8 81.8 54.1 A-7-6 “ Fair to Poor 
39 99.8 86.5 45.6 A-6 Inorganic clayey silt “ 
40 100.0 80.6  42.4 A-6 “ “ 
41 99.9 58.4 24.9 A-2-6 “ Good to Fair 
42 100.0 99.9 7.4 A-2-6 “ “  
43 100.0 99.4 64.1 A-7-6 “ Fair to poor 
44 98.7 90.1 53.9 A-2-7 “ Good to fair 
45 100.0 99.3 56.2 A-2-7 Inorganic clayey silt Good to fair 
46 99.6 95.4 967 A-7-6 “ Fair to poor 
47 99.9 85.8 43.5 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey silt “ 
48 993 79.7 58.3 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey of high plasticity “ 
49 99.5 70.3 46.9 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey silt “ 
50 100.0 79.7 31.5 A-7-6 “ “ 
51 99.9 99.3 96.4 A-2-6 “ “ 
52 99.7 97.2 96.4 A-7-6 Inorganic clay silts of high plasticity “ 
53 99.9 95.6 67.1 A-7-6 “ “ 
54 99.9 98.9 92.0 A-7-6 “ “ 
55 99.7 99.1 59.5 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey silt “ 
56 100.0 89.5 30.0 A-7-6 “ “ 
57 93.6 64.9 42.5 A-7-5 Inorganic clayey of high plasticity “ 
58 100.0 100.0 95.5 A-6 “ “ 
59 99.9 85.5 27.4 A-7-6 Inorganic clayey silt “ 
60 99.4 77.4 46.5 A-7-6 “ “ 
61 99.9 72.7 32.7 A-7-6 “ “ 
 
From Table 5. 17, it can be discerned that almost two thirds (39 sample points) of the soil types 
at project locations fall within the lowest range of soils (A-6, A-7 and A-8), which are mostly highly 
plastic silty-clays, classified as fair to poor sub-grade soils in engineering application, due to the 
high percentage of very fine grained soil particles. The prevalence of fine grained particles in the 
Niger Delta soils, which limits the applicability of the soils at project locations, inferred as inducing 
cost overruns during the construction phase, is further statistically explored, based on more 
quantitative index parameters of subgrade soils.  
5.6.2 Quantitative Parameters: Index Properties 
Although the particle size distribution and classification of the soils are useful in providing a 
broader picture of the engineering applicability of the soil types in the region, they are more 
descriptive, and thus not amenable to statistical manipulation. Other more quantitative 
geotechnical parameters, such as Atterberg limits, free swell, maximum dry density and optimum 
moisture content give more specific quantifiable geotechnical attributes of sub-soils. These 
engineering index properties of the sub-soils, approximated for the sampled project locations, 
which may account for the cost overrun disparity between the geo-zones, are presented in Table 
5.18. The definitions of these quantitative parameters are also provided. 
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Table 5.18: Geotechnical Index Properties of Soils at Project Locations 
 
S/No. 
Liquid Limit 
(%) 
Plastic Limit (%) Plasticity Index (%) Free Swell (%) Maximum Dry Density  
(x 103 Kg/m3) 
Optimum Moisture 
Content (%) 
1 48.5 26.3 22.0 30 1.89 13.0 
2 45.5 18.5 27.0 40 2.00 12.5 
3 49.6 20.5 29.0 50 1.99 13.8 
4 0 0 0 15 2.10 12.0 
5 35.5 17.0 18.5 45 1.91 13.8 
6 48.0 20.0 28.0 4S 1.86 16.3 
7 49.0 24.0 25.5 55 1.95 15 1 
8 49.0 26.5 22.5 50 1.93 15.6 
9 52.0 25.5 26.5 60 2.00 11.8 
10 59.5 20.5 39.0 80 1.78 18.0 
11 0 0 0 0 1.73 14.1 
12 37.0 17.0 20.0 25 1.84 12.2 
13 47.0 21.5 25.5 60 1.72 20.0 
14 35.0 20.5 14.5 30 1.89 15.4 
15 62.4 25.5 37.0 80 1.66 19.0 
16 64.0 26.0 38.0 40 1.71 18.0 
17 52.5 20.0 32.5 70 1.77 15.5 
18 24.5 16.5 8.0 35 2.09 9.0 
19 32.0 16.0 16.0 40 2.13 8.2 
20 48.5 17.5 31.0 50 2.02 12.3 
21 33.5 17.0 16.5 40 2.06 10.0 
22 45.5 18.5 27.0 70 1.93 14.0 
23 39.0 31.0 18.0 50 2.05 11.2 
24 32.0 17.0 15.0 55 2.40 13.4 
25 37.0 16.0 21.0 45 2.13 9.0 
26 34.5 15.5 19.0 50 2.02 10.0 
27 53.0 21.5 33.5 45 1.92 15.3 
28 44.5 20.0 24.5 50 2.04 12.5 
29 41.0 20.0 21.0 40 2.04 12.0 
30 52.0 21.0 31.0 50 1.95 15.0 
31 41.0 18.5 22.5 40 1.97 12.6 
32 47.5 20,0 27.5 60 1.98 13.1 
33 50.5 19.5 31.0 50 1.92 13.8 
34 57.0 22.0 35.0 55 1.90 14.0 
35 36 0 17.5 18.5 40 2.00 10.0 
36 52.5 23.5 29.0 50 1.95 13.6 
37 56.5 25.5 31.0 60 1.87 16.0 
38 63.5 27.0 36.5 60 1.86 17.2 
39 48.0 21.5 36.5 50 1.91 15.3 
40 45.5 18.5 27.0 50 1.92 15.5 
41 34.5 15.6 19.2 45 2.16 8.8 
42 22.2 0 22.2 20 1.75 14.3 
43 36.2 20.5 15.7 10 1.69 16.8 
44 35.2 26.2 9.0 50 1.69 18.5 
45 26.7 21.9 4.8 30 1.63 17.2 
46 65.6 37.4 23.2 60 1.43 22.8 
47 31.7 12.3 19.4 45 2.13 9.4 
48 56.0 27.3 28.7 80 1.65 17.8 
49 49.0 22.0 27.0 40 2.00 12.3 
50 32.0 14.9 17.1 35 2.03 11.4 
51 70.5 33.5 37.0 80 1.64 21.8 
52 70.5 19.5 37.7 75 1.94 15.0 
53 55.6 18.9 36.7 75 1.89 16.6 
54 533 28.5 25.0 40 1.63 19.2 
55 28.0 16.5 11.5 20 1.91 15.0 
56 24.7 12.2 12.5 30 2.11 9.7 
57 50.1 19.7 30.4 50 1.97 12.2 
58 67.5 34.8 32.7 80 1.63 21.5 
59 27.1 15.8 11.3 75 2.30 10.4 
60 41.0 16.7 24.3 70 2.01 11.6 
61 32.8 15.8  17.0 30 2.06 8.5 
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5.6.2.1 Expansivity Parameters 
For finer grained expansive soils which are predominant in the Niger Delta region, the Atterberg 
limits (Plastic Limit and Liquid limit) is used in engineering application to define soil behaviour 
with increasing water content, are shown in Figure 5.22. 
 
Figure 5.22: Engineering Behaviour of Fine Grained Soils with Increasing Water Content  
(Source: Coduto, 2007) 
The parameters of expansivity are thus defined: 
 Plastic limit (PL): The lowest water content at which the soil remains plastic (Semi-solid). 
 Liquid limit (LL): The moisture content at which soil begins to behave as a liquid material 
and flows. 
 Plasticity Index (PI): Represents the range of percentage water content that induces a 
change from the semisolid phase to the liquid phase, in which the soil begins to behave 
as a liquid. During this range of water content, the soils are described as being in the 
plastic state. Plasticity Index is calculated as the difference between the liquid limit and 
plastic limit.  
 Free Swell (FS): is the geotechnical index descriptive of the swelling potential of 
unconfined soil when submerged in water. The swell potential of a soil is the percentage 
volume change that occurs in the soil with increased water content during the phases of 
transitioning. 
 
5.6.2.2 Compaction Parameters 
 Maximum Dry Density (MDD): This is a measure of the degree of compaction on a soil 
mass. The implication of this index property of soil for sub-grade soils in road 
construction is the level of compaction that would be required per unit volume of the soil. 
Further consolidation of the sub-grade under imposed traffic is prevented if the 
compaction is carried out to a sufficient depth that naturally attains this maximum dry 
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unit weight.  The maximum dry density of soils tends to decreases with an increase in 
percentage of fine particles. A-1 materials typically display the highest maximum 
densities while the A-7 materials will tend to have relatively lower density. 
 Optimum Moisture Content (OMC): The moisture content at which the density of a soil 
reaches a climax point referred to the maximum dry unit weight. The optimum water 
content is thus necessary to improve compaction, above which the dry density begins to 
reduce (Coduto, 2007). 
 
5.7 Hypothesis 3: Correlation Analysis of Geotechnical versus Project Cost overrun Data 
Correlation analysis of the paired sample cost overrun and geotechnical data is carried to test if 
there is any significant statistical association between the geotechnical properties of sub-grade 
soils in the Niger Delta as represented by their geotechnical index values, and the level of cost 
overruns experienced on the highway projects.  
 
Table 5.19: Correlation Analysis of Geotechnical Variables versus Cost Overrun 
 Cost overrun 
Plasticity Index (PI) 
Pearson Correlation .630 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
Free Swell (FS) 
Pearson Correlation .630 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
Liquid Limit (LL) 
Pearson Correlation .625 
Sig. (2-tailed) .00 
Plastic Limit (PL) 
Pearson Correlation -.716 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 Max Dry Density (MDD) 
Pearson Correlation -.447 
Sig. (2-tailed) .418 
Optimum Moisture Content (OMC) 
Pearson Correlation .462 
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 
 
From the output of the correlation analysis in Table 5.19, only the parameters of expansivity (PI, 
FS, LL and PL) display, relatively high correlations with cost overruns. Compaction parameters 
such as the Maximum Dry density and Optimum Moisture Content, however display weaker 
correlations with cost overruns.   The predominantly high Plasticity Indices, Swell Potentials and 
Liquid Limits of the soils are indicative of very poor and weak subsoils at project locations, due 
to their tendency to rapidly undergo volume changes.  
 
These expansive characteristics of soils are highly undesirable for road construction, as they 
portend high shrinkage and expansion potential for road pavements constructed on them, 
associated with significant volume increment such soils experience, with changes from dry 
193 
 
season to wet season. The occurrence of such soils have thus been noted as problem soils in 
the region by several scholars, which imply significant financial post contract connotations for 
highway projects, if they are not adequately investigated prior to the contracting and construction 
phases (Chukweze, 1991; Youdeowei and Nwankwala, 2010; Otoko and Pedro, 2014).  
 
These assertions are consistent with the positive correlation coefficient of these parameters with 
cost overruns, returned from the correlation analysis. However, the Plastic Limit (PL) displays a 
negative correlation with cost overruns, implying that higher plastic limit of soils would connote 
lower cost overruns. This can be explained by the fact that soils which have high plasticity ranges, 
are stable even with the introduction of water, without rapidly undergoing changes into a semi-
solid phase. 
 
The Atterberg Limits and Swell Potential of the Niger Delta soils can thus be inferred as an 
indication of the how much financial constraint is posed by ground conditions to highway 
construction, which would translate into significant cost overruns if not adequately catered for in 
pre-contract preparation. The plasticity and swelling index characteristics ultimately determine 
the geologic potential for projects to run over budget, underscoring the need to accommodate 
these geotechnical requirements in highway designs, and the implied cost in client’s and 
contractor’s estimate preparation.  
 
These geotechnical variables are thus inferred as the latent geologic variables inherent in the 
heterogeneous wetland terrain of the Niger Delta, which inherently induce cost overruns in 
highway projects, in the absence of adequate ground investigations. They are further 
incorporated in chapter nine, as a part of the variables included in the regression modelling of 
latent geotechnical cost overrun drivers in the geologic setting of the Niger Delta region. 
 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
The exploratory geo-statistical analysis carried out in this chapter, has provided an empirical view 
of the geologic variability of the terrain of the Niger Delta, and how this creates a potential for 
highway projects to run over budgeted cost estimates. The significant cost overrun disparities, 
between the various synthesized geo-zones of the Niger Delta, inferred from the analysis, has 
reinforced the researcher’s pre-conceived assertions, that the unusually high level of cost 
overruns recorded in highway projects, is strongly correlated with the peculiar geologic setting of 
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the region. It has thus provided an empirical justification of the need for further investigation into 
what latent geotechnical pathogens in the practice of the highway agencies, were responsible 
for triggering these geologic cost overrun drivers inherent in the wetland terrain of the Niger Delta 
region, to actively manifest in the excessive level of cost overruns.  
 
        Figure 5.23, inspired by ICE (2001), represents the researcher’s conceptualised circle of concern 
on matters relating to ground conditions, showing the circle of influence of the geologic setting of 
the Niger Delta, with exogenous geotechnical variables that can only be controlled within the 
limited decision interface via adequate ground investigations and ground risk containment in 
practice. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 5.23: Conceptual Approach to managing Ground conditions  
(Adapted after ICE, 2001) 
 
It was thus the researcher’s interim proposition at this phase of the study, based on the geo-
statistical analysis results, that: The trend in cost overruns are primarily triggered by issues 
relating to the management of geotechnical risks, inherent in the ground conditions of the Niger 
Delta, which ideally ought to be clearly defined and tackled, but were not resolved early on in the 
project at the pre-tender stage, thereby allowed to spill into the contractual and construction 
phase, leading to significant cost overruns.  
 
Identifying the geotechnical shortcomings/deviations from the dictates of best practice, was thus 
considered a necessary starting point for subsequent qualitative analysis. Chapter six of this 
thesis, thus explores best practices in the technical literature requisite to accommodate ground 
conditions in designs and estimates, a lack of which therefore, may account for the unusually 
high cost overruns in the sampled highway projects. 
 
Circle of Concern (Geologic Setting) 
Circle of Influence (Best Practices) 
Decision Interface (Practice) 
Random Exogenous Ground 
Related Variables 
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Chapter 6 
Geotechnical Best Practices: Exploratory Literature Review of Geotechnical 
Triggers to Cost Overruns in Highway Project Estimates 
6.0 Conceptual Approach to the Literature 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature related to the key concepts/themes which define the 
practical basis of the study. Figure 6.1 diagrammatically captures the major thrusts of the 
literature which discusses the prevalence of cost overruns in highway projects due to ground 
risks, as a background to the core emphasis of deducing latent pathogens that can potentially 
exists in practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1:  Conceptual Approach to the Literature 
 
The significance of ground risks for triggering cost overruns, latent in the pre-construction phases 
of highway projects, is reviewed as the theoretical basis of the need for geotechnical input. The 
exploratory literature analysis explicitly illuminates best practices which represents the various 
progressive mediums of risk containment in highway projects via adequate geotechnical input at 
the: Conceptual costing phase of budget estimate computation; Engineering designs/detailed 
estimate preparation phase; Contractual phase during bidding, tender documentation, and 
contractor selection. The above conceptual background sets the structure of the literature review, 
which leads the researcher to deduce gaps in knowledge, suspected as prevailing in the 
professional practices of highway agencies. Due to the practice based nature of this aspect of 
the research, related articles from the technical press evident in publications by international 
professional bodies, recognised standards of best practice, research institutes and highway 
agencies are thus used to support the bulk of scholarly literature.  
Latent 
Geotechnical 
Pathogens 
 
Ground Related Risk in 
Highway Projects 
 
 
Cost Overruns in 
Highway Projects 
BEST PRACTICE: MEDIUMS OF GEOTECHNICAL INPUT 
(Geotechnical Risk Containment in Pre-Contract Estimates) 
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6.1 Ground Related Risk in Highway Projects: The Need for Geotechnical Input  
Ground conditions have been repeatedly asserted to account for a significant percentage of the 
technical risk posed to highway development, due to its complex interfaces with the design and 
construction of transportation projects (Alhalaby and Whyte, 1994; Venmans, 2006;2013). The 
literature reveals that irrespective of projects details, ground condition is a factor that has to be 
contended with in highway projects (ICE, 1999, 2001; Whitman, 2000; Clayton, 2001; Venmans, 
2006; 2013). The United States Department of Transport (USDOT, 2002) in recognition of this, 
used the maxim “all transportation projects are carried on earth, with earth or in the earth” to 
emphasize the importance of ground conditions in the construction of highway projects.  Rao and 
Ranade (2013:58) thus stated that: 
        “In the early stages of large infrastructure projects, a significant proportion of the risk 
exposure comes from the unknown unknowns. These may derive from complex interfaces 
with the physical environment into which the infrastructure is to be built such as the route 
of the transport link”  
 
The Institution of Civil Engineers (2001:12) equally acknowledged this, but however drew 
attention to the paradox that: 
            “Ground conditions constitute the highest element of risks in construction works, yet it is 
the element of construction work about which much remains to be known”. 
 
       The Institution of Civil Engineers (2001) further explained that this is largely due to the fact that, 
unlike material requirements in construction which can be specified, ground conditions are 
predetermined and therefore beyond human control. Ground related risk according to the 
Institution of Civil Engineers (2001) have adverse consequences for project cost; completion 
times; environment; health and safety; and quality of design, as illustrated in Figure 6.2.  
 
Quality 
of Design 
 
COST          Time 
Environment 
Health and 
Safety 
Geotechnical 
Risk 
 
Figure 6.2: Ground Related Risk and its Impact on Construction           (Source: ICE, 2001) 
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This study’s definition and focus, on ground related risks, emphasizes its cost implication, and is 
placed in the context of the need for geotechnical input as a medium of financial risk containment 
in the pre-contract phases of highway project estimate development.  
 
Several publications (Peacock, and Whyte, 1992; Alhalaby and Whyte, 1994; Whitman, 2000; 
Clayton, 2001; Venmans, 2006) have thus identified ground conditions, and the relatively high 
level of uncertainty associated with it, as one of the most fundamental technical explanation of 
cost overruns in highway projects. However, as noted in the literature review earlier, there 
appears to be a central debate, between the technical and theoretical studies from refereed peer 
reviewed journals, on this key theme. Yet, the literature reviewed in subsequent sections (from 
both the scholarly and technical press), which stems from the former, continues to report the 
need for geotechnical input, as being fundamental to subverting cost overruns and ensuring a 
project's successful delivery. As a result of this contradiction within the existing literature, this 
chapter is focused on exploring what specific geotechnical pathogens have been reported to 
trigger cost overruns in highway projects, as a prelude to testing the statistical validity of 
geotechnical risk factors in explaining cost overruns.  
 
6.2 Empirical Literature on Cost Overruns Identifying Ground Related Risk Factors 
Alhalaby and Whyte (1994) asserted that the highest percentage of technical risk leading to cost 
overruns in highway projects are linked to design and engineering issues related to ground 
conditions. According to Paul et al. (2002), unanticipated ground conditions can escalate project 
costs by as high as 10% or more while site investigation costs only account for 0.20 to 1.55 
percent of the capital cost of projects. Albatal et al. (2010) studied the levels of financial risks 
associated with varying scopes of the site investigation for highways projects. The authors 
carried out cost analysis of the cost of initial geotechnical investigation against the post contract 
cost associated with failure to carryout adequate site investigation. It was concluded from 
detailed cost analysis, that the post contract cost was 10.2 times the minimum ideal expenditure 
on site investigation.  
 
In view of the very high impact of ground related risk in transportation projects, several empirical 
studies in the literature have identified it as one of the most fundamental factors to which delays 
and cost overruns in highway projects can be attributed (Mansfield et al., 1994; Ashton and 
Gidado, 2001; Bordat et al., 2004; Kaliba et al., 2008). The literature synthesis (Table 6.1) 
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highlights several issues related to inadequate geotechnical input identifiable from factors such 
as poor preliminary engineering; changes in site conditions; design errors and changes in 
specifications; and deficient specification in contract preparation; all of which have underlying 
geotechnical drivers. These are dominant in the array of technical factors causing high levels of 
cost overruns in highway projects. 
 
 Table 6.1: Empirical Studies Identifying Ground Related Cost Overrun Factors 
Author(s)/Year  Country          Major Factors Identified 
Merewitz (1973)  USA.  Price level increases  
Scope changes  
Unforeseen conditions and structural modifications  
(Mansfield et al., 1994)  Nigeria  Poor contract management 
Changes in site conditions  
Financing and payment of completed work  
Ashton and Gidado (2001) UK Design and re-engineering due to ground conditions 
Abd El-Razek et al. (2008)  Egypt  Financing by contractor during construction  
Delays in contractor’s payment by owner  
Design changes due to unexpected ground conditions 
during construction  
Kaliba et al. (2008) Zambia incompleteness of preliminary engineering 
technical challenges 
changes in design drawings and specifications  
Improper planning 
(Tumi et al., 2009)  Libya  Improper planning  
Lack of effective communication  
Design errors  
(Creedy et al., 2010)  Australia  Design change 
Scope change  
Insufficient investigations and ground conditions  
Deficient documentation (specification and design)  
Mahamid and Bruland (2012)  Unforeseen ground conditions 
 
 
Ashton and Gidado (2001) asserted that the financial impact of lack of ground investigation on 
highway construction cost will become evident in inaccurate designs which will translate to 
increased cost overruns. This was based on findings revealed from an analysis of a large sample 
of 474 questionnaires responses received from construction practitioners in the UK, and 
supported by content analysis of 41 project documents.  The sample demographics included 
project managers, engineers, and other construction professionals.  Contractors for the case 
study projects emphasized financial losses incurred due to difficulties experienced in the 
execution of substructure works as a direct consequence of uncertain ground conditions.  The 
content analysis of documents based on detailed project cost estimates, schedules and site 
progress programmes, equally revealed high cost overruns and delays.  
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In developing countries, typically, the study by Mansfield et al. (1994) considered the causes of 
cost overruns in Nigerian highway projects. An array of factors which were responsible for the 
significant level of cost overruns evidenced in highway projects, were listed and ranked based 
on severity rankings, accorded them from data, obtained using questionnaire survey among key 
stakeholders (contractor, consultant and client organisations) in Nigeria. Changes in site 
conditions, was ranked 5th in the survey, with a mean severity index of 78.3%. The standard 
mean error due to variation in ranking by respondents was 2.96%, an indication that the 
variations in ranking by respondents did not affect the position accorded this factor. The problem 
of unexpected site conditions was attributed to inadequate feasibility studies before project 
authorisation and insufficient geotechnical investigations at the feasibility stage which ultimately 
led to design changes ranked 6th in the survey. The findings of Mansfield et al. (1994) study, 
although carried out more than 2 decades ago, appears to still have a significant bearing in this 
research. 
 
Other empirical studies carried out for other forms of construction works equally identify ground 
related factors as being responsible for cost overruns. Typically, Le-Hoai et al. (2008), Olawale 
(2010) and Rahman (2013) who carried out their studies based on projects located in Vietnam, 
the U.K and Malaysia respectively, rated changes in design occasioned by ground conditions 
among the top five in the list of identified factors. It can thus be seen that ground related factors 
rank high among the factors that can cause delays and consequent overruns in all forms of 
construction projects.  
6.3 Technical Literature Statistics on the Impact of Ground Risks 
Engineering and re-engineering issues related to ground conditions have being consistently 
discussed in the technical press, as the cause of significant overruns in highway projects located 
in different parts of the world, with significant economic implications (NEDO, 1983, 1988; NAO, 
1994; ICE, 2001; Alavi and Tavares, 2009; DETR, 2014). 
 
The National Economic Development Office (NEDO, 1983; 1988) in a review of 13,000 building 
construction projects: 5,000 industrial; and 8,000 commercial, revealed that ground related 
problems accounted for 37% and 50% of projects delays encountered during construction.  In 
1990, an analysis of 67 highways contracts in the UK, revealed average cost overrun value of 
28%, 17 of which showed 44% cost increases due to earthworks and unforeseen ground 
conditions (ICE,1991). The National Audit Office (1994) also reported 210 cases of premature 
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failures, worth about £260 million, due to inadequate ground investigations.  Also the National 
Audit Office (2001) further revealed that 70% of public sector projects experienced delays, with 
73% over budget, in the face of dwindling investment in ground investigations. The New Civil 
Engineer (NCE) (2011), reported an audit of geotechnical failures, in the Netherlands, which 
were estimated as costing between 5% and 13% of annual expenditure (€70bn/£61b). 
Significant cost overruns of up to £516 million were revealed by, the Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR, 2014), in the seven largest road projects 
executed, due to unforeseen ground conditions, accounting for a 63% increase above budgeted 
funds.  Of the seven projects, the M60 Manchester ring road incurred the highest cost overrun of 
£184 million, on account of unforeseen ground conditions amounting from delays of 35 to 46 
weeks, and claims worth £30 million. Five of the schemes included within the DETR analysis 
were also revealed to be between one to five years behind schedule.   
 
The Hallandsås Tunnel Project, Sweden, designed for the construction of two 8.6 km long railway 
tunnels at an initial budgeted cost of £440 million in 1992, escalated to £840 million in 2008, due 
to unforeseen ground and water conditions (Creedy, 2010).  The project was abandoned at 3 km 
(30%) completion in 1995, resumed in 1996, discontinued in 1997, and resumed again in 2004, 
after seven years. Work progress in as at 2009, was measured to at 59% completion, with a final 
completion in 2015, as reported in the technical press (IRJ, 2015).  
 
Also, the critical factor cited as responsible for the controversial £900m cost overrun reported in 
the Big Dig, United States Boston Artery project, were technical issues due to unforeseen ground 
conditions compounded by a high water table two to three meters below the surface which was 
discovered during construction (Creedy, 2006).  
As noted from the different popularly cited statistics and case histories of highway project cost 
overruns in the technical press, ground conditions constitutes a major risk factor that can 
ultimately determine the successful performance of a contract. The literature in subsequent 
sections thus explores the nature of geotechnical risk factors which constitute latent pathogens 
at the pre-contract phase of highway projects, leading to cost overruns at the post contract phase. 
As Sower (1993:238) asserts: “Ground-related problems often originate in an earlier phase than 
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the phase in which they occur…out of 500 failures evaluated, 58% originated in design, and 
manifested in construction”.  
 
Subsequent sections provide a kaleidoscopic view of the various geotechnical routes to 
managing risks due to the ground, at the preconstruction phases of highway projects, and how 
a lack thereof, can culminate to determine the trend of high levels of cost overruns in highway 
projects. The nomenclature of the pre-contract phases of highway projects is however analysed 
as a prelude to this, due to the discrepancies reported on various studies, on how highway 
projects progress through phases. 
6.4 Nomenclature of Highway Project Phases  
Project development phases have been outlined in the literature to portray how highway projects 
advance from inception to completion (Chou, 2002; Phaobunjong, 2002; Tan and Wakmasha, 
2010; Asmar et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 6.3: Typical Project Phase Configuration for US DOTs 
                                                         (Source: USDOT, 2006) 
 
In the United States, the configuration of project development phases by local and regional 
DOTs, generally follow the outlined process, in accordance with the Federal Highways Authority 
(FHWA) requirements (in Figure 6.3), from its inception to construction, with responsibilities that 
include: estimating, cost control and adhering to environmental requirements. The literature, 
however, draws attention to the fact that these developmental phases are not uniformly labelled 
by highway agencies, but vary according to their individual practices. 
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Typically, Asmar et al. (2011) outlined the five stages in project development, in terms of the 
level of completeness of design details at each phase of highway project development. The 
authors discussed these phases in relation to the typical project lifecycle for the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation (WisDOT): Planning and scoping; Environmental process; 
Preliminary design; Final design and Advertise and bid. 
 
Chou (2002) analysed timeframes over which various estimates are prepared for highway 
projects in the US, using an illustration of the major stages of estimate development in projects. 
The author categorised the stages of project development in the context of the Texas Department 
of Transport The first stage of project development for the agency is the investment stage. Chou 
(2002) stated that this is the crucial initial point, where a project is introduced into the 
department’s long range plans, which are prepared to span a period of twenty years. The 
estimate at this point is prepared to analyse the feasibility of proposed schemes, with high 
feasibility projects given higher priority. The project then proceeds to the next phase where 
alternative layouts are compared for their environmental impacts. Subsequent to this, schematic 
estimates are then prepared which determine the funding requirements of projects. Chou (2002) 
stated that this is the point at which a scheme can be definitively described as a project, with 
responsibility passing from planners to designers at the Plan, Specifications and Estimate stage.  
 
Similarly, Evans and Peck (2008) in their study of costing practices, noted the differences in the 
phase configuration of Australian highway agencies. The authors described the lack of 
commonality in the nomenclature of the phases adopted by highway agencies, with different 
terminologies being adopted. However, according to the Australian Federal Infrastructure’s 
Notes on Administration (2015) project phases were labelled: Project Identification; Project 
Scoping; Project Development; and Project Delivery Phase.  
 
The researcher thus notes that the development phases specific to highway projects, like most 
publicly funded projects, are often structured in recognition of the necessary technical 
bureaucratic details and procedures, requisite for obtaining environmental and funding approval, 
needed in public infrastructure projects. Irrespective of the varied nomenclature of project 
phases, three broad pre-construction phases can be identified as common to all forms of highway 
development. 
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 The conceptual/budgetary phase;  
 The design/engineering phase;  
 The procurement/contracting phase. 
  
The accuracy of cost estimates prepared by the highway agencies, in these distinct pre-
construction phases, have implications for cost overruns, as identified and synthesised, based 
on geotechnical best practices perused in the literature (Table 6.2). 
 
Table 6.2: Geotechnically Induced Cost Overrun Drivers in Highway Projects 
 
 
 
These geotechnically induced cost overruns drivers, representing latent pathogens, are 
triggered, when the various mediums of ensuring geotechnical input in highway projects, are not 
adhered to. The subsequent subsections evaluate the dictates of best practices, as potential 
mediums for ensuring geotechnical input at the conceptual, detailed, and contractual phases of 
highway projects, highlighting their distinct contributory implications in averting cost overruns.  
 
6.5 Geotechnical Pathogens in Conceptual Cost Estimates 
A conceptual estimate is an estimate prepared at the phase of highway development, whereby 
only a general idea exists about what the project will entail (Lowe et al., 2006). Various 
terminologies have been used to label this estimate in a project. Typically, such terms as ‘early 
stage estimates’, ‘initial estimates’, ‘top-down estimates’, ‘preliminary estimates’ and ‘investment 
estimates’ are also used in the literature to label this point of initial arbitrariness in project details 
and definition (Phaobunjong, 2002; Chou, 2005: Tan and Wakmasha, 2010; Asmar et al., 2011).  
 
Phase Geotechnical Practices 
Conceptual 
Phase 
 
Underestimation of budgetary estimates due to cost projection from historical data which 
does not account for differing or heterogeneous soil profiles. 
Design Phase Weak and insufficient preliminary ground engineering leading to design and specification 
deficiencies; 
Inaccurate engineering design estimates. 
Contractual Inadequate ground investigation data in contract documentation provided for contractors 
during bidding leading to unexpected site conditions; 
 
Poor geotechnical risk containment due to lack of Differing Site Conditions clauses; 
  
Lowest bid contactor selection without geotechnical input. 
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Despite the different terminologies used to identify phases of highway project development in the 
literature, the starting point, or basis of estimation, for any project is the one projected at the 
planning stage, during which a business case is identified, and investment decisions have to be 
made. The proper planning of highway construction programs thus necessitates the accurate 
estimation of funds to be budgeted for individual projects, to circumvent the occurrence of cost 
overruns (Tan and Wakmasha, 2010). It has been opined that highway projects have historically 
experienced significant cost overruns, often rooted at the point of the decision to build, which 
ideally corresponds to the conceptual phase (Moleenar, 2005; Cantarelli et al., 2010).  
 
The current practices of highway agencies, reveal varied methodologies of approximating 
conceptual estimates (Chou, 2005; Alavi and Tavares, 2009). Different agencies have used 
differing approaches at the preliminary phase to project budget estimates in line with their 
organisational needs. It was thus commented that: 
            “Cost estimation is a complex practice impacted by the unique characteristics of an 
agency’s organizational structure.... Those unique characteristics make the problems 
associated with cost estimation practices different among agencies. (Alavi and Tavares, 
2009: 10). 
 
Based on the literature, the methodologies used by highway agencies in the computation of 
conceptual estimates in budgeting, vary, and is dependent on needs specific to the highway 
agencies. The findings for several highway agencies perused in the literature, however showed 
that there are certain methods which are conventionally associated with their early stage 
estimation practices. From the analysis of costing practices, summarised in Table 6.3, it is noted 
that none of the methodologies can be identified as having any basis of geotechnical input. As 
such:  
 Unique characteristics and other variables such as ground conditions were noted as not 
accounted for in these estimates; 
 A high element of subjectivity is required on the part of estimators in deducing to the 
level of ground similarity with past project.  
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Table 6.3: Conceptual Costing Trends in Highway Agencies 
Highway Agency              Conceptual Costing Practice 
Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation (WisDOT),  
 
Project divided into functional elements;  
Apply Historical bid data early phase generated quantities; 
Historic percentages for the remaining work items; 
Add contingency allowance.  
Virginia Department of Transport 
(VDOT) 
 
Apply pre-formulated concepts from database; 
Generate computed cost figures for different elements;  
Sum up for components relating to individual projects; 
Periodic adjustments to update cost to current market values; 
California Department of Transport 
(CDOT) 
 
Determine the appropriate unit price range for work items;  
Adjust price for location; quantity and other factors;  
Prepare Standard check lists as a base; 
Add allowances for inflation, contingency and overheads; 
Contingency allowance set at 25% of base estimate. 
Alabama State Department of 
Transportation (ADOT) 
Extract Historic lane mile averages from updated databases; 
Apply to the different work elements; 
Sum-up; 
Add contingency allowance range of 5- 15%;  
 
Chou (2005) 
31 State DOTs 
Historic lane-mile cost averages for similar works; 
Bridges estimated based on historical square-foot or square-meter.  
NCHRP (2006) 
 
 
Historical lane-mile cost averages based on similar projects;  
Contingency and engineering costs added as % of the total cost. 
Turouchy et al., (2001) -8 DOTs  
Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
Washington, and West Virginia 
Use of tables of generic "cost-per-mile" values by typical section or;  
Estimation of "rough" quantities for all major items or;  
Lack of any uniform or documented method. 
 
Turouchy et al. (2001) explained that these methods, based on cost per-mile tables, usually have 
adjustment made for project specific incidentals, using informal engineering judgment. Methods 
based on the estimation of "rough" quantities for all major items, basically apply the generic LWD 
(length, width, depth) method which involves estimating pavement volume, and then adding costs 
for other items. The LWD method however does not make adjustments for possible variability in 
cross sectional details along the proposed route. Unforeseen ground conditions were thus 
provided for using contingency allocations, ranging between 5 and 20% of estimated cost. 
 
As such, it can thus be deduced that the technique of ‘lane mile extrapolation’ typically used by 
most highway agencies, may not necessarily account for external environmental influences such 
as subsoil conditions. Turouchy et al. (2001) however reported that a fair attempt to account for 
ground conditions was observed in the Tennessee Department of Transport, (TnDOT), which 
goes through a vigorous process, where cost estimates are developed after site visits, 
supplemented with the use of aerial photography and topographic sheets. This is reproduced in 
a CAD drawing system scaled plan sheet, where a rough layout of the road is produced, based 
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on which the road centre line is drawn to envision the typical section for subsequent detailed 
measurement to generate quantities for 20 major cost items. 
 
Turouchy et al. (2001) further reported that most of the DOTs surveyed revealed that the 
pavement cost, and associated preliminary engineering required to develop more accurate 
forecast, represented the most difficult cost item to estimate and often accounted for the largest 
deviations from detailed design estimate and final cost. This contrast with few states DOTs such 
as Tennessee that dedicate a relatively large amount of financial and human resources to 
preliminary engineering, and have very low deviations from their initial cost estimates. Despite 
this technical shortcoming noted, several highway agencies still deploy these qualitative methods 
due to the speed and ease of its applicability, which could be due to low risk perception/lack of 
skills to use more advanced conceptual estimation techniques (Chou, 2005). This may thus 
account for the trend of significant disparity between budgeted and final out-turn cost reported 
on highway projects (Chou, 2005).  
 
These forms of estimating practice, principally based on cost extrapolation from historical data 
with subjective adjustment, has being subject to criticism, by a robust scholarly and technical 
literature base as well as best practice, advocating for the improvement of estimates in this 
phase, against the background of the paucity of technical information. The literature is replete 
with a wide variety of cost estimating models and tools proposed for use at the conceptual phase 
of project developments. (Watson, 1995; Kim et al., 2004, Lowe et al., 2002; Salem et al., 2003; 
Chou, 2010). These tools and models are based on differing quantitative and analytical 
approaches. Several professional bodies and government agencies which address the issue of 
improving accuracy by providing recommended practices are also evident, and include: NASA 
(2008); GAO (2009); DOE (2011); AACE (1997, 2011, 2012). 
 
Best practice cost estimation standards, proposed for use by highway agencies, have been 
drafted to serve as a benchmark to upgrade methodologies adopted by the agencies in relation 
to project cost estimation. Typically, the AACE (1997) as far back as almost two decades ago, 
advocated for more stochastic approaches to conceptual cost estimation (In Table 6.4).  
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Table 6.4: AACE Best Practice Cost Estimation Standard 
Estimate 
Class 
Level of Project 
definition as % 
of complete 
definition 
End usage 
Typical purpose 
of estimate 
Methodology 
 
Expected 
Accuracy range 
 
Estimate 
preparation Effort 
relative to least 
cost index of 1 
Class 5 0 – 2% Screening or 
Feasibility 
Stochastic or 
Judgment 
L:20% to -50%     
H:+30% to +100% 
1 
Class 4 1to 15% Concept Study or 
Feasibility 
Primarily 
Stochastic 
L: -15% to -30% 
 H: +20% to +50% 
2 to 4 
Class 3 10 to 40% Budget, 
Authorization, or 
Control 
Mixed, but 
Primarily 
Stochastic 
L: -10% to -20%  
H: +10% to +30% 
3 to 10 
Class 2 30 to 70% Control or 
Bid/Tender 
Primarily 
Deterministic 
L: -5% to -15% 
H: +5% to +20% 
5 to 20 
Class 1 50 t0 100% Check Estimate 
or Bid/Tender 
Deterministic L:3% to -10%  
H: +3% to +15% 
10 to 100 
 (Source: AACE Recommended Practice No. 17R-97, 1997) 
 
The Department of Energy (2011) cost estimation guide also stresses the need for high quality 
conceptual cost estimates as pivotal to successful project execution. Four characteristics are 
established by this standard as criteria for assessing the quality of such estimates: “they should 
be credible; well-documented; accurate; and comprehensive” (DOE, 2011:11). The DOE (2011: 
11) guide further defines these criteria. An estimate should be: 
 
 “Credible when the assumptions and estimates are realistic relative to the level of 
confidence 
 well-documented showing methods used to create the estimate and identify the 
underlying data and assumptions used to develop the estimate; 
 accurate when actual costs deviate little from the assessment of costs likely to be 
incurred; 
 comprehensive when it accounts for all possible costs associated with a project”  
 
Competent application of the cost estimation process is thus a pre-requisite to obtaining the goal 
of a quality conceptual cost estimate. It is thus discernible that the methodology deployed in the 
computation of the conceptual estimate, is a festering latent pathogen in the practice of highway 
agencies, which can be triggered to result in cost overruns in the long run. The poor quality of 
estimates relied on by highway agencies from the conceptual phase, thus represents a viable 
pathogen identified in this study, as possibly accounting for cost overruns.  
 
Adequately defining ground conditions at increasing levels has thus been advocated to ensure 
higher levels of accuracy in estimates, from the conceptual phase to the detailed design phase 
(Reiley et al., 1994, 2004; Evans and Peck, 2009; Romero and Stolz, 2009). Geotechnical input 
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from comprehensive desk studies at the conceptual phase, to site specific detailed ground 
explorations at the detailed design estimate phase, has thus been argued as necessary to 
improve the accuracy of estimates, as a mechanism of financial and technical risk containment, 
necessary to subvert cost overruns (Reiley et al., 1994). Romero and Stolz (2009) also 
expressed such opinion and principally advocated for improving the accuracy of conceptual cost 
estimates on a non-uniform basis predicated on adequate information of ground conditions. They 
observed that for transportation projects which have a high level of interface with the ground, the 
use of this uniform ‘off-the-shelve basis’ of cost extrapolation was not adequate and thus no more 
than just a guestimate. In this vain, the Romero and Stolz (2009:186) stated that:  
             “Reliance on historical cost data are not well suited for feasibility studies, because not 
only do construction costs vary widely because of subsurface, geographic, and other 
project-specific parameters, but also because such construction costs are not generally 
available in cost databases… This could result in significant budgetary shortfalls as 
projects progress through the developmental phases of planning and design to 
construction”.  
 
Geologic conditions according to Romero and Stolz (2009) should be defined to various degrees 
and applied to the estimates with applicable contingency allowance, depending on the level of 
confidence in the geologic conditions. As such at the planning or feasibility stage geologic 
mapping and case histories from desk studies in the area can be deployed to characterize 
geologic conditions. It was further stated that as a project develops from this phase to the 
preliminary design stage and to site specific geotechnical exploration, the estimates may be 
correspondingly reviewed and the level of contingency allowance reduced. As Reiley et al. 
(1994:5) asserts:  
“The base cost should be broadly complete, although still subject to refinement, and 
potentially growth, as the design becomes better understood and more developed”. 
 
Evans and Peck (2008) equally noted that although engineering definition may not be sufficiently 
developed at the conceptual phase, there was a need for more a more rigorous approach to cost 
estimation at the conceptual phase. As such a recommendation for producing reliable conceptual 
cost estimates, that can be used for making long term project decisions, was suggested:  
             “Preliminary estimates must be underpinned by a combination of sufficient investigation 
and definition, preliminary design of key elements to ensure constructability, expert 
knowledge to advise on the design, definition and construction, comparison with 
benchmark costs, appropriate risk and contingency allowances and a rigorous review” 
(Evans and Peck, 2008:19) 
 
Further emphasis was placed more on getting the right information at the right time, necessary 
to get the project scope defined to the best possible degree at conceptual phase: 
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           “The more effort that goes into getting the parts of base estimate correct means less effort 
that has to be made to assess, and less reliance placed on, the contingency allowance” 
(Evans and Peck, 2008: 41) 
 
Evans and Peck (2008) illustrated three scenarios of project cost performance: An ideal project; 
an acceptable project; and an unacceptable project. The ideal project was defined as one in 
which the final cost coincides with the conceptual cost without reliance on contingency allowance. 
The acceptable project was defined as a project whose final outturn cost does not exceed the 
sum of the initial projected cost and contingency allowance.  
 
 
Figure 6.4: Cost growth in Project Phases                               Source: Evans and Peck (2008) 
 
An unacceptable project was defined as a project whose final cost far exceeds the initial cost 
plus the contingency allowance as shown in in Figure 6.4. Evans and Peck (2008) noted 
regrettably that this last project scenario, was however the common trend in highway projects, 
and attributed this to the approach used in generating the initial estimates.  
6.6 Geotechnical Pathogens in Detailed Designs and Estimates 
Detailed estimates are prepared at later stages of projects, often before the contractual phase, 
when all project details and cost data previously not adequately defined at the conceptual stage 
are available. Turouchy et al. (2001) opined that each successive phase of the project life cycle 
is more influential as the focus narrows on the amount each project will cost with a corresponding 
reduction in contingency allowance (Figure 6.5). 
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Figure 6.5: Typical Bounds of Estimate Accuracy             Source: Schexnayder et al. (2003) 
Schexnayder et al. (2003) thus stated that subsequent estimates are made throughout project 
design as continuing checks on cost expectations, and the confidence intervals decline to where 
the final definitive estimate is expected to be very close (plus or minus 5 per cent) to actual 
project costs and that the estimates are symmetrically distributed around the actual costs as 
shown in Figure 6.5. 
 
Detailed design estimates are typically prepared by breaking down work into the lowest level of 
detail, (Level 4 Rate Build-up of the WBS) that comprehensively captures all cost components, 
before a contract is awarded and construction commences (DOE, 2011)). Detailed design 
estimates ideally should cater for all major cost contributors and financial risk factors in the 
project (GAO, 2009).   It is thus an underlying basic assumption that the cost estimate prepared 
by clients at the detailed design phase is an accurate predictor for future costs of a project, having 
taking into consideration, condition of the ground at the proposed site, with the Institution of Civil 
Engineers (1991) publishing several articles on this theme. It is therefore logical that at this point 
of detailed estimating, that the cost implication of ground related risk in projects, recognized to 
be a major cost driver, particularly in transportation projects, has been adequately established.  
  
Reiley et al. (2004:20) in their discussion of the Cost Estimate Validation Process (CEVP), 
developed for the Washington Department of Transport emphasized that: 
          “Every project is unique, particularly in the geotechnical uncertainties and risks to which 
its eventual “cost to complete” will be subjected, as it goes through the stages of concept 
design, preliminary design, detailed design, bidding and construction”. 
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Reiley et al. (2004) further stated that an investment in the gathering of additional design 
information can change the understanding of a risk. Typically, a comprehensive geotechnical 
investigation in this regard, was noted as a useful avenue of relevant information that can serve 
to confirm that a geotechnical risk, perceived at the initial project conceptualisation phase, is 
active and therefore constitutes a basis for preparing detailed designs, and its quantification in 
estimates.  
 
Ashton (1997) as well as the Institution of Civil Engineers (1991), stressed the need to 
accommodate geotechnical risk in designs, to avert the likely series of ground related problems, 
which will carry significant financial connotation. This is particularly important for road works 
which basically entail modifying the natural ground structure (sub-grade) to create motorable 
conditions for vehicles via the construction of pavements (Bell, 2007). Consequently, it can be 
deduced that defining the geotechnical properties of the ground, in sufficient detail and accuracy, 
is of vital importance in the preparation of highway designs and cost estimation, as unanticipated 
poor sub-grade can undermine the overall financial performance of a highway project. This is 
because the properties of the ground are not known and its behaviour is not one that is uniform, 
but rather differs over distances and with depth (Coduto, 2007). Ground related risks therefore 
can only be unravelled through detailed investigation, which should be carried out prior to the 
award of contract. The planned execution of ground investigation is a means for reducing ground 
related uncertainty, both in designs and during construction (ICE, 1999). To this end, the level of 
ground investigation carried out prior to the estimation of costs, necessary to reveal subsurface 
conditions, and which should adequately capture the geotechnical properties of sub-soils, is of 
crucial importance.  
 
The general objective of a ground investigation is to assess the suitability of a site for a specific 
purpose (Bell, 2007). As such, it involves exploring the ground conditions at and below the 
surface (Anon, 1999). It is thus a prerequisite standard for the successful and economic design 
of highways, recommended by various construction institutes, professional associations and 
international standards: 
 Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE); 
 Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA); 
 Association of Geotechnical and Geo-Environmental Specialists (AGS); 
 British Standards Institution (BSI);   
 Transport and Road Research Laboratory(TRRL); 
 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 
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Accordingly, a site investigation should attempt to foresee and provide against technical and 
financial difficulties that may arise during construction because of ground and/or other local 
conditions (Ashton, 1997). A site investigation as stipulated by best practice should consist of 
three stages, namely a desk study, a preliminary reconnaissance and a site exploration. These 
are discussed in further detail in the subsequent sections. 
6.6.1 Desk Study  
Bell (2007:231) stated that a desk study is undertaken in order to make an initial assessment of 
the ground and to identify, if possible, any potential geotechnical problems.  
            “A desk study is the collation and review of information already available about a site, 
and is carried out at an early stage of site appraisal to inform and guide the remainder 
of the site investigation”.  
 
The desk study can thus be described as phase-1 of a site investigation process (AGS, 2003; 
Bell, 2007). Rys and Wood (1986) opined that for road works, valuable information can be 
obtained from desk studies at low cost, but insufficient attention is often given to this phase of 
ground investigation, which should be a routine exercise before the commencement of detailed 
exploration. The British Standard Institute (1999) in their Code of Practice for Site Investigations, 
BS 5930 recommends that:  
           “To obtain best value from a site investigation, it is essential to carry out a desk study as 
the first stage of a site investigation”.  
 
Requisites for any comprehensive desk study should therefore include an investigation of 
geology, geomorphology, aerial photographs and archival data (Bell, 2007). This should form 
background information before the actual ground investigation. Bell (2007) further stated that 
topographical and geological maps are particularly useful in planning and design of route ways. 
As such available archival records, literature, maps, imagery and photographs relevant to the 
proposed site is relevant to ascertain a general picture of the existing geological conditions prior 
to a field investigation (Bell, 2007).   
 
According to the ICE (2001:3) literature and map surveys may save time and thereby reduce the 
cost of the site investigation programme:  
            “Without a desk study the site investigation may be little more than a random search for 
data, so that the usefulness of the investigation may be jeopardised if the desk study is 
omitted”.  
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The Institution of Civil Engineers (1999) explained that from a client’s perspective, best value can 
be obtained through desk studies by minimising the risk of unforeseen ground conditions, which 
might cause increased costs and/or lengthy equally costly delays in programme.  
6.6.2 Preliminary Reconnaissance 
The preliminary reconnaissance involves a walk over the site and its surrounds based on visual 
inspection. Bell (2007) underscored the need for the inspection not to be restricted to the site but 
extended to adjacent areas to assess their potential impact on the proposed construction. 
Although some authors such as Clayton (1995) regard preliminary reconnaissance as part of a 
desk study, others including Bell (2007) have identified it as a distinguishable phase in ground 
investigations. Clayton (1995) explained that a desk study report would be expected to equally 
incorporate the results of the walk-over survey. However, Bell (2007) stated that a walk-over 
survey is carried out after a desk study, and before the detailed ground investigation, the primary 
objective being to confirm information gathered from a desk study and collect additional 
information about a site. The Institution of Civil Engineers (2001) equally, stated that the 
preliminary reconnaissance allows a check to be made on any conclusions reached in the desk 
study. 
 
According to Clayton (2001) the importance of the preliminary reconnaissance is that it assesses 
the suitability of the site for the proposed works, a basis upon which the detailed ground 
exploration is planned. Bell (2007) outlined that, although the fundamental information to be 
gathered in a preliminary reconnaissance depends on the nature of the site and proposed project, 
typical features such as the distribution of the soil and rock types present, the relief of the ground, 
the surface drainage and associated features should be noted. Limiting ground investigations to 
this preliminary visual site inspection phase, is one of the critical issues suspected as prevailing 
in the practices of highway agencies in the Niger Delta, which would likely increase the probability 
of encountering unexpected ground conditions and lead to cost overruns. This would thus be 
investigated as one of the potential cost drivers to cost overruns in the fieldwork. 
6.6.3 Detailed Ground Exploration  
Geotechnical uncertainty is always high before a comprehensive site investigation is completed 
(Aston and Gidado, 2001). The aim of a detailed ground exploration is to try to determine and 
thereby understand the nature of the ground conditions on site and those of its surroundings 
(Clayton et al., 1996). The site exploration must be concluded by a report embodying the findings, 
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which can be used for design and contract documentation purposes (DRMB, 2006). Such report, 
called a ‘Ground investigation report’, according to Bell (2007) should contain geological plans 
of the site with accompanying sections, thereby conveying a 3D picture of the subsurface strata. 
It should also report on the rock and soil types, which should be described using internationally 
recognised engineering soil classification standards, such as the USC and the AASHTO 
systems. Furthermore, geomorphologic conditions, hydro-geological conditions, borehole and 
field-test information should all be recorded on geotechnical maps (Bell, 2007). 
 
It was further clarified that the extent to which this stage of a site investigation is carried, depends 
upon the size and nature of the construction operation. Ashton (1997) opined that in most 
construction works, where the level of geotechnical risk is not particularly high, routine 
investigations carried out by experienced personnel may suffice. However, with high risk geologic 
settings with poor ground conditions, more sophisticated analytical geotechnical investigation 
techniques may be required (DRMB, 2006). This directly reflects the ideally higher levels of site 
investigation requirements, implicit in the high risk wetland terrain of the Niger Delta region, 
characterised by difficult expansive soils, analysed in chapter Five. 
 
The literature, based on an analysis of expenditure on ground investigations, however shows 
that clients are rarely willing to expend adequate funds on procuring detailed or more 
sophisticated ground investigations (ICE, 1991; Alhabyl and Peacock, 1992; Paul et al., 2002; 
Albatal et al., 2010). This trend is suspected as one of the fundamental geotechnical shortcoming 
of highway project delivery in the Niger Delta.  The ICE (1999) thus emphasized that a desk 
study and preliminary reconnaissance should not be regarded as an alternative to detailed 
ground exploration for a construction project. Clayton et al. (1995:38) contradicts this stance by 
opining that: 
           “The desk study and walk-over survey are the two essential components of ground 
investigations. Other parts (such as boring, drilling, and testing) may sometimes be 
omitted, but these parts of site investigation must always be carried out”.  
 
These contradictory stances in the literature may thus imply that this critical phase of ground 
investigation may be overlooked, leading to significantly high cost overruns that could have being 
prevented (Institution of Civil Engineers, 1999).  
 
Several authors (Clayton, 2001; Paul et al., 2002; Albatal et al., 2010) have also noted that the 
cost of site investigations in relation to the total project cost is small. Typical values in roads are 
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0.20 to 1.50 per cent of total project cost were revealed by Albatal et al. (2010), in a study in 
which it was recommended that site investigation should proceed until the ground conditions are 
well established to generate safe designs and construction. The Institution of Civil Engineers 
(1991) stated that expenditure on ground investigation was often accorded a low priority by 
clients, and often procured based on ‘minimum cost and maximum speed’, which increases the 
risk of poor quality design. The Institution of Civil Engineers (1991) emphasized that most 
investigations, typically procured on this minimalistic basis, fail to present an accurate account 
of the ground conditions, which in effect accounts for significant levels of cost overruns. Clayton 
(2001) in an empirical study found a direct positive relationship between expenditure on site 
investigations and the level of cost overruns experienced in projects. (In Figure 6.6). 
 
Figure 6.6: Association between Expenditure on Site investigations and Cost overruns                                                                  
Source: Clayton (2001) 
This implication of this finding is that higher investments in ground investigations would yield 
correspondingly lower cost overruns. Cathie (2000:1) in alignment with Clayton (2001) 
consequently stated that: “Spending money on geotechnical investigations and engineering is 
like a good insurance policy”. The Institution of Civil Engineers (1991) attested that expenditure 
on ground investigation was low and that this increases the risk of cost overruns in civil 
engineering projects. 
 
Peacock and Whyte (1992) used data from a case study to model risks associated with 
inadequate ground investigation as a demonstration of the level of project financial uncertainty. 
The study quantified the benefits and returns to the client, of quality of site investigation work on 
a scale of 1-5, and computed the effect of ground condition uncertainty (ranging from a residual 
level of 20% corresponding to the highest quality of investigations) on the estimated project cost 
and duration. The findings based on simulations revealed that for a very good quality site 
investigation work at level 5, the project would experience a negligible 0-2 weeks’ delay, while 
for a poor quality investigation at level 1, delays of up to 14 weeks were possible. This 
Site Investigation/ Construction Tender cost 
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corresponds to a 15% and 85% respectively for earthworks and 4% and 20% of the total project 
cost. 
 
There however exists no clear benchmark on spending on site investigation works as a 
proportion of the overall contract sum of a project, with various views expressed in the literature. 
The National Economic Development Office (1988:8) thus recommended that in any particular 
case: “A balance should be struck between the substantial cost of an exhaustive site 
investigation, and the risk of extra cost and delay arising from an inadequate one. Whereas, the 
Institution of Civil Engineers (1991) advocated that clients should be persuaded to have site 
investigation undertaken for every site, with an adequate cost margin provided.  
 
The literature thus hinges the accuracy of detailed design estimates, on the quality of ground 
investigations carried out. Carrying out comprehensive and accurate ground investigations, is 
evidently a critical decisive factor, which can result in significant cost overruns, particularly under 
poor ground conditions, such as in the deltaic setting of the case study area. Adequate ground 
investigations can thus be inferred as a worthwhile medium of ensuring geotechnical input in 
detailed estimates, a lack of which can serve as a stimulus, triggering cost overruns in the 
geologic context of the Niger Delta.  The researcher equally notes the argument in the literature, 
surrounding the financial justification for the high expenditure requisite for detailed ground 
investigation, as opposed to preliminary desk studies and site reconnaissance. The potential 
impact that this perception may have on the design practices of highway agencies in the Niger 
Delta will thus be further explored in the subsequent field work. 
6.7 Geotechnical Input as a Financial Risk Containment Strategy in Tender Estimates 
At the contractual phase of highway projects, the tender price forwarded by contractors, is 
fundamentally determined by the level of ‘knowns’ about a project (Moleenar et al., 2006).  The 
literature establishes the importance of making fully known, the level and types of risks 
associated with any project, so that inconsistencies on the basis of computing the tender figure 
do not arise (DRMB, 2006; Moleenar et al., 2006). Achieving realistic tender estimates is 
necessary to avoid costly disputes and delays, which can affect the ability of the project to be 
completed under budgeted cost (Wong, 2012).  
 
The literature on geotechnical risk containment in highway contracts, provided in this section, is 
thus closely linked to the dynamics of game signalling and risk aversion by clients and 
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contractors, theorised by Ganuza (2003) and Cantarelli et al. (2013), as a pervasive culture of 
most infrastructure projects.  In recognition of this intricate dynamics inherent in transportation 
projects, Moleenar et al. (2006:31) stated: 
            “The contract is a vehicle for risk allocation ... it defines the roles and responsibilities for 
risks. Risk allocation in any contract affects cost, time, quality, and the potential for 
disputes, delays, and claims. In fact, contractual misallocation of risk has been found to 
be a leading cause of construction disputes.  
 
The subsequent sub-sections therefore emphasize the contractual perspective to geotechnical 
input in highway project estimates: In contract documentation and contractor selection, and how 
the dynamics of geotechnical risk aversion and the strategic behaviour of both parties to a 
contract has important implications for the accuracy of the client’s final outturn cost. The issues, 
bordering on the containment of ground related risk and how this creates a propensity for cost 
overruns, are however discussed in relation to the two popularly adopted procurement systems: 
Traditional versus Design and Build. 
6.7.1 Geotechnical Pathogens in Traditionally Procured Highway Projects 
Risk management in construction projects, aim to minimise the total cost of potential risk on a 
project (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2001). A fundamental principle of risk sharing in 
construction projects, recommended in the Groove Report (1998: 23), ‘the allocation of risk to 
the party most suited to manage it’, was noted and discussed by both Moleenar et al. (2006) and 
Romero and Stolz (2009) in respect of geotechnical risks inherent in highway projects. Moleenar 
et al. (2006) asserted that clients, were in the best position to assume responsibility for ground 
related risks, as indicated in Table 6.4 via geotechnical investigations and contract clauses. 
 
Table 6.4: Risk Allocation Matrix for Highway Projects 
Risk Party recommended to assume 
risk 
Medium of Risk Management 
Site access Owner Advanced Planning 
Methods of construction Contractor Specific Contract Clause 
Site conditions Owner Geotechnical Investigations; 
Contract Clauses. 
Weather/Acts of God Shared (Owner assumes delay 
risk; contractor assumes financial 
risk). 
Contract Clause 
(Source: Moleenar et al., 2006) 
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Romero and Stolz (2009) equally took the same stance that, Ground Investigation Reports and 
the various contractual clauses which are included for highway projects, serve as risk allocation 
measures. Typically, O’ Toole (2006) discussed the use of a ‘Differing Site Conditions (DSC) 
clause’, the implication of which is that, in the event of encountering a subsurface condition 
different from that which was indicated in the contract, the owner bears the additional cost for 
executing the work under such conditions. The efficacy of how these measures serve to optimally 
allocate geotechnical risk and therefore avoid costly disputes, largely lies with the client and how 
the contract is packaged (O’ Toole, 2006).  
 
The contractual packaging, in relation to whether a ground investigation report for the proposed 
site is included by the client as part of the contract documentation, is the key feature of contracts 
around which hinges the magnitude of risks borne by both parties to a contract (Moleenar et al., 
2006). The inclusion or exclusion of geotechnical investigation reports determines the level of 
risk borne by the contractor. Consequently, Romero and Stolz (2009:8) was of the view that: 
           “The types of risk allocation measures, or the lack thereof, have a profound influence on 
a contractor’s decision whether to bid for a project and the amount of contingency placed 
in a bid for risk”. 
 
Several authors (Geddes, 1985; Smith, 1986; Tah et al., 1994) have thus identified the 
containment of risks in contracts, as a major factor driving the estimation basis of contractors. 
Where ground investigation reports are included, the literature states that a significant reduction 
in the level of bids received is noticeable (Geddes, 1985; O’ Toole, 2006; Romero and Stolz, 
2009; Wong, 2012). This reduction in the level of bids received by clients, was attributed to the 
reduction in the level of risk borne by the contractors relating to ground conditions, and therefore 
the level of contingency that is included in the bids tendered.  Geddes (1985:2) remarking on this 
stated that: 
             “Although including ground investigation reports, and as such adding a differing site 
condition clause to a construction contract, introduces some uncertainty for an owner 
regarding the ultimate cost of a project. This uncertainty, however, may be offset by 
lower bids from contractors who will not have to account for unknown conditions by 
including contingencies in their bids”. 
 
A note of caution is, however, sounded by O’ Toole (2006), who raises valid concerns about the 
accuracy and representativeness of ground investigation reports, suggesting that where 
incomplete or inaccurate reports are used as a basis of financial and risk assessments by 
contractors, the client faces significant financial risk due to contractual change events resulting 
from report inaccuracies. Supporting this view, Wong (2010) identified two common arguments 
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often raised by contractors when faced with the unforeseen ground conditions during the 
progress of works. Firstly, whether a ground investigation report was included as part of the 
contract documentation, and secondly whether the report provided, was truly representative of 
the physical conditions of site. 
In the event that a ground investigation report was included as part of the contract, and was 
subsequently found not to be representative of the ground conditions experienced during 
construction, this can provide sufficient basis for claims and variations to arise in a contract.   As 
a result, case law related to construction projects, is rife with cases where the core argument 
revolves around the issue of non-representative ground investigation reports. For example, the 
landmark case of E. H. Morrill Co. versus. State of California, is both a classic example of one 
such dispute, and the underpinning case law used by contractors wishing to challenge the 
employer’s ground investigation report. The client in this case had tried to avoid the liability for 
unknown or unforeseen site conditions by incorporating ‘Disclaimers and Exculpatory Clauses’, 
which as the literature shows, do not often hold up to detailed legal scrutiny in the final judgement 
(O’Toole, 2006).  
 
 6.7.2 The ‘Differing Site Condition’(DSC) Clause Debate, as a Geotechnical Trigger to Cost 
Overruns 
The Institution of Civil Engineers (1991) argue that, since it is the client that bears most of the 
geotechnical risk, they stand to benefit the most from carrying out detailed ground investigations, 
including adequate and representative ground investigation reports along with DSC clauses in 
contracts. This stance is equally corroborated by the fundamental basis of the enactment of the 
DSC clause in engineering contracts, as analysed by O’Toole, (2006: 5): 
 “The owner is best able to assess and avoid risks relating to ground conditions; 
 The owner has time for detailed investigations, and benefits from them by using the 
information to refine the design; 
 The owner employs engineers to research the project and draw the plans who get 
unlimited access to the site. 
 
On the other hand, it was rationalised that: 
 A contractor at the tender phase is under time pressure to submit his bid and therefore 
has limited time and access to the job site. 
 A contractor bids on many jobs, but is awarded few and as such money spent on 
investigations can only be recouped on the projects awarded to the contractor. 
Contractors on this basis cannot afford to carry out more than a cursory investigation. 
 The contractor is bound to rely upon experience and the information provided with the 
bidding documents”. 
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Clients would thus only have to resort to the use of DSC clauses, which would mean paying for 
those conditions that could not have been revealed in detailed investigations, archetypally 
expressed in the form of ‘Unforeseen Ground Conditions’ or a type-1 DSC (ICE, 1991).   
Different internationally recognised standard forms of contracts and regulations thus have 
various adaptations of a DSC clause: The ICE form of engineering contracts (1991); The FIDIC 
Red and Yellow Books (1999), The American Federal Acquisition Regulations (2005). Even the 
most recent, newly released version of the Engineers’ Joint Contract Documents Committee 
(2016) contracts prepared as a joint document between The American Council of Engineering 
Companies (ACEC), The National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) and The American 
Society of Civil Engineers Institute (ASCE), contains adaptations of the differing site condition 
clause.  
 
The 7th Edition of the ICE Standard Form of Engineering Contract: Clauses 11 and 12, later 
replaced by the suite of New Engineering Contract (NEC) forms (1993, 2001, 2005, 2013), 
focuses on the theme of managing ground risks. Typically, Clause 12 of the 7th Edition of the 
ICE Form states: 
“If during execution of the Works the Contractor encounter physical conditions (other 
than weather conditions or conditions due to weather conditions) or artificial obstructions 
which conditions or obstructions he consider could not reasonably have been foreseen 
by an experienced contractor…he shall give notice to the Engineer…” 
 
The ICE Form of contract was intended to rationally share the risk on ground conditions between 
the employer and the contractor, as a basis of fostering adequate management of ground risks 
in engineering and construction contracts (Wong, 2012). 
 
The FIDIC Red Book (1999) focuses on client designed projects, while the FIDIC Yellow Book 
(1999) focuses on contractor designed projects. Clause Clause 4.10 -12, of the FIDIC Red Book, 
centers on three main themes: Information on sub-surface conditions and inspection of site; 
Interpretation by the contractor; and physical conditions revealed during contract execution. 
Typically, Clause 4.10 of the FIDIC Red Book (1999) stipulates: 
“The Employer shall have available to the contractor for his information, prior to the Base 
Date, all relevant data in the Employer’s possession on sub-surface and hydrological 
conditions at the Site, including environmental aspects. The Employer shall similarly 
make available to the Contractor all such data which come into the Employer’s 
possession after the Base Date. The Contractor shall be responsible for interpreting all 
such data”. 
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Clause 4.11 focuses on the interpretation and accuracy of the data, stating: 
 
“The Contractor shall be deemed to: (a) have satisfied himself as to the correctness and 
sufficiency of the Accepted Contract Amount, (b) have based the Accepted Contract 
Amount on the data, interpretations, necessary information, inspections, examinations 
and satisfaction as to all relevant matters referred to in Sub-Clause 4.10” 
 
Wong (2012) interpretation of this requirement was thus that: Employer’s obligation to provide 
information does not end after the tender submission, and that contractors are responsible only 
to the extent of interpreting the data furnished. Clause 4.12 however, focuses on the physical 
conditions, which come to light upon commencement of the contract, with the stipulation that the 
risk of physical conditions established as unforeseeable by an experienced contractor at the date 
of tender, is borne by the client, similar to Clause 12 of the ICE form.  
 
However, some other forms of contracts used in different countries adopt common law position. 
Typical wordings contained in JCT forms of contract (1999), used by the Nigerian Federal 
Government, states:  
“…the Contractor shall be deemed to have visited the site and satisfied himself that he 
has allowed in his price for everything necessary for the completion of the Works”. 
 
Similarly, Clause 13(1) of the Hong Kong Government General Conditions of Contract (GCC) for 
civil engineering or building works states: 
“The Contractor shall be deemed to have examined and inspected the Site and its 
surroundings and to have satisfied himself, before submitting his Tender... as regards 
the nature of the ground and sub-soil, the form and nature of the Site... the nature of the 
work and materials necessary for the execution of the Works… and generally to have 
obtained his own information on all matters affecting his Tender and the execution of the 
Works.” 
 
Others, even within the jurisdiction of the countries which adopt the requirement of differing Site 
Condition clauses, have resorted to including ‘Site Inspection Clauses’ stipulating that 
contractors carry out all requisite inspections, typically worded as:  
“The contractor further covenants and warrants that he has had sufficient time to . . . 
examine the site of the project to determine the character of the subsurface materials 
and conditions to be encountered; that he is fully aware and knows of the character of 
the subsurface materials and conditions to be encountered; that he has compared the 
actual site conditions with those reflected in the contract documents; . . . and that no 
additional compensation will be paid as a result of unforeseen site conditions” (O’Toole, 
2006;7). 
 
The preceding arguments indicate a divergence between best practices, as some highway 
agencies tow the latter, and try to transfer the risk associated with the ground conditions to 
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contractors in their misguided notion of ensuring certainty of final outturn cost (Harrison, 1981; 
Geddes, 1985; Chan and Au, 2007). As such adequate containment of risks due to potentially 
undetected ground conditions, requisite for contractors to prepare their estimates, may be 
missing from such contracts. Contractors thus have to rely on guesswork to project estimates, 
which are forwarded in bids. Remarking on this scenario, as a financial gamble by clients, Chan 
and Au (2007:3) opined that: 
         “The owner risks tragedy, first, from cost-cutting measures the contractor will take if it hits 
unforeseen conditions, and then, from fighting contractor claims and picking up the pieces 
if the contractor abandons the project or goes bankrupt”. 
 
The geotechnical risk allocation measures deployed by highway agencies in contract 
documentation, during bid solicitation constitutes a latent pathogen in highway projects, and 
would thus be established in the field work, as a basis of ascertaining if this scenario plays out 
to trigger cost overruns in the context of highway delivery in the Niger Delta. 
6.7.3 Geotechnical Pathogens in Design and Build Contracts 
The literature in the preceding section has identified insufficient data on ground conditions, and 
poor geotechnical risk measures in contracts, as potentially one of the main causes of failures in 
traditional Design-Bid-Build (DBB) projects, which fundamentally increases technical and 
financial risks at the post-contract phase. Ashton and Gidado (2001) noting this, attributed the 
spiral upward increase in the adoption of Design and Build (DB) contracts, to clients seeking to 
allocate and identify one point of responsibility for all design and construction risks. Franks (1994) 
distinguished the traditional DBB procurement system from the DB system based on the liability 
for the supply and flow of ground investigation information. Figure 6.7 shows the contractual 
relationship with respect to geotechnical information flow for both contract types. 
  
Figure 6.7: Geotechnical Information Flow for Traditional/Design and Build  
Source: (Tolla and Valkeisenmäki, 2012) 
223 
 
It is shown in Figure 6.7 that under the traditional system of procurement, the client takes the 
position of the party providing the ground investigation information, while in DB systems, it is the 
contractor’s prerogative. Findings of an empirical study conducted by Tolla and Valkeisenmäki 
(2012) on ground investigations practices for DB road projects executed by the Finnish Traffic 
Agency, evidenced that the level of availability and utilisation of ground investigations in sampled 
road projects was in most cases classified as ‘just satisfactory’.  Additionally, the research also 
suggested that ground investigations were often poorly utilised by contractors at the initial phase 
of highway procurement.  
 
According to Franks (1994), the contractor in the DB contract, bears the sole liability for any 
consequences of proceeding with the work based on inadequate ground investigation. Based on 
the findings of Ashton and Gidado’s (2001) empirical study, it was revealed that 78% of the 
Design and Build contractors employed the services of external structural or geotechnical 
consultants for the development of designs work.  Whilst 95% of those contractors, further stated 
that the appointment of such a specialist is done only after the award of the contract. The 
contractors surveyed justified this approach, by arguing that the expensive nature of the 
tendering process, together with a need to cut tendering overheads often prevented them 
commissioning geotechnical specialists. It was thus opined by Clayton (2001) that often 
inadequate information, ‘is made do with’. Ashton and Gidado (2001: 964) however, remarked 
on the implications of this for clients by querying:  
          “Having committed to a fixed contract sum, it begs the question, is ‘best practice’ and 
therefore ‘best value’ achieved from geotechnical specialists when such an important 
appointment is made following the commitment to an outline planning design?”  
Ashton and Gidado (2001) thus described this as a flawed system of geotechnical input, since 
the changes and refinement of designs should logically flow from the initial planning stage. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Impact of Geotechnical Information on Designs in Highway Project Phases   
Source: (Gransberg and Gad, 2014) 
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 As Grasberg and Gad (2014:20) illustrate in Figure 6.8:  
            “The impact of the quality of geotechnical information on designs is predominantly defined 
at the earlier stages of highway project development and rapidly dwindles in subsequent 
phases”.  
 
Tolla, and Valkeisenmäki (2012) equally corroborated this by asserting that detailed geotechnical 
information on ground conditions was necessary baseline data for the award of design and build 
contracts. 
6.7.4 Geotechnical Pathogens in Contractor Selection 
A key underlying feature, implicit in the successful execution of a highway contract, is the 
efficiency of the contractor. The selection of a contractor has thus been emphasized in the 
literature (Holt et al., 1995; Crowley and Hancher, 1995), as a risk variable to which utmost 
consideration should be given during the procurement phase, as it has significant connotation to 
undermine meeting project performance objectives of cost, quality and time. Holt et al. (1995) 
thus distinguished between the lowest initial bid and the most competitive/viable price for a 
project under an existing investment climate. This is against the misguided notion of clients often 
opting to award contracts on a lowest bidder basis, at the risk of incurring significant cost overruns 
due to contractor’s incompetence (Crowley and Hancher, 1995; Akon, 2011).  
 
The need for an informed unbiased appraisal of contractors’ technical capabilities relative to bid 
price has thus resulted in the development of multi-parameter quantitative models for contractor 
selection (Gransberg and Gad, 2014). Gransberg and Gad (2014) asserted that comprehensive 
quantitative approaches to contractor selection require the assignment of relative weighting of 
critical geotechnical factors, aggregated in making a decision on the winning bid. Gransberg and 
Gad (2014:967) further stated: 
          “it is during the development of the RFQ [Request for Qualifications] and RFP [Request 
for Proposals] that the ultimate quality and cost of the project can be most influenced”  
 
Gad (2014) explained that in the United States, during this phase, the inclusion criteria of the 
project RFQ or RFP, is however established based on state laws or published DB procurement 
guides of the highway agency, and not just on a project specific basis.  The findings of Gransberg 
and Gad (2014) study revealed the various approaches adopted by US highway agencies, in DB 
projects. These are shown in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5: Geotechnical Input Approaches in DB Contractor Selection  
Highway Agency Approach 
Minnesota DOT Higher scoring weights 
Bonus scoring for exceeding minimum requirements; 
UDOT Heavier emphasis on the technical aspects via a 50/50 
cost/technical weighting. 
Delaware Submission of a narrative outlining 
the various geotechnical risks and proposed method of 
construction 
Maine DOT Superior scores in geotechnical category 
Minnesota  5-year warranty for geotechnical failure on a pass/fail 
basis 
Florida  20 points awarded for quality of design and ground 
Investigations plan and minimization of design 
changes  
Source: Gransberg and Gad (2014) 
 
As can be discerned from the various methods adopted by highway agencies, geotechnical input 
is ensured either on the basis of the weightings or extra scores in the technical proposal. The 
geotechnical input weightings or scores are also noted as proportionate to its magnitude of 
impact in specific project contexts. Minimal geotechnical requirements relative to other factors 
may thus be necessitated under routine construction work in better ground conditions, with higher 
requirements in more complex projects or in adverse difficult ground conditions. This higher 
geotechnical input requirement for difficult ground conditions thus has particular bearing in the 
context of highway project delivery in the study area, due to its wetland geologic setting.  
 
The underling computational techniques, adopted by the highway agencies in choosing a winning 
contractor, were based on averaged price and technical scores following a 3-step procedure 
outlined by Gransberg and Gad (2014): 
 Appraisal of contractors’ qualifications and past experience: specific geotechnical 
qualifications for key personnel; geotechnical project experience; references from past 
projects with specific geotechnical issues; and proof of local geotechnical project 
experience.  
  Evaluation of contractors’ technical proposal; 
 Deployment of a defined algorithm: A function of technical/financial evaluation  
 
Subjectivity in the process of contractor selection was therefore eliminated by the explicitness of 
the procedure.  Increased emphasis on geotechnical input requirements in the RFQ or RFP were 
considered an incentive to competing contractors bidding for the contract. Geotechnical factors 
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weighting therefore need to be assigned proportionately to other factors in the award decision 
for the successful contractor.  
 
The qualitative/quantitative mechanism deployed to ensure that geotechnical requirements are 
incorporated into contractor selection decision, therefore represents another potential 
geotechnical pathogen at the contractual phase of highway projects, a lack of which can trigger 
calamitous financial consequences on projects. The practices of highway agencies in the Niger 
Delta, in the process of contractor selection, investigated as part of the fieldwork, thus follows 
this logic. 
6.8 Post-Contract Implications of Triggering Geotechnical Pathogens 
 The preceding literature has evaluated the contractual impacts of lack of geotechnical input, by 
weighing the arguments posed by various authors and standards of best practice, implicit in the 
lack of geotechnical input in highway projects. It has been shown that a ‘whole can of worms’ 
can erupt if adequate geotechnical risk containment measures are not taken. As such, if risks 
are not properly shared or managed through the various mediums of geotechnical input outlined, 
particularly at the contractual phase, variations, claims and disputes may be some of the post 
contract consequences. The subsequent sections explore the mechanism by which claims and 
variations from geotechnical issues, often arise in highway contracts, leading to cost overruns. 
6.8.1 Variations 
A variation can be defined as any deviation from an agreed well-defined scope/schedule, or any 
modification to the contractual guidance, provided to the contractor by the owner or owner’s 
representative (O’Brien, 1998; Arain and Pheng, 2005). The total cost of a project can therefore 
significantly differ from the initial estimated cost, due to variations occasioned by changes in 
scope of work, specifications, or any other contract documents, with several negative effects to 
both the client and the contractor (Halwatura and Ranasinghe, 2013).  
 
Chan and Yeung (1995) were of the view that the more the variation orders are on a project, the 
greater the likelihood that they become time consuming and costly elements in construction 
projects. The authors opined that when a variation order occurs, the contractor tends to charge 
higher rates for the variation items. Other authors have also noted the adverse implication of 
variation orders in contracts and their impact on project performance, in terms of the level of cost 
and time overrun often elicited (Mansfield et al., 1994; Odeck, 2004; Kaliba et al., 2008, 
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Halwatura and Ranasinghe, 2013). As illustrated in Figure 6.9, the ability to make a non-
disruptive change in projects decreases correspondingly in response to the advancement of 
project. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Cost Impact of Variations in Projects with Project Advancement (CIOB, 1997) 
  
Recognising the potential impact of change orders in contracts, due to variations, is the first and 
most fundamental step to minimising their negative potential financial impact (CIOB, 1997). 
During the early phases of projects, such changes could be easily accommodated without 
adversely affecting the projects viability or its ability to be completed in time and under budget. 
However, a similar change made at the latter phases such as after contract award, during 
construction could lead to significant financial losses, due to the requisite changes in designs 
and construction work on site. 
 
Variations, leading to cost overruns in highway contracts, have been attributed to a number of 
factors, notable among them being unforeseen ground conditions, due to lack of, or inadequate 
ground investigation. Halwatura and Ranasinghe (2013) identified poor designs without 
recognising ground conditions, as the main cause of variation orders in the road construction 
industry in Sri Lanka. Similarly, Perera (2009) identified variations elicited due to unforeseen site 
ground in an empirical study of Sri-Lankan road projects. Perera (2009) explained that due to 
differing weaker sub-grade and unexpected high water table, the use of rock fill and additional 
depth of excavations were often required. Wu et al. (2005) identified the most significant cause 
of design variations in Taiwan highway projects, based on statistical and case study analysis of 
several projects, as being mostly due to the disparity in the engineering properties of road 
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subgrade used in preparing designs, and those encountered on site. Therefore, several 
unanticipated site conditions may crop up in the construction phase, leading to unnecessary, 
avoidable and irrecoverable delays, which often elicit disproportionate increases in the cost 
required to correct design inadequacies (Chan and Yeung, 1995). The adequacy of initial 
feasibility studies and approach to managing geological concerns at the design stage, were thus 
emphasised as necessary to prevent design variations.  
 
A contrary stance was however adopted by the National Economic Development Office (1988); 
in stating that variations due to unexpected site or soil conditions may be unavoidable. Justin 
(2012) backed up this stance and thus categorised contractual risks due to ground conditions as 
‘foreseeable’, ‘unforeseen’, and ‘unforeseeable’. The distinction between these adjectival 
descriptions were made, by defining foreseeable ground risks as those that can be reasonably 
anticipated, while unforeseen risks are those that were unanticipated due to incompleteness or 
short comings in the investigations. Unforeseeable risks on the other hand, were defined as those 
risks that cannot be eliminated, and are therefore beyond the contractors control, regardless of 
the level of experience on his part or how much ground investigation is undertaken. Wong (2012) 
however asserted that although ground investigation reports cannot disclose all details, it can to 
a great extent, reduce the likely ground related risks to clients and be of use for dispute resolution 
in contracts.  
6.8.2 Claims 
A contract claim is a written demand submitted by the contractor in compliance with the contract 
documents, and seeking additional monetary compensation, time, and/or other adjustments to 
the contract, the entitlement or impact of which is disputed by the client (Thompson and Perry, 
1992). It has been argued that adequate contractual provisions will ensure the right allocation of 
risks in the event of adverse events during construction (Thompson and Perry, 1992). 
Construction contract documents thus include provisions for altering plans, including additional 
work within the original scope, changed site conditions, and extending contract time to address 
unanticipated conditions encountered in the field during construction, via contractual clauses.  
 
Disputes however may occur due to unclear stipulations, on the basis of the fairness of the risk 
allocation mechanism (Wong, 2012). The school of thought which emphasizes that that ‘all the 
risks should rightfully reside with the owner, and therefore transfer to another party should entail 
fair compensation’, has led to claims from contractors (Kartam and Kartam, 2001: 329).  This is 
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because, responsibility for increases in cost and time that may occur, is an important factor for 
the contractor when preparing bid estimates, and any upward deviation could lead to losses. As 
such, if geotechnical risks are not properly shared or managed through the various mediums of 
geotechnical risk containment outlined earlier, claims and disputes may be some of the 
consequences during the construction. This is because contractors may only add contingencies 
to their tenders to cover the costs of foreseeable risks.  Figure 6.9 captures the contractor’s 
perspective in bidding for projects, on an ill-informed geotechnical basis, and the likely 
consequent contractual impacts of this gamble on project delivery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Contractual Impact of Lack of GI on Highway Project Delivery     
(Source: Wong, 2012) 
 
This illustrates the likely consequences for highway agencies, if the dictates of best practice for 
managing geotechnical risks are not adhered to, in their contractual practices. The ensuing 
delays will invariably lead to the deferment of usage or income/returns on capital invested in the 
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highway project. Crowley and Hancher (1995) rationalised that the implied ex-post transaction 
costs, expended on dispute resolution and litigation, can accumulate to disproportionate 
dimensions. Crowley and Hancher (1995) cited figures as high as 2.8% of the annual 
administration costs for the Texas Department of Transportation, were expended on account of 
construction claims filed against the agency.  
 
The Grove Report (1998: 22) targeted to address fundamental contractual concerns plaguing the 
Hong Kong construction industry, further reinforces this contractual scenario, in asserting that 
“Contractors who are gamble and claim artists will predominate among winners of contract 
award”. The well-publicised Latham Report (1994) which was prepared to address key issues in 
the UK construction industry, also underscored that, the nature of contracting arrangements 
inherent in the construction industry, creates a significant propensity for disputes, which erodes 
the potential for added value for funds invested in construction. Latham (1994:12) thus asserted 
that “Risk cannot be eliminated; it can only be transferred, reduced or shared”. In the absence of 
adequate geotechnical input in contracts, the literature asserts that contractors will ultimately 
seek to transfer the cost of such uncertainty to the client. On this basis, the Groove Report (1998: 
27) recommends that “… Risk is best borne by the party who gains the long term benefit of the 
project, namely the employer…”, which is further re-stated in the recommendation of the Latham 
Report (1994:15), “… Risk should be allocated to the party best suited to manage that risk...” 
 
Based on these assertions, and following the arguments in the literature, a direct financial 
implication of inadequate designs due to limited ground investigations, inflexible contract 
clauses/weak documentation and poor contractor selection criteria, is the notable trend of claims, 
illustrated in Figure 6.9. It is has further being rigorously argued, that the client ultimately stands 
to bear the financial loss associated with a lack of geotechnical risk containment in estimates, as 
a result of the ensuing project delays leading to cost overruns or even outright abandonment by 
contractors. This trend of negative contractual impacts has been evidenced by the local literature, 
to be rife in the delivery of highway projects executed in the Niger Delta. The practices of the 
highway agencies responsible for the delivery of such projects, are thus investigated in the 
subsequent field work, for the prevalence of underlying geotechnical pathogens. 
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6.9 Conceptual Model 
The exploratory analysis of the technical literature has revealed various geotechnical pathogens, 
latent at the conceptual, detailed design, and contractual phases of highway projects. The 
presence of these geotechnical pathogens in highway projects, have implications for the 
accuracy of initial budgeted funds, detailed design estimates, contractor’s tender estimates and 
final outturn cost of project, as captured in the conceptual model, shown in Figure 6.10. 
Risk containment in 
Contracting
(Tender Estimates)
The need for 
geotechnical 
input
Accuracy of Conceptual
Cost Estimates  
(Budgetary Estimates)
Geotechnical Basis of Highway 
Project Cost Overruns
Similar Methodologies 
evident in the Practises 
of Highway agencies are 
Identified as  lacking in 
Geotechnical Input.
 Reliance on Uniform 
Historical Cost Data 
(with Subjective 
Adjustment ).
 Low Level of 
Accuracy due to Poor 
Scope Definition and 
Technical Data.
 The need for 
Differentiated  ground  
adjustment factor to 
serve as a medium of 
Geotechnical Input 
Identified.
Mediums of 
Geotechnical  Input  
identified in Contract 
Documentation and 
Contractor Selection  
 Expenditure on 
Ground investigation 
reduces project 
uncertainty and Bid 
values.
 Inclusion of  
representative  GI  
Report and DSI Clause 
serve as Contractual Risk 
Allocation Approach
Geotechnical Input in 
Contractor selection 
identified as a critical 
success factor in highway 
projects
Identified Mediums of 
Geotechnical Input in Project 
Estimates
Estimating Methodology
Ground Investigations
Contract Documentation
Contractor selection
Impact on Project Delivery
Variations?
Claims?
Delays?
Abandonments?
Pavement Designs
(Geotechnical Input 
Required in Detailed 
Estimates)
Cost Overrun
 
Figure 6.10: Conceptual Model of Geotechnical Pathogens 
 
As Figure 6.10 illustrates, the various mediums of geotechnical input in the literature, 
recommended as best practices for clients of highway projects at the pre-contract phases, 
necessary for clients of highway projects to avert cost overruns, can thus be deduced as the: 
 Use of differentiated costing profiles as opposed to uniform historical rates at the 
conceptual phase of budget preparation; 
 Carrying out adequate levels of ground investigations: Desk studies; preliminary 
reconnaissance; and detailed explorations, as a basis of preparing designs and 
computing detailed estimates; 
 Inclusion of Ground Investigation Reports (GIR) in contract documentation with provision 
for Differing Site Condition (DSC) clauses; 
 Mechanism deployed to ensure an adequate geotechnical basis in contractor selection 
criteria.  
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The researcher thus uses the findings from this exploratory literature analysis of geotechnical 
best practices, as a logical theoretical perspective, necessary to understand cost overruns 
experienced in the delivery of highway projects in the Niger Delta. The findings thus serve as a 
prelude to the descriptive phase of the study in chapter eight, which thematically analyses the 
prevailing levels of geotechnical input in highway projects executed by the highway agencies in 
the region. The identified mediums of geotechnical input at the pre-contract phases of highway 
projects, conceptualised in Figure 6.10, thus served as a guide in drafting the interview template. 
The field work was thus structured to specifically investigate: the technical details of how funds 
budgeted for proposed highway projects are estimated; what levels of ground investigations are 
carried out as a basis for designs; and the modalities of contractor selection/contract 
documentation.  
 
6.10 Chapter Summary 
The literature analysis in this chapter has explicitly illuminated geotechnical best practices, which 
represents the various progressive mediums of risk containment in highway projects, at the 
conceptual costing phase of budget estimate computation, detailed estimate preparation phase 
and contractual phase. A lack of which represents potential pathogens in highway projects. The 
findings have thus revealed how the myriad of issues arising from mismanaged geotechnical 
risks at the pre-contract phase, can trigger a series of claims and variations, leading to significant 
levels of cost overruns at the post contract phase. This scenario played out in this chapter, is 
tested in the case of the Niger Delta, by investigating the geotechnical practises of the three 
highway agencies responsible for the delivery of the sample of highway projects, previously 
analysed in chapter five of this thesis.  Chapter seven of this thesis, however, is a prelude to the 
presentation of the interview analysis results, setting out the background information on the 
highway organisations investigated, and further providing a detailed breakdown of the analytical 
procedure used to analyse the collated qualitative data from the fieldwork.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Background to Interview Analysis: Organisational Context, Respondent 
Demographics and Qualitative Analytic Procedure 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter sets out and discusses the contextual background to the interview analysis, by 
providing a description of the three highway organisations sampled, the demographics of the 
interviewees, and the detailed procedures used for coding and analysing the interviews. To 
introduce each of the highway organisations, the organisational structure of each highway 
agency has been prepared, from a combination of preliminary information provided by 
respondents, and published government reports. The institutional context of the three highway 
agencies in the Niger Delta was further provided, to serve as a backdrop to understanding the 
intrinsic geo-political dynamics inherent in highway development in the Niger Delta. Relevant, 
descriptive, and more specific background information on the spatial extent of the geographic 
boundaries, which define the constitutional obligations and duties of the highway agencies are 
also laid out. The demographics of the respondents interviewed is discussed, before a detailed 
description of the coding procedure used in developing the themes from the interview data is 
provided.  
7.1 Background Reports on Highway Agencies  
None of the highway organisations had a definite organogram, it therefore became necessary 
for the researcher to draft them. As such information were elicited from the respondents, on the 
hierarchy of authority, job designations, and intra-organisational processes, in relation to cost 
estimation, design preparations, and procurement functions, for road projects executed by the 
highway agencies. In addition, related published background information on each organisation, 
was obtained from the websites and the grey literature, published by each of the agencies. Based 
on the information gathered, the researcher diagrammatically captured the relevant sub-divisions 
of the highway agencies as organisational charts. The level of detailing in the organisational 
charts reflects the requisite data used as a basis of describing related functions and processes. 
As a result, details considered not to be fundamental to the analysis have been left at a generic 
level. 
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7.2 The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
7.2.1 Institutional Background 
The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established in 2000 by the Federal 
Government based on the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan (NRDMP) draft 
master plan for the region, whose implementation was estimated to cost US$2.9 billion over a 
fifteen-year period (NDDC Act, 2000). The commission was setup to prepare a ‘Niger Delta 
Regional Development Master Plan’ (NDRMP) designed on a long-term basis to integrate the 
different intervening agencies and tiers of government. NDDC is a regional interventionist 
developmental body in the Niger Delta whose delegated mandate includes the development of 
social and physical infrastructure, ecological/environmental remediation and human 
development across all the nine states that now constitute the political Niger Delta, as listed in 
Table 7.1 (NRDMP, 2006).  
 
The constitutional mandate of the NDDC is thus supplemental, as the traditional three-tier 
structure of highway development in Nigeria: Federal; State and Local Government, discussed 
in chapter two, was considered inadequate to cater for the developmental needs of the region 
(NDDC Act, 2000). In the present democratic dispensation, the geo-political structure of highway 
development specifically in the Niger Delta, has being modified to feature family/clan 
representation with traditional leaders playing effective advisory roles within specific areas. 
Under the present arrangement, every community is headed by a chief or king, clusters of which 
form the council of chiefs, headed by an officially recognised traditional ruler (NRDMP, 2006). 
 
The internal structures of communities, often living in clusters on the limited amount of dry land 
available in the region, are typically dichotomised on the basis of age group into youths and 
elders (NRDMP, 2006). The council of elders are constituted of elderly persons who are 
considered to have played active roles in fostering the development of the community, and thus 
act in an advisory capacity to the chief/traditional ruler. This council accorded a high status in the 
communities, make development decisions at the community level (NRDMP, 2006).  
 
However, in recent times, youths baying for change have been increasingly challenging the 
status quo, owing to the perceived inaction of the elders with respect to securing anticipated 
communal benefits from government agencies and corporations operating within the 
communities (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010). Typically, the lack of internal community link roads 
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in these remote and often isolated settlements, was a major contention of the youths, who have 
resorted to widely publicised violence and hostage taking in the bid to gain the attention of the 
government (The United States Institute of Peace, 2011). 
As a result, the listed terms of reference of the NDDC specific to highway development included 
the:  
 “Formulation of policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger Delta area. 
 Conception, planning and implementation, in accordance with set rules and regulations, 
of projects and programs for sustainable development of the Niger Delta area in the field 
of transportation including roads, jetties and waterways, health, employment, 
industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water 
supply, electricity and telecommunications. 
 Surveying of the Niger Delta in order to ascertain measures necessary to promote its 
physical and socio-economic development” (NDRMP, 2000: 45). 
Highway development, typically the development of major roads (intra-regional and intra-state) 
and community roads (intra-Local Government Areas), constitute an integral part of the 
development projects embarked upon by the NDDC. Projects executed by the NDDC are carried 
out in liaison with the state and local governments. 
 
From its inception in 2000 to 2005, the NDDC had initiated 2,035 physical development projects 
across the nine states constituting the ‘Political Niger Delta’. Table 7.1 shows the types and 
volume of major infrastructure stocks initiated by the NDDC in the different states of the region 
bases on the regional master plan. 
Table 7.1: NDDC States and Volume of Infrastructure executed from 2000-2005   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (NDDC, 2006)  
No comprehensive report outlining the current status of these projects is presently available. 
However, years of community protest and uproar over the abandonment of most of these projects 
have become a major cause of public concern (Vanguard, 2016). Respondents from the agency 
States Buildings Electrification Roads Jetties Water Supply Shore protection 
Akwa Ibom 190 50 19 - 31 - 
Abia 79 12 112 22 19 - 
Bayelsa 147 10 15 3 41 7 
Cross River 39 6 6 19 9 - 
Edo 46 12 6 - - - 
Delta 128 42 41 19 59 12 
Imo 133 25 6 - 30 - 
Ondo 179 27 2 19 35 = 
Rivers 85 12 37 6 32 - 
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further revealed that to date, an additional 4000 projects have been initiated by the NDDC, most 
of which were delayed or abandoned at various levels of completion. This assertion was validated 
through both articles in the local and national press.  
 
Due to this high spate of project delay and abandonment, a Presidential Projects Assessment 
Committee (PPAC) was set up in 2013 by the Federal Government to investigate cases of 
abandoned NDDC projects. Their report concluded there were 1,886 abandoned projects across 
the nine different states of the Niger Delta. Following the report’s publication, the Managing 
Director and board of the (NDDC) jointly commissioned an extensive audit of all on-going and 
abandoned projects, awarded since the inception of the NDDC in 2000. The findings of this audit 
had unfortunately not being published at the time of writing this thesis. The emphasis of this 
research however, is limited to highway projects executed in Bayelsa and Rivers State, justified 
as the states which constitute the geologic Niger Delta, as earlier defined. Details of the highway 
projects proposed, under construction or abandoned in these states are presented in the chapter 
Eight.  
7.2.2 Organisational Structure 
Figure 7.1 shows the organisational hierarchy of the Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC).  
 
Figure 6.1: Organisational Structure (NDDC) 
There are board members who vote and make strategic development decisions for the 
commission, and are direct representatives of the government. The board is comprised of 
representatives of the federal government and the nine oil producing states: Abia,  Akwa-
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Ibom,  Bayelsa,  Cross River,  Delta,   Edo,  Imo,  Ondo and Rivers., which make up the 
commission. The Chairman of the board heads the institutional structure.  
The management staff of NDDC have the rank of the Managing Director at the apex and moves 
down the hierarchy to the Executive Directors: Finance/administration and Projects. The 
Executive Director Finance (EDF) operates in an administrative capacity and executes projects 
such as lower order roads that may be required to calm local community agitation and youth 
restiveness. The following directors report to the Executive Director Finance (EDF): 
 Director of Finance and Supply; 
 Director of Administration; 
 Director of Legal Services; 
 Director of Planning, Research and Statistics; 
 Director of Education, Health and Social Services.; 
 Director of Youth, Sports and Women Affairs. 
 
The role of Executive Director Projects (EDP) is designated to be occupied by a qualified 
registered construction professional: An Architect; Quantity Surveyor or Engineer. The three 
departments headed by the Executive Director Projects include:  
 Special Projects: This unit has registered professionals such as engineers, architects 
and quantity surveyors. The in-house engineers are responsible for the vetting and 
technical approval of the design of major road projects, while the architects vet building 
projects. The quantity surveyors cross-check quantities and cost elements in the bill of 
quantities prepared by consultants, as a basis for costing the proposed projects prior to 
budgetary approval; 
 Project monitoring: This unit is responsible for post contract monitoring of awarded 
major road projects, via the use of consultants. As such the project monitoring 
department oversees the supervisory activities of the consultants charged with the 
responsibility for ensuring adherence by contractors to stipulated construction 
standards;  
 Utility, Infrastructural Development and Water Ways: This unit is responsible for the 
execution of projects such as water purification, shore protection, building of schools etc. 
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They are also in charge of pre and post-contract management of other intercommunity 
road projects executed by the EDF. They also work with consultants for the post contract 
management of major projects. 
 
7.3 The Rivers State Ministry of Works and Transport (RMWT) 
7.3.1 Institutional Background 
The Rivers State Ministry of Works is a state based highway agency, responsible for the 
development of Trunk B state roads in the urban and rural areas of the Rivers state. Rivers State 
is one of the 36 states of Nigeria, located in the southern parts and at the core of the Niger Delta. 
The state was formed in 1967, with the split of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. It occupied an area 
of 21,850 sq. Km, and until 1996 the state contained the area which is now Bayelsa State. It has 
a present geographic size of 10,077sq. Km and is bounded to the south by the Atlantic Ocean, 
to the North by the Anambra, Imo and Abia States, to the East by Akwa Ibom State and finally to 
the West by the Bayelsa and Delta States, as shown in Figure 7.2 (Iloeje, 1982).  
 
Figure 7.2: Map of Rivers State                                        Source: RMW (2014) Home page 
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With two thirds of the state in the Niger Delta’s water shed, the inland part of Rivers State consists 
of tropical rainforest which is of higher relief, and declining towards the coast as shown in Figure 
7.3, where the typical river delta environment features dense mangrove swamps.  
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Figure 7.3: Map of Rivers State Showing Relief               Source: Aisubeugon (2006) 
 
As a result, sub-soils are predominantly made up of organic clays, silts and sand deposits. Rivers 
State as the name implies is one of the two states that comprise the core delta based on a 
geologic definition of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. An aspect of the administrative structure 
of the federation, which is of importance to highway development in Rivers state, is the 
distribution of resources. Under section 16 of the 1999 constitution, all revenues of the Federation 
are paid into the federation account (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1999). The 
criteria for the distribution of the funds in the federation is determined using factors such as 
terrain; population density; and ecological damage. These revenue is shared vertically among 
the tiers of government and horizontally among states. On this basis, Rivers State due to its 
wetland terrain and high population of 6,185,400 based on the 2006 census, occasioned by oil 
and gas exploration, unlike other states in the political Niger Delta, receives the highest revenue 
allocation for funds to be invested in highway development.  
Administration of funds for highway development at the state level is vested in the elected 
Governor, who appoints a Commissioner to head the state’s bureaucratic structure, referred to 
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as the ‘Civil Service’ under the Rivers State Ministry of Works (RMW). The State House of 
Assembly, constituted of elected members, approves budgets for funds to be invested in highway 
development.  
Rivers State is divided into twenty-three Local Government Areas (LGAs), as shown in Figure 
7.4, which handle administration and construction of local government rural roads.   
 
Figure 7.4: LGAs in Rivers State                           Source: Rivers State Homepage (2014) 
 
Each LGA has an administrative capital for handling its developmental affairs, which is overseen 
by a constituted authority. At the Local Government level, elected chairmen resident in the 
administrative capitals, as listed in Table 7.2, and assisted by supervisory councillors who 
constitute the legislative arm, are responsible for the administration and approval of budgets for 
highway development. 
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Table 7.2: Local Government Areas in Rivers State 
LGA Name Area (km2) Administrative capital 
Port Harcourt 109 Port Harcourt 
Obio-Akpor 260 Rumuokoro 
Okrika 222 Okrika 
Ogu/Bolo 89 Ogu  
Eleme 138 Eleme 
Tai 159 Sakpenwa 
Gokana 126 Kpor 
Khana 560 Bori 
Oyigbo 248 Afam 
Opobo/Nkoro 130 Opobo Town 
Andoni  233 Ngo  
Bonny 642 Bonny 
Degema  1,011 Degema  
Asari-Toru 113 Buguma  
Akuku-Toru 1,443 Abonnema 
Abua/Odual 704 Abua 
Ahoada West 403 Akinima 
Ahoada East 341 Ahoada 
Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni  969 Omuku 
Emohua 831 Emohua 
Ikwerre 655 Isiokpo 
Etche 805 Okehi 
Omuma 170 Eberi  
(Source: RMW, 2014) 
 
  
7.3.2 Organisational Structure  
The Rivers State Ministry of Works (RMW) is headed by the Commissioner for Works, as shown 
in Figure 7.5, who is appointed by the governor of the state. However, in the hierarchical structure 
of the agency, the permanent secretary is the functional head of administration. The Senior 
Director of Works, who occupies a professional and managerial role, works directly with the 
commissioner. He is one of the three directors responsible for the execution of highways and 
bridges, and whose role includes organising logistics during project supervision.  
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Figure 7.5: Organisational Structure- RMW 
 
Further down the hierarchy are Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors, who work with the 
directors in a supportive role. However, with respect to professional roles involved in the 
management of projects, the Senior Civil Engineer is the head of all other professionals 
responsible for pre-contract preparation of proposed highway projects. As such operational level 
civil engineers and quantity surveyors work directly under the senior civil engineer, along with 
electrical/mechanical engineers and land surveyors.  
 
7.4 Bayelsa State Ministry of Works and Infrastructure (BMWI)  
7.4.1 Institutional Background 
Bayelsa State was formerly part of the Eastern Region in the three-region structure of 1954. 
Following the creation of twelve states by the military government in 1967, Bayelsa state was 
part of Rivers State from which it was later carved out in 1996. It is thus one of the newest states 
of the Nigerian federation. Lying between latitude 4°45' north and longitude 6°05' east, Bayelsa 
State covers a geographical area of 9,415.8 square kilometres, a significant part (three-quarters) 
of which is covered in water (Aisubeugon, 1995).  
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Figure 7.6: Map of Bayelsa State                                      (Source: Bayelsa Home Page, 2015) 
 
Consequently, agricultural practices are very limited with the primary occupation of the local 
population being fishing, on a subsistence and commercial level amongst mainly rural dwellers. 
The state has a population of 1,704,515, based on the 2006 census figures with a population 
density of 158 people per square kilometre. As a result, the state accounts for only 1.2% of 
Nigeria's total population.  
 
 
Figure 7.7: Bayelsa State showing Relief                 Source: Online Nigeria Homepage (2014) 
 
Bayelsa has a predominantly riverine and estuarine setting lying below sea level, as depicted in 
Figure 7.8 in which dry land is sparse. This dictates the pattern of human settlement which is 
mostly located on patches of dry land, islands and levees.    
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Figure 7.8: Human Settlement in Bayelsa State       Source: Bayelsa-State Homepage (2104) 
 
Bayelsa state is thus frequently described on this basis as: 
           “A floating settlement of villages and towns, amidst brackish swamps forming an intricate 
maze of water courses and highlands, regularly affected by the ebb and flow of tides” 
(Ossai, 2012. P.23).  
This has had a significant influence on the pattern of human life and economic activities in the 
state with the limited highlands which are relatively drier used as settlement sites for the major 
cities. Due to its peculiar terrain, characterised by extensive mangrove swamps, excessive 
rainfall, prolonged, disastrous floods, creek erosion, and lack of adequate transportation or other 
infrastructure, the state has an almost non-existent level of commerce. Despite the marshy 
nature of the soil and its implications for highway development, official reports published on the 
website of the Bayelsa State Ministry of Works and Infrastructure (BMWI) reveals the 
construction of: 
 over 350 kilometres of completed road projects; 
 15 bridges;  
 2 flyovers; 
 Dualisation of 18 roads in progress. 
  
Plans for the award of contracts relating to the construction of fifteen internal roads in Yenagoa, 
the state capital, which is to be replicated in all eight Local Government headquarters of the state, 
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are also said to in progress. The unusual volume of construction works going on in the state, was 
explained by respondents from the state highway agency, as being due to the significant 
developmental backlog still existing in the state as a result of decades of neglect from past 
successive government administrations on the premise of the difficulty of the terrain. 
The Bayelsa State Ministry of Works and Infrastructure (BMWI) is one of the newest highway 
agencies in Nigeria.  The BMWI is located in the state’s administrative headquarters, Yenegoa, 
and is charged with the responsibility for highway development and other forms of physical 
infrastructure works in Bayelsa State. The institutional administrative and budgetary authorities 
for highway development is similar in structure to that of Rivers State. However, there are only 
eight local government areas (LGAs) in the state, as shown in Figure 7.9. 
 
Figure 7.9: Map of Bayelsa State Showing LGA’s      Source: Nigeria Home Page (2015) 
The chairmen of these LGA’s are responsible for the construction of local government roads: 
7.4.2 Organisational Structure 
The Bayelsa State Ministry of Works like all other state highway agencies is headed by the 
commissioner for works who is appointed by the governor of the state. The permanent secretary 
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is the functional head of administration, and works directly with the commissioner. The 
permanent secretary is supported by a team of directors who head each department. As shown 
in Figure 7.10, there are several departmental divisions, four of which are directly responsible for 
the execution of highway projects: 
 
Commissioner 
Permanent Secretary 
Human Resources /dmin  
 
 
Civil 
Building 
Engineering Services 
Architectural Services 
Planning  and Statistics 
Finance and Supply 
Highway Engineers Geotechnical Engineers 
Structural Engineers Engineering Geologists 
Quantity Surveyors Builders 
Land Surveyors 
Mechanical Engineers 
Process Engineers 
Chemical Engineers 
Electrical Engineers 
 
Figure 7.10: Organisational Structure – BMWI 
 Department of Civil Engineering Services: The department of civil engineering 
services is responsible for the management of roads, bridges and other civil engineering 
structures. The department is also responsible for the design of community projects. 
Detailed designs for projects are prepared in-house, by the department’s highway 
engineers, reflecting all relevant inputs from the related design professionals in the 
ministry: structural, geotechnical and mechanical engineers. Major road projects are, 
however, designed and monitored by consultants who are supervised by ministry staff.  
 Department of Engineering Services: The Department of Engineering Services is 
responsible for the provision of all other engineering services in projects such as for 
mechanical and electrical works. Process and chemical engineers working under this 
department are also responsible for the management of inter-phasing professional 
project processes within the agency, and quality control in projects. As such, the services 
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of the professionals working in the department of engineering services cuts, across all 
other project departments; 
 Department of Architectural Services: This department is responsible for the design 
and management of building projects undertaken by the BMWI. The department 
comprises of a team of architects who are responsible for the management of other 
infrastructure projects such as hospitals, health centres and schools. The department of 
architectural services is also responsible for preparing designs for the agency’s internal 
administrative building projects. 
 Department of Building Services: The department of building is comprised of land 
surveyors, quantity surveyors and builders. The land surveyors prepare survey drawings 
for proposed project sites, after identification of projects, prior to the preparation of 
designs. Builders supervise the construction of internal administrative building projects, 
which are sourced in-house by the procurement department. Quantity surveyors in the 
ministry are responsible for costing projects and the preparation of contract 
documentation. However, their services under the agencies organisational process 
arrangement basically involves collating quantities and cost estimates from the related 
design professionals. Typically, mechanical engineers would quantify and estimate the 
cost of all mechanical services and forward these estimates to the quantity surveyor. 
Structural and electrical engineers would also do same for structural and electrical 
design components of projects. The quantity surveyor working in the building services 
department would then produce a contract estimate reflecting the inputs from these other 
departments. 
 
7.5 Interview Participants  
7.5.1 Demographics within the Organisational Structure of the Agencies 
The preceding subsection has clarified the geo-political backgrounds and organisational 
structures of the highway agencies, and the related internal processes which define the prevailing 
design and costing practices of the professionals, to serve as a backdrop to the analysis. The 
distribution of respondent demographics within the highway agencies is thus predicated on their 
respective structures, which is further used as a basis of analysing the organisational setting in 
which professionals responsible for design, costing and award of highway projects, work.  
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Table 7.3 shows the distribution of professional roles within the organisational structures, in 
relation to job description. From Table 7.3, the total number of respondents (Quantity Surveyors 
and Civil Engineers) interviewed in the highway agencies is lower, as compared to the original 
twelve respondents proposed in the methodology.  This was due to difficulties experienced in 
gaining access to members of the senior executive in the agencies, namely two Senior Civil 
Engineers in Rivers and Bayelsa State Ministries of Works respectively. However, this did not 
affect the reliability of findings, as the information sought was elicited from the junior civil 
engineers and cross-validated with responses from the quantity surveyors. 
Table 7.3: Interview Response Rate 
 
Cases 
       Management Staff          Operational Staff  
Civil Q.S Civil Q.S Total No. 
NDDC 1 1 1 1 4 
RMW - 1 1 1 3 
BMW - 1 1 1 3 
Total 1 3 3 3 10 
 
7.5.2 Demographics outside the Organisational Structure of the Agencies 
The information provided from interviews conducted within the organisational settings of the 
highway agencies, was further complimented by information provided by external registered 
consultants and contractors, employed by the agencies but outside the organisational settings of 
the highway agencies. The level of experience and academic qualifications, necessary to provide 
the required technical information sought, was used by the researcher to adjudge the 
respondents’ adequacy.   The years of experience and qualifications for the registered 
consultants and contractors, are shown in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4: Respondents’ Affiliations,Years of Experience and Qualfications   
 
 
 
 
 Years of Experience Qualification 
 0 –10 0 – 10 10 -15 15-25  Civ/Eng Geo/Eng Qty/Surv 
Consultants   1 2  1 1 1 
Contractors   2 1 - - 3 
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7.5.2.1 Consultancy Firms Registered with the Highway Agencies  
Two of the three interviewees from consultancy firms, working with the highway agencies stated 
that they had been with the firms for over 15 years, while one less experienced (10 - 15 years) 
consultant, had worked for other consultancy firms prior to joining the current firm. The 
respondent was thus able to recount experiences from other firms in relation to the questions 
asked, and not just from their work with the highway agency. Two of the three interviewees were 
design professionals (a highway engineer and a geotechnical engineer), while the third was a 
quantity surveyor. All the respondents had worked with contractors on design and build contracts 
procured by the highway agencies. This established their appropriateness to provide balanced 
answers to questions pertaining to the design and costing of highway projects. 
 
7.5.2.2 Road Contracting Firms Registered with the Highway Agencies  
Two of the three respondents interviewed were from medium sized firms, whilst the third was 
employed by one of the biggest and oldest construction firm in the region. The respondents were 
all experienced quantity surveyors. Two had worked with construction firms for between 10 to 15 
years; whilst the third had over 15 years of experience. This was considered necessary to ensure 
the respondents had adequate professional experience to answer questions related to how they 
priced works for bids submitted to the highway agencies, during the contracting phase. Difficulties 
experienced by the researcher in negotiating access to the contractors, and the commercially 
sensitive information of their firms, were overcome with the help of respondents from the highway 
agencies. However, during the course of the interviews, the researcher had to repeatedly 
emphasize the academic nature of the exercise and the assurance of complete confidentiality 
and anonymity in reporting the study, as outlined in the ethical approval/informed consent 
documents (see Appendix B, C and D). 
7.6 Interview Data 
The responses of the participants’ accounts on the design and costing practices in the highway 
organisations, consultancy firms and contracting firms were tape recorded. Full transcription of 
the taped interview conversations however was not made, rather notes taken from recorded 
taped conversation where used, and supplemented by relevant quotes (Bazeley, 2007). The 
notes were, however, taken in the context of the flow of the interview conversation based on the 
interview protocols, and not under predetermined headings, so as not to distort there intended 
meaning. This was considered sufficient to extract information on design and costing practices 
as a basis for assessing the prevailing level of geotechnical input at the development phases.  
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Whilst offering the added benefit of a much reduced, richer and denser body of data (Bazeley, 
2007).   
However, for interviews conducted over the internet, such recorded conversations were by 
implication not available and therefore for these specific interviews, were not used as a basis for 
making notes, but rather the typed online conversations were used with minimal editing. The bulk 
of text generated from these online sessions were more comprehensive than those generated 
from initial telephone interviews. This was attributed to the fact that by that stage of the fieldwork, 
a higher percentage of the interviews had been conducted, and the approach to presenting the 
interview questions by the researcher were more established, with less digression in the 
information provided by respondents.  
7.6.1 Mode of Data Analysis 
Analysis of textual data can be carried out manually or computer aided using appropriate 
qualitative software such as NVivo 8, MAXQDA, ATLAS and NUDIST, which have proliferated 
the field of qualitative research (King 2008). The advantage of using computer aided qualitative 
data analysis software (CAQDAS)  
over manual analysis include: being freed from manual and clerical tasks; and time saving in 
managing significant amounts of qualitative data (Connor and Gibson, 2003). Also having 
increased flexibility, validity and editability of qualitative research are particular added 
advantages. Typically using this medium, the researcher was able to systematically trace and 
account for the various stages of data analysis, particularly at the coding phase. The use of NVivo 
10 was the chosen as the option of analysis due to the relative familiarity, and ease of its use for 
the researcher, facilitated by the practical advanced training courses undertook on the software.  
However, as opposed to completely using the NVivo 10 software, the analysis was initially started 
manually from hand written notes, prepared from the taped interview responses.  The debates 
and concerns in the literature espoused by King (2008) over the issue of analytic distance in 
qualitative research, was fundamental to this choice of methodological mix. The researcher’s 
experience during the analysis sustains the argument on the advantage of c loseness to data 
enhanced by manual analysis of textual data, albeit the unsophistication and technologically 
disadvantaged nature of this technique. 
The manual analysis of the notes prepared from the interviews, were carried out under 
predetermined themes derived from the literature review, with a clear outline of the criteria used 
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in the analysis. This was considered necessary to clarify the presentation and provide structure 
and organisation to the significant amount of data. The researcher, upon conclusion of each 
interview, quickly scribbled down reflections on the responses, and before the taped conversation 
was transcribed verbatim into notes, ready for analysis. This enabled the researcher to get more 
intimate with the data, uncover subtleties, which lent further insights that enabled the more 
efficient conduct of subsequent interviews. As such between interviews, manual coding of the 
initial set themes commenced.  
This is rationalised on the grounds of the limited number of similar interview questions asked of 
the various groups of respondents interviewed, which made the need for the complete 
deployment of the NVivo 10 software for the analysis, less practical. This was because the 
interview questions were drafted from different but converging perspectives, to accommodate for 
differences in respondents’ professional roles and academic backgrounds. As such four sets of 
interview questions structured in non-revealing patterns were used to elicit information relevant 
to confirming the earlier stated gaps in knowledge, deduced from practices evident in the 
literature: These included different sets of interview questions for: 
 Civil engineers from the highway agencies (5 Nr); 
 Quantity surveyors from the highway agencies (5 Nr); 
 Consultants registered with the highway agencies (3 Nr); 
 Road Contractors (3 Nr). 
On conclusion of all the interviews, all the researcher’s notes and reflections had been written 
and coding of the initial themes had been manually concluded. Subsequent to this phase of the 
analysis, the notes were typed and imported from MS Word into the NVivo 10 software, a 
process, which was considered a fresh re-familiarisation with the data. However, at this point of 
the analysis, the researcher was solely seeking to uncover other themes which were emerging 
from the data. This two phase manual/CAQDAS coding process is considered a very vital aspect 
in the analysis process, as it made for clarity of purpose in the coding, and prevented the 
researcher from falling into the syndrome of ‘over-coding’ that often plagues the inefficient use 
of CAQDAS, as noted by King (2008).  
The operational capabilities and visualisation features of the NVivo 10 software, enabled the 
researcher to explore the wealth of visual functions, such as graphical tools, cluster analysis 
tools, and modelling tools, which were used to richly enhance the analysis process. It thus 
afforded the researcher a medium of thoroughly exploring the data in different dimensions that 
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were not easily discernible during the manual analysis.  This facilitated the process of discovering 
key emerging trends and relationships in the data. 
7.6.2 Respondents Anonymous Reference Codes 
A worthy point of note in the reporting of the analysis of the interview data, is that the analysis 
was carried out in a manner necessary to retain a level of ambiguity as to the identity of the 
specific agencies was being discussed. This was considered adequate, since the specific identity 
of the agencies did not necessarily add more depth to the research or detract from its theoretical 
significance. The structure of the qualitative analysis chapters of this thesis: Chapter eight and 
nine, is a reflection of this consideration. The demands of maintaining anonymity of respondents 
thus informed the researcher’s reflexive choice of later segregating and writing a distinct chapter 
(seven), as a background to the analysis, prior to the detailed analysis and discussion of the 
geotechnical and emergent themes, presented in chapters eight and nine respectively.   
As such in the inferences, quotes and discussions, specific reference to the names of the 
agencies or the respondents was not made, rather codes were used to identify the specific 
respondents, in line with the ethical necessity of maintaining confidentiality and anonymity of 
respondents. In fulfilment of the ethical requirements of maintaining anonymity of respondents, 
the following reference codes were used in identifying respondents, giving an indication of their 
hierarchical organisational status, affiliation and professional background. This is set out in Table 
7.5.  
Table 7.5: Anonymous Reference Codes for Respondents 
S/No Interview Transcript Reference Code 
1 Highway Agency 1- Management Civil Engineer HA1-MCV 
2 Highway Agency 1- Operational Civil Engineer HA1-OCV 
3 Highway Agency 1- Management Quantity Surveyor HA1-MQS 
4 Highway Agency 1- Operational Quantity Surveyor HA1-OQS 
5 Highway Agency 2- Operational Civil Engineer HA2-OCV 
6 Highway Agency 2- Management Quantity Surveyor HA2-MQS 
7 Highway Agency 2- Operational Quantity Surveyor HA2-OQS 
8 Highway Agency 3- Operational Civil Engineer HA3-OCV 
9 Highway Agency 3- Management Quantity Surveyor HA3-MQS 
10 Highway Agency 3- Operational Quantity Surveyor HA3-OQS 
11 Highway Agency 1- Design Consultant HA1-DC 
12 Highway Agency 2- Design Consultant HA2-DC 
13 Highway Agency 3- Design Consultant HA3-DC 
14 Highway Agency 1- Road Contractor HA1-RC 
15 Highway Agency 2- Road Contractor HA2-RC 
16 Highway Agency 3- Road Contractor HA3-RC 
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As such quotes from specific interviewees in the discussion, a basis on which inferences were 
made by the researcher in the analysis of the interview data, are referenced using the above 
codes. 
7.7 Themes. Coding and Analytical Procedure 
The approach adopted by the researcher in carrying out the interview analysis is a hybrid form 
of thematic and content analysis. Template analysis, which is a form of thematic analysis was 
used in defining the initial codes (King, 2004). The appropriateness of this qualitative 
methodology is justified on the basis of the geotechnical issues pre-conceived by the researcher, 
as the fundamental drivers of cost overruns in the Niger Delta region, due to its peculiar geologic 
setting. According to King (2004:21) when using template analysis: 
“… the researcher produces a list of codes (‘template’) representing themes which will 
usually be defined a priori, but are modified and added to as the researcher reads and 
interprets the texts. The template is organized in a way which represents the 
relationships between themes, as defined by the researcher”. 
King (2004) further buttressed the need for reflexivity in other to capture richness of the data in 
the descriptions of the codes. Reflexivity thus offered the added advantage of flexibility, afforded 
by the use of both deductive and inductive coding. Inductive analysis was thus carried out as the 
second phase of the analysis, following the deductive phase. The inductive phase, thus identified 
emergent themes which act to impact on the level of geotechnical input in highway projects. The 
following logical steps inspired by King (2004), were thus used in the deductive/inductive analysis 
of the interviews (Table 7.6). 
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Table 7.6: Qualitative Analytic Procedure used in this Thesis 
 Qualitative 
Analysis 
Stages Description 
1. 
D
ed
u
ct
iv
e 
T
h
em
at
ic
 A
n
al
ys
is
 
Development of Template Projection of conceptual mind map in 
relation to logical flow of geotechnical 
themes derived from the literature; 
 
2. Initial Read through Air brush reading of the interview notes; 
 
3. Deductive A priori Coding 
 
Sorting and categorising interview 
responses into apriori geotechnical 
themes  
 
4. Deductive Axial Coding Discovering subthemes and patterns 
around the parent geotechnical themes 
 
5. 
In
d
u
ct
iv
e 
C
o
n
te
n
t 
A
n
al
ys
is
 
Second Read Through (Bottom-up 
reading) 
 
Reading the interview notes afresh from 
a new perspective  
 
6. Inductive Micro Coding Induce further micro themes related to 
and impacting on geotechnical themes  
 
7. Inductive Cluster analysis Cluster analysis of induced micro themes 
into subthemes and emergent parent 
themes; 
 
8. Content analysis Further content analysis of induced 
themes; 
 
9.  Cognitive mapping Conceptualisation of Cognitive map of 
interrelated geotechnical and emergent 
cost overrun drivers 
 
 
7.7.1 Conceptual Projection of Template Coding Structure 
The drafting of the interview template was carried out with the objective of ascertaining the 
suspected gaps in knowledge, presupposed as the existing cost overrun drivers in the practices 
of highway agencies. Following the conceptual model deduced from the literature in chapter six, 
Figure 7.11 shows the researcher’s initial pre-conceived mind map which served to define logical 
flow of geotechnical themes in the thematic analysis of the interview notes. 
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Figure 7.11: Conceptual Template of Apriori Themes highlighting the flow of Geotechnical 
Input (GI) and Impact on Project Delivery/Final Cost 
 
This progressive linear phase configuration, served as the blueprint, around which further 
emergent interwoven themes, induced as impacting on the level of geotechnical input in the 
development phases of the highway projects, were inferred. The resulting cognitive map of cost-
overrun drivers is thus structured following this core conceptual projection. 
7.7.2 Air Brush Reading of the interview Notes 
The interview notes were taken in the context of the flow of the interview conversation, guided 
by the semi-structured flexible format of the interview protocols, and not under predetermined 
headings, so as not to distort their intended meaning. The purpose of note taking was to produce 
a richer and much denser body of data, more focused to the objectives of the study. According 
to Connor and Gibson (2003: 65):  
…The amount of data generated by one interview could answer an incredible number 
of questions. You could spend the rest of your life trying to analyse all of that information. 
That’s why it is important to go back to the original questions that you are trying to 
answer. Analyse your data always keeping in mind what you are trying to find out and 
why you wanted to do the interviews in the first place”  
Air brush reading of the interview notes was thus the next logical step necessary for the 
researcher to familiarise with the data, in line with the objective of assessing the level of 
geotechnical input in the progressive project phases.  
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7.7.3 Deductive Apriori Coding 
The next phase was the sorting and categorisation of the text in the notes into individual interview 
questions, which had been pre-coded in the template analysis. Six major initial geotechnical 
themes, deduced from the literature findings formed the basis of the interview structure: 
1. Nomenclature of the development phases; 
2. Level of geotechnical input in preliminary planning phase;  
3. Level of geotechnical input at the conceptual costing phase; 
4. Level of geotechnical input at the design phase; 
5. Level of geotechnical input at the contractual phase in relation to procurement route; 
6. Post contract Impact of prevailing levels of GI on Project Delivery. 
 
These pre and post contract themes thus informed the drafting of the interview questions for 
each group of respondents. The post contract theme was set as a single parent theme ‘Differing 
site conditions, to establish whether variation orders, delays and abandonment on the premise 
of unexpected ground conditions, often occur when adequate geotechnical input is not ensured 
in highway projects at the pre-construction phases of highway development.  The post-contract 
theme was thus set to capture the technical and financial risks/issues, that arose during the 
construction phase, and have plagued projects executed by the highway agencies on account of 
these factors. This was dialectically inferred by the researcher from the perspectives of the 
inferences drawn from further analysis of both clients’ and contractors’ responses, supplemented 
by documentary evidence from project records.   
The researcher used a reverse evaluation approach, inferred from the contractors’ perspective 
to get a dialectical feel of the impact of inadequate geotechnical input on project delivery. This 
was used to identify areas of dissatisfaction with prevailing contractual practices of the highway 
agencies, which may account for claims and other contractual issues posed as a consequence 
of inadequate information on ground conditions. As such a similar line of questioning included in 
clients’ interview templates, was replicated in the contractors’ interview templates, designed to 
elicit contractors’ perceptions of the current level of geotechnical input, evident during the 
contractual phase of the executed highway projects. The information elicited, was used to further 
assess the financial impact of unexpected ground conditions on contractors’ bid estimates and 
their post-contract execution. The corresponding interview question numbers (in Appendix A), 
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whose responses were sorted and coded, in relation to these initial apriori themes derived based 
on the initial conceptual model developed from the literature, is set out below in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6: Structure of A priori Themes in Template as linked to Interview Questions 
 Interview Templates for: 
 
Themes  
Highway Civil    
Engineers 
Highway Quantity 
Surveyors 
Design 
Consultants 
Road 
Contractors 
Nomenclature of project phases  3   
Level of GI in preliminary Planning 12, 13 3 10  
Level of GI at the budgetary phase 12,13  4, 8 10  
Level of GI at the design phase  4, 7, 8, 9,10, 11, 
12,13 
8 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 
12, 13 
6 
Level of GI at the contractual  12,13 9, 10, 11, 12 10 3,4, 5,6,7,9,10,11 
Post contract impact of GI   5, 6, 7,13  10 
7.7.4 Deductive Axial Coding 
During the course of the coding, further sub-themes were derived from the parent geotechnical 
themes. The induced subthemes noted in the institutional practices of all three of the cases 
(Highway agencies), which are primarily linked to the previously deduced themes were: 
 Level of geotechnical input in relation to project size (Defined the researcher’s 
interpretation of initial themes 1-6); 
 Level of geotechnical input in relation to pre-contract preparation (merged into the 
researcher’s interpretation of initial theme 1); 
 Political Planning (merged into the researcher’s interpretation of initial theme 2);  
 Adequacy of in-house design preparation processes projects (deduced as a distinct 
sub-theme under initial theme 4); 
 Mode of in-house assessment of heterogeneous soil conditions (deduced as a distinct 
sub-theme under initial theme 4); 
 Adherence of designs in relation to GI requirements of TRRL (1993) (deduced as a 
distinct sub-theme under initial theme 4); 
 Adequacy of external consultant’s GI (deduced in relation to traditional procurement of 
major project); 
 Adequacy of contractor’s GI in DB Designs (deduced as a distinct subtheme under in 
the initial themes 4 and 5, which had to be merged for DB projects); 
 Tender price relative to geologic uncertainties (deduced as a distinct sub-theme under 
initial theme 5); 
 Delays and project abandonments due to DSC approval protocol (deduced as a Post 
contract subthemes deduced from the highway organisations practice). 
7.7.5 Second Read Through 
 In line of the necessity of thinking outside the confines of the initially predetermined themes, 
requisite to maintain a measure of analytic distance, the researcher re-read the interview data 
from a fresh perspective, to further induce themes which were displaying a discernible pattern 
across the data. A wide range of issues interlinking with the initial themes were noted as possible 
drivers to cost overruns, as they were consistently represented across most of the data.  
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7.7.5 Inductive Air Brush Micro Coding 
 At this phase of coding a long listing of about 89 themes and subthemes had been derived, 
including the fundamentally core geotechnical themes.  
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Figure 6.12: Snapshot of NVivo Coding 
 
The additional themes, although linked to other themes, were not previously deduced through 
the synthesis of the literature, but were noted as repeatedly emphasized in the responses, and 
therefore inferred and included by the researcher. This is captured in the snapshot of the NVivo 
10 coding, shown in Figure 7.12. 
The creation of new nodes to account for these emergent themes, during the coding was thus 
informed by the researcher’s perception of their over-arching interface with, and impacts of 
differing magnitude on, the agencies’ levels of geotechnical input/ ground risk containment in the 
phases of development, and by implication their complicity in determining the resultant level of 
cost overrun.  
7.7.7 Inductive Cluster Coding: 
Two stages of cluster analysis were carried to bring the number of codes down, and to a more 
hierarchically structured network, more specific to the objectives of the study: Clustering of 
interrelated micro-codes into more distinct subthemes; and clustering of sub themes into parent 
nodes. Some of the less distinct micro themes, which less repeatedly occurred were thus merged 
into each other, before clusters of parent themes were derived. This is captured in the NVivo 10 
snapshot shown in Figure 7.13. Typically, the political related micro themes such as political 
designs, political procurement, and political influence, were clustered into a subtheme labelled 
political pressures. Similarly, all micro themes related to pressures from the local communities, 
such as community considerations and community youth restiveness, were clustered in to the 
subtheme labelled community pressures. 
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Figure 7.13: Clusters of Emergent Sub-Themes and Themes  
261 
 
The following distinct major sets of technical and human related clusters were noted as emerging 
parent themes from the clusters of subthemes, evident in the technical details of the internal 
organisational set-up of the agencies, their respective constituted institutional authorities; and 
the respondents’ personnel and external socio-politically driven environments:  
1. Adequacy organisational setting for ensuring geotechnical input  
 Clarity of professional roles and skills in relation to GI in highway designs and 
costing; 
 Adequacy of organisational environment for ensuring progressive flow of GI. 
 
2. Socio-political pressures impacting on level of geotechnical input 
 Adequacy of in-house GI in Projects in relation to Community Pressures; 
 Adequacy of in-house GI in relation to the influence of geo-political structures; 
 Adequacy of GI in relation to contractors’ pressures 
 
3. Psychological factors 
 Risk perception in relation to GI 
 Adversarial contractual stance 
 Awareness/ignorance/ Delusion in relation to designs 
 
The resulting hierarchical structure of the coding of the interview results is shown in Figure 7.14.
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Figure 7.14: Hierarchical Structure of the Themes 
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This hierarchal thematic structure thus defined the basis of making inferences in the analysis. 
However, the analysis results are split into the initial deduced and later induced themes. The A 
priori geotechnical themes on the levels of geotechnical input, and the resultant post impact of 
these themes on project delivery and levels of cost overruns are analysed and discussed in 
chapter eight. The emergent themes are analysed and discussed in chapter nine.  
7.7.8 Content Analysis of Induced Themes  
Further content analysis of the induced themes, based on the frequency of the coded references, 
provided the researcher the necessary quantitative platform to weigh the salience of the 
emergent themes, which were unanticipated in the drafting of the interview templates. This 
weighting is reflected in the relative sizing of the node representation used in the cognitive 
mapping of all themes. More frequently coded emergent themes, were inferred as having more 
significant impact on the levels of geotechnical input, and were thus represented in larger nodes. 
7.7.9 Cognitive Mapping 
The final step in the qualitative analysis was the conceptual visual representation of the 
interdependent web of emergent cost overrun drivers, which ultimately interlinked with the linear 
construct of the core a priori geotechnical themes. The cognitive mapping further built in the 
interactive impact of the emergent cost overrun drivers, upon the initial conceptual projection of 
geotechnical drivers, which was used as a template for the deductive analysis.  
Figure 7.15 is a generic categorisation of cognitive mapping approaches generally used in 
qualitative organisational research. In line with the aim of developing an explanatory concept of 
cost overruns in highway projects, the researcher used a combination of type 1 and 3 of Huff’s 
generic categories of maps in the cognitive mapping. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.15: Huff’s Generic Families of Cognitive Maps      (Source: McDonald et al., 2004) 
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The cognitive mapping thus sought to highlight the complexity and impact of the latent 
geotechnical pathogens, and the contextual drivers causing the unusually high levels of cost 
overruns experienced in high projects executed in the Niger Delta. It conceptually maps out the 
system dynamics of causality, between the wetland geologic setting of the Niger Delta, prevailing 
geotechnical practices and other unanticipated contextual organisational, human and 
sociocultural factors, which have culminated to define the state of highway delivery in the region.   
7.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has clarified the geo-political background and the organisational structures of the 
highway agencies investigated, and the related internal processes which define the prevailing 
design and costing practices of the professionals. This clarification was considered pivotal to 
understand the nature of the interview responses, and discussions in subsequent analysis. The 
coding procedure used to analyse the initial themes, deductively inferred from the interview 
responses as latent geotechnical pathogens, has thus been explained. However, several other 
unanticipated themes were simultaneously induced, and inferred as emergent contextual drivers, 
due to their dynamic interaction effects with the latent geotechnical pathogens. The subsequent 
chapters are thus structured, with the initial deductive analysis result presented in chapter eight, 
describing the prevailing levels of geotechnical input inherent in the highway agencies, while the 
inductively analysed themes, which represent the emergent social constructs constituting 
barriers to geotechnical input, are presented in chapter nine.  
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Chapter 8 
Latent Geotechnical Pathogens in Practice: Interview/Documentary 
Analysis 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter deductively analyses the geotechnical practices of the three highway agencies in 
the Niger Delta, whose organisational structures and respondent characteristics have been 
discussed in the preceding chapter, for the presence of latent pathogens. The presentation of 
the analysis follows the hierarchical structures of the initial geotechnical themes set out in the 
conceptual framework used as a template for data analysis. The analysis is carried out with the 
objective of understanding the budgetary, design, and procurement practices of the highway 
agencies, and to what extent geotechnical best practices are adhered to in highway projects, 
throughout the pre-contract phases. The inferences made were elicited, based on the responses 
of the various groups of respondents within or affiliated to the respective highway organisations: 
Civil engineers; Quantity Surveyors; Consultants; and Contractors. Also related issues on the 
post contract impact of the analysed geotechnical pathogens, are further elicited from the 
responses, and supported by available documentary evidence, to infer a chain of causality. The 
prevailing levels of geotechnical input at the pre-contract phases, and their post-contract 
implications in projects executed by each of the three agencies, are thus evaluated and 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
8.1 Nomenclature of the Development Phases in Relation to Pre-Contract Preparation 
All respondents interviewed in the highway agencies, explained that the approach to project 
development by their respective agencies, was determined by the class/size of the road project. 
The phases of project development thus vary according to the size of projects: Major or 
community road projects. Major roads were described as those projects typically running into 
multi-million dollars (inter-city roads, highways and bridges), while community roads were the 
most common types of roads constructed as minor roads in urban and rural areas. The typical 
description of the project phases for both types of road projects, provided by respondents from 
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Highway agency-1 (HA1), the management (HA1-MQS) and operational (HA1-OQS) quantity 
surveyors is illustrated in Figure 8.1.  
                 Major Projects                                                                 Community Projects 
 
 
 
 Project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Configuration of Pre-Contract Phases for HA1 
 
For HA1, the researcher noted the poor structuring of project phases for community projects. 
Response from HA1-MQS, a management level Quantity Surveyor, who admitted their project 
cycle is not well defined, and is largely determined by the specific circumstance, validates the 
researcher’s observation. However, respondent HA1-OQS, an operational level quantity 
surveyor provided an unreserved description of the internal arrangement for the procurement of 
community road projects. He termed the current practice as a ‘Mad House’, stating: 
        “...There are no designs, no detailed costing or even the inclusion of standard contract 
documentation in the award of contracts. Projects may even be awarded before the 
survey plans, useful in determining length of the roads are out. Verbal instructions to 
the contractor on the scope of work can even be a sufficient basis for the award of 
contracts” (HA1-OQS).  
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Respondents from Agency 2 (HA2-MQS and HA2-OQS) stated that both major and community 
projects had no definite procedure, and were largely determined by the urgency induced from 
political quarters. Both respondents, however emphasized, that community projects were more 
often initiated without any formal process and lacked adequate pre-contract preparation. 
Commenting on the poor level of pre-contract preparation for most community road projects HA2-
OCE stated: 
            “Most of our projects are always rushed at the initial point, with lots of details that should 
ideally be in place to provide a sound basis for contracting, missing. This has given room 
for contractors to reap the government of significant sums of money...” (HA2-OCE) 
However, respondents from HA3, provided a contradictory picture of practice, suggesting most 
of their major and community projects follow a pre-determined and structured process for project 
development. The interviews revealed that HA3 adopt a standard project configuration system, 
similar to those identified in the literature, which moved through the following distinct phases of 
activity: 
 Planning/Identification; 
 Conceptual/Budgetary Estimates; 
 Preliminary Designs; 
 Detailed Designs; 
 Detailed Costing; 
 Contract Award.  
 
Respondents from HA3 also stated that major projects were awarded and executed, after they 
were identified and budgeted for, by the Planning, Research and Statistics (PRS) unit, and 
designed by consultants. Community projects on identification and approval by the governor or 
commissioner, were designed and costed with input from all relevant professional units in the 
agency, before they were awarded. 
The researcher thus infers, that in terms of the phase configuration of projects for highway 
development, there appears to be better conceptualisation and pre-contract basis for major road 
projects executed by the agencies, than for other lower order community roads in the Niger Delta. 
The breakdown of this pre-contract phase configuration, as it impacts on the levels of 
geotechnical input at distinct project phases, is fully analysed based on all supporting direct 
quotes under subsequent more specific themes. 
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8.2 Geotechnical Input in Preliminary Project Phases 
Figure 8.2 shows the coding structure for the themes deduced in relation to geotechnical input 
at the initial planning and conceptual phases of project development. 
 
Figure 8.2: Coding Structure for Geotechnical Input in Preliminary Phases 
 
8.2.1 Geotechnical Input in Planning 
HA1- MQS stated that ideally, based on the laws setting up HA1, the identification of major road 
projects to be executed and therefore included in the budget, should be carried out based on the 
outcome of a stake holders meeting comprising of communities, oil companies and the agency. 
This would in turn, provide the basis for identifying projects to be included in budgets. However, 
both quantity surveyors interviewed from HA1, confirmed that this still was not the basis of 
planning. Oftentimes, projects are introduced into budgets based on the level of political clout, 
which the interested parties have: 
   “Most of our projects are influenced from the very top ranks in the hierarchy of government. 
... Some political father would simply express interest in a particular project and push for 
it to be included in the budget” (HA1-MQS). 
Also the operational QS, HA1-OQS re-affirmed this stating: 
  “ .. Most of our major projects have powerful political figures pushing for them ...You cannot 
have a road leading to a ‘nobody’s’ community or house in the budget” (HA1-OQS). 
For HA2, it was explained that most major and community road projects, were planned to favour 
active politicians, as compensation for their political contributions in the present administration.  
Respondents from HA3 further acknowledged the influence of political presence in the planning 
of major road projects. It was however stated that, this would have to fall into the overall master 
development plan for the state, based on projections made by the Planning, Research and 
Statistics (PRS) unit. 
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          “Questionnaires are usually administered to communities by the agency’s Planning, 
Research and Statistics (PRS) department, responsible for planning of major projects to 
be executed on an annual basis” (HA3- OQS).   
Community projects, according to HA3-OQS and HA3-MQS, were mostly executed in response 
to communal demands. Typically, the management QS stated: 
        “...Community projects are however identified and executed in direct response to pulse of 
the people. As such when the governor goes on courtesy calls and visits to the 
communities, he is accompanied by the commissioner for works and a director, to take 
note of the community’s development demands” (HA3-MQS). 
Based on the interview responses, of primary significance at this phase of highway development 
in the Niger Delta, is the impact of political and communal influences which serve as the basic 
consideration in planning for road projects to be executed. This practice contravenes the 
requirements of best practice, where the ultimate goal during planning and feasibility analysis of 
highway projects, should be a more comprehensive approach using Cost Benefit Analysis of 
competing options, with social and economic considerations factored in (Steenbrink, 1994).  
Therefore, it can be inferred that planning and approval of highways in the Niger Delta do not 
necessarily strive to achieve optimal long range benefits relative to cost, an underlying 
assumption which may create a motive to deliberately under-represent cost to get project 
approved, from the perspective of strategic misrepresentation, argued in the developed world. 
Rather satisfying immediate political and community demands, dictates the pattern of project 
planning, costing, design and execution in the Niger Delta region. This fundamental theme thus 
underpins all subsequent themes, as shown from the detailed analysis of the interview data. 
8.2.2 Geotechnical Input at the Conceptual Costing Phase 
8.2.2.1 Major Roads 
Respondents from HA1 stated that, after the project identification phase, budgets for major roads 
are prepared, using the costs estimated for projects by the consultants, who equally prepared 
the highway designs, after carrying out geotechnical investigations. This often follows technical 
debates between the consultants and the in-house group of chartered professionals, necessary 
to finalise the highway design, before detailed costing of projects for use in budgets are 
subsequently prepared by the consultants. HA1-MQS stated: 
“After the project design has been cross checked by the department of special projects, 
the project will now be costed and queued up for inclusion in the subsequent annual 
budgets”.  
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However, not all projects whose detailed design work and costing have been carried out, are 
included in the immediate upcoming budget. This was explained by both quantity surveyors in 
the agency. It was stated, that projects not included in the current budget, are carried forward for 
inclusion in successive years, a time lag which causes inflation to set in: 
         “Major Projects may be costed and budgeted several years in advance of their award. 
During this time lag, fluctuations due to inflation usually sets in and project cost may 
shoot up far beyond the budgeted amount by the time the call for tenders is carried out. 
There has been a typical instance of a project where the contract figure at the point of 
award was N5.4 Billion, approximately 40% higher than the initial budgeted figure of 
N4 billion.” (HA1-OQS). 
HA1-MQS further argued: 
“Sometimes, the project, having been costed may remain at this phase for several years 
before a formal call for expression of interest is made”. 
In HA2 however, it was noted that budgets for both planned major and unplanned community 
projects, were not dichotomised, and projects were mostly executed from the annual budgetary 
pool, based on the Governor’s priority until it is exhausted. As a result, various major and 
community projects were simultaneously executed from the same budget, and may be delayed 
or abandoned until more funds are available. Supplementary budgets within the same financial 
year may then have to be approved for continuation of construction works. Higher preference, 
however, is given to highly visible major projects. Conceptual costing methods for such projects 
were described as basically being projected on a cost per kilometre of road length basis: 
          “We are often asked to produce quick estimates for major projects, without any much 
formal notice...We simply look for any past project which is most similar to the proposed 
one and adjust the figures on a per kilometre basis based on the project location. We will 
then add about 20 to 30% as contingency to cover any probable cost” (HA2-OQS). 
For HA2, the costing practice of what appears to be a conceptual/detailed costing phase, used 
as a basis of contract award is synonymous with the conceptual estimating practices in the 
literature. Rough estimates, which are often a cost breakdown per kilometre of road length basis, 
are prepared on project identification. These are then used directly for contract award without 
any apparent form of differentiated costing, such as is necessary to account for heterogeneous 
ground conditions which may occur along the proposed length of the road. It was thus stated by 
the management quantity surveyor (HA2-MQS), that such estimates were prepared using 
approximate quantities based on the standard dimensions of community road projects executed 
by the agency:  
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         “...Most of the items in our bills are standardised and do not vary irrespective of project 
location. Typically, ... one-meter depth of excavation, though in some locations, 
excavations may not necessarily be up to this depth, particularly in the uplands were most 
of our projects are located. This is followed by 750mm fill with imported laterite or sharp 
sand depending on project location and based on experience. Materials and thicknesses 
for the various structural layers, typically primer, base course and finishing course, are 
also standardised...” (HA2-MQS). 
Respondents from HA3 also stated that conceptual estimates for longer range planning of major 
roads by the PRS, and for use in budget preparation are prepared on a uniform cost per kilometre 
basis, but with the rates adjusted for different locations in the state, before detailed costs are 
prepared at the contracting phase. 
“Our budgets are prepared based on projections made relative to the length and location 
of the proposed road. Typically, a project to be executed in Yenegoa which is an urban 
centre with a denser network of roads, will be cheaper compared to those executed in 
the heart of the swamps, where access to site and haulage of materials will be a major 
issue. We use location adjustment factors to pro-rata the projected standard cost per km 
of length, in order to arrive at a budget figure. After the full designs have been prepared, 
we can now prepare more detailed cost estimates” (HA3-OQS).  
 
8.2.2.2 Community Roads 
For the execution of local community projects, respondents from HA1and HA3 stated that there 
were two separate budgets, one for major and the second for smaller community projects. This 
is different from the practice in HA2, where both classes of project had a single budgetary 
provision. It was explained that local projects executed by HA1 and HA3 are executed on demand 
from a fixed annual unstructured budget which serves as a funding pool. There is thus no 
structured budgetary allocation for individual community projects. Based on the practices of all 
three agencies, a fixed allocated budgetary limit determines how many projects can be 
accommodated as the need for them arises. As projects are awarded, the funds required for their 
execution are drawn from the funding pool, subject to approval from the constituted authority and 
the availability of funds.  
For HA1 and HA2, there appears to be no preliminary cost forecast for community roads. Projects 
are commenced as they are identified and approved in response to community demand, due to 
the level of urgency associated with these projects. HA1-OQS observations in this regard were 
typical of the responses received: 
“For EDF projects we simply use rough estimates prepared from the land survey plans 
which indicates the length of the road… This serve as schematic drawings for a road 
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project before we estimate the cost.  Since we know the standard width of most 
community roads, we use it and multiply to get the area which is then multiplied by the 
various standard thicknesses of the base layer and the sub-base as well as the prime 
coat. We then add other standard items for clearing, excavation and preliminaries to 
arrive a contract sum” (HA1-OQS). 
As such funds are drawn from this fixed budget, and so the project stops when the budget is 
exhausted, until more funds are available in the subsequent annual budgetary allocations. The 
project is however not terminated. The respondents from the agencies thus explained that 
projects may get delayed for prolonged periods, or may be completely abandoned if there is no 
sustained interest in the project from political quarters, to push for it to be carried over to 
successive budgets. Describing a similar situation in the HA2, respondent HA2-OQS observed: 
“… our community projects, where everything is upsidedown, are almost always delayed 
and abandoned. I think if things were properly done in the process of contracting for 
community projects, some level of sanity will be achieved in project delivery”. (HA2-
OQS).  
For HA3, respondents however stated that preliminary forecast were often prepared, in a similar 
cost per Km fashion to major projects, to determine if a proposed community project could be 
accommodated in the fixed annual budget. This was carried out before approval can be given for 
further in-house pre-contract preparation of detailed designs and other contract documentation. 
8.2.3 Theme Summary: Level of Geotechnical Input in Preliminary phase 
It can thus be inferred that the preliminary budget preparation practices for highway development 
in the Niger Delta, shows variation in organisational conceptual costing approaches, similarly 
evidenced in the literature. The different highway organisations all have conceptual costing 
approaches which reflect their distinct organisational structures and institutional backgrounds. 
This, and not the motive of strategic under-estimation, has largely defined the methods used in 
preliminary estimating, and budgeting for road works executed in the Niger Delta. 
For HA1, budgets for major roads can be inferred to have an adequate level of geotechnical 
input, since conceptual estimates are prepared from fully designed projects, after all design 
details have been ascertained, based on geotechnical investigation reports. This practice is 
similar to that of the Norwegian house of parliament, in the literature, which Odeck (2004) 
advocated as being ideal, stressing the need for budget preparation, after, and not before 
detailed designs had been completed, as a panacea for higher levels of accuracy. However, the 
273 
 
inflation induced by the lengthy period between the time of cost estimation preparation and the 
award of the contract, may counter this advantage of accuracy. 
For major road projects executed by HA2, there is no apparent geotechnical input which should 
ideally reflect sub-soil variations at the conceptual costing phase. This was deduced, from the 
uniformity in base rate computation, used in projecting probable construction cost. Estimates 
thus used in budget preparation in HA2, is carried out on a uniform cost per Km basis based on 
subjective adjustments of historical cost data without any form of geotechnical input.  
For community road projects executed by HA1 and HA2, there is no explicit conceptual 
estimating phase as comparable to practices evident in the literature. For these two agencies, 
the conceptual phase cannot be clearly defined and appears non-existent or merged with the 
detailed costing phase. There is however no element of geotechnical input.  
HA3, however, has a defined conceptual costing phase for both major and community projects. 
Although also on a cost/ break down per km of road length basis, HA3 has an inbuilt subjective 
mechanism to account for costs due to locational variations. However, no references to the use 
of any form of preliminary desk studies typically from topographical maps, aerial photographs or 
geotechnical data from past projects in the vicinity of proposed highway is made, to ensure higher 
accuracy of estimates at the budget preparation phase.  
The researcher thus infers, based on the responses, that there is generally no apparent, well 
defined medium of ensuring geotechnical input for road works in conceptual costing by all three 
agencies, with the exception of major projects by HA1. The highway agencies still deploy these 
qualitative methods, criticised in the literature by Chou (2005), which may be due to the speed 
and ease of its applicability or lack of skills to use more advanced conceptual estimation 
techniques, or some form of optimism bias.  This may thus contribute to account for the trend of 
significant disparity between budgeted and final out-turn cost reported on highway projects in the 
Niger Delta. 
  
The literature however emphasizes that the containment of ground related risks should begin 
from the early developmental phases of highway projects which should be correspondingly 
accommodated in estimates. Reiley et al. (2004) as well as Evans and Peck (2008), thus 
underscored the need to invest in the gathering of additional design information such as 
geotechnical investigations.  Typically, such preliminary geotechnical investigations at this initial 
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point of estimation, would entail carrying out desk studies in relation to the proposed site location 
as a means of making informed judgement about subsoil conditions, and improving the accuracy 
of budgetary allocation. In line with this stance, Clayton, (2001) asserted: 
           “The base cost should be broadly complete, although still subject to refinement, and 
potentially growth, as the design becomes better understood and more developed” (p. 9). 
The practices of the highway agencies contravene the dictates of best practice, which 
underscores the need to use available data from various sources including engineering-
geological or hydrological maps on areas through which the proposed route traverses. Such 
effort made at this phase of ill-defined project definition, can serve to better capture the cost 
implications of subsoil conditions, thus minimising the likelihood of significant disparity between 
budgetary allocation, tender estimates and final cost. 
8.3 Geotechnical Input at Design Phase 
Under this section, the researcher’s interpretation of the level of geotechnical input at the design 
phase is dialectically inferred from the responses of interviewees from the highway agencies, 
consultants, and main contractors. This is considered appropriate, due to the fact that for DB 
projects, the bidding/tender stage of project development often overlaps with the design phase, 
as responsibility for design under this procurement system shifts to the contractor. The themes 
under this phase are represented in Figure 8.3. 
 
Figure 8.3: Coding Structure for Geotechnical Input in designs 
The inferences made in respect of the level of geotechnical input, specifically relates to the 
adequacy of ground investigations carried out by clients or contractors at the pre-contract design 
preparation phase. For DB projects, this is assessed in relation to the procurement climate 
inherent under competitive, and not selective negotiated bidding. 
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8.3.1 Community Projects: Adequacy of In-house Designs  
Everything relating to pre-contract preparation, including designs for community road projects, is 
sourced in-house. In the prevailing practice of HA1, most community road projects are executed 
without any formal engineering drawings or designs. Schematic outlines of the scope of work 
contained in the survey plans are used to prepare bill of quantities, supplemented by specification 
notes: 
“For our community projects, there are actually no real design drawings that are used 
for our road projects…what serves as designs are the land survey plans prepared to 
show the location and dimensions of the road...Sometimes we may prepare rough 
sketches of the road to guide the contractor if need be” (HA1-OCE). 
 
For HA2, the design practice for community projects is also much removed from the ideal. The 
interviews revealed that:   
“... For most of our road projects, there are no designs...We engineers then go to site to 
check if there are any specific site details that need to be captured ...to be included in 
project description and specifications contained in the BOQ” (HA2-OCV).   
 
A secondary response on the agencies design practice was elicited from HA2-MQS, who 
unequivocally confirmed: 
        “90% of all our community road projects are awarded and executed without designs: No 
drawings, not even a sketch or land survey plans. It is a political regime and things are 
done in consonance with the dictates of the present administration” (HA2-MQS). 
 
For HA3, contrary to the practices in the aforementioned agencies, the interviews revealed that 
preliminary and detailed designs are prepared for community projects. The department of Civil 
Engineering Services, which has both geologists and geotechnical engineers working in the unit, 
carry out all preliminary investigations including site visits, before detailed ground investigations 
and testing of soil samples in the agency’s materials and geotechnics laboratory take place. HA3-
OCV stated that these were mandatorily carried out before detailed designs are sent to the other 
relevant professional service units. 
8.3.2 Community Projects: Mode of In-House Assessment of Heterogeneous Soil 
Conditions 
For HA1, interviews with both management and operational staff revealed contradictions in their 
views of current practice. The senior staff in the agency (HA1-MCE), was perceived by the 
researcher as towing the pre-scripted management line, often painting a picture of proper site 
investigations being carried out before designs. The operational staff however, seemed more 
inclined to explain the details of the realities of the situation. A typical self-contradiction by the 
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management Civil Engineer, HA1-MCE, was noted by the researcher. In response to the 
question: “What is the approach to designing your road projects: do you prepare designs for 
individual road projects or do you use standard designs?” HA1-MCE, had earlier mentioned that 
ground investigations were carried out, and used as a basis for designing individual road designs:  
“We always organise site visits to proposed sites to assess the nature of the sub-soils 
for our community projects, before detailed ground investigations are carried out.” (HA1-
MCE). 
In response to the same question which was restructured as “How does your organisation identify 
varying subsoil conditions along a road length?” HA1-MCE, later stated: 
       “...Let me educate you on how designs are prepared in the agency. We prepare uniform 
designs for our road projects using worst case scenario designs that are simulated for the 
worst possible soil conditions based on expert judgement” (HA1-MCE).  
 
The operational staff, HA1-OCE, however revealed that site visits were the only form of 
geotechnical input for community projects: 
“We engineers then go to site to check if there are any specific details that need to be 
captured before we report back to the office, based on which we prepare rough sketches 
of the road to guide the contractor” (HA1-OCE).  
 For construction of roads in swampy areas having the typical fibrous peaty Chikoko soils, earlier 
described in the preliminary geologic exploratory phase of the study, it was explained that 
provision is usually made for soils to be stabilised with sharp sand before pavement construction 
using the standard pavement thickness configuration is commenced. In addition to visual 
inspection, the only element of geotechnical input in community road projects were crude forms 
of improvised desk studies. As HA1-OCV reveals: 
         “...Sometimes we ask indigenes of the communities if there are any bad spots were water 
tends to pool or which are usually in a perpetual state of water-logging, so that we can 
make provision for higher depths of excavation and fill at these sections” (HA1-OCE). 
 
Also, in HA2, the interviews revealed that similar improvised measures may be deployed, with 
HA2-OCE attesting: 
 
         “... We can assess the nature of soils in the project location from the type of vegetation 
growing. On frequently inundated and waterlogged areas, you will notice that farmlands 
with cassava plantation cannot be found with the vicinity” (HA2-OCE).   
 
 Reactive geotechnical input during the construction phase, in response to unexpected ground 
conditions, may later have to be reflected on site as expressed in one of the typical responses: 
         “... For upland areas having better soil conditions, whereby the contractor reports back to 
us that bad waterlogged spots were experienced along the road way, the designs will have 
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to be altered to allow for excavation of such soils and replacement with imported laterite 
filling” (HA2-OCE). 
 
For HA3 however, it was emphatically stated: 
“…the predominantly difficult swampy terrain dictates that geotechnical investigations 
are a must for all our road projects. The outcome of the investigation will determine the 
designs and specifications for proposed road projects”. (HA3-OCV). 
 
This is corroborated by the organisational structure of HA3, which has a relevant departmental 
unit for carrying out ground investigations, to ensure geotechnical input for community projects 
sourced in-house.  
 
8.3.3 Major Projects: Adequacy of External Consultants GI  
It was clarified by the respondents in all of the cases, that for major road projects procured under 
traditional contracting arrangement, external consultants, handle the full preliminary works and 
designs. The geotechnical input in such projects were provided by consultants external to the 
highway organisations, and are thus accountable for level of ground investigations carried out 
prior to the design preparation. Typically for HA1, it was stated that: 
   “Designs and costing for all our major projects as executed by the EDP are handled by 
prime consultants, a partnership of chattered construction professionals. Geotechnical 
professionals are part of this team of consultants and prepare detailed soil investigation 
reports for major projects” (HA1-MCE) 
Interviews with professionals in the consultancy firms whose services are employed by the 
highway agencies confirmed this. Two of the respondents from the consultancy firms (HA1-DC 
and HA3-DC) who were chief consultants, stated that detailed geotechnical investigations were 
carried out, emphasizing that designs were prepared based on complete geotechnical 
investigation reports. HA1-DC discussed one of the biggest projects designed by the firm: 
“The ongoing **** road which spans 48km was designed by us. The road has proved a 
challenge to develop by successive governments, due to the challenging terrain along 
the proposed alignment, which is predominantly underlain by very soft and weak clay”. 
 
It was also clarified that such reports were prepared after the preliminary site visits to locate the 
boring locations for drilling, before detailed ground investigations, laboratory analysis of samples 
obtained from borings and logs maintained during the field work.  HA1-DC thus described some 
of the rigours faced in carrying out soil investigations for the project: 
“The highway traverses 5 major rivers of varying depths, through the mangrove and fresh 
water forests. We thus opted to use potable and easily dismountable investigative 
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equipment such as drilling rigs and CPT machine due to the challenging terrain. With 
this we were able to drill a total of 30 boreholes, necessary to determine the stratigraphy 
of the superficial deposits as well as the engineering properties of the deeper underlying 
layer”. 
 
The respondent further went on to describe an outline of the final design for the highway: 
“Due to the super saturated and weak highly compressible clay soils existing to depths 
more 8m, the ultimate and allowable bearing pressures were unsatisfactory in large 
sections of the alignment, to permit the use of conventional pavement designs. We thus 
designed a combination of piling and ground improvement technique, requiring the 
placement of fill, as opposed to excavation and replacement, for the bridge and 
pavement foundation, to minimise the cost”. 
 
However, one of the respondents HA2-DC, a lower cadre civil engineer from another consultancy 
firm told a different tale. It was revealed that sometimes ground investigations were not carried 
out, and ground investigation reports for previous similar projects were used in designs. As such 
ground investigation reports for past projects, often within the vicinity of the project, were 
obtained and presented to the agencies.  
          “...Sometimes geotechnical investigation reports and design drawings are photocopied 
from other similar previously executed projects and modified”. (HA2-DC). 
 
Interview response from HA2-OCE, an operational civil engineer who had previously worked in 
a consultancy firm before being employed by HA2, also supported the notion of the prevalence 
of such unethical practices: 
“... we have experienced cases were the proposed plans and structural drawings prepared 
and presented by consultants for approval did not match…” (HA2-OCE).  
 
This was explained as some of the issues that the department of special projects in the agency 
experience, when plans for proposed highway projects prepared by consultants were vetted by 
the in-house group of chartered professionals. The management level quantity surveyor, HA1-
MQS, equally expressed similar views. 
“…We have had issues were the designs are completely unsuitable for the soils at project 
location and latter had to be redesigned...What is particularly funny is that these designs 
prepared by consultants are supposed to have been thoroughly vetted in the department of 
special project by chartered civil engineers before approval”. 
Respondents from HA3 differed in their views stating that: 
    “We maintain a set of highly qualified and reputable consortium of professionals, who are 
responsible for the design of our major projects They have the requisite high level of 
technical skills necessary for the specialised designs that are compatible with our marshy 
terrain”. 
279 
 
8.3.4 Adherence of Designs in Relation to GI Requirements of TRRL (1993) 
This theme was set to establish the general practice of road designs, in respect of their level of 
adherence to the stipulated highway standard adopted by the Federal Ministry of Works (FMW) 
for the construction and rehabilitation of road projects, TRRL (1993). The Transportation and 
Road Research Laboratory (TRRL, 1993) Overseas Road Note 31, prepared as a form of 
technical assistance by the British Government, for the design of bituminous pavements in 
tropical countries, is the current version of the guide adopted, which provides a catalogue of road 
design configurations suitable for the various sub-soil types in Nigeria. An extract from this 
document is shown in Figure 8.4.  
 
Figure 8.4: Design Configurations                                                            (TRRL 1993, ORN 31) 
 Key: TI -T6 Traffic Classes; S1 to S6: Subgrade Soil Classes 
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Community projects as earlier discussed in the previous analysis, mostly lacked any form of 
design preparation, except for HA3, where designs are prepared in house by the department of 
civil engineering services: 
“Preliminary and detailed designs are prepared for community projects by the 
department of Civil Engineering Services” (HA3-MQS).  
 
The follow up questions eliciting information on the level of adherence in designs to the TRRL 
requirements, were logically deemed by the researcher as being more applicable to HA3, and 
consultants for the major projects who actually prepared detailed designs. However, this line of 
questioning was still retained to assess the respondents’ level of knowledge on the technical 
requirements of the TRRL (1993) guide 
 
The limited response of the operational civil engineer for HA3, however did not display adequate 
knowledge of the TRRL, (1993) design guide, sufficient to infer if the agency actually deployed 
this guide for the design of community roads or the level of adherence to the minimum GI 
requirements for various classes of traffic load: 
“Of course we use standards, there are standards for everything. We use the latest 2015 
standard…” (HA3-OCE) 
 
Further enquiries on the class of traffic that the roads were typically designed for revealed that 
none of the agencies incorporated this variable in the design of community roads as noted from 
all the responses. HA1-MCV was unable to answer the question, stating: “I am not sure but I can 
always find out.”, while HA1-OCV appeared amused by the question, exclaiming unequivocally 
that: “Ah! we don’t even prepare full design drawings, yet you are asking of traffic class. That one 
is text book story, nobody bothers with all that.  HA2-OCV gave a similar response, in less certain 
terms: “Oh, do you mean vehicles per day or what? I have forgotten about all that. I know from 
text books that this should ideally be the case. But I don’t think we go to all that length”. HA3-
OCV was more guarded and evasive in response: “Well, I am not certain of that, but of course 
this should be the basis of designs”, which led the researcher to doubt the truthfulness of HA3-
OCV’s assertion. 
However, the two external design consultants stated that the TRRL (1993) was used as a basis 
for the design of major roads, quoting some of the minimum CBR requirements for subgrade and 
discussing other technical details in the guide. HA1-DC commented:  
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“The CBR method, which is used by the federal government to set regulatory design 
standards for the quality of subgrade, has gained credibility in federal highway designs 
in Nigeria, as it gives a good indication of subgrade strength”.  
However, (HA3-DC) stated that he had presented a paper at an engineering conference on the 
TRRL guide, in which he pointed out some limitations of the guide and advocated that Nigeria 
needed to develop a highway design guide specifically tailored to reflect local conditions. It was 
commented that: 
         “It is high time Nigeria developed its own highway design standard. Look at a developing 
tropical country like India which has its own highway design manual specifically for the 
construction of their roads. Nigeria like most other African countries still has to depend on 
using highway manuals prepared by other developed countries” (HA3-DC).  
8.3.5 Adequacy of Contractors GI in DB Designs  
Responses by HA1-RC and HA2-RC revealed that they often times did not carry out ground 
investigations before bidding for jobs, on the premise of the uncertainty of being awarded the 
contract. This was expressed in the responses by HA1- RC and HA2-RC, who stated that site 
visits and information from previous projects executed in the area often constituted the 
geotechnical input when designing such schemes.  It was explained by HA1-RC that the time 
frame normally allocated for contractors in the competitive bidding phase was too short to allow 
for a thorough examination of the project and the ground condition at project site and that 
irrespective of this, the contractor would only carry out detailed ground investigations if they were 
reasonably certain of being awarded the contract. It was stated that: 
     “... Due to uncertainty of being awarded the contracts, we are often reluctant to incur such 
high expenditure associated with ground investigations. We often times engage civil 
engineers who prepare the designs for such projects from visual inspection of the sites” 
(HA1-RC). 
HA2-RC expressed similar reservations about the level of financial resources required to carry 
out detailed ground investigations suggesting that the cost of such studies constrained the level 
of geotechnical input in designs prepared when bidding for design and build contracts. It was 
explained that: 
          “We approach engineers to prepare designs, but we do not employ geotechnical 
consultants to carryout soil investigations…soil investigations are very expensive and we 
cannot afford to commit such an amount, when we are not certain of getting the job” (HA2-
RC) 
HA3- RC however seemed to adopt a different approach, explaining that prior to bidding for such 
contracts, geotechnical professionals employed by the firm were responsible for all site 
282 
 
investigations requisite for designs. HA3-RC stated that the firm carried out ground investigation 
reports before concluding the final designs:  
          “We have staff who are geotechnical professionals ... For all our DB contracts…we carry 
out desk studies on the proposed project area, organise site visits before detailed ground 
investigations are carried out to determine the engineering characteristics of the sub-soils 
to be inputted in designs” (HA3-RC).  
It was also noted that most jobs awarded to this firm were DB projects due to their level of 
established efficiency. It is one of the largest and well established construction firms in the region. 
It was stated that although several of the DB contracts executed by the firm were negotiated 
contracts for specialist highway projects with multiple bridge crossings, they also handled less 
complex DB projects contracted on a competitive basis.  
8.3.6 Theme Summary: Level of Geotechnical Input in Design Phase 
Geotechnical input is noted as completely lacking in design preparation for traditionally procured 
community projects for HA1 and HA2. It was made clear to the researcher that what constitutes 
designs in HA1 is a schematic outline of the scope of work as contained in the survey plans used 
to prepare bill of quantities, supplemented by specification notes. For HA2, the mostly non-
existent designs/sketches, inferred as prepared on a discretionary basis by the agency’s in-
house civil engineers, clearly did not have any form of geotechnical input. It was also inferred 
from the responses that the professionals did not see any particular relevance in carrying out 
ground investigations for small scale road projects. However HA3 seemed to have adequate in-
house geotechnical input for community road projects, and the design professional appeared to 
understand the risk implications of inadequate ground investigations. 
 
The researcher thus inferred that in HA1 and HA2, heterogeneous soil profiles, not discernible 
during site visits were not reflected at the design phase and were approximated. Designs with 
standard items are used uniformly throughout the length of the road, with the depth of excavation 
and fill adjusted in response to soil conditions noted from visual inspection. The tenets of best 
practice outlined in the literature, however dictates that the site inspection serve as a basis to 
assess the suitability of the site for the proposed works, a basis upon which the detailed ground 
exploration is planned. Limiting ground investigations to this preliminary phase, can thus be 
inferred as a critical issue, which would likely increase the probability of encountering unexpected 
ground conditions and lead to cost overruns. As such differences in the geotechnical properties 
of sub-soils along a proposed route will not necessarily bear upon such designs for community 
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projects. A case for over design or under design of such road projects could be made for sections 
of roads underlain by firmer or weaker subsoil strata. 
The level of geotechnical input in designs prepared by consultants for major roads procured 
traditionally, could not be ascertained, due to contradictory responses from the chief consultants, 
lower cadre staffs in the consultancy firm, and the highway agency. However, from the response 
pattern of the chief consultants, the researcher inferred that only preliminary site reconnaissance 
are carried out, before the detailed ground investigations. No reference, however, was made to 
carrying out desk studies (related searches on the geology of the project site) which should 
ideally precede detailed investigations. This gives an indication which serves to reaffirm literature 
assertions, by the ICE (1999) that this phase of ground investigation is often overlooked, leading 
to cost-overruns that could have being prevented. 
The response pattern of the civil engineers in the highway agencies leads the researcher to infer, 
that the local highway agencies in the Niger Delta do not adopt the TRRL (1993) design guide, 
required by the Federal Ministry of Works. By implication, the geotechnical requirements of the 
TRRL (1993) guide, which is now widely used in developing countries, to provide guidance on 
the structural design of roads within tropical regions, and define the construction material 
requirements, are not ensured on highway projects in the region. The use of homogenous 
designs in the award of contracts, particularly for community road projects, clearly evidences 
this. This has significant consequences for cost overruns, as the TRRL (1993) guide, explicitly 
provides a catalogue of design configurations, which determines the required thickness of the 
pavement structural layers, from sub-grade to surfacing, and by implication, the financial 
sensitivity of project estimates to changes in sub-grade properties.  
 
It is also apparent that the level of geotechnical input in DB road projects executed by the highway 
agencies still remains in doubt. Poor geotechnical input and ground related risk management at 
the pre-contract phase of DB contracts, awarded before detailed ground investigations have 
being carried out is indicative of this. Contractor’s responses on the level of geotechnical input 
in design and build projects, was noted by the researcher as directly reflecting the firm’s size and 
relative risk perception.  DB projects executed by the larger more established construction firm 
(HA3-RC), which has a geotechnical division, was inferred to have an adequate level of 
geotechnical input. The precise level of pre-contract GI by the smaller firms however remains un-
established due to the financial loss implied by losing the contract. This finding aligns with the 
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literature, which questions the adequacy of geotechnical input in DB designs procured under 
competitive tendering, as the quality of designs may be compromised. It can thus be inferred that 
a chain of geotechnical shortcomings has plagued the designs for community and major projects 
executed in the Niger Delta.  
8.4 Geotechnical Input at the Contractual Phase: Clients Vs Contractors 
This theme is set to elicit information regarding the level of geotechnical risk containment in 
highway contracts awarded by the three organisations, following the coding structure shown in 
Figure 8.5. The researcher analyses the responses of the respondents from the highway 
agencies, on how projects are procured and the criteria for contractor selection. The researcher 
also analysed responses elicited from contractors, relating to their firm’s geo-risk containment 
strategies, in response to the level of detail provided by the highway agencies, and the approach 
to managing risk inherent in the geologic setting of the region, during bidding.  
 
Figure 8.5: Coding Structure for GI in Contracts 
8.4.1 Clients: Adequacy of GI in Contract Documentation  
The level of geotechnical input in traditionally procured contracts was inferred on the basis of the 
inclusion/exclusion of Ground Investigation Reports (GIR), or any provisional Differing Site 
Condition (DFC) clauses, in the contract documentation provided for contractors, at the tender 
phase, when bids are solicited. Respondents from HA1 and HA3 stated that traditional 
procurement was principally used for major and community projects. For HA2, all major projects 
are procured on a DB basis, while community projects may be discretionarily procured either on 
a traditional or DB basis.  
285 
 
“In the past, traditional contracting was the norm… where comprehensive designs are 
prepared, bids were solicited, before the selection of a successful contractor. However, 
in the current practice of the agency, almost all projects including numerous small 
community roads are procured on a DB basis, depending on the urgency”. (HA2-MQS). 
The typical contract documents used as a basis of traditionally procuring major and community 
projects as commonly listed by all six quantity surveyors from the three agencies are summarised 
in Figure 8.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Contract Documentation provided by Clients to Contractors in Bidding 
 
Respondents were asked whether GIRs were included as part of contract documentation or if 
there were any form of DSC clauses in contracts used. For HA1, the operational level Q.S did 
not give any confirmation to this for major projects, while unequivocally responding in the 
negative for community projects as stated: 
          “For major projects, I am not sure. But I think if the contractor requests for the ground 
investigation report, it can be made available. As for community projects ... there is 
absolutely nothing of that kind in the contract documents” (HA1-OQS). 
 
However, HA1-MQS stated that although ground investigation reports were part of the design 
drawings and reports prepared by consultants, they were not necessarily included as part of the 
contract documentation. The respondent thus argued against the use of a DSC clause, asserting 
that: 
         “It is clearly stated in the conditions of contracts, that contractors are advised to visit site 
and verify the conditions of the site for themselves. With this clause in the contract, it is 
the contractors’ prerogative to ascertain things for themselves and not have to rely on us 
to define the conditions of site. The ground investigation reports prepared by consultants 
for major projects are for the agency’s internal use in designs” (HA1-MQS). 
Traditional Major Projects 
 
HA1 and HA3:  
 Form of Tender; 
 Bill of Quantities; 
 Engineering Drawings; 
(Structural, mechanical, 
electrical....) 
 Conditions of Contract. 
(Joint Contract Tribunal - JCT) 
 
HA2 (DB) 
 JCT 
 
Community Projects 
HA1: 
 Approximate Bill of Quantities; 
 Survey Plans/Sketches; 
HA2 
 No designs or sketches 
 Approximate Bill of Quantities; 
HA3 
 Form of Tender; 
 Bill of Quantities; 
 Detailed Design Drawings;  
 JCT Conditions of Contract. 
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Respondents from HA2 and HA3 also stated that GIR and DSC clause were not incorporated in 
the standard contract documentation used for the award of contracts in the agency.  
HA3-MQs stated that the agency does not include GIR or incorporate DSI clauses, but in cases 
where the original designs are inadequate to suit specific conditions at site, variations are 
approved. 
“Plans and designs for most roads have also needed to be revisited …. Sometimes site 
conditions at project sites may be worse than was designed for. In such instances, the 
agency will investigate the validity of the contractors claim”. 
 
8.4.2 Contractors: Bid Price in Relation to Contract Documentation  
The scale of the problem, as noted from the responses, was that the contractors attributed major 
difficulties experienced during the pricing of earthworks, to the lack of information on ground 
conditions, which often resulted in significant financial losses. The contractors thus rated risk due 
to unexpected ground conditions, as having a high impact on the viability of contracts. It was 
explained that sometimes, this could lead to projects requiring different construction methods, 
materials, and other temporary or permanent works. It was stated:  
“Changes in ground profile which may require different construction methods or 
materials are rated as very high risks to the viability of our contracts particularly when 
we bid without adequate ground investigation information…” (HA1-RC) 
All the contractors stated that the required standard documentation are usually provided by the 
consultants, other than ground investigation reports on subsoil condition, which was the critical 
factor that largely influenced the firm’s bidding pattern. This appeared to constitute a main area 
of uncertainty for all the contractors. Typically, HA3-RC stated that: “It is the critical factor that 
largely influences our bidding pattern. HA2-RC further stated that the contingency allocation 
included, is influenced by how clear the details regarding the ground conditions at proposed sites, 
are set out, and how management foresees its likely impact. He further explained: 
“... if ground investigation reports are included it would drastically reduce the risk 
associated with unforeseen ground conditions during construction and we can more 
comfortably reduce our contingency allowance in our bids”.  
 
HA1 explained that in the absence of such reports, the firm usually carried out preliminary site 
investigations by visiting adjoining areas of the proposed site locations, as well as assessing 
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them from soil maps where available, to determine the likely fluctuations in ground water levels 
or the possible existence of soft clayey/peaty soils. Typically, HA1-RC stated that:  
            “It is difficult for us the contractors to know the right prices for earthworks and other 
elements of the project that may be potentially affected by poor ground conditions 
without ground investigation reports. However, in order to meet a deadline, we would 
rely on our own experience to arrive at a rough approximate estimate…” (HA1-RC) 
 Each of the contractors relied on applying different approaches in pricing such works. According 
to HA1-RC: 
            “In certain aspects of the work where a lump sum is required, we allow about 15% in the 
price…this or a higher percentage is also applied in areas of the work that we often view 
as complex or particularly if poor soil conditions are suspected...”  
HA2-RC also pointed out that: 
“... We build up unit rates for the material, plant, and labour component of each job bearing 
in mind the likely risk factors which includes poor soils and then apply a fixed percentage 
of around 25% for profit and overheads”. 
HR3-RC stated: 
         “...The profit margin allocated in conjunction with overheads and contingency is adjusted 
... is not apportioned as a fixed percentage of the total estimated project cost, but is 
apportioned locally on the estimated costs for the items in each work section. As such for 
earthworks which is mostly influenced by ground conditions, we increase the margin 
significantly to cover for such unforeseen but likely ground conditions”. 
 
The contractors particularly emphasized that the lack of clarity in designs and inconsistency in 
contract documentation further worsened the situation. This was stated as the norm. Typically, 
HA2-RC criticised the quality of documentation, stating: 
          “... The quality of tender documents from the *** is so poor and seems to be getting worse 
over the past decade. In the past, the *** prepared complete and accurate contract 
documents, and if changes did occur, they were relatively minor” (HA2-RC). 
 
From the responses, ground condition of the project site was a major risk factor for road projects 
in the region.  It can thus be inferred that contractors; standard practice is to build in extra price 
margins in their rates or in bid mark-ups as strategies of risk containment during bid preparation, 
similar to literature assertions. 
8.4.3 Contractors: Bid Price in relation to Geologic Uncertainty  
The contractors emphasized that the high level of geotechnical uncertainty in the execution of 
highway projects awarded by the highway agencies, is further exacerbated in the riverine areas 
of the Niger Delta: 
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“Pricing road contracts to be executed in riverine areas can be tricky because of the level of 
familiarity that one must have with the terrain in such areas to be able to successfully execute 
roads jobs in these areas. Several unanticipated cost associated with the terrain may crop 
up and completely wipe out anticipated profits and you may even end up executing such jobs 
at a loss. We charge much higher margins for profit and overheads (30-45%). (HA2-RC). 
 
HA2-RC explained that for a typical distance of 20km in the upland areas, fare price of about 
N800 per passenger is normal, while the same distance via waterways would cost about N2, 
000, which is more than twice the cost.  
“We may need to employ skilled labour from urban cities such as Port Harcourt and 
transport them to sites in riverine areas. We sometimes need to sub-contract this aspect 
of its pre-contract arrangements into the care of specialized firms for a fee or use the 
ferrying boats available at the water fronts or other departure points in the uplands to 
convey our skilled craftsmen, however the costs of transportation per seat, of these 
ferrying boats to riverine communities, is always unstable due to fuel scarcity”.  
HA1-RC stated that: 
“There a lot of financial risks to materials being transported on the turbulent waters of 
the sea or along rivers, as the riverine areas, which are often cut off by lack of existing 
roads to transport materials.”  
HA2-RC further pointed out technical issues in riverine settings which majorly impact on contract 
execution in these areas and can constitute a basis for claims:  
            “Flooding and higher ground water tables during the rainy season, existence of unstable 
soft soils to depths that were not anticipated for, hikes in transportation and haulage 
costs in projects were we need to replace existing subgrades with suitable materials are 
some of these technical risks”. 
HA3-RC, however stated that: 
             “We often request to be compensated for unpredictable issues in riverine settings which 
may not have been included in setting our contingency funds. However, sometimes the 
highway agency may refuse to grant this request. We may thus have to bear the financial 
risk associated with working in such areas”.  
The increased financial requirement and geologic uncertainty, associated with executing 
highway projects in riverine areas, is unanimously expressed in the contractors’ responses. 
Contractors’ abilities to manage the high level of geologic uncertainty associated with physical 
configuration of the terrain, against the background of difficulties typically associated with 
construction works in the swamps and coastal zones, is apparently a key success factor for 
highway projects. This will thus require a high level of geotechnical experience by contractors, 
and familiarity with the rigours and uncertainties of construction works in these areas, for a project 
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to be successfully completed under budget and time. The technical criterion adopted in contractor 
selection is thus deduced, as a crucial factor, which can determine the level of cost overrun 
experienced upon completion.  
8.4.4 Clients: Adequacy of GI in Contractor Selection Criteria 
Traditional procurement system was stated by respondents from HA1 and HA3 as the common 
procurement route for major and community projects executed by their agencies. Contracts are 
awarded on either a competitive or selective tendering basis. This is in line with the Federal 
Government Procurement Act of 1991, based on which a formal ‘Call for bids’ or ‘Expression of 
interest’ is mandatory to be made for all public works. At present times, for some mega projects 
running into multi- billion Naira, the respondents clarified that the need to integrate project design 
and construction, has resulted in a shift towards Design and Build (DB) contracting system, in a 
bid to achieve cost, schedule and quality objectives.  
The interview revealed that, the selection of contractors is based on the lowest bid criteria, 
repeatedly discouraged in the literature. Typically, it was thus stated:  
“…for traditionally procured major highway projects, subsequent to the ‘call for bids’, 
financial evaluation, determine the successful contractor, which often goes with the 
lowest bid value. (HA3-MQS)  
Respondents from HA1, however stated that, this was with the exception of community projects, 
which do not necessarily follow any formal protocol, due to the community pressure and urgency 
associated with calming youth restiveness in the region.  
“For community projects … it is a mad house. Projects are usually emergency projects 
which are executed to settle community demands and reduce tension. They are often 
rushed” (HA1-OQS).  
For HA2, respondents explained that in the past, the traditional design-bid-build system, was the 
dominant procurement route adopted, but at present times only a few community projects were 
awarded following the traditional route. As such it was clarified that most projects awarded by 
HA2, were DB projects. For HA1 and HA3 the interviews revealed that that the agencies only 
awarded projects on a Design and Build Basis for mega highly technical projects, and that the 
awards for such contracts were usually based on the established technical competence of the 
contractor. Such contracts were emphatically stated has always being awarded to well qualified 
contractors.  
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“Most mega projects, are awarded on a design and build negotiated basis, as they 
require the particular technical expertise of an experienced construction firm with the 
requisite level of technical know-how and efficiency” (HA3-MQS).  
HA2-MQS also expressed similar personal opinion and stated that: “ideally only highly technical 
road projects should be awarded using DB procurement”.  However, HA2-MQS, the management 
level Q.S who had worked in HA2 for more than 20 years recounted that in the past this was the 
practice for major roads, while traditional contracting was the norm for community roads, where 
bids were solicited before the selection of a successful contractor. The current practice in HA2 
based on the response as recounted by HA2-MQS is that:  
“Many smaller scale community projects are equally awarded on a DB basis, without any 
formal call for bids, following the dictates of the political regime”.  
 
Both respondents from HA2 expressed concerns about the current contractor selection practices 
prevailing in HA2. HA2-OCE thus stated that most of the contractors were completely 
inexperienced, often awarded contracts on the basis of their level of political clout, and not on 
the basis of their technical efficiency. It was commented that: 
“... The contractors do not know how to execute the jobs... they often had to privately hire 
the services of the in-house professionals to supervise their projects. What most of the 
contractors basically managed to do is to employ consultants to design the geometric 
alignment of the road using the levels from survey plan” (HA2-OCE). 
 
HA2-MQS also stated that: 
 
“Most of the contractors for community projects, are not even registered construction 
firms, and have no prior knowledge of road construction, much less the relevance of 
geotechnical investigations”. 
 
This contrast with the DB procurement practices of HA1 applicable only to mega projects, which 
are usually negotiated. Typically, HA1-MQS stated that:  
 
“Most of our major projects are traditionally procured, except for specialized DB projects 
designed by the contractor and which may be negotiated”. (HA1-MQS).  
  
Respondents for HA3 stated: 
 
“It is the standard practice by the agency for our DB contractors to prepare detailed 
design for projects, before placing their bids for consideration in a selective tendering 
arrangement”. 
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8.4.5 Theme Summary: Level of Geotechnical Input at the Contractual Phase 
The interviews have revealed the inadequate level of geotechnical input by highway agencies in 
the Niger Delta in procuring highway projects. The principal findings from this theme reveal a 
lack of geotechnical input at the contractual phase in projects procured via the traditional versus 
Design and Build contracts. Typically issues noted include: 
 The high potential for inaccurate over-inflated bid estimates due to non-inclusion of 
GIRs and DSC clauses, which may not still offset the associated contractual 
consequences of claims and variations in traditional contracts; 
 
 The adoption of the lowest bid criteria and lack of an explicit basis of geotechnical 
input in contractor selection by the highway agencies, which raises doubts about the 
technical qualification of contractors executing highway projects;  
 
 The geologic concerns and difficulties experienced in pricing for road construction 
works in the riverine areas, which increases the bid values of experienced 
contractors, who may ultimately loose out to inexperienced and unqualified 
contractors with lower bid prices. 
 
The findings thus capture the geotechnical risk containment shortcomings in the prevailing 
contractual practices of the highway agencies. Contractor selection by the highway agencies 
based on the lowest bid criteria, without incorporating geotechnical bid evaluations of the 
contractors’ capabilities to execute the project, particularly in riverine areas directly connotes 
catastrophic consequences.  This may account for the higher level of cost overruns recorded in 
the swampy and coastal zones of the region, and the incessant trend of project delays and 
abandonment rife in highway project delivery in the Niger delta. As Chan and Au (2007:3) 
asserts: 
         “The owner risks tragedy, first, from cost-cutting measures the contractor will take if it hits 
unforeseen conditions, and then, from fighting contractor claims and picking up the pieces 
if the contractor abandons the project or goes bankrupt”. 
The practice of highway agencies in the Niger Delta thus confirms literature that highway 
agencies try to transfer the risk associated with the ground conditions to contractors in their 
misguided notion of ensuring certainty of final outturn cost (Harrison, 1981; Geddes, 1985; Chan 
and Au, 2007). The use of JCT, a non-engineering standard form of contracts, by the highway 
292 
 
agencies is also noted. Typically, an engineering form of contracts such as the NCE/ICE, Clause 
12 of which, makes provision for contractors to recover costs, in the event that an adverse 
physical condition is encountered, would be more applicable. 
The interview analysis results, from the contractors’ perspective, further reveals that the non-
inclusion of GIR/DSC clause, lack of clarity and in-consistency in designs and contract 
documentation are the principal issues which affected their ability to make informed pricing 
decisions when bidding for contracts. It is therefore apparent that mismanaged risk arising from 
unforeseen ground conditions can cause project inefficiencies and make contract relationships 
adversarial (Latham, 1994). This is further inferred against the backdrop of the literature, which 
particularly emphasises that higher level of pre-contract engineering will result in the production 
of a ‘cleaner set of contract documents which are less vulnerable to cost overruns’ (WSDOT, 
1991). 
The contractors’ explanations of their firms pricing approaches, plays out the literature narrative, 
mapped out by several studies, such as Wong (2012) and Cantarelli et al. (2010), on the financial 
implications of geotechnical poor risk apportionment and containment in the award of contracts. 
It illustrates, the dynamics of Cantarelli et al. (2010) theory of ‘game play’ between contractors 
and clients, in setting price margins during the bidding phase. Lack of awareness of the need for 
ground-related financial risk management in contracts, evidenced by the non-inclusion of ground 
investigation reports, has been shown to either elicit higher levels of contingency allowance that 
have to be provided for in such bids, or higher levels of claims and variations, as confirmed by 
all the contractors interviewed.  This scenario further corroborates the assertions of the Grove 
Report (1998) which states that “Contractors, who are gamble and claim artists, will predominate 
among winners of contract award”.    
The analysis thus shows that most of the contractors handling community projects lacked the 
relevant technical expertise and experience, which is a definitive parameter necessary to ensure 
geotechnical input in the award of contracts. Political and community pressures, appear to 
constitute the basic consideration by the highway agencies in contract award. Further analyses 
of quotes, descriptive of this external interference in contractor selection within the highway 
agencies, are coded under the emergent themes.  
From the interview response, it is also noted that for major DB projects, none of the respondents 
described carrying out preliminary technical bid evaluation, such as using any systematic form 
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of composite algorithm that incorporates geotechnical criteria in contractor selection. The 
literature however advocates geotechnical input in contractor selection, as subjectivity in the 
process of contractor selection is eliminated by the explicitness of the procedure, with increased 
emphasis on geotechnical input requirements in the RFQ or RFP. Gransberg and Gad (2014) 
emphasized the need for an informed unbiased appraisal of contractors’ technical capabilities 
relative to bid price via the development of multi-parameter quantitative models for contractor 
selection. 
Adequate geotechnical input, which is a key investment strategy for any road project, necessary 
to avert the risk of variations and claims leading to delays and cost overruns, represents the 
missing link, highlighted in the analysis. The researcher thus infers that the various geotechnical 
issues at the contractual phase, represent the ‘bowl of contention’, between contractors and 
clients in highway contracts, and are therefore, the festering latent pathogens, which ultimately 
manifest in the post contract phases. These issues which ideally ought to be resolved at the pre-
contract phase, are allowed to spill into the post contract phase by the highway agencies, and 
have to a large extent resulted in the state of highway project delivery and cost overruns in the 
Niger Delta. 
8.5 Post Contract Impact of Geotechnical Risk 
This theme was set to analyse the impact, that the prevailing levels of pre-contract geo-technical 
input evident in the practice of the highway agencies, has had on highway project delivery in the 
Niger Delta region. This inference is deduced based on the typical responses, elicited from the 
clients and contractors, on the issues and tensions, that are precipitated as a chain of contractual 
impacts, upon encountering differing physical conditions of site, other than anticipated by 
contractors, when bids were placed, based on insufficient geotechnical information (Figure 8.7). 
 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.7: Post contract Impact of Geotechnical Risk 
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A descriptive analysis of the level of delays, and its impact on project delivery, typically occurring 
in response to differing site conditions and other contractual claims arising on this premises is 
used to corroborate this inference.  
8.5.1 Variations and Claims Due to Differing Site Conditions 
For HA1, the respondents explained that claims and variation orders made on the basis of 
unexpected ground conditions were relatively fewer in major projects than in community projects.  
HA1-OCE explained that: 
“For major roads, if before the award of the contract, that is during bidding, if one of the 
contractors discovers that the site conditions are different from what is provided for in 
the BOQ prepared by the consultants, we simply go to site to verify it and communicate 
this information across to all the other contractors bidding for the job. This may happen 
since site investigation reports and costing of proposed major roads are usually prepared 
several years in advance of the procurement phase. However, after contract award we 
have limited numbers of such case”.  
 
It was however, explained that although less frequent cases of unexpected site conditions occur 
in major projects, than in community projects, when it did, the cost implications were often more 
significant. As HA1-MQS stated: 
 
“…We have had issues were the designs were completely unsuitable for the soils at 
project location and latter had to be redesigned. For one particular major project, this 
had meant a colossal increase in project cost because of the lengthy delay it caused in 
the project”. 
 
For HA2, respondents expressly stated that most of their projects were awarded on a DB basis, 
yet frequent changes and variation orders due to unexpected ground conditions, were approved 
in response to demands by contractors, who were supposed to have prepared detailed designs, 
as specified in the contract documentation, and for which a provisional sum for site investigation 
is provided.  According to HA2-OCE: 
         “...Contractors collect money for site investigations and the preparation of detailed designs 
and simply pocket it. It is only when they encounter poor unexpected soil conditions that 
they may eventually employ a geotechnical consultant to determine its extent, to demand 
extra payment” (HA2-OCE). 
HA2-MQS described a typical instance of a mega project where unexpected ground conditions 
occurred due to inadequate ground investigation: 
        “The *** road project traversing several soil types from the uplands all the way through the 
riverine areas was abandoned on the basis of inaccurate estimate resulting from 
inadequate ground investigation. The project ideally supposed to cost 1.2billion Naira, was 
initially priced at 800million Naira by the contractors, but was later down scaled to 
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600million Naira after lengthy negotiations with the government. However, when the 
project commenced, several significant unanticipated cost cropped up due to unexpected 
ground conditions and the project had to be abandoned for several years after payment of 
mobilisation fee”. 
 
For HA3, the respondents explained that any claims made by contractors on the grounds of 
unexpected site conditions experienced during excavations and ground work, such as due to 
ground conditions, were not entertained by the agency, on the basis of the contract terms which 
required that contractors should verify site conditions.  
           “It is clearly stated in the conditions of contracts, that contractors are advised to visit site 
and verify the conditions of the site for themselves. With this clause in the contract, it is 
the contractors’ prerogative to ascertain things for themselves …” (HA1-MQS). 
It was argued that such financial claims were considered unjustifiable, and as such no demands 
for extra payment can be granted to contractors. It was thus stated that: 
“… if the contractors for major projects still persist in demanding financial compensation 
for such claims, the project has to be halted, and the agency’s legal unit will have to 
pursue settlement in court” (HA1-MQS). 
The researcher thus noted that, lengthy delays will occur on account of this ensuing legal tussle, 
which will likely drive the final cost of such major projects beyond the initial budgeted cost. The 
lack of flexibility in contractual documentation, with respect to the exclusion of GIR, and the lack 
of contractual provisions made via DSC clauses, to equitably allocate and contain risks, due to 
differing physical conditions on site, may still have a high financial impact on projects executed 
by the HA3. 
8.5.2 Delays: Project Timeline Shifts due to DSC 
This theme investigates the contractors’ perceptions of how the practices and timeline of the 
highway agencies, has affected their approach to geo-risk containment during and after contract 
award. This is deduced in line with the literature assertions, about the chain reaction impact of 
lack of adequate pre-contract GI, at the construction phase: 
            “Most major construction activities involving the ground lie on or are sufficiently close to 
the critical path for any delay to that activity to affect the whole of the project. The 
consequences of inadequate investigations are shown to be severe for both the 
engineering and construction phases of a project…” (ICE, 1991:8). 
Along this line of enquiry, HA3-RC clarified that this was because: 
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              “If permanent or temporary works are affected, we have to apply for a variation order 
and time extension, particularly if the contract is likely to be delayed beyond the contract 
completion date”.  
It was however stated that they still experienced lengthy delays due to the non-availability of 
funds, after the approval process, which often lead to the disruption of the construction timeline, 
as other construction activities are pushed forward.   
HA2 stated that cases where claims where granted, typically due to unforeseen groundwater 
during earthworks, excavation and all other follow up activities are delayed: 
            “We have to wait for approval of variation order before we can proceed to install a 
dewatering system. This delay will consequently affect other items of work in the 
programme schedule and may push other earthworks and pavement works into the rainy 
season month, during which not much construction work can be done” (HA2-RC).  
HA2-RC expressed particular dissatisfaction with the time lag between the application, approval 
and the remittance of funds: 
“Our cash flow on these contracts are very unpredictable. There was a time, we sank in 
most of our capital into a project, after our application for variation was approved. We 
were assured that we would receive payment within a week. Due to flooding of the 
project location, which caused very high water table, and we had to hire machinery to 
access the swamps in order to commence ground works, and suddenly, there was a 
change in administration. The payment was delayed for more than 2 years. The firm 
almost ran aground, as we became cash strapped”.  
8.5.3 Delays and Abandonment: Post-Contract Protocol for Approval of DSC Claims  
The protocol followed by the agency in response to contractual claims and variation orders 
related to ground conditions, and the approximate timescale requisite to resolve such issues at 
the post contract phase was elicited from participant responses. For all major projects executed 
by the highway agencies, monitoring and supervision of contractors, is carried out by consultants 
who have to verify reports on progress of work and make recommendations for milestone 
payments to contractors. As such in instances were issues of differing site conditions were 
verified by the consultants, the respondents from the agencies explained that they have to 
ascertain the validity of contractors’ claims before a variation order can be approved. Following 
the verification of formal written application for claims and variations, the application is forwarded 
to the relevant higher authorities. The practice for community projects however requires the in-
house quantity surveyors or engineers to directly visit site based on the contractor’s application 
and verify such claim. 
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HA1-OQS stated that the approval processes for such applications though confined within the 
organisational structure of the agency, implies that the associated bureaucracy of gaining further 
budgetary approval can amount to lengthy delays since these additional costs were not part of 
the planned budget of the agency, and projects had to be suspended until funds are available to 
foot the bill.  For major projects, it was stated that: 
  “The contractor has to wait for the variation order to be approved. The approval process 
requires a lot of paper work and the application would have to move from one of fice to 
another before it can be approved”.  
HA1-OQS explained that community projects, usually get delayed for very lengthy periods. The 
respondent further provided evidence to this effect. Table 8.1 is an extract from the list of 
abandoned community projects awarded by HA1, showing the date of award, most of which are 
over a decade ago. These projects were explained by the respondents as being abandoned on 
the grounds of funding shortfall, resulting from variations and claims due to technical issues 
related to ground conditions. 
 
Table 8.1: An Extract of Community Projects Currently Delayed and Abandoned by HA1 
  
It was further explained, that the disruption of work schedule caused by unanticipated ground 
conditions often elicits further claims, on the basis of lost/un-productive plant and man-hours.  
“... The contractor at this point has to suspend the work on site until he is given a go ahead 
to continue with the work, otherwise he will not get paid for any additional expenditure. 
Meanwhile, the contractor has hired equipment on site and other overhead expenditure 
which are running on a daily basis irrespective of the fact that work progress has stopped. 
The contractor would equally make claims on this ground” (HA1-OCE).  
As such, the respondents explained that: 
DESCRIPTION LOCATION STATUS % 
COMP 
TYPE DATE OF 
AWARD 
OKOGBE OGBOLOGBO OCHIBA ROAD AHOADA WEST STALLED 75 ROAD 1-Jun-02 
AJA-ETIE AKPOALOKA VARIOUS STALLED 45 ROAD 4-Nov-02 
CONSTRUCTION OF CONCRETE FOOTBRIDGE OLOIBIRI STALLED 75 ROAD 2-May-03 
OBOHIA - MKPOROBE ROAD PROJECT OBUOHIA-
MKPOROBE 
STALLED 55 ROAD 3-Jun-03 
CONSTRUCTION OF OMOKU OKPASIMINI - ORASHI 
RIVER ROAD/BRIDGES (2.7KM ROAD AND 273M LONG 
BRIDGE) 
OMOKU OKPASIMINI, 
ORASHI RIVER 
STALLED 10 ROAD 28-Jul-03 
CONSTRUCTION OF UMUWANWA - OBIZI ROAD UMUWANWA - NWA 
OBIZI 
STALLED 24 ROAD 10-Dec-04 
CONSTR. OF IKOT - AKPADEN - NDON OBODOM - IKOT 
EKPUK - IKOT EDEGHE IKOT USOP ROAD 
IKOT - AKPADEN - 
NDON OBODOM 
STALLED 40 ROAD 10-Dec-04 
CONSTRUCTION OF INTERNAL CONCRETE ROAD 
NETWORK/DRAINAGE & FOOTBRIDGE 
OTUOKE STALLED 40 ROAD 10-Dec-04 
CONSTRUCTION OF INTERNAL CONCRETE ROAD 
NETWORK AT SANDFILLED AREA, BASSAMBIRI, (4 KM, 
PHASE 1) 
BASSAMBIRI STALLED 30 ROAD 10-Dec-04 
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“… if the contractor does not have the financial capacity to continue work on site after 
the variation orders and claims have being processed, the project will simply stop until 
budgetary approval is gotten” (HA1-OQS).  
This cycle, according to HA1-OQS may continue up until the end of the financial year at which 
point any unspent funds will have to be returned to the treasury, and the increased financial 
requirements for the project will have to be considered in the budget for another financial year.  
It was explained by respondents in HA2 that:  
For community projects, a quantity surveyor or engineer has to visit site based on the 
contractor’s written application and verify such claim. When we have gone to site and 
assessed the claim made by the contractor, we then report back to the agency, for the 
variation order to be approved. (HA2-OCE). 
It was however emphasized, that if the contractor does not have any strong links with the current 
political administration, or with in-house staff to facilitate the approval process, the contract may 
just lie in an endless limbo, with the contractor eventually having to abandon the project. 
“…this may take lengthy periods of several months and even up to a year, depending 
on the contractor’s personal political connections to push for his application to be 
handled” (HA2-OCE).  
It was also stated: 
“… If the contractor does not have an insider, his file and application will not be pushed 
forward for approval and he would keep running around in circles waiting for the 
approval which may never surface” (HA2-OQS).  
Delays due to this, may span several months or even years. Based on current information 
accessed on 12/04/2015 from the official website of HA2, over 170 roads are being constructed, 
most of which are major projects executed in upland areas, with few located in riverine areas, 
listed as been completed and near completion as shown in Table 8.2.  
Table 8.2: Highway Projects Executed by HA2 
Project Status 
First Bank/Rumuobiakani/Old Aba Road Completed 
Oginigba /Slaughter Road Completed 
The Elekahia/Rumuomasi road Completed 
Rumuola Road (completed) Completed 
Eneka/Igbo-Etche/ Iriebe road Near Completion 
Woji/Okujagu/Elelenwo road. Near Completion 
Rumuagholu /Ada George road Near Completion 
Ken Saro Wiwa road/ Stadium road  Near Completion 
Rumuibekwe/Elelenwo road and bridge Near Completion 
Rumuekini/ Aluu road Near Completion 
Ozuboko/Elelenwo road-  Near Completion 
Rukpokwu/Eneka/Eligbolo road Near Completion 
Rukpakwulusi /Eligbolo /Rumuodomaya road Near Completion 
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Confirmation was sought from the respondents, who unequivocally stated that publicised projects 
were for media purposes. 
“All what is projected to the public, are less than 20% of contracts awarded in 2008. As 
I speak to you, over 75% of these projects are not publicised because they have been 
delayed and abandoned. Several of these projects experienced technical hiccups and 
had no political god father to rescue them” (HA2-MQS). 
For HA3, the management QS explained that the agency had put in place pro-active measures 
to curtail the negative practices of contractors always devising avenues to make claims:  
 “We have recently devised a financial risk management system for contractors’ payment 
through banks. The banks which have to insure the contractors therefore bear the risk 
of project failure. This system requires the contractors to sign an insurance bond with 
the banks who have an independent set of professionals to cross-verify the 
recommendations for milestone payments made by agencies consultants and in-house 
professionals...” (HA3-MQS) 
HA3-MQs further enumerated several ongoing and completed major projects awarded in 2012, 
which were already completed or near completion, and referring to documentary evidence to this 
effect as shown in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3: Extract of Completed and Ongoing Road Projects Awarded by HA3 in 2012 
TITLE DESCRIPTION IMAGES 
Edepie-Tombia Bridge  
(Completed) 
Newly Completed Edepie-
Tombia Bridge 3 Showing 
Before and Present States 
,  
Edepie-Tombia Bridge  
(Completed) 
Edepie-Tombia Bridge 2 
Showing before and after 
Completion States 
,  
Edepie-Tombia Bridge  
(Completed) 
Edepie-Tombia Bridge 1 
Showing before and after 
Completion States 
,  
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TITLE DESCRIPTION IMAGES 
Ox-Box Lake Road 
(Completed) 
Newly Constructed Ox-Box Lake 
Road 
 
Ox-Box Lake Pavilion Road 
(On-going) 
Aerial View of Ox-Box Lake 
Pavilion Under Construction 
Showing,  
 
International Cargo Airport 
Road 
(On-going) 
Cross Section and Aerial View of 
International Cargo Airport road 
Amassoma Under construction. 
, , 
 
It was thus explained that under the closely monitored and standard contractual environment 
maintained by the agency, budgeted funds for major projects, as projected at the conceptual 
phase are paid to the collaborating banks, based on which all subsequent disbursements were 
made, although subject to necessary verification and approval. 
The respondents from HA3 explained that in the long run, claims made by contractors soliciting 
additional funds, due to differing site conditions in major projects, in the few cases where 
approved, implied a lengthy bureaucratic protocol:  
“…the agency has to seek for budgetary approval, which has to go through the 
organisational hierarchy of the organisational set up, headed by the commissioner for 
works. This had to be done before further approval from the State House of Assembly, 
which constitutes the legislative arm of government and the Governor is sought”.  
HA3-OQS explained that for community projects, the contractor’s application for variations on 
the grounds of unexpected ground conditions, after in-house verification, will ultimately proceed 
to the governor’s office, before approval for the release of extra funds can be gained. It was 
further stated: 
          “...How soon the eventual payment for such changes will be made however depends 
on how long it takes to process the application, the availability of funds as well as on 
the urgency of the project” (HA3-OQS). 
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This aligns with literature findings by Cusworth (1993), who provided a schematic outline of the 
typically lengthy budgetary approval process for public projects in developing countries. The 
researcher thus infers that the total cost of the overall delay and disruption can build up to 
disproportionate financial proportions for the highway agencies. 
8.5.5 Theme Summary: Level of Post-Contract Impact due to Geotechnical Risk 
The findings on this theme has captured the post-contractual management issues experienced 
by highway agencies and contractors in the delivery of highway projects in the Niger Delta region. 
The chain of evidence, established from the analysis has therefore provided qualitative 
explanations, about how the prevailing levels of geotechnical input, has impacted on project 
delivery in the Niger Delta. The findings thus reinforce local literature evidence, which alludes to 
the poor procurement practices of public agencies in Nigeria, as the fundamental cause of project 
delays and abandonment. It has provided contextual information which clarifies the mechanism 
of the build-up of unusually high cost overruns previously analysed in chapter 5. The geotechnical 
shortcomings of the highway agencies represent the latent pathogens, which have provided a 
fertile ground for contractors to make claims leading to delays and project abandonment at the 
post contract phase. 
 
8.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis and evaluation of the levels of pre-contract 
geotechnical input, and its post-contract implication in the geologic setting of the Niger Delta 
region. The themes have thus defined the technical basis of qualitatively assessing the prevailing 
level of geotechnical input evident in the practices of highway agencies. The findings have served 
to provide a descriptive snapshot of the design and costing practices of the highway agencies in 
the Niger Delta, which shows that the reality of the situation for project delivery, depicts a far 
departure from the theory of good practice relevant for the delivering cost effective delivery of 
highway projects. An array of factors predicated on the need for geotechnical input have thus 
been identified as contributing to the unusually high levels of cost overruns evidenced by highway 
agencies in the Niger Delta (In Table 8.4). 
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Table 8.4: Assessment of Level of Geotechnical Input in Highway Projects   
Themes Organisational Scores 
 HA1 HA2 HA3 
 Nomenclature of Project Development Phases 
 Major Projects Consistent In-Consistent Consistent 
 Community Projects In-Consistent In-Consistent Consistent 
Level of GI at the Preliminary Project Phases 
 Level of Geotechnical Input in Planning: 
 Major Projects; 
 Community Projects. 
 
None 
None 
 
None 
None 
 
None 
None 
 Level of Geotechnical Input at the conceptual phase: 
 Major Projects; 
 Community Projects. 
 
High 
None 
 
Low 
None 
 
Low 
Low 
Level of Geotechnical Input at the Design/Contractual Phases in Relation to Procurement Route 
GI in Designs    
 Adequacy of External GI in Major Projects 
 Adequacy of In-house Design preparation 
 Adherence of in-house designs in relation to GI 
requirements of TRRL (1993); 
 Adequacy of GI in DB Contractor’s Designs 
Unverified 
Inadequate 
 
 
Unverified 
Unverified 
None 
Adequate 
Adequate 
 Mode of In-house Assessment of Heterogeneous 
Soil Conditions 
Inadequate Inadequate Adequate 
 Adequacy of Contract Documentation (Client’s): 
 Major Projects 
 Community Projects 
 
Inadequate 
Highly Inadequate 
 
Inadequate 
Highly 
Inadequate 
 
Inadequate 
Inadequate 
 Adequacy of GI in Contractor Selection Criteria 
 Traditional Major 
 Traditional Minor 
 DB Mega 
 DB Minor 
 
Subjective (political) 
Subjective (community) 
Adequate 
NA 
 
 
N/A 
N/A 
Adequate 
Subjective 
(Political) 
 
Adequate 
Subjective  
Adequate 
NA 
D&B Projects: Level of Geotechnical Input 
(Client/Contractor) 
 Adequacy of GI in DB Contractor Selection Criteria 
 
Adequate 
 
Inadequate 
 
Adequate 
 Adequacy of GI in DB Contractor’s Designs Verified Unverified Verified 
Adequacy of Institutional/Organisational Setting for Ensuring Geotechnical Input  
 
 Adequacy of organisational environment for ensuring 
progressive flow of External GI. 
Inadequate Inadequate Adequate 
 Clarity of professional roles in relation to internal GI 
in highway designs and costing; 
Not Clearly Defined Not Clearly 
Defined 
Clearly 
Defined 
 Professional Skills 
 Management Civil Engineers 
 Operational Civil Engineers 
Non-Adherence 
 
Not-Discernible 
Low 
Non-
Adherence 
Unverified 
Low 
Unverified 
 
Unverified 
Moderate 
 
The interview findings reinforce the assertion that low level of in-house pre-contract preparation 
and geotechnical input are still considered normal practice, despite the calls in the literature for 
a step change, or a paradigm shift in practice (Figure 8.8). 
 
 
303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.8: Calls in the Literature for a Step Change in Geotechnical Practice 
 
These findings thus suggest that despite several calls for improved planning and the adoption of 
a more comprehensive pre-construction geotechnical evaluative stage for all highway projects in 
the Niger Delta, community projects, which are mostly situated in these riverine areas, still exhibit 
an almost complete lack of planning and geotechnical input in the pre-construction, design 
phases of the project. This is typified by (1) the inconsistency of phase configuration of projects 
for highway development.  (2) The use of ad-hoc and inconsistent pre-contract preparation and 
design processes for community projects executed in-house by the three highway agencies 
evaluated.   
In an attempt to further understand the barriers to the paradigm shift in practice called for by 
these scholars, the research has attempted to uncover the significant organisational, human and 
psychological barriers to change within the highway agencies, emergent from the interview 
responses in the subsequent chapter. Chapter nine, thus unveils the contextual factors inherent 
in the institutional setting of highway development, that account for the prevailing levels of 
geotechnical input inherent in highway projects executed in the Niger Delta region. 
  
“The assessment of properties of soil sub-
grades, in terms of density, soil stiffness, 
strength, and other in-situ parameters is vital in 
the design of roads in the Niger Delta” 
(Ngerebara et al., 2014.p 25) 
 
 
“The need for necessary precautions, 
commencing with appropriate steps in site 
investigation and exploration to reveal the 
presence of the aforementioned poor soil 
conditions, particularly for coastal areas 
before the execution of any project cannot be 
over emphasized” (Akpokodje, 1987. p 753).  
 
 
The engineer in the Niger Delta region must 
not, without reasoning lift designs that are 
applicable to other environments, but must 
strive to use systems that are adaptable to the 
local environment, recognizing the differences 
in the ecological zones”. (Oguara, 2002.p 8) 
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Chapter 9 
Contextual Cost Overrun Drivers: Emergent Social Constructs as Barriers 
to Geotechnical Input (GI) 
9.0 Introduction 
The foregoing analysis of the core geotechnical themes in chapter eight, has been framed within 
the lenses of an organisational perspective, as opposed to the more common approach of using 
project level characteristics to account for cost overruns, as evident in the literature. This has 
revealed the geotechnical pathogens, latent at the pre and post-contract phases of highway 
project execution in the Niger Delta, as major risk factors accounting for the high level of cost 
overruns. This finding aligns with numerous case histories in the literature, which shows that 
failure to anticipate ground conditions can have significant post-construction cost implications for 
highway projects. Further inductive analysis of the interview data, however highlighted the 
dominant role of the organisational settings, people, and external factors, inherent in the 
institutional system, in determining the level geotechnical input. These socially constructed 
forces, constitute the emergent barriers to geotechnical best practice in the highway agencies. 
They are by implication the contextual drivers actively triggering the latent geotechnical 
pathogens, which often lie dormant in the highway organisations, and have resulted in the 
unusually high levels of cost overruns experienced in highway projects in the Niger Delta. These 
emergent issues, visualised in Figure 9.1 as a word cloud, will be discussed in this chapter. 
 
Figure 9.1: Word Cloud Showing Frequently Discussed Issues  
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9.1 Adequacy of the Organisational Environments for Ensuring GI 
9.1.1 Non-Progressive Flow of External GI in Project Phases 
For all the highway agencies, it has been noted that geotechnical input in projects commence at 
the design phase. Prior to this phase, the researcher could not discern any apparent evidence of 
geotechnical input at the initial the planning and budgetary phases, for both major and community 
projects. The researcher also noted a lack of continuity in the services of external consultants, 
who were responsible for ensuring geotechnical input at the design phase of major roads 
procured traditionally, into the contractual and construction phases.  
Respondents from HA1 explained that consultants responsible for preparing designs at the pre-
contract phase were different from those used in project monitoring at the post-contract phase. 
The researcher thus sought to establish the contractual protocol followed by the highway 
agencies to make relevant changes to designs, in the event of encountering unexpected site 
conditions, after commencement of works on site. The respondents revealed that if differing site 
conditions were identified by contractors during the pre-contract phase, this would be 
communicated to the client and brought to the attention of other bidders, to make all necessary 
financial adjustment. However, at this point of contracting, it was noted by the researcher that 
geotechnical input at the detailed design and budget preparation phase, are not necessar ily 
carried forward into the post-contract phase by the design consultants.  This was inferred from 
the respondent’s explanations that consultants who designed projects at the budgeting phase 
concluded all design preparation and their services were terminated: 
“The department of project monitoring is responsible for the post-contract monitoring of 
awarded major road projects, via the use of consultants. However, the consultants used 
at the post contract phase are usually different from the pre-contract team, as designs 
and costing for major projects may be prepared years in advance of the contract award”. 
(HA1 MCE)   
 
This was clarified by the respondent, as being due to the lengthy time interval between the initial 
long range budgeting phase, when detailed designs are prepared and the contractual phase, 
before a formal call for bids is made. Accordingly, any necessary adjustments to designs have 
to be made by in-house professionals who did not prepare the original designs, leading to 
potential inconsistencies in geotechnical input. 
For HA2, all major projects are procured using Design and Build. HA2-MQS thus explained: 
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“the services of consultants were only engaged for the purpose of project monitoring. 
Technical details of design adaptation or changes are thus the responsibility of 
contractor’s consultants”.  
 
Finally, respondents from HA3 explained that the same sets of consultants are used at the pre 
and post-contract phases of all major projects, procured traditionally. 
   “For all major projects, the same consultants who designed the projects, are also 
responsible for project monitoring and for making any relevant design changes as may be 
required. The agency however has to approve such design changes before the contractor 
can proceed with the site works. The services of consultants define the successful 
completion of our projects, and so the agency does not change consultants arbitrarily...” 
(HA3-MQS)  
 
9.1.2 Absence of In-house Geotechnical Professional 
Based on the previous inferences drawn, it was noted that community projects procured 
traditionally by HA1 and HA2, have no geotechnical professional presence throughout the 
phases. In addition, analysis of the organisational structures for both organisations revealed 
there are no in-house geotechnical professionals employed by either agency, with the 
responsibility for geotechnical input in the design of community highway projects.  
However, respondents from HA3, in describing the organisational structure and functionality of 
the units in the agency, explained that geotechnical professionals are employed within the 
department of civil engineering services.  These professionals are responsible for ensuring 
geotechnical input in all highway design.  
“The department of civil engineering services is responsible for the management of 
roads, bridges and other civil engineering structures. The department is also responsible 
for the design of community projects. Detailed designs for projects are prepared in-house 
by the department’s highway engineers, reflecting all relevant inputs from the related 
design professionals in the ministry: structural, geotechnical and mechanical engineers” 
(HA3-OCE). 
 
It was further explained that geotechnical input at the post-contract phase was maintained via 
laboratory testing of geo-materials as measures of quality control.  
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9.1.3 Clarity and Adequacy of Professional Roles responsible for Highway Designs and 
Costing 
When describing the various functional units of their respective agencies, respondents 
interviewed from HA1 and HA2 revealed the agencies did not have a distinct design and 
estimating department who would be responsible for the delivery of highway projects. This was 
typified by this response from HA1-MQS who asserted: 
          ... There are no specific departments for costing or design of projects. What we have are 
different professionals working under different departments (HA1-MQS). 
  
The response from a managerial Quantity surveyor employed by HA2 also relayed the apparent 
non-differentiation of functional units, confirming: 
         “...There are no departmental divisions within the agency, with respect to professional roles. 
Ideally, based on the initial organisational set-up of the agency, the professionals are 
supposed to be in their respective departments, but these are no longer functional... (HA2-
MQS). 
It was thus inferred that quantity surveyors and civil engineers worked in dual capacities, often 
interchangeably, within the various departments. As such, the researcher noted that no clear cut 
definition of professional roles existed within the highway organisations. Consequently, most 
professionals serve in multiple capacities. For example, the researcher discovered from the 
responses that quantity surveyors often function as civil engineers. A supposition confirmed by 
an operational quantity surveyor employed by HA1 who conformed: 
          “...I am a quantity surveyor, working under the department of ***, I can perform the job of 
an engineer and often times go to site and based on the survey drawings, prepare 
schematic drawings for the road project before I estimate the cost (HA1-OQS).  
 
In HA2, a similar response was noted: 
 
“...I am a quantity surveyor but most times, I serve in the dual capacity of both an 
engineer and a quantity surveyor: I learnt how to prepare highway designs...” (HA2-
OQS) 
 
HA2-MQS also stated that:  
 
“...The quantity surveyors and civil engineers all supervise projects, along with the 
electrical and mechanical engineers who are attached to them because we are badly 
short staffed” (HA2-MQS). 
 
HA2 MQS further stated the agencies lacked qualified technical manpower with the requisite 
qualifications, as a result they were badly under staffed: 
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“...We have a situation, whereby hundreds of projects being executed by the agency, 
and running concurrently, are managed and supervised by less than 10 persons. Most 
of the so called engineers are not experienced and don’t even have adequate 
qualifications. They are mostly Higher National Diploma or first degree fresh graduates, 
who were just recently employed. You will find only one senior civil engineer in the lot, 
who will usually delegate responsibility for design preparation to these operational staff”.  
There were also instances of job descriptions not matching the qualifications of staff working on 
road projects. It was discovered during the fieldwork that completely unrelated (non-construction) 
professionals were working in the capacity of project managers and supervisors.  This was 
captured in the very revealing statement from the management staff of the agency in which it 
was admitted: 
“... We have cases of medical doctors, accountants, marine engineers and even 
petroleum engineers, heading departments in charge of road projects, and working as 
project managers: supervising projects and approving remittance of payment to 
contractors (HA1-MQS). 
HA1-MQS further went on to express contempt of the situation exclaiming: 
“It is a disgraceful state of affair, yet nothing is done about it. Once one has political 
connections ... they can easily find their way to gain employment and occupy positions 
not suited to their academic qualifications”. 
 
The organisational setting in HA3 in contrast to HA1 and HA2 appears to be well defined and 
patterned to a high degree of specialisation in professional roles as shown in Figure 9.2. 
 
 
Commissioner 
Permanent Secretary 
Human Resources /dmin  
 
 
Civil 
Building 
Engineering Services 
Architectural Services 
Planning  and Statistics 
Finance and Supply 
Highway Engineers Geotechnical Engineers 
Structural Engineers Engineering Geologists 
Quantity Surveyors Builders 
Land Surveyors 
Mechanical Engineers 
Process Engineers 
Chemical Engineers 
Electrical Engineers 
 
Figure 9.2: Organisational Structure HA3 
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The organisational structure for HA3 clearly reflects the multi-disciplinary roles relevant to 
highway project designs and costing: Civil Engineers; Geotechnical engineers; Geologists; 
Electrical engineers; Mechanical engineers; Quantity surveyors.  It is noted that the various 
preliminary engineering and costing services were duly separated, and their respective inputs in 
designs and costing were limited to the ideal professional roles. 
Also noted from the response of the Management Q.S, HA3-MQS, was that the co-ordination of 
the various inputs and processes in designs and costing during pre-contract preparation was 
overseen by the senior process engineer, who worked as a director heading the department of 
engineering services. 
 
        “... It is the duty of the process engineer to ensure that all interrelated design processes are 
in logical order at the phase of design preparation after project approval... without the 
process engineer coordinating the activities of all the design process, there may be loss 
of time...” (HA3-MQS).  
 
9.1.4 Contractual Porosity   
Interview responses from registered contractors working for the highway agencies, revealed that 
the contractors were aware of the porosity of highway procurement in the Niger Delta. The 
contractors explained that although the level of financial risks due to unforeseen ground 
conditions could be high, they could still afford to reduce the contingency allowance provided in 
their bid submission.  None of the firms, however, had ever opted out of bidding for jobs on the 
basis of the risk perceived, due to ground conditions:  
Irrespective of such perceived risk, we are most times compelled to reduce our bid 
values so that we can win a tender as jobs are often awarded to the lowest price (HA1-
RC) 
This was suspected to be because they know they would be able to recover any overspend. As 
to whether this situation discouraged the contractors from taking up further jobs with the highway 
agencies, two of the contractors responded in negative, stating “…No certainly not. In fact, this 
is a major area where there is a significant potential for making profit …” (HA1-RC).  
When asked how this was possible, the contractors confirmed they considered these projects to 
be fertile ground for making extra profit due to the significant post-contract change that would 
(not may) occur. It was explained by the two medium sized contractors (HA1-RC and HA2-RC) 
that inconsistent and poor contract documentation, issued as part of the tender packages by the 
highway agencies, allowed the contractors to consider bidding for these projects. As such the 
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contractors strategically deployed suicide bidding (bidding below cost to secure the work), even 
when they knew the contracts, were relatively risk laden.  This would ultimately make up for any 
potential losses they suffer in the short term bidding stage. For example, HA1-RC explained it 
thus: 
         . For most projects, the reduced profit margin could be recovered since variations and 
delays will most likely arise from the inconsistencies in contract documents or lack of funds 
a basis of which we can get adequate compensation from making claims or due to price 
fluctuation” (HA1-RC) 
 The situation was reinforced by a second contractor HA2-RC who confirmed: 
         “...we operate under cut throat competition in bidding for contracts. We would strategically 
reduce the profit margin to win a job and then take advantage of opportunities in the 
contract phase. There are lots of avenues for claims and variations in our contracts which 
we have to capitalise on” (HA2-RC). 
The respondent further explained that, most times consultants and in-house project monitoring 
teams did not bother to re-measure work during milestone payments. This therefore provided the 
contractors with a veritable means of recovering any losses due to unexpected ground conditions 
at the initial phase. HA2-RC went further stating: 
“...we may still reduce the contingency allowance for perceived ground related risks 
in earthworks even if we are not provided with ground investigation reports, since if 
we are awarded the contracts, we could be able to recover any losses, due to 
unexpected ground conditions, through variations that almost always occur on road 
contracts” (HA2-RC). 
 
The researcher thus noted the implied and unspoken impression of the contractors, as being 
familiar with the known shortcomings in contractual arrangements by highway agencies in the 
Niger Delta. These assertions further corroborated the assertion of Sunjka and Jacob (2013), 
who criticised the basis of contract award and execution by highway agencies in the Niger Delta, 
as being as being poorly packaged, with contractors standing to benefit from this shortcoming.   
However, HA3-RC, who worked for a large contractor that mostly executed major projects for the 
agencies, explained that the additional profit margin included in bids had meant that several bids 
had been lost since most of the highway agencies tend to award contracts to the lowest bidder. 
One problem highlighted with this, was that some contractors, mainly smaller scale indigenous 
contractors, often need to employ private quantity surveyors (consultants) to price jobs for them. 
As a result, in an attempt to save money, these organisations often bid without even bothering 
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to ensure the adequacy of the price quoted to execute the job. It was thus regrettably expressed 
that:  
         “... Unfortunately, sometimes they get the job, and abandon it midway. There has been 
several of such cases where the highway agencies have come back to re-award the jobs 
for us to complete these projects that were initially awarded to ‘quack’ contractors” (HA3-
RC).  
 
It can therefore be inferred that the contractors were provided with a fertile ground by the highway 
agencies for delaying and abandoning projects, often due to unresolved claims and variation 
orders arising during the contract execution phase. 
9.1.5 Theme Summary: Adequacy of Organisational Environment for Ensuring GI 
The findings from this parent theme have provided contextual understanding of how the poorly 
constituted organisational environments in the various highway agencies, has served to actively 
foster geotechnical pathogens inherent in highway projects executed in the Niger Delta. Several 
issues have been identified, principally in relation to HA1 and HA2, as constituting organisational 
barriers to geotechnical input in highway projects, these included:  
 The lack of continuity in the services of external consultants for major roads;  
 The lack of geotechnical professional presence throughout the phases of community 
projects; 
 The lack of distinct in-house design and estimating units; 
 Design and costing professionals serving in multiple capacities; 
 Job description not matching the qualifications of staff working on road projects; 
 Lack of qualified technical manpower, with the requisite qualification; 
 Porosity of the contractual management system. 
 
9.2 Knowledge and Skills Gap 
9.2.1 In-house Knowledge Deficiencies Relating to Current Design Practices  
This inference was drawn in relation to the preliminary line of questioning in the interviews, 
focused on the respondents understanding of and adherence with highway design specifications 
such as the TRRL (1993) highway design guide. Questions were also asked to elicit information 
on whether the highway agencies deployed similar design standards published by other 
recognised international bodies, such as the American AASHTO, or the British DMRB design 
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guides.  The questioning revealed significant knowledge deficiencies amongst the professionals 
interviewed, demonstrating worryingly low levels of awareness amongst the in-house civil 
engineers, of the fundamental tools of their profession, internationally recognised best practice 
design standards. 
 
Three operational civil engineers out of the four design professionals interviewed demonstrated 
absolute ignorance about the existence of the TRRL or any other design standard. This 
observation is typically illustrated in extracts of typical response patterns in the four interview 
conversations carried out with civil engineers in the agencies, in response to the researcher’s 
specific question:  
“Do you use the Transportation and Road Research laboratory (TRRL, 1993) Overseas 
Road Note guideline or any other international design standard for the design of flexible 
pavements?” 
 
Some of the respondents, openly admitted their lack of knowledge, while others were defensive 
and tried to cover up their apparent ignorance: 
“No, we still use analogue, we are not yet digital… we are doing hand sketches” (HAI-
OCE);  
 
“I don’t understand” (HA2-OCE);     
       
“Of course we use standards, there are standards for everything. We use the latest 2015 
standard”.  (HA3-OCE). 
 
Recognising the need for further clarification, the researcher stated: 
“No what I mean is that do you use the Federal Government stipulated Highway design 
standard which adopts the TRRL (1993) Overseas Road Note. This is a guide for the 
design of bituminous paved roads in tropical countries prepared by the British 
government as a form of technical assistance. Successive versions of this standard have 
being used by the Federal Ministry of Works (FMW) as a guide for the design of roads 
without much alteration. The Current standard is the 1993 version”. 
 
This clarification prompted the following responses from the interviewees: 
“Oh, is that what you mean. Well I have heard about this standard, though, I have not 
seen it before”. (HA1-OCV);    
        
“Is that the name of the Federal Ministry of Works design guide? A friend of mine has it; 
I will get a copy of it for myself” (HA2-OCV);     
   . 
“The 1993 standard! That must be outdated.  A more recent standard ought to be used” 
(HA3-OCV).      
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The responses of the operational civil engineers were thus very revealing of this knowledge gap 
on highway design standards. However, the response of the management level civil engineer, 
was insufficient to infer his level of awareness on current design trends: 
“I don’t know the exact design standard used by our consultants for our major roads, but 
for our community road projects we have our own internal standard specifications we 
use” (HA1-MCE). 
 
As the researcher was unable to gain access to two out of the three senior civil engineers 
employed by the highway agencies, this inference could not be generalised to the senior civil 
engineers. The findings however seem to echo the assertion of HA2-MQS that: 
“The entirety of the staff in the agency are not even in the know about current design 
practices or standards that are being used internationally or at the national level”. 
9.2.2 In-house Knowledge Deficiencies Relating to Geo-Risk Containment in Procurement 
The responses of the quantity surveyors to questions relating to the adequacy of geotechnical 
input, specifically structured to elicit information on, the inclusion/exclusion of Ground 
Investigation Reports (GIR), and Differing Site Condition (DSC) clauses, revealed deficiencies in 
their knowledge in relation to these geo-risk containment measures.  
The responses from operational level quantity surveyors revealed knowledge deficiencies in 
relation to the use of GIR and DSC clauses as geo-risk containment measures in highway 
projects. The operational quantity surveyor from HA3, provided a response that typified those 
from all respondents at this level.  He appeared to be surprised at this line of question exclaiming: 
         “...Are ground investigation reports supposed to be part of standard contract 
documentation? I thought these technical reports are required only by the civil engineers 
to prepare structural drawings. What does a contractor have to do with it? Is he going to  
redesign the project? ...” (HA3-OQS). 
The respondents also appeared not to have any prior knowledge as to what a DSC clause was, 
all the quantity surveyors interviewed either responded in mono syllables or simply asked for 
further clarification. For example, HA2-MQS responded “No”, while HA1-OQS, HA2-OQS and 
HA3-MQS needed the question to be clarified. Once this clarification was given, the response 
from HA1-OQS typified the views of the three quantity surveyors, who appeared confused by the 
question and its clarification, responding by simply asking: “What do you mean?”  The researcher 
thus had to explain that a DSC clause was often inserted in to civil engineering contracts. The 
clause provides financial compensation for contractors, whereby should they encounter adverse 
ground conditions different from what was known at the time of bidding, the clause would provide 
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mechanisms to determine responsibility. This means clients are responsible for paying for the 
additional costs triggered by physical conditions encountered on site, which differ from those 
which could have been reasonably foreseen by an experienced contractor in preparing his tender 
estimate. As such resorting to the use of DSC clauses in contracts, which would mean paying 
contractors for those differing conditions that could not have been foreseen. The Management 
level quantity surveyors from the highway agencies, upon clarification, however expressed 
adversarial perspectives. Typically arguing: 
“It is the contractors’ prerogative to ascertain things for themselves and not have to rely 
on us to define the conditions of site” (HA1-MQS).  
9.2.3 Theme Summary Knowledge and Skills Gap 
Based on the general pattern of the responses, what became increasingly apparent, was that 
most of the agencies’ in house professionals, were significantly uninformed about current issues 
in their profession, which clearly had a significant bearing on their ability to follow the underlying 
logic behind the line of questioning. The in-house design professionals exhibited very low levels 
of familiarity with the basic technical terminology of highway pavement designs and standards. 
This contrasts with the responses from consultants, earlier analysed in chapter eight, who 
demonstrated adequate knowledge of the TRRL design standard, and other international 
standards. Finally, the quantity surveyors’ interviewed as part of this study also demonstrated an 
inadequate level of knowledge and understanding, in relation to contractual matters as they 
related to geotechnical risk containment in highway projects. This evident gap in the knowledge 
of the highway officials, can thus be said to be the blue prints, which fosters dysfunctional 
professional practises, that actively trigger geotechnical pathogens in highway projects. 
9.3 External Socio-Cultural Pressures Impacting on Professional Roles 
9.3.1 Political Pressure  
The influence of political interference on in-house professional roles for the design and costing 
of road projects, was noted from the general trend of the responses of the in-house respondents 
(Civil Engineers and Quantity Surveyors) from the highway agencies. The pattern of the 
responses, depicted a politically driven mode of procurement practise, underlying the 
performance of professional responsibilities. This was clearly evident, as it was the most 
repeatedly mentioned theme, in all the responses elicited from the highway officials. Political 
pressure, is thus inferred as, significantly impacting on the level of in-house GI, evident in the 
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progressive phases previously analysed. However, at the contractual phase the impact of geo-
political structures appeared to be more tangibly manifested.  
All six quantity surveyors commented on the impact of political interference on their professional 
roles in contract award. Typically, respondent HA3-OQS commented that:  
        “Most road contracts are usually awarded to the construction firms of active politicians” 
(HA3-OQS). 
The researcher however noted that respondents from HA2, particularly emphasised the impact 
that political factors had on procurement and project delivery in the agency. Respondent HA2-
MQS stated that there were no standardised contracting system or pre-contract procedure for 
projects which were deduced as being procured politically, without following any formal protocol: 
          “In the present regime, all contracts are awarded based on recommendation from the *** 
or the *** without competitive bids being solicited from the public” (HA2- MQS).   
Respondent HA2- MQS further stated: 
          “... The politically driven and influenced mode of procurement of most of our projects 
affects everything. Due process in contracts is often not followed” (HA2-MQS).   
 
HA2-OCE, described a typical instance of how the political environment surrounding the 
procurement of road projects by the agency had impacted on their professional obligations. 
Specifically, the need to ensure the requisite level of geotechnical input in some of the major DB 
projects, during the pre-contract and post contract phase of the project developments:  
           “Those of us who are civil engineers may not even get to see the final designs that has 
being provided by the contractor, for our road projects ... As a consequence, the 
contractors who usually have political clout can get away with making significant claims, 
on the basis of variations due to differing ground conditions, which we may not even be 
allowed to verify (HA2-OCE).  
On this note, respondent HA2-MQS affirmed that: 
... ideally, where requests for variation are not justified, such projects should be 
determined, re-advertised and re-awarded to technically qualified contractors. 
 
HA2-MQS, further stated that as a matter of fact, the harsh reality of the situation of the 
procurement climate of highway projects, prevented this from happening: 
             “... As a professional employed under the service of a government parastatal, you have 
to be careful with the due diligence and integrity with which you carry out your job. 
Overzealousness can lead to your being removed from being part of the project team or 
even dismissal from your job” (HA2- MQS). 
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9.3.2 Local Community Pressure  
Community pressure in the form of youth restiveness was described as a critical issue for projects 
executed in local communities, due to years of social deprivation and infrastructural neglect by 
successive government administration. This has led to a wave of insurgency characterised by 
violent demonstrations, hostage taking and bomb blasts by armed youths. This trend was thus 
described as constituting a major source of fear amongst professionals responsible for the 
execution of projects in these areas.  Consequently, local community projects were normally 
executed on an emergency basis to calm youth restiveness in communities. Given the projects 
were awarded on an emergency basis without extensive pre-planning, these projects were 
unsurprisingly awarded to politically active indigenes of the community from where the 
clamouring for the construction of the road had emanated, without recourse to a planned budget. 
A situation affirmed by respondent HA2-OQS who commented that: 
     “...The contracts for such roads will end up being awarded to the project sponsor from the 
community who pushed for the project” (HA2-OQS). 
It was further explained by respondents from HA1 that the technical qualifications of the 
contractor in these situations was considered secondary to the urgent need to calm youths, and 
prevent further catastrophe. As respondent HA1-MQS states: 
“If the contract is awarded to a contractor who is not an indigene of the community, the 
contractor is often faced with disruptions and threats from the youths. Typically, the 
contractor’s equipment would be vandalised and site workers may be kidnapped” (HA1-
MQS).  
 
In confirming this trend across the Niger Delta region, respondent HA3-OQS, representing the 
final highway agency in the region, affirmed that community projects were often awarded to 
indigenes of the community. Although he did qualify this assertion by acknowledging that the 
agency still tried to assess the contractor’s technical capacity to deliver the job. 
It was however clarified that although this trend was more common in community projects, such 
community pressures also impacted on the procurement of major projects at the post-contract 
phase during site works. For instance, respondent HA1-MQS avowed: 
“We have also had these situations on major projects. Typically, the ****** road that was 
being executed by ****, one of the best international contracting firms operating in the 
region, had to be abandoned on these grounds”. (HA1-MQS). 
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The respondent further explained that this was despite the heightened security measures put in 
place by contractors, which had been approved by the agency as part of claims for additional 
funds. Several engineers and site workers were kidnapped as hostages, with the contractors 
having to pay significant ransoms to the community before the hostages were released.  This in 
turn led to the collapse of the project, as respondent HA1-MQS confirms: 
“Further to the release of the workers, the contractor refused to return to site, and the 
project was abandoned for several years, until recently when it was resuscitated by the 
new administration” 
9.3.3 Theme Summary: External Socio-Cultural Pressures impacting on Professional 
Roles 
The impact of political and community interference on in-house professional roles for the design 
and costing of road projects is particularly noted by the researcher as being of a major influence 
in the Niger Delta, due to its overwhelming implication for the adequacy of geotechnical input in 
the procurement of highway projects. This is also due to the cautiousness it arouses in 
professionals in the performance of their duties to ensure geotechnical input. The impact of these 
contextual drivers, manifests in the: 
 Emergency procurement of highway projects; 
 Award of contracts to unqualified contractors; 
 Lack of due process in contract award procedure; 
 Unverified contractors’ claims; 
 Unplanned budgeting for highway projects; 
 Heightened security risk to contractors; 
 increased delays and abandonment of highway projects. 
Due to the numerous multiplier impacts of external pressure from political and community 
sources, the existing socio-cultural setting of highway development in the Niger Delta region, has 
thus being inferred by the researcher, to have constrained the discharge of professional 
obligations, in ensuring geotechnical input in projects to an un-defined extent. 
9.4 Psychologic Factors impacting on GI 
9.4.1 Adversarial Contractual Relationship 
The most significant attitudes noted from the interview responses was the adversarial and 
suspicious view of the client and contractors towards each other. This was particularly evident in 
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the responses of the quantity surveyors interviewed from the highway agencies. For example, 
respondent HA1-MQS argued against the use of a DSC clause, asserting: 
          “It is clearly stated in the conditions of contracts, that contractors are advised to visit site 
and verify the conditions of the site for themselves. With this clause in the contract, it is 
the contractors’ prerogative to ascertain things for themselves and not have to rely on us 
to define the conditions of site. The ground investigation reports prepared by consultants 
for major projects are for the agency’s internal use in designs”. 
Also HA3-MQS in his description of the procurement practices of the highway agencies stressed: 
               “... We do not give room for contractors to swindle the government...” 
This psychological barrier may thus account for the divergence between the dictates of best 
practice and current practice within the highway agency organisations.  Especially given the 
highway agencies attempts to transfer risks associated with ground conditions to contractors, in 
their misguided notion of ensuring the certainty of final outturn cost.  However, as earlier sections 
of this analysis reveals, the contractors thus have to rely on guesswork in preparing estimates, 
which are forwarded in bids and typically see this as a non-risk, given the simplicity of post-
contract financial recovery due to the poor drafting of contractual documents. 
As HA2-RC, one of the medium sized contractors confirmed in response to a similar line of 
questioning relating to the inclusion of GIR, due to the current practices of the highway agencies, 
the firm was compelled to make claims and financial demands, through any available loopholes 
in the contract.  
“We have no option but to seek avenues in the contract, which are never water tight, in 
order to recover our losses” 
However respondent HA3-MQS stated:  
 “… if the contractors for major projects still persist in demanding financial compensation 
for such claims, the project has to be halted, and the agency’s legal unit will have to 
pursue settlement in court”.  
These forms of inherent counter relationship within the project environment, effectively act to limit 
professionals in the highway agencies, in their ability to realise the contractual benefits of 
adequate geo-risk containment. Such attitudes from the client is also counterproductive when 
considering the delivery of best value or value for money within the commissioned projects.  As 
these attitudes, ultimately are also counter-productive to the effective management of the 
financial risks associated with ground conditions in projects.  Given the lack of geotechnical data, 
is prompting the contractor to simply guess too high or too low when bidding for the project, and 
then recovering any losses through the manipulation of the contract.  
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Ultimately the client will either miss out on the attainment of value for money, as they may pay a 
premium for the project, if the contractor values the risk too highly and thus submits a high bid.  
Or the project will be threatened by delays, disputes and even abandonment, if the contractor 
bids too low.  Yet given the client’s focus on ‘lowest price wins’, together with the contractor’s 
perception that ‘any suicide bid submitted to secure the work, can then be recovered using the 
myriad of contractual loopholes once the project has been awarded’, extremely low bids would 
appear to be the most probable outcome. The adversarial contractual stance of client in highway 
projects, thus constitutes a psychological barrier to ensuring geotechnical input in highway 
projects, and a major trigger inducing cost overruns from latent geotechnical pathogens. 
9.4.2 GI in relation to Risk Perception 
The responses of respondents from the highway agencies, revealed inherent differences in the 
perceptions of the professionals, to ground risk. The researcher noted the poor risk perceptions 
of some of the engineers, as there appears not to be an understanding of the magnitude of  
financial risk posed to highway projects, undertaken without adequate ground investigations, 
irrespective of project size. Respondents from HA1 and HA2 did not see any justifiable need for 
detailed ground investigations for smaller community projects. An example of this can be seen 
in the response from the operational civil engineer from HA1, who suggested:  
“We do not need to carry out ground investigations for community projects. As you know 
ground investigations are very expensive, and that level of expenditure cannot be justified 
for simple community projects. We simply rely on experience and professional judgement 
to adjust from previous projects to suit the present project” (HA1-OCE) 
 
Also the response from HA2-OCE revealed the low level of geotechnical risk perception inferred 
from the explanation of how the agency identified heterogeneous ground conditions at project 
sites. It was stated that: 
“... We can easily assess the nature of soils in the project location from the type of 
vegetation growing” (HA2-OCE). 
However, respondents from HA3 seemed to have adequate in-house awareness of the need for 
geotechnical input for community road projects. based on their understanding of the risk 
implications of inadequate ground investigations, particularly for locations in wetlands. The 
respondents from HA3 made emphatic statements, dismissing this low risk view as to the 
relevance of ground investigations in projects. It was categorically opined that: 
           “… We cannot afford to build roads without taking necessary precautions in designs. In 
other states with better soil conditions, they can afford to take chances, but the 
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predominantly difficult swampy terrain dictates that geotechnical investigations are a must 
for all our road projects” (HA3-OCV). 
It was thus inferred from the responses that the professionals display differences in risk 
perception (in terms of geotechnical risk management) when they are involved in the delivery of 
small scale road projects. This is on the premise of some of the respondents’ adjudged adequacy 
of relying on geotechnical input from site inspections, as a basis for design preparation, and due 
to the perceived non-justification of the expenditure associated with carrying out detailed ground 
explorations.  
9.4.3 De-Motivation of Professionals 
The motivation of professionals to apply their geotechnical expertise in designs and costing was 
identified as a factor, which plays out to affect the quality of GI in projects. For instance, 
respondent HA2-OQS expressed an attitude of unquestioning acceptance of the power of 
political influence which weighs in oppressively on the motivation of the professionals. He 
stated: 
         “... Our contractors are mostly political bigwigs and can get away with anything. We the 
professionals simply dance to the tune of our political superiors” (HA2-OQS). 
A similar response from respondent HA1-OCE reinforced this view, asserting: 
“Never underestimate the powers of politicians… the political entity or entities who 
pushed for the project to be approved, will also ultimately influence the speed of the 
design preparation process by mounting pressure on the consultants”.  
Finally, respondent HA1-MQS made similar references to the influence and power of politicians 
over the consultants: 
“Often times, the consultants under pressure may over-design or under-design the 
project which would inevitably mean that the project estimate which is also prepared by 
the consultants would be much higher or lower than what it should. The successful 
contractor would end up being that same political father who lobbied and facilitated the 
speedy preparation of estimate, for the project to be included in the budget.  
 
The overriding influence of political authority on professional duties was expressed un-
equivocally by HA2-MQS who advocated: 
             “... As a professional employed under the service of a government parastatal, you have 
to be careful with the due diligence and integrity with which you carry out your job. 
Overzealousness can lead to your being removed from being part of the project team or 
even dismissal from your job” (HA2- MQS). 
At the post contract phase, the respondents’ resignation to accept the influence of political 
authority, considered necessary to facilitate in-house approval processes, is equally discernible: 
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“Several of these projects experienced technical hiccups and had no political god father 
to rescue them” (HA2-MQS). 
Also respondent HA2-OCE stated:  
“…this may take lengthy periods of several months and even up to a year, depending 
on the contractor’s personal political connections to push for his application to be 
handled” (HA2-OCE).  
Political authority thus appears to have usurped the role of project leadership, the dynamics of 
which ideally determines the motivation and performance of team members in highway projects. 
The subjugation of professional obligations and ethics in deference to political dictates, can thus 
be inferred to have had a psychological impact on the motivation of professionals in highway 
projects. This may ultimately have its fundamental roots in the wider socio-political climate 
surrounding highway development in the Niger Delta, characterised by both its political instability 
and poor governance (Ihuah and Benibo, 2014). Political authority which represents non-
geotechnical decision makers in highway projects, thus impact on the performance of core 
geotechnical expertise, ultimately hindering the attainment of the value for money benefits of 
adequate geotechnical input in the Niger Delta region 
9.4.4 Theme Summary: Psychologic Factors impacting on GI 
Several issues have been discerned from the responses of the highway professionals, which 
constitute psychological barriers to ensuring geotechnical input in highway projects executed in 
the Niger Delta region: 
 The adversarial contractual stance of client in highway projects; 
 The lack of adequate geotechnical risk perception; 
 The demotivation of design and costing professionals in the performance of their 
obligations by non-geotechnical decision makers.  
 
It is inferred that these psychological barriers are put up by the professional actors in highway 
projects, in response to social conditioning inherent in the institutional setting of the highway 
organisations, and as a result of a lack of a clear-cut understanding of the benefits of geotechnical 
input. Psychological barriers thus represent the behavioural contextual drivers, whose negative 
aura facilitate the geotechnical pathogens, latent in the highway organisations, to act out their 
full potential in the human element underlying the execution of highway projects, thus inducing 
cost overruns. 
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9.5 GI Dichotomies 
9.5.1 Major Versus Community Projects Dichotomy  
Different combinations of ground related issues, previously inferred from the deductive analysis 
of geotechnical pathogen, have affected project delivery by the highway agencies to varying 
degrees of undefined impact. However, from the responses, there is an easily discernible 
dichotomy in the levels of geotechnical input, in major versus community projects. Community 
projects evident an almost complete lack of geotechnical input in pre-contract preparation, with 
ill-defined and illogical stages of project development. For major projects executed, the 
researcher noted the relatively higher level of pre-contract preparation by consultants, who are 
charged with the full responsibility for ensuring geotechnical input in the design of major projects.   
 
This dichotomy in the levels of geotechnical input at the pre-contract phases, further differs in 
consonance with the adequacy of the distinct organisational settings in the Niger Delta, as 
presented in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3. As such, for the different organisations, the contrast 
between the levels of geotechnical risk containment, for both classes of projects, also differs. 
 
As summarised in Table 9.1, major projects executed by HA1 have relatively higher level of pre-
contract preparation via geotechnical input in budgeting; carrying out ground investigations prior 
to design preparation and contract awarded based on formal design drawings after some form 
of technical tender examination criteria.  
Table 9.1: Levels of GI in Major and Community Projects Executed by HA1 
 Major Projects(Traditional/DB) Community Projects (Traditional) 
Nomenclature of development phases in 
relation to pre-contract preparation 
Consistent with adequate pre-
contract preparation 
In-Consistent and poor level of pre-
contract preparation 
Level of Geotechnical Input in Budgeting High (based on detailed 
designs) 
None-No budgetary projections  
Adequacy of Designs Adequacy unverified (may be 
subject to unethical practices) 
In-adequate- No formal design 
drawings, only discretionary 
sketches, based on survey plans... 
Mode of Assessment of Heterogeneous Soil 
Conditions 
Adequate (based on detailed 
ground investigations) 
Inadequate (based on preliminary site 
reconnaissance and crude 
improvised desk studies) 
Adequacy of Contract Documentation: In-adequate (no GIR or DSC 
clauses) 
Highly In-adequate (No GIR, DSC 
clause or other standard contract 
documentation) 
Adequacy of GI in In-house Contractor 
Selection Criteria 
In-adequate (Based on technical 
and Financial bids, but no GI 
algorithm) 
In-adequate (based on community 
considerations) 
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Respondents from HA2 did not imply any form of dichotomy for major and community projects, 
as they repeatedly emphasized that both major and community projects lacked adequate 
geotechnical input, and were fraught with variations and delays on the grounds of unexpected 
site conditions. This trend is inferred by the researcher to be closely linked with the almost 
complete lack of geotechnical input in pre-contract preparation evident at the phases of project 
development, which are ill-defined and follow no standard logically progressive stages. The 
prevailing very low levels of geotechnical input in major and community road projects are 
summarily outlined in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2: Levels of GI in Major and Community Projects executed by HA2 
 Major Projects (DB) Community Projects (DB) 
Nomenclature of development phases in 
relation to pre-contract preparation 
Inconsistent with poor pre-
contract preparation 
Inconsistent and poor level of pre-
contract preparation 
Level of Geotechnical Input in Budgeting low-based on uniform cost per Km 
with subjective adjustments 
None-No budgetary projections 
Adequacy of Designs Adequacy unverified, may be 
subject to unethical practices 
In-adequate- No formal design 
drawings or sketches. 
Mode of Assessment of Heterogeneous 
Soil Conditions 
Adequacy unverified (based on 
D&B contractor’s discretion) 
Inadequate (based on contractors’ 
discretion) 
Adequacy of Contract Documentation In-adequate (No formal contract 
documentation procedure),  
Highly In-adequate (Unverified DB 
designs in contract documentation) 
Adequacy of GI in In-house Contractor 
Selection Criteria 
In-adequate (Contractors selected 
without technical bids, based on 
political considerations). 
In-adequate (Contractors selected 
without technical bids, based on 
political considerations) 
 
Respondents from HA3, in contrast to the scenario of project delivery in HA1 and HA2, stated 
that for both major and community projects soil conditions were reflected in designs prepared 
after detailed ground investigations. For major projects, it was stated: 
              “We maintain a set of highly qualified and reputable consortium of professionals, who 
are responsible for the design of our major projects. They have the requisite high level 
of technical skills necessary for the specialised designs that are compatible with our 
marshy terrain” (HA3-MQS). 
For community projects, respondent HA3-MQs further explained: 
              “For community projects, we prepare adequate and comprehensive des igns that reflect 
all required professional expertise … (HA3-MQS). 
Table 9.3 captures the relatively higher level of geotechnical input in the pre-construction phases 
of development for both classes of projects executed by HA3. 
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Table 9.3: Levels of GI in Major and Community Projects Executed by HA3 
 Major Projects (Traditional/DB) Community Projects 
(Traditional) 
Nomenclature of development phases in 
relation to pre-contract preparation 
consistent with adequate pre-
contract preparation 
consistent with adequate pre-
contract preparation 
Level of Geotechnical Input in Budgeting low-based on uniform cost per Km 
with subjective adjustments 
low-based on uniform cost per Km 
with subjective adjustments 
Adequacy of Designs Adequate-Formal designs inclusive 
of all relevant design drawings. 
Adequate- formal design drawings 
are produced based on all relevant 
professional input. 
Mode of Assessment of Heterogeneous 
Soil Conditions 
Adequate-based on detailed 
investigations by consultants 
Adequate-GI ensured by in-house 
geotechnical unit  
Adequacy of GI in Contract 
Documentation 
In-adequate, No GIR or DSC 
clauses.  However, based on 
approved designs and other 
standard contract documentation.   
In-adequate No GIR or DSC 
clauses.   However, based on 
approved designs and other 
standard contract documentation.   
Adequacy of GI in in-house Contractor 
selection 
In-Adequate (Contractors selected 
based on technical and financial 
bids but no GI Algorithm). 
Inadequate (Contractors selected, 
based on community 
considerations) 
 
9.5.2 Upland Vs Riverine Dichotomy 
Some of the respondents from the highway agencies stated that only few of their road projects 
were located in riverine areas, whose locations are often remote. This was repeatedly 
emphasized by respondents from HA2. It was explained that this was because the government 
preferred to focus on highly visible projects located in densely populated areas, which can be 
used as a basis for political campaigns and adverts. Table 9.4 provides a list of projects executed 
by HA2 over the past 8 years, illustrating a predominance to commission upland projects, a 
finding which supports literature assertions. 
Table 9.4: Projects Executed by HA2 in Different Upland and Riverine Locations 
Project Location 
First Bank/Rumuobiakani/Old Aba Road Upland 
Oginigba /Slaughter Road Upland 
The Elekahia/Rumuomasi road Upland 
Rumuola Road (completed) Upland 
Eneka/Igbo-Etche/ Iriebe road Upland 
Woji/Okujagu/Elelenwo road. Upland 
Rumuagholu /Ada George road Upland 
Ken Saro Wiwa road/ Stadium road  Upland 
Rumuibekwe/Elelenwo road and bridge Upland 
Rumuekini/ Aluu road Upland 
Ozuboko/Elelenwo road-  Upland 
Rukpokwu/Eneka/Eligbolo road Upland 
Rukpakwulusi /Eligbolo /Rumuodomaya road Upland 
Ozuoba/Rumuparaeli/Choba road Upland 
The Okirika Ring Road Riverine 
The Ogoni/Andoni/Opobo Unity Road Riverine 
The Bonny- Bodo road Riverine 
Omofo/Agba/Ndele road leading to Abua. Riverine 
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The respondents explained that most internal rural community roads initiated by HA2, located in 
different riverine areas, have been abandoned for several years. Respondent HA2-MQS, 
explained that minimising delays in more visible upland projects were often prioritised in budgets 
while delays in community projects often led to outright project abandonment: 
          “... It is these highly visible major projects in upland areas, which are often included in 
budgets and whose work progress is closely monitored to ensure completion, so as not to 
project a bad image for the government. These projects are the ones included in urban 
master plans. Most projects in riverine areas are executed adhocly, used to settle active 
politicians who have played major political roles. (HA2-MQS) 
 
It was further stated that: 
         ““The agency as it stands does not have any autonomy to make mile stone payments for 
awarded projects already included in budgets, it is at the discretion of the ***, depending 
on what are considered priority projects, to authorise payments and for projects execution 
to continue. This often results in other non-strategic projects often situated in riverine areas 
to be put on hold. As such cash flow to these other projects between instalments will 
experience frequent hiccups and may even be abandoned for several years (HA2-OQS).”  
 
Respondents’ assertions revealed a very high spate of project delays and abandonment which 
appears to be clustered more in riverine areas mainly as a result of their low priority status within 
the agencies. This is despite the fact that these riverine roads, ideally should serve as inter 
community links necessary to foster economic growth and aid the mobility of the vast majority of 
the rural populace who reside in these areas. The researcher thus infers that this practice has 
doubly impacted on the levels of geotechnical input, particularly as most of these riverine roads 
are community projects, which completely lack pre-contract preparation. This may explain their 
relatively higher level of delays and project abandonments, leading to the significant 
infrastructural gap between the drier uplands and the riverine areas, repeatedly reported in the 
literature (Ogura 2002; Teme 2002; Ngerebara et al., 2014). The literature thus shows that the 
few available roads in the Niger Delta are those within the towns and villages located in the 
uplands, a situation which has being frequently attributed to the terrain. As Ngerebara (2014:87) 
commented: 
            “The existence of roads which is taken for granted in some parts of the country is a luxury 
to the people of the predominantly riverine Niger Delta … A development blamed on 
the several abandoned government road projects, due to the developmental constraints 
posed by the difficult terrain”. 
 
For HA1 and HA3, no form of dichotomy in levels of GI for upland and riverine projects was 
implied. For instance, respondent HA3-OCE suggested: 
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              “All our projects have to go through all relevant design procedures, with inputs from 
made from the professional departments such as mechanical, electrical, civil and geo-
technics before they can be approved for detailed costing. They are also supervised by 
qualified engineers employed by the ministry.” (HA3-OCE). 
Contrary to HA2, it was explained that projects commissioned in riverine areas were given closer 
attention due to the inherent difficulties associated with the terrain. As respondent HA3-MQS 
opined: 
“Plans and designs for most roads in the riverine areas had needed to be revisited after 
the recent epoch of disastrous floods which destroyed so much of the existing meagre 
infrastructure in the state. The ministry has since then embarked on over 40 major 
construction projects and over 41 community road projects awarded in 2013”. 
 
The respondents further explained that due to the state's predominantly swampy terrain, and the 
scarcity of dry land, most construction works undertaken by the agency were inevitably built on 
reclaimed land. Making any form of construction work not only expensive, but also time 
consuming.  It is clear, this perception of the difficulties the Niger Delta, presently, may also 
account for the infrastructure deficit in the state, as it was further stated that: 
             “Prior to this, there was practically no infrastructure and that is why the Governor is angry 
to develop the State. The State is backward and unlike neighbouring oil producing states, 
has nothing to show in terms of development” (HA3-MQS) 
9.5.2 Theme Summary: GI Dichotomies 
Findings from this theme has highlighted several dichotomous practices and issues in the 
highway agencies, which account for the poor levels of geotechnical input in highway projects. 
These factors include the: 
 Preferential management of geotechnical risk, in relation to project size and location;  
 Adequate versus poor pre-contract preparation for major versus community; 
 Planned versus adhoc procurement practices for major versus community projects; 
 Politically motivated selective project management practices; 
 Unequal priority status in post contract management of upland versus riverine projects.  
 
The negative trend of poor levels of geotechnical input, more evident in community projects, than 
in major projects, as well as the prioritisation of upland projects to the detriment of projects in 
remote riverine locations, is indicative of a preferential management of geotechnical risk, which 
is a recipe that would logically culminate in significant cost overruns. Considering the 
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geotechnical difficulties and complementary cost associated with highway construction in the 
meander and coastal belts of the Niger Delta. This trend may account for the significant disparity 
in the levels of cost overruns, between the geo-zones in the sample of highway projects, 
previously analysed in chapter five. The inequalities in the level of geotechnical input in relation 
to project size and location, has major implications which constitute the barriers, latent in the 
entirety of the institutional system of highway delivery, to managing the ground risk inherent in 
the geologic setting of the Niger Delta. 
9.6 Unethical Professional Practices  
9.6.1 Unethical Consultancy Practices 
Some respondents from the HA1 and HA2 emphasized the prevalence of unprofessional 
practices by consultants. Typical responses from the agencies’ staff implied that consultants 
were unethical in the performance of their professional duties, and may be compromised.  This 
can be inferred from the response of HA1-OCE who stated: 
“Never underestimate the powers of politicians… the political entity or entities who 
pushed for the project to be approved, will also ultimately influence the speed of the 
design preparation process by mounting pressure on the consultants”.  
 
Respondent HA1-MQS made similar references to the influence and power which may induce 
unethical practices by the consultants, suggesting: 
“…the consultants, under pressure may over-design or under-design the project which 
would inevitably mean that the project estimate which is also prepared by the consultants 
would be much higher or lower than what it should”.  
 
Respondent HA1-MQS further described some of the consultants as being more inclined towards 
promoting their financial interest, stating: 
      “...most times the consultants don’t even have a motivation to manage cost ... sometimes 
over-designing projects to simulate worst case scenarios, ... to increase their fees 
which are payed as a percentage of the project cost...” 
The Interview response from HA2-OCE, an operational civil engineer who had previously worked 
in a consultancy firm before being employed by HA2, further supported the notion of the 
prevalence of such unethical practices, with the respondent admitting: 
“... we have experienced cases were the proposed plans and structural drawings 
prepared and presented by consultants for approval did not match… were discovered 
during the vetting process” (HA2-OCE).  
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This was explained as some of the issues that the department of *** in the agency experience, 
when plans for proposed highway projects prepared by consultants were vetted by an in-house 
group of chartered professionals. It was also revealed that sometimes ground investigation 
reports or designs for previous projects of a similar nature within the vicinity of the proposed 
project were obtained and presented to the agencies as part of their consultancy services: 
“...Sometimes geotechnical investigation reports and design drawings are photocopied 
from other previously executed projects and modified” (HA2-DC).  
 
Respondent HA2-OCE further explained that some of unethical practices were still continuing, 
although the highway agency was not aware of these and expressed dismay that such practices 
went undetected by the agency: 
“...The consultant still gets to be payed the full professional fees and makes a hefty profit” 
HA2-OCE.   
 
Respondents from HA3, however, did not make any assertions on the prevalence of such un-
ethical practices. 
9.6.2 Unethical Contractor’s Practices 
The responses of the agencies staff revealed various forms of unethical practices by contractors 
which has severe implications for the adequacy of geotechnical input in highway projects. For 
HA1, it was explained that due to the politicised procurement climate in the highway agency, 
some of the major projects were awarded to political figures, who lacked the technical capacity 
to execute the job. Most of the contractors were not registered construction firms and had no 
prior knowledge of road construction or the relevance of geotechnical input. This led to several 
unethical contractual practices, typically the subletting of contracts. It was stated: 
“Most of the contractors are politicians, who do not have the technical capacity to 
execute major highway projects, the politicians often sub-let the awarded contract to 
other smaller unestablished construction firms who would then carry out the execution 
of the project. However, the firms to which the contracts are sublet have no direct 
contractual stake in the project” (HA1-MQS). 
 
Respondent HA2-MQS also alluded to unethical design practices by contractors in most of the 
agency’s projects which were usually procured on a Design and Build basis. It was explained 
that often times the designs which are ideally supposed to be prepared by the contractor’s 
consultant were never actually prepared. It was thus explicitly emphasized that at present times, 
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the Design and Build tag attached to the procurement system was a farce, as detailed designs 
were hardly ever prepared by the contractors.  
 
It was commented by respondent HA2-MQS that: 
       “... In reality what happens is different from what is projected to the public. For most of our 
so-called design and build projects, detailed designs may not necessarily be prepared, 
unless for mega high profile projects executed by efficient and established contractors”.  
 
It was further stated that it was left to discretion of the contractor, to employ the services of a 
geotechnical professional for which a provisional sum for site investigation is provided. 
Respondent HA2-OCE also stated that: 
“What most of the contractors basically managed to do is to employ engineers to design 
the geometric alignment of the road using the levels from survey plan provided”. 
 
Frequent changes and variation orders approved in such DB projects, in response to demands 
by contractors who were supposed to have prepared detailed designs, as specified in the 
contract documentation, and for which a provisional sum for site investigation is provided, was 
considered as proof of this.  According to respondent HA2-OCE: 
         “...Contractors collect money for site investigations and the preparation of detailed designs 
and simply pocket it. It is only when they encounter poor unexpected soil conditions, that 
they may eventually employ a geotechnical consultant to determine its extent, to demand 
extra payment”. 
9.6.3 Unethical GI Verification Practices 
From the responses of the interviewees, the practices of the highway agencies in verifying 
geotechnical input by contractors and consultants was inferred. For HA2, whether ground 
investigations were actually carried out by the contractors as a basis of preparing detailed 
designs was not ascertained by the agency. Respondent HA2-OCE, described a typical instance 
of how the political environment surrounding the procurement of road projects by the agency has 
impacted on the professional obligation to ascertain the requisite level of geotechnical input in 
some of the major DB projects:  
           “Those of us who are civil engineers may not even get to see the final designs that has 
being provided by the contractor, for our road projects ... As a consequence, the 
contractors who usually have political clout can get away with making significant claims, 
on the basis of variations due to differing ground conditions, which we may not even be 
allowed to verify” (HA2-OCE).  
 
This was also implied in the response of respondent HA2-OQS 
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“... The contractors do not know how to execute the jobs... often had to privately hire the 
services of the in-house professionals to supervise their projects”. 
 
This form of unethical practice at the post contractual phase implies that the in-house 
professionals who are obligated to monitor post-contract project execution, to ensure 
geotechnical input as client’s representatives are compromised, and thus function in a dual 
capacity as contractor’s employees.  
For HA1, the management level quantity surveyor thus explained the prevailing trend of unethical 
practices, had been noted by the management of the agency, who have put measures in place 
at the pre-contract phase to verify geotechnical input:  
        The agency has noted this trend and there have been recent changes in the scale of 
payment of their professional fees. We now negotiate with the consultants on a flat fee 
and vet their designs thoroughly before they are approved. It has been proposed that 
there should be a distinct estimating unit to equally vet proposed cost figures for 
projects and trim excesses” (HA1-MQS) 
However, the operational quantity surveyor differed in his opinion, stating: 
“Major Projects listed in budget are sometimes awarded by management … and site 
works commenced without the knowledge of the agency’s professional staff...  (HA1-
OQS).  
 
This implies that there will be project management lapses at the post contract phase in monitoring 
of projects, which would ultimately determine the adequacy of geotechnical input in the awarded 
highway projects.  
Responses of interviewees from HA3, did not imply any form of unethical practices, in the 
verification of geotechnical input by consultants and contractors for major projects. Rather the 
respondents repeatedly stressed how rigorous the practice of the agency was in ensuring 
geotechnical input, it was asserted emphatically that: 
“At the post-contract phase, we carryout laboratory testing of geo-materials as measures 
of quality control” (HA3-OCE).  
 
9.6.4 Theme Summary: Unethical Professional Practices 
The findings from this theme have highlighted three major underlying issues, external and 
internal to the organisational confines of the highway agencies, which constitute barriers to 
achieving adequate geotechnical input in highway projects: 
 Unethical professional practices of consultants at the pre-contract phase; 
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 Unethical professional practices of contractors at the post contract phase; 
 Lack of verification of geotechnical input by in-house professionals, who may be 
compromised. 
It can be inferred that subtle unethical practices may thus be associated with the adequacy of 
geotechnical input in designs and the post contract management of highway projects executed 
in the Niger Delta. The researcher, however, cannot generalise the prevalence of such un-ethical 
practices to all registered consultants or contractors in the professional service of the agencies.  
Yet, based on the responses from the highway agencies’ staff, the researcher has, however, 
discovered the existence of internal organisational loopholes, which create a viable ground for 
such unethical practices, where they do occur, to thrive. It can be thus inferred that some of the 
highway agencies operating in the Niger Delta are lacking a rigorously enforced organisational 
platform that will allow them to ensure and verify geotechnical input at the pre-contract or at the 
post contract phase of project execution. This internal shortcoming thus creates avenues for 
unethical practices by consultants and contractors, some of who may exploit the porosity of the 
prevailing organisational system to their advantage. 
9.7 Procurement Irregularities 
9.7.1 Hushed and Unrealistic Bidding Timelines 
The contractors stated that coupled with insufficient geotechnical details provided the highway 
agencies, they were also mostly subjected to unrealistic timelines, during bidding. At the bidding 
stage, they often had to bid for projects, whose call for tenders were not formally publicised or 
were contracted on an emergency basis. Respondent HA2-RC stated: 
“The call for tender, most times is not publicised, and is usually hushed. Unless you have 
an insider to relay information, the bidding process may be over before it is made public. 
We most times do not get adequate notice to prepare our bids. As such under this 
conditions, our bids may not be realistic”. 
 
The contractors thus explained that it was impracticable for them to carry out their own pre-
contract ground investigations within the time-scale of the tender period, and also in view of the 
prohibitive cost of detailed investigations. Respondent HA1-RC thus stated: 
Contract documents may be provided just a week before the deadline for submission of 
tender, and we are thus expected to hurriedly ascertain ground conditions based on 
visual inspections. 
 
Additionally, respondent HA3-RC also suggested:  
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“The time normally allowed for bidding is too short to allow us to do a thorough 
examination of the project and the ground condition at project site in the calculation of 
our prices. The normal tender period is around 1-2 weeks on the average for most jobs… 
 
This has meant that the contractors invariably have to rely on subjective assessments made 
during expedited site visits at the time of tender. This risk of unforeseen ground conditions due 
to lack of adequate geotechnical input is therefore very high in such highway projects, procured 
under emergency conditions. Respondent HA2-RC thus explained that the compressed timing 
in addition to lack of geotechnical input in contract documentation, often meant that they had to 
seek avenues of recovering costs unaccounted for during bidding.  
9.7.2 Subjective Procurement 
Subjectivity in the procurement practices of the highway agencies was noted by the researcher 
from the responses to the interview questions. Some of the respondents explained that despite 
the outward policy projection by the highway agencies, most of their projects were subjectively 
awarded without any form of competitive bidding or following due process, and were influenced 
by the senior managerial staff of the agencies in response to contractors’ demands. Typically, it 
was stated that: 
“… There were no due contractual processes in the award of some of these 
projects…influenced by the agency’s senior staff...” (HA1-OQS) 
 
HA1-OQS, thus explained that, most of the managerial staff award contracts for road projects, 
without following due contractual processes, against the agencies’ technical regulations which 
ideally requires that due processes and ethical protocols be followed. The participants explained 
that some contracts were awarded to relations, and friends who were ill-qualified to execute 
highway projects. 
“Imagine giving a highway project to a contractor who does not have the faintest idea 
about construction simply on the basis of his friendship with a senior staff” (HA1-OQS). 
 
Also respondent HA1-OQS explained that after contract award, applications for variations or 
claims made by contractors during project execution, were also subjectively processed within the 
internal organisational structure of the agency: 
“… If the contractor does not have an insider, his file and application will not be pushed 
forward for approval and he would keep running around in circles waiting for the 
approval which may never surface” (HA1-OQS).  
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In HA2, it was explained that most contracts were awarded based on the personal discretion of 
the current political authority: 
          “... Our contractors are mostly political bigwigs and can get away with anything. We the 
professionals simply dance to the tune of our political superiors” (HA2-OQS). 
 
Such similar politicised procurement climate, which imposes subjectivity on the professional staff 
of the agency during contractor selection is also noted in HA1: 
“The successful contractor would end up being that same political father who lobbied 
and facilitated the speedy preparation of estimate, for the project to be included in the 
budget” (HA1-MQS).  
 
In HA3, the respondents however did not directly acknowledge subjectivity in procurement during 
the contractor selection process. 
9.7.3 Multiple Contract Re-Award  
The trend of frequent project delays and abandonment evident in highway projects was emphasized 
in the responses of the highway agencies’ staff. Respondent HA2-OQS opined:  
“Sometimes when the contractor ends up out rightly abandoning the projects, they remain 
in this state for several years, while degenerating and causing public nuisance, by 
hindering the mobility of goods and persons”. 
 
Respondent HA1-MQS explained that when projects had been delayed for unusually long time, 
successive administrations will have to re-award the contract afresh to another contractor. A typical 
response by one of the participants in respect of this was: 
        “When a new administration comes into power, either in government or if the *** is 
changed, there is usually what we call ‘clean-up’. This means all outstanding abandoned 
projects will have to be re-awarded as new projects and all the financial resources that 
may have gone into the project in the previous administration will be wiped off the slate 
as non-recoverable” (HA1-OQS). 
For HA2, the respondents explained that this was typical for community projects, where a project 
that ideally ought to be completed within a few months may span up to several years, being 
intermittently delayed for lengthy periods of times at various stages. Respondent HA2-OQS stated 
that: 
“Most of our projects exceed our initial figures by a very wide margin. Sometimes you 
cannot even keep track of how much the project has exceeded the initial budget because 
projects just keep getting delayed and abandoned and re-awarded haphazardly”.  
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9.7.4 Theme Summary: Procurement Irregularities 
The findings from this theme has shown that the socio-cultural system of highway projects 
execution in the Niger Delta, is fraught with in-effective procurement processes, which are also 
counterproductive to ensuring geotechnical input in highway projects, ultimately leading to 
excessive cost overruns. Such practices and inconsistencies include: 
 Non-publicising of call for bids, which deters technically efficient contractors from bidding 
for jobs;  
 Compressed timeline for contractors to bid, which increases clients’ financial risk 
exposure to differing site condition claims;  
 Award of contracts to unqualified contractors, which has led to an informal hierarchical 
chain of contract subletting with no binding geotechnical stake;  
 Multiple contract re-award leading inconsistent and unaccountable geotechnical input in 
projects, which is further complemented by cost escalations.   
 
9.8 Summary of Findings from the Interview Analysis 
The deductive analysis of the interviews in the chapter eight, examined the design and estimating 
practices of highway agencies in the Niger Delta, and how they account for the level of 
geotechnical input in highway projects. The findings from the inductive analysis of the interviews 
in this chapter has served to create an awareness of the role of people, organisations/institutions 
and socio-cultural settings as factors in the management of geotechnical risk. These induced 
themes have thus been identified as the barriers to adequate geotechnical input, which equally 
represent the range of practical issues evident in the practices of highway agencies, driving cost 
overruns compounded by the deltaic setting of the region. 
 
An array of factors predicated on the need for geotechnical input, has thus been identified from 
the deductive and inductive phases of the interview analysis, as actively contributing to the 
current state of highway development in the Niger Delta. Table 9.5 provides a summary of the 
factors and sub-factors extracted from the interview analysis, which constitute the latent 
geotechnical pathogens and contextual drivers, escalating costs for in highway projects executed 
in the Niger Delta.  
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Table 9.5: Cost Overrun Drivers Inferred from the Deductive and Inductive Analysis  
Theme       Sub-Theme            Cost Overrun Drivers 
 
Nomenclature of 
project  
Phases 
    Configuration 
    Pre-contract preparation 
Ill—Structured phase configuration 
Poor Pre-contract preparation 
 
Level of GI in 
preliminary  
project phase 
Lack of GI in conceptual costing 
 
 
lack of GI in Planning Phase 
 
Community restiveness pressure 
Lack of preliminary GI 
Community considerations 
Lack of geo-route-selection 
 
GI in designs Design preparation  
Process 
 
Mode of assessing  
heterogeneous ground conditions 
 
Non-Adherence to TRRL GI 
 
Ext Consultant GI 
 
DB contractors’ GI 
 
 
 
Adhoc design preparation 
Emergency designs 
Reactive post contract GI 
Uniform standard designs 
Lack of desk study 
Lack of detailed GI 
Based on preliminary reconnaissance 
Non verification of GI 
 
 
GI in contractual 
Phase 
 
Contract documentation 
 
Contractor selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No DSC Clauses 
Non-inclusion of GIR 
Non-engineering Form of contract 
Hand sketches designs   
Survey plan layout contract documentation 
Verbal instructions 
Emergency procurement 
No GI algorithm 
Non -Technical bids 
 
 
Organisational 
dynamics 
Flow of GI  
Clarity of professional roles 
 
Geotechnical Presence 
 
Contractual Porosity 
Poor organisational structure; 
Mis-matched qualifications and job description 
Lack of qualified technical manpower 
Porosity of contractual system 
Non-progressive GI    
non-construction related professionals 
No role-specific professional delineation; 
Absence of in-house Geotechnical Personnel 
 
 
External Pressure     Community pressure 
     
Political pressure 
    
 
Community considerations 
Youth restiveness pressure 
Emergency procurement 
Contractors influence 
Political interference 
Unqualified contractors 
Lack of due process in contracts 
Unverified contractors’ claims 
Fear by professionals 
Unplanned budgeting 
Heightened security risk to contractors 
 
Psychologic Adversarial contractual stance 
 
Counter geotechnical relations; 
Oppressive political influence 
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De-motivation of professionals 
 
Risk perception 
 
Poor risk perception 
Unjustified expenditure for detailed GI; 
 
Skills and Knowledge 
Gaps  
 
 
Knowledge gaps in design 
 
Knowledge gaps in 
procurement  
 
 
Lack of clear understanding of geo-risk 
Ignorance of geotechnical best practices 
Lack of awareness of current design practices 
Non-discernible skills 
   
GI Dichotomies Major Vs Community Projects 
 
Upland Vs Riverine 
Preferential management of geotechnical risk in 
relation to project size and location;  
Planned vs adhoc procurement practices for major 
vs community projects; 
Politically motivated selective project management 
practices; 
Lower priority status in post contract management of 
riverine projects 
 
Unethical Practices Unethical professional 
practices of consultants 
 
Unethical professional 
practices of contractors 
 
Unethical in-house verification  
Deliberate under-design of projects 
Replication of past GI reports 
Replication of similar designs 
Non-GI in DB designs   
Contractors Influence of design preparation 
Contractors Influence of contract award 
Stifled verification of post-contract GI 
In-house professionals serving in dual capacity as 
client and contractors representative 
 
Procurement 
Irregularities 
Hushed and Unrealistic 
Bidding Timelines  
 
Subjective Procurement 
 
Multiple Contract Re-Award 
 
 
Non-adherence to due contractual processes  
Non-publicising of call for bid 
Compressed timeline for tender submission 
informal hierarchical chain of contract subletting  
Multiple contract re-award  
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.9 Chapter Summary 
The findings from this chapter have served to fill in a major gap in the literature, against the 
backdrop of the paucity of organisational studies which have developed a robust and in-depth 
contextual explanation of cost overruns in highway projects in the Niger Delta. The findings thus 
highlight the fact that the high level of cost overrun evidenced in highway project execution in the 
geologic setting of the Niger Delta, are not purely triggered by technical factors. Non-technical 
Deduced Themes (Latent Geotechnical Pathogens) 
 Induced Themes (Contextual Drivers) 
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factors, such as: human psychology; organizational setting; socio-political factors; knowledge 
gaps; procurement irregularities; as well as the current practice of prioritisation of projects 
according to project size or location/preferential management of ground related risk, also playout 
to culminate in the unusually high levels of cost overruns. Consideration thus has to be given to 
not only the geotechnical factors evident in the development phases as they relate to ground 
conditions, but also to the psychological interplay between the principal technical and non-
technical actors in the prevailing organisational and socio-political context of the highway 
agencies.  
 
The result of the earlier deductive analysis in chapter eight, had identified the geotechnical 
pathogens latent in the practices of the highway organisations, which as Love (2012) ‘Latent 
Pathogen’ theory conceptualises, mostly lie dormant and have gone undetected, as they form 
part of the everyday practices of the highway organisations. However, the fundamental 
contextual drivers, representing the barriers to managing geotechnical risk uncovered in this 
chapter, actively combine with the geotechnical pathogens to trigger a ‘vicious cycle of delays 
and short funding’, which Morris (1990) conceptualises as leading to cost overruns in public 
projects.  It thus cannot be easily isolated, which of the identified issues has had the highest 
impact on highway project delivery, as they all exist in a state of complex mutual interactivity. 
Chapter ten, nonetheless, attempts this, using regression modelling, to explain and account for 
the variance in cost overruns of the sampled highway projects, induced by the geotechnical 
pathogens, while -content analysis is used to rank the emergent contextual drivers. 
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Chapter 10 
Geo-Spatial Regression Modelling, Content Analysis, and Cognitive 
Mapping of Geotechnical and Contextual Cost Overrun Drivers  
10.0 Introduction 
The findings of the previous analysis in chapter five and eight, has shown the latent geotechnical 
pathogens that have culminated in accounting for the recorded levels of cost overruns in highway 
projects, constitute a chain of causality, which is entrenched in the complex web of contextual 
dynamics (revealed in chapter nine). As captured in Figure 10.1, a multiplicity of latent variables 
and contexts appear to be directly relevant, when trying to explain why the cost overruns 
experienced on Niger Delta highway projects are so unusually high. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Complexity of Interaction and Contexts in Highway Projects in the Niger Delta 
To explain and thus account for the recorded level of cost overrun, the researcher in this chapter, 
has attempted to triangulate the findings of the case study, by evaluating the distinct contributions 
of the geotechnical pathogens, and the contextual drivers inherent in highway development in 
the Niger Delta. This was achieved quantitatively and qualitatively, via regression analysis and 
content analysis/cognitive mapping respectively.  
Regression modelling was used to statistically analyse how much variation in the recorded 
project cost overruns have been directly triggered by variation in the core geotechnical factors, 
namely: (1) the latent cost drivers as deduced from the geo-statistical analysis undertaken in 
chapter five and (2) the levels of geotechnical input by highway agencies explored in chapter 
eight. Secondly, the researcher has also applied content analysis to the qualitative data, to 
quantitatively assess the frequency of coded responses linked to the social constructs, which 
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emerged as contextual drivers, as identified from the inductive thematic analysis presented in 
chapter nine. Finally, cognitive mapping has been adopted to allow the researcher to visually 
conceptualise the interactions between the emergent contextual drivers and the latent 
geotechnical pathogens. 
10.1 Regression Modelling 
Regression analysis has been defined as “A statistical process for estimating the relationships 
among variables. It includes many techniques for modelling and analysing several variables, 
when the focus is on the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables or predictors” (Zwaing, 2014:84). Chou (2010) asserts that regression is 
a very powerful statistical tool that can be used as both an analytical and predictive tool in 
evaluating the sensitivity of project estimates to cost drivers.  Such regression models of cost 
overrun, particularly have applicability and statistical significance that has been useful mostly in 
risk analysis (Zwaing, 2014), as they have the advantage of a well-defined mathematical basis. 
This is because regression analysis has the additional advantage of explaining the amount of 
variance, induced due to the predictor variables, on the basis of their individual effects or on the 
basis of their collective impact.  
Regression analysis, as used in this chapter, is principally deployed as an explanatory analytical 
tool, and not a predictive tool, relevant to understand the individual and collective levels of impact 
of the geotechnically induced pathogens, driving the unusually high cost overruns experienced 
on highway projects executed in the Niger Delta. It is used to triangulate the findings from 
geotechnical strands of the case study: the geo-statistical analysis of geologic pathogens 
inherent in the wetland geology (chapter five), and the deductive interview analysis of practice 
based geotechnical pathogens (chapter 8). In this vain, the researcher uses multiple regression 
analysis, to deduce the proportion of variance in cost overruns that are explained by latent 
geologic factors, and the proportion that is explained by shortcomings in the geotechnical 
practices of the highway agencies.  Regression analysis therefore, serves to quantitatively 
triangulate the core geotechnical explanations, emanating from the various data sources 
analysed in the case study (Geotechnical index data, Archival project data and Interview data).  
10.2 Regression Analytic Procedure for Model Optimisation 
In chapter five, the researcher carried out exploratory statistical tests between geotechnical 
variables and percentage cost overruns recorded by the three highway agencies. It was 
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established that varying levels of association exist between cost overruns and geotechnical 
properties of sub-soils at project locations. It was also established that significant differences 
existed in the levels of cost overrun recorded in the three geo-zones of the Niger Delta, spatially 
synthesized from the literature on Niger Delta soils. The analysis continued in chapter eight, 
necessary to provide an in-depth qualitative evaluation of the geotechnical practices of the three 
highway agencies, in terms of their adherence or non-adherence to geotechnical best practices, 
which further explained the results of the previous geo-statistical analysis. The findings from 
Chapter’s five and eight thus constitute the inputs that serve as the predictor variables in the 
regression model of geotechnical drivers explaining the variance in cost overruns.  
The regression analysis was carried out using a stepwise approach, as a basis of optimising the 
final output of the model. The step wise approach entailed the selection of variables that yield 
the highest R2, whereby at each step variables were introduced that increases the R2, while 
ensuring that outliers and collinearity effects are simultaneously detected (Ngo, 2012). The 
stepwise procedure of model building used in the regression analysis, was thus aimed at 
systematically maximizing the explanatory capacity of the predictor geotechnical variables, to 
account for the unusually high levels of recorded cost overruns in the sampled highway projects. 
The process of model optimisation thus moved through several intermediary stages, shown in 
Figure 10.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2: Flow Chart Depicting a Step-Wise Multiple Regression Explanatory Modelling 
Initial Default Multiple Regression Model/ 
Residual analysis 
Geotechnical Indices Percentage Cost Overruns 
Fitting the generated model via Log Transformation 
Further Residual Analysis for the satisfaction of 
assumptions of regression analysis 
Collinearity Diagnostics/ Principal Component Analysis of 
geotechnical indices 
Introduction of 3-level categorical dummy Variable:         Geo-
Zones of Project Locations  
Test overall model significance 
Test for the contribution of individual geotechnical variables 
Interpret net coefficient of multiple determination 
Introduction of 2-level categorical dummy Variable: 
Levels of Geotechnical Input in Practice 
USING MODEL TO EXPLAIN COST OVERRUNS IN THE GEOLOGIC SETTING OF THE NIGER DELTA 
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10.2.1 Development of Initial Multiple Regression Model 
The initial model of the regression of Cost overruns (Y: Dependent Variable) versus Geotechnical 
indices (X1-n: Independent Variables), i.e. the regression of Y on X1-n was simply put as: 
Y=a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + bnXn + e   .………………………………………………….............................…Equation 2 
Where Y = Percentage Cost Overrun 
           X1 = PI (Plasticity Index) 
           X2 = FS (Free Swell)   
           X3 = LL (Liquid Limit) 
           X4 = PL (Plastic Limit)  
           X5 = MDD (Maximum Dry Density); 
           X6 = OMC (Optimum Moisture Content; 
           E = error term 
           a = Y-intercept for the population and  
           b1 to b6 = Net regression coefficients.  
 
However, not all the variables may be imputed into the initial regression model, due to possible 
co-variance. Several methods of variable selection are possible in regression analysis. The 
forward and backward variable selection methods have the notable disadvantage of not 
necessarily yielding optimal variable selection, due to the ‘one-at-a time’ approach (Mendenhall 
and Terry, 2003). Therefore, although automatic variable selection is mostly adopted, 
Mendenhall and Terry (2003) caution that it is not a guarantee for optimal variable selection. As 
a consequence, stepwise regression modelling is advocated for. Stepwise regression modelling 
can thus be described as a combination of forward and backward approach of variable selection, 
as after each step in which variables are added, any nonsignificant variable found, is removed 
from the model (Ngo, 2012). The stepwise procedure for variable selection in the regression 
model, will however be treated in later phases of the analysis, after initial residual analysis of the 
data to: 
 To identify outliers and influential points;  
 Fit the initial model type; 
 Ensure normality of the residual distribution;  
 Detect auto-correlation of the residuals;  
 Identify if there is a need for data transformation. 
The researcher, however started the residual analysis of the regression model, using the default 
SPSS setting for variable selection, which automatically excluded Plasticity Index (PI), as shown 
in Table 10.1. 
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Table 10.1: Variables Entered/Removed  
 Variables Entered Variables 
Removed 
Method 
  1 
OMC, Plasticlimit, 
freeswell, Liquidlimit, 
Drydensityb 
Plasticity Index. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Costoverrun 
 
This selection criterion was based on the output of the default collinearity diagnostic test in SPSS, 
which showed very low tolerance of 0.00, for plasticity index. This was as opposed to the 
Tolerance and VIF values obtained for other geotechnical indices shown in Table 10.2. 
 
Table 10.2: Collinearity Diagnostic for Geotechnical Index Variables 
Coefficientsa 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 
(Constant) 157.026 978.015  .161 .873   
Freeswell -.583 2.029 -.039 -.287 .775 .977 1.023 
Liquidlimit .052 .743 .010 .070 .944 .897 1.114 
Plasticlimit -.316 1.907 -.023 -.166 .869 .982 1.018 
Drydensity -.551 401.949 .000 -.001 .999 .413 2.420 
OMC 5.820 18.279 .067 .318 .751 .413 2.424 
a. Dependent Variable: Costoverrun 
 
 
The implication of this was, that plasticity index displays an almost perfect linear correlation, with 
of one or more of the independent variables already in the equation. However, it was not known 
with which of the variable(s) the collinearity existed, or if this default output represented an 
optimal variable selection. Table 10.3 and 10.4 illustrate the regression model summary and 
ANOVA test based on the default setting of automatic variable selection, which yielded an 
insignificant model which does not explain variance in the level of cost overruns in the highway 
project (R2 =0.006). The residual analysis was, however, carried out on this default regression 
output. 
 
Table 10.3: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 .077a .006 -.084 352.14661 1.528 
a. Predictors: (Constant), OMC, Plasticlimit, Freeswell, Liquidlimit, Drydensity 
b. Dependent Variable: Costoverrun 
 
 
 Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF Minimum 
Tolerance 
 plasticityindex .000 . .000 
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Table 10.4: ANOVA Output 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 40406.071 5 8081.214 .065 .997b 
Residual 6820397.834 55 124007.233   
Total 6860803.905 60    
a.Dependent Variable: Costoverrun b. Predictors: (Constant), OMC, Plasticlimit, freeswell, Liquidlimit, Drydensity 
 
10.2.2 Residual Analysis: Test for Fitness of the initial Cost Model and Potential Violations 
of Regression Assumptions 
Residual Analysis was used to test the fitness of the initial default model. Residual Analysis is a 
graphical approach, used to evaluate whether the regression model that had been fitted to the 
cost overrun data and geotechnical data was an appropriate model (Ngo, 2012). In addition, it 
also enabled potential violations of the assumptions of the regression model to be evaluated. 
The residual or estimated error value e, is the difference between the observed Y and predicted 
Y of the cost overrun for any given set of geotechnical variables. Graphically, the residual for the 
data, has been depicted on a scatter diagram (in Figure 10.4), representing the plot of the values 
of the vertical distances, between the observed value of cost overrun and the line defined by the 
initial default model. 
The fitness of the initial default model was evaluated, by plotting the residuals on the vertical 
axis, against the corresponding Xi values of the independent geotechnical variable on the 
horizontal axis. The criteria for the evaluation being that if the fitted cost model was appropriate 
for the data, there would be no apparent pattern. However, as the fitted cost model was not 
appropriate, there was a relationship between the values of the geotechnical variables and the 
residuals. This thus enabled the lack of fitness of the linear cost model to be filtered out, leading 
the researcher to explore the option of a non-linear transformation. 
Table 10.5: Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 124.8866 271.9771 216.4657 25.95062 61 
Residual -231.34502 1718.04761 .00000 337.15471 61 
Std. Predicted Value -3.529 2.139 .000 1.000 61 
Std. Residual -.657 4.879 .000 .957 61 
a. Dependent Variable: Costoverrun 
 
The histogram for the standardized residuals in Figure 10.3, as well as the data (Table 10.5), 
showed the smallest and largest residuals, and indicated a couple of very extreme residuals 
worthy of further investigation.  
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Figure 10.3: Histogram and Normality Plots of Residuals 
The normality plots of the regression model residuals also showed large deviations from the 
assumption of normality of errors. The residual plot in Figure 10.4, indicated that the residuals 
were not evenly distributed about a central point or line, but show a significant number of very 
conspicuous residuals. The distribution also exhibited a level of curvature, suggesting the data 
did not fit a linear model. As such, a log-linear model or a quadratic model was considered more 
apt (Mendenhall and Terry, 2003; Ngo, 2012). 
 
Figure 10.4: Residual Plot of initial Regression Model 
 
The initial default regression model clearly violated all the assumptions of linear least squares 
regression analyses (Crawle, 2014), due to the numerous outliers, the very uneven, and non-
normal distribution of the residuals. The option of log transformation was thus explored to 
normalise the distribution and linearize the fit of the dependent cost overrun variable.  
 
Table 10.6: Model Summary Regression Re-run 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 .327a .107 .024 .95304 1.502 
b. Dependent Variable: logcostoverrun 
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Table 10.7: Residual Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.6616 5.3228 4.8390 .31541 60 
Residual -1.53461 2.76603 .00000 .91176 60 
Std. Predicted Value -6.903 1.534 .000 1.000 60 
Std. Residual -1.610 2.902 .000 .957 60 
a. Dependent Variable: logcostoverrun 
 
The regression was re-run using the log-transformed cost overrun values, as shown in Table 
10.7. The histograms of residuals before and after the log-transformation as shown in Figure 
10.5, indicates that an improvement in the normality of the residual distribution had been attained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.5: Histogram of Residuals before and after Log-Transformation 
 
The normality P-P plot in Figure 10.6 further illustrates this improvement, with a stronger linearity 
within the data post transformation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.6: Normality P-P Plots before and after Log Transformation 
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However, although the residual plot reflected this improvement, there were still some extreme 
values that were relatively outlying (Figure 10.7 and Table 10.7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.7: Residual Plots before and after Transformation 
The case wise diagnostics for outliers, deduced based on the default critical SPSS thresholds 
for Mahalanobis Distances, Cooks Distances and Centred Leverage values were thus used to 
detect these outliers and observations with high leverage values. Table 10.7 shows that variable 
entry values for sample project number 37, 49 and 52 were still outlying. 
Table 10.7: Case wise Outlier Diagnostics 
Case Number Std. Residual Logcostoverrun Predicted Value Residual 
37 2.136 6.86 4.8220 2.03574 
49 2.902 7.56 4.7969 2.76603 
52 2.768 7.35 4.7132 2.63806 
a. Dependent Variable: logcostoverrun 
 
With the extreme values omitted, the Studentized Deleted Residual statistics for the regression 
re-run, is presented. The minimum and maximum Mahalanobis Distances, Cooks Distances and 
Centred Leverage values of the Studentized Deleted Residuals, is displayed in Table 10.8. 
Table 10.8: Studentized Deleted Residuals Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Predicted Value 2.6616 5.3228 4.8390 .31541 
Std. Predicted Value -6.903 1.534 .000 1.000 
Standard Error of Predicted Value .127 .934 .242 .181 
Adjusted Predicted Value 3.0970 9.3705 4.9139 .66120 
Residual -1.53461 2.76603 .00000 .91176 
Std. Residual -1.610 2.902 .000 .957 
Stud. Residual -1.758 2.933 -.019 .994 
Deleted Residual -4.21548 2.82495 -.07490 1.14978 
Stud. Deleted Residual -1.794 3.169 -.011 1.024 
Mahal. Distance .061 55.668 4.917 11.987 
Cook's Distance .000 3.131 .077 .410 
Centred Leverage Value .001 .944 .083 .203 
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The changes in the distribution shape of the residuals normality P-P plots in Figure 10.8, also 
reflects this improvement. The distribution of the residuals, has thus satisfied the underlying 
assumption of normality of errors, requisite for carrying out regression analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.8: Normality of Distribution of Residuals, after Transformation/Outlier Omission 
 
As shown in Figure 10.9, the requirement of independence of errors in the distribution, i.e. non-
autocorrelation, is also satisfied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.9: Residual Plots showing Improvement in Non-autocorrelation 
 
Table 10.9 shows a value of 1.825 for the Durbin-Watson statistic, which is closer to 2.00, thus 
confirming the assumption of independence of residuals (Crawle, 2014). The log transformed 
cost-overrun values, with the three deleted outliers, leaving 58 sample points, were therefore 
used in re-running the regression analysis. The screened data thus satisfied the requirement of 
linearity, normality, and independence in the distribution of the residuals generated in fitting the 
regression model. 
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 Table 10.9: Initial and Fitted Regression Model 
 
The improved model fitness, was also reflected in the increased explanatory power of the 
geotechnical indices (R2), from 0.006 observed the initial model, to 0.195 in the fitted initial model. 
 
10.2.3 Collinearity Diagnostics: Principal Component Analysis 
The existence of collinearity or multi-collinearity, although not a violation of the assumptions of 
regression modelling, via interactions amongst the predictor variables, will yield sub-optimal 
model output with poor explanatory power in accounting for relationships amongst the variables 
(Miles and Chelvin, 2001: Ngo, 2012). Detection of collinearity is carried out in this section, using 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as a useful step in selecting variables that were included 
in the initial regression model (Lawrence, 2006). Table 10.10, highlights significant bi-variate 
correlations between the geotechnical variables. 
 
Table 10.10: Correlation Matrix of Geotechnical Variables. 
 Plasticityindex Freeswell Liquidlimit Plasticlimit Drydensity OMC 
Plasticityindex 
Pearson Correlation 1 1.000** .063 .052 -.122 .145 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .627 .691 .349 .265 
Freeswell 
Pearson Correlation 1.000** 1 .063 .052 -.122 .145 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .627 .691 .349 .265 
Liquidlimit 
Pearson Correlation .063 .063 1 .089 -.301* .289* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .627 .627  .494 .018 .024 
Plasticlimit 
Pearson Correlation .052 .052 .089 1 -.088 .114 
Sig. (2-tailed) .691 .691 .494  .502 .383 
Drydensity 
Pearson Correlation -.122 -.122 -.301* -.088 1 -.761** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .349 .349 .018 .502  .000 
OMC 
Pearson Correlation .145 .145 .289* .114 -.761** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .265 .265 .024 .383 .000  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The correlation matrix highlighted the perfect correlation, existing between PI (Plasticity Index) 
and FS (Free swell). It is not surprising that these parameters display such perfect collinearity, 
as they both describe the behaviour of fined soils, as they transition from their solid state to a 
more fluid-like state in the inherently wet geomorphologic setting of the Niger Delta. The analysis 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
.077a .006 -.084 352.14661 1.528 
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
.442a .195 .117 .75554 1.825 
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is consistent with geotechnical theories: that highly plastic soils display high volume changes or 
swelling with the introduction of moisture (Figure 10.10).  
  
Figure 10.10: Scatter Plot of Free Swell Vs Plasticity Index  
 
The correlation matrix also highlighted significant lower levels of correlations between the 
Maximum Dry Density (MDD) and Optimum Moisture Contents (OMC) of the soils, as well as 
between MDD and Liquid Limit (LL). The bi-variate analysis was however limited, as it could only 
detect significant bi-variate collinearity combinations and not multi-collinearity amongst the 
geotechnical variables. The researcher opted to use factor analysis as a useful step in detecting 
multi-collinearity, prior to the regression analysis as suggested by (Lawrence, 2006). 
 Principal Component Analysis was thus deployed in this instance as a factor classification tool, 
and not for reduction, useful to detect multicollinearity amongst the geotechnical variables, 
discernible from the pattern of loading of the analysed principal components in the varimax 
rotation. Lawrence (2006) however cautioned that the functionality of PCA in minimising 
collinearity amongst the explanatory variables, may lead to selected components with little 
explanatory power to account for variation in the dependent variable. Thus as opposed to 
performing a Principal Component Regression, in which the selected components are imputed 
into the regression model as the explanatory variables, it was used as preliminary variable 
selection tool to detect the groups of geotechnical variables, whose contribution to the model are 
similar. Therefore, geotechnical indices loaded principally onto a particular component were 
inferred as confounding, and only one variable was selected as input into the regression model. 
The criteria for this elimination, was however, further defined by their level of contribution to 
optimising the model’s explanatory power (R2), in terms of the dependent variable (Cost overrun). 
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Table 10.11: PCA output for Total Variance Explained 
 
The PCA output in Table 10.11 highlights two principal components (1 and 2) based on the 
default Eigen value cut-off of 1.0 in the SPSS software, which explained about 66.25% of the co-
variance amongst the geotechnical variables. However, this still left a significant portion of 
unexplained variance amongst the geotechnical variables. This was indicative of other potentially 
significant principal components, worthy of further investigation. 
 
Table 10.12: Loadings of Principal Components  
 Initial Extraction 
Plasticityindex 1.000 .999 
Freeswell 1.000 .999 
Liquidlimit 1.000 .322 
Plasticlimit 1.000 .055 
Drydensity 1.000 .801 
OMC 1.000 .798 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
                                                                   Figure 10.11: Scree Plot of Principal Components 
Table 10.12 shows the loadings of the individual geotechnical indices in the two extracted 
components, before and after the varimax rotation. The varimax rotation in Table 10.13, has 
made the factor loading more clearly discernible.  
Table 10.13: Component Loading before and after Varimax Rotation 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 
Plasticityindex .772 .635 
Freeswell .772 .635 
Liquidlimit .398 -.405 
Plasticlimit .196 -.129 
Drydensity -.657 .607 
OMC .675 -.586 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
a. 2 components extracted. 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 2.277 37.943 37.943 2.277 37.943 37.943 1.995 33.253 33.253 
2 1.699 28.311 66.253 1.699 28.311 66.253 1.980 33.001 66.253 
3 .975 16.251 82.505       
4 .812 13.529 96.034       
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 
Plasticityindex .996 .084 
Freeswell .996 .084 
Liquidlimit .003 .568 
Plasticlimit .050 .229 
Drydensity -.047 -.894 
OMC .075 .890 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
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Plasticity index and free swell, were loaded primarily in component 1, while Maximum Dry Density 
and OMC are loaded onto component 2. Plastic limit and liquid limit, however seem not to be 
primarily loaded onto any of the two components. These two principal components could not be 
used to classify and detect structure amongst all the 6 geotechnical variables. The PCA analysis 
was thus rerun with a cut-off specification of four components, to explore for further principal 
components. Table 10.14 shows four principal components selected, and their loadings after the 
Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization. The selected components maximised all 6 
geotechnical indices loadings. 
Table 10.14: Rotated Component Matrix 
 Components 
1 2 3 4 
Plasticityindex .997 .069 .020 .021 
Freeswell .997 .069 .020 .021 
Liquidlimit .029 .187 .040 .981 
Plasticlimit .027 .058 .997 .038 
Drydensity -.054 -.928 -.023 -.131 
OMC .079 .927 .058 .110 
                                                                        Figure10.12: Component Plot in Rotated Space 
10.2.4 Selection of Optimal Model 
The objective of using a step wise regression analysis to generate the cost overrun model, was 
in other to include only the geotechnical indices of subsoil characteristics that are useful in 
predicting cost overrun. Thus the geotechnical variables that were not significantly useful in 
predicting costoverrun, despite displaying a relationship with it, were deleted. A regression cost 
model with fewer geotechnical variables was used in its place, in other to ensure that the best 
explanatory approximation of cost overrun was obtained. 
Based on the PCA outputs therefore, the researcher therefore selected the following principal 
groups of variables as input to the regression model: PI/FS, PL, LL, and OMC/MDD. Four 
regression models, representing all possible four combinations of variables were run in the 
following combinations, to test for the combination that yields the highest explanation of variance 
in in the log of cost overruns (R2): 
 PI, PL, LL, and OMC; 
 FS, PL, LL, and OMC; 
 PL, PL, LL, and MDD; 
 FS, PL, LL, and MDD. 
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Table 10.15 shows the outcome of the regressions run with four sets of geotechnical index 
variables. The explained variances of the regression models are highlighted. However, it was 
easily discernible that for all the models, Plastic Limit (PL) has being automatically removed by 
the default SPSS setting. This implied that it was redundant, as its effect was already explained 
by the other 3 geo-technical variables in the models. 
 Table 10.15: Alternative Regression Models after Collinearity Diagnostic 
 
 
The optimal model of geotechnical indices explained about 19.6% of the variation in cost 
overruns, based on the value of R2 in the regression model of plasticity index, Liquid limit and 
Maximum Dry density.   The explained variation by the initial model of geotechnical indices 
increased from 0.006, for the unfitted initial model for five variables versus cost overrun, to 0.196 
in the optimal selected model, based on three variables versus log cost overrun, as shown in 
Table 10.16. 
 Table 10.16: Unfitted and Fitted Initial Models 
. Predictors: (Constant), Freeswell, Liquidlimit, Drydensity, 
PlasticLimit, OMC 
The ANOVA Table for the fitted model also shows the significance of this fitted initial geotechnical 
model.  
Table 10.17: ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 7.098 3 2.366 4.380 .008b 
Residual 29.170 54 .540   
Total 36.268 57    
a. Dependent Variable: Logcostoverrun 
b. Predictors: (Constant), plasticityindex, Liquidlimit, Drydensity 
The model coefficients for the fitted initial model are presented in Table 10.18 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .434a .188 .143 .73831 
a. Predictors: (Constant), freeswell, Liquidlimit, 
Drydensity 
Model Summary 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .442a .196 .151 .73497 
a. Predictors: (Constant), plasticityindex, Liquidlimit, 
Drydensity 
Model Summary 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .432a .187 .142 .73907 
a. Predictors: (Constant), OMC, Liquidlimit, freeswell 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .442a .195 .150 .73532 
a. Predictors: (Constant), plasticityindex, OMC, Liquidlimit 
Selected optimal Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
2 .442a .196 .151 .73497 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .077a .006 -.084 352.14661 
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Table 10.18: Regression Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part 
1 
(Constant) 6.166 1.141  5.402 .000    
Liquidlimit -.015 .004 -.438 -3.557 .001 -.420 -.436 -.434 
Drydensity .000 .002 .033 .260 .796 .045 .035 .032 
plasticityindex -.560 .571 -.126 -.981 .331 -.083 -.132 -.120 
a. Dependent Variable: Logcostoverrun 
 
The optimal regression equation based on geotechnical indices would thus be: 
Log costoverrun = 6.166 – 0.015LL – 0.560PI + e                 ...........Equation 10.1 
10.2.5 Introduction of a 3-Level Categorical Dummy Variable: Geo-Zonation of Projects  
From the Analysis of Variance test carried out in chapter five, significant differences in cost were 
noted between the level of cost overruns experienced by the highway agencies in the upland, 
swamps and coastal parts of the Niger Delta. It was therefore determined that the geo-zonation 
of projects impacts on the level of cost overrun. Its impact on cost overrun was fundamentally 
attributed to the strength/weakness of sub-soils in each of these distinct zones, with projects 
constructed in swamps, which have the poorest soil types, demonstrating the highest levels of 
recorded cost overruns.   The next phase in the stepwise regression modelling was therefore, 
the introduction of a 3-level categorical dummy variable to account for these geo-zones.  
To achieve this, three sets of recoded dummy variables were imputed into the regression model 
based on the following specifications in SPSS variable data entry, with Z1 set as the control 
variable in the model: 
 Recoded Dummy Variable 1:  Z1 = 1; Z2 = 0; Z3=0, for projects located in the uplands; 
 Recoded Dummy Variable 2:  Z1 = 0; Z2 = 1; Z3= 0, for projects located in the swamps; 
 Recoded Dummy Variable 3:  Z1 = 0; Z2 = 0; Z3= 1 for projects located along the coast. 
 
Where Z1 = Uplands 
            Z2 = Swamps 
            Z3= Coastal 
However, before the dummy variables were included in the regression model, they were used as 
independent predictors to test for their relationship with cost overruns, as presented in Table 
10.18. 
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Table 10.18: Regression of Cost overrun Vs Geo-zone 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 
Sig. F Change Durbin-Watson 
1 .384a .147 .118 317.63031 .010 2.026 
 
Table 10.18: ANOVA Output for Regression of Cost overrun Vs Geo-zone 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 1009241.097 2 504620.549 5.002 .010b 
Residual 5851562.808 55 100889.014   
Total 6860803.905 57    
a. Dependent Variable: costoverrun 
b. Predictors: (Constant), coastal, swamp 
c. Predictors: (Constant), coastal, upland 
 
Tables 10.17 and 10.18 demonstrate that the geo-zones in which the projects are located, in 
isolation, explains approximately 14.7% of the variation in cost overrun. 
 
Table 10.19: Regression Coefficients  
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 117.354 64.836  1.810 .075 
Swamp 276.444 94.910 .392 2.913 .005 
Coastal 15.033 102.515 .020 1.147 .004 
a. Dependent Variable: costoverrun 
 
Based on the regression coefficients in Table 10.19, the linear regression equations based only 
on geo-zones were: 
 Costoverrun = 117.354 +276.44 + e ...Equation 10.2 (For projects located in swamps) 
 Costoverrun = 117.354 + 15.033 +e .... Equation 10.3 (For projects located in coastals) 
 Costoverrun = 117.354 + e      .... Equation 10.4 (For projects located in uplands) 
However, the regression output for the combined geotechnical index and geo-zone variables, 
presented in Table 10.20, shows the changes in the coefficients of the independent variables.  
Table 10.20: Regression Coefficients 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part 
1 
(Constant) 5.281 1.306  4.044 .000    
Liquidlimit -.014 .004 -.398 -3.131 .003 -.420 -.398 -.383 
 Dry Density .001 .004 .043 .349 .729 .005 .048 .043 
Plasticity index -.210 .622 -.047 -.338 .737 -.083 -.047 -.041 
Swamp .347 .265 .203 1.310 .196 .212 .179 .160 
Coastal .210 .248 .119 .846 .402 .062 .116 .103 
a. Dependent Variable: Logcostoverrun 
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The optimised regression equations using the log transformed cost overrun values, and including 
the geotechnical indices of sub-soils for projects in the different geologic environments was thus: 
 
Log costoverrun = 5.281 – 0.014LL + .001MDD – 0.210PI + 0.347 + e           .........Equation 10.5 
(Projects located in the Swamps) 
Log costoverrun = 5.281 – 0.014LL + .001MDD – 0.210PI + 0.210 + e           .........Equation 10.6 
(Projects located in the coastal areas) 
Log costoverrun = 5.281 – 0.014LL + .001MDD – 0.210PI + e               .........Equation 10.7 
(Projects located in the upland areas). 
 
 Table 10.21: Model Summary for Cost Overrun Versus Geotechnical Variables 
 
 
Using the combined variables, it was thus noted that the explanatory power (R2= 0.222) of the 
model, shown in Table 10.21, was greater than for the individual models generated for geo-
indices and geo-zones (19.6% and 14.7%, respectively). This was an indication that accounting 
the geo-zones where the individual projects locations were situated, has further optimised the 
model. 
10.2.6 Introduction of 2-Level Categorical Dummy Variables: Levels of Geotechnical Input 
The outcome of the interview analysis in chapter eight, revealed varying levels of geotechnical 
input in highway projects. This was discernible from the standard geotechnical practices of the 
highway agencies, which revealed an apparent dichotomy for major and community projects, as 
well as differences in the in-house design, costing and procurement practices of the three 
highway agencies. Summative assessment of the levels of geotechnical input in the sampled 
highway projects, was thus deduced based on the dichotomous criteria outlined in Figure 6.9, 
which represents a linear conceptualisation of the flow of GI in the project phases, relative to 
standards of best practice, and the anticipated cumulative impact. 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 
coastal, plasticityindex, 
Dry Density, Liquidlimit, 
swampb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Logcostoverrun 
b. Tolerance = .000 limits reached. 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .471a .222 .147 .73685 
a. Predictors: (Constant), coastal, plasticityindex, 
Drydensity, Liquidlimit, swamp 
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Figure 10.13: Assessment Criteria for Comparison of Level of GI  
 
The inherent levels of GI in the sampled high projects executed by the different highway 
agencies, were represented as binary dummy variables, following the criteria outlined in figure 
10.13.  
Table 10.22: Levels of GI in Sampled Highway Projects 
Project No NPP GIB GID GICD GICS 
1 1 0 1 0 1 
2 1 0 1 0 1 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 0 1 0 1 
6 0 0 1 0 1 
7 1 1 1 0 1 
8 1 1 1 0 1 
9 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1 1 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 
12 1 1 1 0 1 
13 0 1 0 0 0 
14 1 0 1 0 1 
15 1 0 1 0 1 
16 0 0 1 0 0 
17 1 1 1 0 1 
18 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 
•Levels of GI in Project Phases
YES/NO
•Nomenclature Of Project Development Phases (NPP)
•Well structured and consistent?
YES/NO
•Level of Geotechnical Input In Budgeting (GIB)
•Conceptual estimating methodology reflects heterogeneity of ground conditions?
YES/NO
•Level of Geotechnical Input In Designs (GID)
•Adequate Levels of GI: Desk Studies, Reconnaissance Surveys: Detailed ground investigations?
YES/NO
•Level of Geotechnical Input In Contract Documentation (GICD)
•Contract documentation inclusive of Ground Investigation Reports (GIR) and of Differing Site Condition (DSC) 
clauses?
YES/NO
Level of Geotechnical Input In Contractor Selection (GICS)
Use of GI Algorithms?
Technical Criteria for contractor selection?
IMPACT
•Cost Overruns?
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21 1 1 0 0 0 
22 1 1 1 0 1 
23 0 0 0 0 0 
24 1 1 0 0 1 
25 0 1 1 0 1 
26 1 1 1 0 1 
27 1 1 1 0 1 
28 1 1 1 0 1 
29 0 0 0 0 0 
30 1 0 0 0 0 
31 0 0 0 0 0 
32 1 0 0 0 0 
33 1 0 1 0 1 
34 1 0 0 0 0 
35 0 1 1 0 1 
36 0 0 0 0 0 
37 1 1 1 0 1 
38 0 1 1 0 1 
39 0 0 0 0 0 
40 1 0 0 0 0 
41 1 0 0 0 0 
42 0 0 0 0 0 
43 1 1 1 0 1 
44 0 0 0 0 0 
45 1 1 1 0 1 
46 1 1 1 0 0 
47 0 0 0 0 0 
48 1 0 0 0 0 
49 1 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 1 0 0 
51 0 1 0 0 0 
52 0 0 0 0 0 
53 1 0 1 0 0 
54 1 1 1 0 1 
55 0 0 0 0 0 
56 0 0 0 0 0 
57 0 0 0 0 0 
58 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Where 1 = Yes 
            0 = No 
             
Table 10.23 shows the estimated overall regression model of cost overrun based on all deduced 
geotechnical cost overrun drivers for highway projects executed in the Niger Delta region. 
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Table 10.23: Regression Coefficients for Final Regression Model 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-
order 
Partial Part 
1 
(Constant) 6.501 .734  8.863 .000    
Liquidlimit -.010 .002 -.279 -3.849 .000 -.420 -.486 -.253 
Drydensity .000 .001 .015 .203 .840 .045 .029 .013 
plasticityindex -.545 .348 -.123 -1.565 .124 -.083 -.220 -.103 
Swamp .363 .145 .095 1.126 .266 .212 .160 .074 
Coastal .260 .134 .147 1.935 .059 .062 .269 .127 
uGIBUDG -.435 .145 -.264 -2.996 .004 -.568 -.397 -.197 
NOMEN -.139 .124 -.088 -1.120 .268 -.525 -.160 -.074 
GIDES -.471 .193 -.296 -2.438 .019 -.743 -.332 -.160 
GICONTSEL -.452 .211 -.280 -2.141 .037 -.784 -.295 -.141 
Dependent Variable: logcostoverrun 
Constant: GICONTDOC 
 
The Log-Linear regression model of cost overrun drivers predicated on ground conditions and 
the current geotechnical practices of highway agencies in the Niger Delta was thus: 
Logcostoverrun = 6.501 - 0.010LL - 0.545PI + 0.363 swamp + 0.260 coastal - 0.435GIB - 
0.139NOM - 0.471GIDS – 0.452GICS + e.   ……………………………………………Equation 10.8 
The level of Geotechnical Input in Contract Documentation (GICONTDOC = 0), was, however, 
flagged by SPSS as constituting a constant, as the practices of all three of the highway agencies 
evidence that Ground Investigation Reports and DSC clauses were not incorporated in contract 
documents, provided to bidders for major and community projects.  
10.2.7 Overall Model Fitness and Significance 
Residual analysis was once again used to determine whether the generated final regression 
model was an appropriate one. The outcome of the residual analysis thus constituted the criterion 
used for adjudging whether the developed log-model defined the linear relationship between the 
level of recorded cost overruns and the set of explanatory geotechnical variables, as follows: 
Ho: There is no linear relationship between cost overruns experienced on highway projects 
executed in the Niger Delta and the selected geotechnical cost drivers inherent in the deltaic 
geologic setting and organisational practices.   
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 H1: There is a linear relationship between cost overruns experienced on highway projects 
executed in the Niger Delta and the selected geotechnical cost drivers inherent in the deltaic 
geologic setting and organisational practices.   
 
Figure 10.14: Residual Plots  
Figure 10.14 shows that the residuals from the final regression model, generated using the log 
transformed values, are still normally and independently dispersed. 
Table 10.24: Final Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin  
Watson 
1 .890a .792 .754 .39596 1.943 
a. Predictors: (Constant), GICONTSEL, plasticityindex, coastal, Liquidlimit, 
Drydensity, NOMEN, swamp, GIBUDG, GIDES 
 
 
The overall model summary also showed that the Durbin Watson Statistic of 1.943 is very close 
to the ideal value of 2.00, which indicated that there was no auto-correlation between the 
residuals (Crawle, 2014). 
Table 10.25: ANOVA Output for Final Model 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 28.743 9 3.194 20.369 .000b 
Residual 7.526 48 .157   
Total 36.268 57    
a. Dependent Variable: logcostoverrun 
b. Predictors: (Constant), GICONTSEL, plasticityindex, coastal, Liquidlimit, Drydensity, NOMEN, swamp, 
uGIBUDG, GIDES 
Based on the outcome of the residual analysis and the analysis of variance output, the null 
hypothesis was rejected, and the alternate accepted, as there exists a significant log-linear 
relationship between cost overruns recorded on the highway projects, and the selected 
geotechnical pathogens. 
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10.2.8 Explanatory Power of the Final Model: Coefficients of Multiple and Partial 
Determination  
The coefficient of Multiple Determination (R2) measures the proportion cost overruns, that is 
explained by the variation in set of geotechnical variables selected. The coefficient of Multiple 
Determination is equal to the regression sum of squares (SSR) divided by the total sum of 
squares (SST). i.e. 
                             R2 = 
𝑆𝑆𝑅
𝑆𝑆𝑇
.........................................................Equation 10.9 
From the model summary presented in Table 10.26, the coefficient of multiple determination (R2) 
has improved from 0.222 to 0.792. 
Table 10:26: Optimised Explanatory Power of the Cost Overrun Model 
 
This implies that all the variables (cost drivers) in the regression model, combine to explain about 
79% of the variation in the level of cost overrun experienced in the sampled highway projects. 
The inclusion of the levels of geotechnical input deduced from the practices of the three highway 
agencies, in the regression model, has had a drastic positive effect in optimising the explanatory 
power of the regression model. The researcher further examines the individual contributions of 
the variables in explaining cost overruns in the sampled highway projects. The Coefficients of 
Partial Determination for each explanatory geotechnical variable for the nth geotechnical variable 
is defined in equation 10.10. 
 ryn2 (all variables except n) =  
𝑺𝑺𝑹(𝑿𝒏)𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒏
𝑺𝑺𝑻−𝑺𝑺𝑹(𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒍𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒏)+ 𝑺𝑺𝑹(𝒂𝒍𝒍 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕 𝒏)
  … 
Equation 10.10 
The coefficient of partial determination for a particular geotechnical variable, means that for given 
constant values of all other geotechnical variables, the percentage variation in cost overrun due 
to is the value of the coefficient, multiplied by 100. Table 10.27 shows the values of the zero-
order and partial correlation coefficients, computed.  
 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .471a .222 .147 .73685 
a. Predictors: (Constant), coastal, plasticityindex, Drydensity, 
Liquidlimit, swamp 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin  
Watson 
1 .890a .792 .754 .39596 1.943 
a. Predictors: (Constant), GICONTSEL, 
plasticityindex, coastal, Liquidlimit, Drydensity, 
NOMEN, swamp, GIBUDG, GIDES 
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Table 10.27: Zero Order and Partial Correlation Coefficients 
Model Zero-order Partial Ranking of Variable 
Contribution 
(Constant)    
Liquidlimit -.420 -.486 1 
Drydensity .045 .029 9 
Plasticityindex -.083 -.220 6 
Swamp .212 .160 7 
Coastal .062 .269 5 
uGIBUDG -.568 -.397 2 
NOMEN -.525 -.160 7 
GIDES -.743 -.332 3 
GICONTSEL -.784 -.295 4 
 
The zero order correlation coefficients (Without including all the other variables) and the partial 
correlation coefficients (when the composite effect of the others is included in the model) differ. 
The partial regression plots of the three geotechnical indices in the regression model are shown 
in Figure 10.15. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.15: Partial Regression Plots of Cost overrun Vs geotechnical indices 
For the three geotechnical indices of subgrade soils in the Niger Delta, the values of the partial 
regression plots show that the Plasticity index displays a more discernible correlation. The 
coefficient for Liquid Limit (LL) and Plasticity Index (PI), increased, however for Maximum Dry 
Density (MDD), the correlation coefficient has reduced.   
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Figure 10.16: Partial Regression Plots of Cost Overrun Vs Geo-Zone 
 
Figure 10.16 shows the partial regression plots for the geo-zones. For these geo-spatial 
regression variables, the correlation coefficient the swamps variable is reduced while the coastal 
variable increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.17: Partial Regression Plots for Levels of GI in Project Phases 
Figure 10.17 shows the partial regression plots for the Levels of GI in Project Phases. For these 
practiced based variables, the correlation coefficient although initially having the highest zero-
order coefficients are reduced. 
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From the ranking of the individual contributions of the geotechnical variables in Table 10.27, it 
was inferred that that Plasticity Limit, which is a geotechnical index of expansivity of subgrade 
soils in response to increasing water content, abound in the Niger Delta, accounts for the highest 
partial correlation with the levels of cost overrun experienced on the highway projects. This is 
followed by the level of GI in budgeting and the level of GI in designs.  The wetland ground 
conditions at the project locations can thus be said to the primary cost overrun driver accounting 
for the unusually high level of cost overruns experienced in highway projects executed in the 
Niger Delta. However, the practice based variables, rank next in terms of their partial correlations 
with cost overruns.  
 
The regression modelling of the core geotechnical variables, has being able to explain 79% of 
the variance in cost overruns recorded in the highway projects. 21% of this variation thus still 
remained unexplained by the regression model. The findings of the analysis in chapter 9, had 
however revealed a multitude of contextual barriers to geotechnical input, which were inferred 
as accounting for the unexplained variation in the level of cost overrun. As such, other than the 
core group of geotechnical cost drivers which defined the initial focus of the study, other 
emergent groups of explanatory social constructs were discerned: Organisational, human and 
skills related, as well as Political and socio-cultural Influences, which directly and indirectly impact 
on the geotechnical explanations, statistically provided. These other purely qualitative 
explanations are further analysed using content analysis, and are cognitively mapped by the 
researcher, to portray the complexity of technical and non-technical variables impacting on cost 
overruns in the specific context of the Niger Delta. 
 
10.3 Content Analysis and Cognitive Mapping of Emergent Cost Overrun Drivers 
To cognitively map out the prevailing scenario of cost overrun drivers as deduced from the 
interview analysis, the researcher matched the barriers to geotechnical input evident in the 
highway agencies, to the corresponding phases of projects where their impact is evident. This is 
shown in Table 10.28. 
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Table 10.28: Barriers to Geotechnical Input as Complementary Cost Overrun Drivers 
Phases       Geotechnical Drivers Barriers 
Nomenclature of 
pre-contract 
phases 
     Phase Configuration 
     
     Pre-contract preparation 
  Flow of GI  
  Clarity of professional roles 
  De-motivation of professionals 
 
Preliminary 
Phase 
Lack of GI in conceptual costing 
 
 
Lack of GI in Planning Phase 
 
Risk perception 
Lack of geotechnical presence 
Political pressure 
Community pressure 
 
Design Phase Design preparation  
Process 
 
Mode of assessing  
heterogeneous ground conditions 
 
Non-Adherence to TRRL GI 
 
Ext Consultant GI 
 
DB contractors’ GI 
 
 
 
 
 
Unethical professional practices of  
Consultants 
Lack of Geotechnical Presence 
Risk perception 
Knowledge gaps in design 
Political pressure 
Unethical professional practices  
of contractors 
 
Contractual 
Phase 
 
Contract documentation 
 
Contractor selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  Contractual Porosity 
  Adversarial contractual stance 
  Knowledge gaps in procurement  
  Hushed and Unrealistic Bidding   
Timelines  
  Subjective Procurement 
  Political pressure 
  Community pressure 
  Risk perception 
Post contract 
Phase 
 
   Delays and abandonment due to 
DSC 
     
  Unethical professional practices of 
contractors 
  Unethical in-house verification 
  Major Vs Community Projects 
dichotomy 
  Upland Vs Riverine Dichotomy 
  Multiple Contract Re-Award 
 
 
The implication of this is that the emergent themes induced from the analysis in chapter 9, plays 
out to ultimately distort the log-linearity of the regression analysis of the core geotechnical 
themes, which had been used to explain the build-up of cost overruns in the project phases. 
However, as these emergent themes are not susceptible to statistical manipulation, they are 
further analysed based on the frequency of text referenced to such nodes during the inductive 
coding of the interview responses, are graphically represented in Figure 10.18.  
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Figure 10.18: Bar Chart of Nodes Compared by Frequency of Coded References 
The ranking of the barriers to geotechnical input are shown in Table 10.29, and used as a basis 
for assigning weights corresponding to the node sizes during further cognitive mapping. 
Table 10.29: Content Analysis of Emergent Themes 
Barrier Sources References Weighting 
Political pressure 10 22 11 
Subjective Procurement 8 18 10 
Community pressure 10 15 9 
Contractual porosity 8 12 8 
Major Vs Community Projects Dichotomy 10 11 7 
Unethical professional practices of contractors 8 9 6 
De-motivation of professionals 7 8 5 
Clarity of professional roles 10 5 4 
Unethical professional practices of consultants 4 5 4 
Adversarial contractual stance 5 5 4 
Knowledge gaps in design 4 5 4 
Flow of GI  8 4 3 
Risk perception 10 4 3 
Upland Vs Riverine Dichotomy 3 4 3 
Unethical verification practices 6 4 3 
Hushed and Unrealistic Bidding Timelines  3 3 2 
Geotechnical Presence 3 3 2 
Multiple Contract Re-Award 2 2 1 
 
The ranked profile of the emergent themes, can be visually assessed, as depicted in Figure 
10.19, based on the content analysis of the frequency of coded responses to each node. Table 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Frequency of coded responses
References
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10.30 is a colour coded list of the emergent themes, as barriers to geotechnical input, which 
serves as a key to the cognitive mapping, presented in Figure 10.19. 
Table 10.30: Colour Coded List of Emergent Themes as Barriers to Geotechnical Input. 
Organisational 
Catalyst  
Flow of GI  
Clarity of professional roles (CPR) 
 
Geotechnical Presence (GP) 
 
Contractual Porosity (CP) 
Poor organisational structure; 
Mis-matched qualifications and job description 
Lack of qualified technical manpower 
Porosity of contractual system 
Non-progressive GI    
non-construction related professionals 
No Role Specific Professional delineation; 
Absence of in-house Geotechnical Personnel 
 
 
Pressure Emitters       Community Pressure (CMP) 
     
Political Pressure (PLP) 
 
Contractor Pressure (CNP) 
    
 
Community Considerations 
Youth restiveness pressure 
Emergency procurement 
Contractors influence 
Political interference 
Unqualified contractors 
Lack of due process in contracts 
Unverified contractor’s claims 
Fear by professionals 
Unplanned budgeting 
Heightened security risk to contractors 
 
Psychological Traps Adversarial Contractual Stance (ADC) 
 
De-motivation of Professionals (DMP)  
 
Risk Perception (RP) 
 
Counter geotechnical relations; 
Oppressive Political influence 
Poor risk perception 
Unjustified expenditure for detailed GI; 
 
Skills Gaps   
 
 
Knowledge Gaps in Design(KGD) 
 
Knowledge Gaps in Procurement(KGP) 
 
Lack of clear understanding of geo-risk 
Ignorance of geotechnical best practices 
Lack of awareness of current design practices 
Non-discernible skills 
 
Dichotomies Major Vs Community Projects (MjCm) 
 
Upland Vs Riverine(UpRv) 
Preferential management of geotechnical risk in 
relation to project size and location;  
Planned vs Adhoc procurement practices for major 
vs community projects; 
Politically motivated selective project management 
practices; 
Lower priority status in post contract management 
of riverine projects 
Unethical 
Facilitators 
Unethical professional practices of 
consultants (UPCL) 
 
Unethical professional practices of 
contractors (UPCR) 
 
Unethical verification Practices (UVP) 
Deliberate under-design of projects 
Replication of past GI reports 
Replication of similar designs 
Non-GI in DB designs   
Contractors Influence of design preparation 
Contractors Influence of contract award 
Stifled verification of post-contract GI 
In-house professionals serving in dual capacity as 
client and contractors representative 
 
Hushed and Unrealistic Bidding Timelines 
(HBT) 
 
Subjective Procurement (SP) 
 
Multiple Contract Re-Award (MCR) 
 
 
Non-adherence to due contractual processes  
Non-publicising of call for bid 
Compressed timeline for tender submission 
informal hierarchical chain of contract subletting  
Multiple contract re-award  
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Figure10.19: Cognitive Map of Geotechnical and Emergent Themes as Cost Drivers 
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The core geotechnical themes thus interplay within bulbs of organisational catalyst’, ‘Pressure 
Emitters’, ‘Psychological Traps’, ‘Skills Gaps’, ‘Dichotomies’ and ‘Unethical Facilitators’ of 
various scales (as ranked), entrenched within the wider macro social value system and geo-
political climate of highway development in the region. The intricate complexity of this interplay 
has been conceptualised by the researcher, the results of this process which is presented in 
Figure 10.19, as a cognitive map. The developed cognitive map is thus an intricately interwoven 
representation of near linear causality, between the core geotechnical themes, and the resultant 
cost overrun, with the emergent organisational and human related themes arrayed as influences, 
whose node sizes were proportionally assigned. The cognitive map thus portrays the visual ties 
of the dependent phase connectivity between the technical, social, organisational and 
institutional issues, driving the high level of cost overruns experienced on highway project 
development in the Niger Delta.  
 
10.4 Chapter Summary: Explaining Cost Overruns in Highway Projects in the Niger Delta 
The findings from the analysis has significantly expanded and created the more holistic picture 
missing in the disjointed findings of previous empirical studies on cost overruns. This is against 
the backdrop of the dialectical debate in the literature, between theoretical and technical schools 
of taught, which deploy single methods of data analysis typically correlations and cost overrun 
trend analysis; project specific case studies based on content analysis of documents; 
questionnaire survey of construction professionals; or using data mining and modelling 
techniques to argue on the fundamental cost drivers in highway projects. This research has 
deployed a multiplicity of quantitative and qualitative analytical tools: Geotechnical analysis; 
Analysis of Variance; Correlation/Regression Analysis; Thematic Analysis; Content Analysis and 
Cognitive Mapping too carry out the most methodologically robust and contextual study of the 
primary triggers to cost overruns in highway projects. Table 10.31 is a summary of the outcome 
of the explained variations for several statistically significant regression models run with different 
combinations of non-collinear predictor variables, during the model optimisation process of the 
regression analysis.  
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Table 10.31: Regression Model Optimisation showing Explained Variations  
 
The initial combination of geotechnical indices, which explained a maximum of 19.6% of the 
variation in cost overruns, was used as a basis for optimising the model with the stepwise 
introduction of other explanatory variables 
The introduction of a 3-level categorical dummy variable to account for the geo-zones, optimised 
the explanatory power of the regression model, after a log-linear transformation of cost overruns, 
to 22%. 
The introduction of dummy variables to account for current geotechnical practices in the highway 
agencies significantly optimised the regression model, as the explanatory power of the model 
increased from 22% to 79%. The Log-Linear regression model of cost overrun drivers predicated 
on ground conditions and the current geotechnical practices of highway agencies in the Niger 
Delta was thus: 
 Logcostoverrun = 6.501 - 0.010LL - 0.545PI + 0.363 swamp + 0.260 coastal - 
0.435GIB - 0.139NOM - 0.471GIDS – 0.452GICS + e                         …. Equation 10.11 
 
The regression analysis of geotechnically induced cost overrun drivers, has shown that the 
geologic setting coupled with lack of geotechnical best practices account for 79% of the variance 
in cost overruns in highway projects executed in the Niger Delta. The predictive transposition of 
the regression equation is thus: 
 Costoverrun = 10 6.501 - 0.010LL - 0.545PI + 0.363 swamp + 0.260 coastal - 0.435GIB - 0.139NOM - 0.471GIDS – 
0.452GICS + e                                                                                     …. Equation 10.12 
This represents an exponential model, whereby small changes in the cost overrun drivers would 
result in disproportionate changes in the levels of cost overruns recorded on highway projects. 
Equations 10.13, 10.14 and 10.15 represent the predictive models that estimate the cost 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Predictors 
 
1 .434a .188 .143 .73831 (Constant), freeswell, Liquidlimit, Drydensity 
2 .442a .196 .151 .73497 (Constant), plasticityindex, Liquidlimit, Drydensity 
3 .432a .187 .142 .73907 (Constant), OMC, Liquidlimit, freeswell 
4 .442a .195 .150 .73532 (Constant), plasticityindex, OMC, Liquidlimit 
5 .471a .222 .147 .73685 
Constant), coastal, plasticityindex, Drydensity, Liquidlimit, 
swamp 
6 .890a .792 .754 .39596 
(Constant), GICONTSEL, plasticityindex, coastal, 
Liquidlimit, Drydensity, NOMEN, swamp, GIBUDG, GIDES 
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overruns for highway projects executed in the different geo-zones of the Niger Delta, and in view 
of the current practices of the highway agencies: 
 10 6.501 - 0.010LL - 0.545PI + 0.363 - 0.435GIB - 0.139NOM - 0.471GIDS – 0.452GICS (Swamps)…Equation 10.13 
 10 6.501 - 0.010LL - 0.545PI + 0.260 - 0.435GIB - 0.139NOM - 0.471GIDS – 0.452GICS (Coastal)  ... Equation 10.14 
 10 6.501 - 0.010LL - 0.545PI - 0.435GIB - 0.139NOM - 0.471GIDS – 0.452GICS + e (Upland)    ... Equation 10. 15 
 
This implies that positive or negative changes made to ground conditions or in the geotechnical 
practices of the highway agencies will produce an expected exponential increase or decrease in 
the level of cost overruns recorded in highway projects. However, since the inherent deltaic 
ground conditions at project sites cannot be changed, but only managed, the only interface based 
on which cost overruns can be exponentially minimised in highway projects lies in making 
positive changes in the geotechnical practices of highway agencies, principally in budget 
estimation and design practices (2nd and 3rd).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 10.20: Conceptual Approach to Managing Ground Conditions after ICE (2001) 
 
The regression analysis thus validates the assertions of the ICE (2001: 12), as shown in Figure 
10.20: that geotechnical risks associated with ground conditions can only be controlled within the 
limited decision interface via adequate geotechnical risk containment”. As such it can be inferred 
that improved budget estimates and appropriate designs that reflect the geologic heterogeneity 
of the Niger delta terrain, will counteract the cost overrun propensity of projects, due to effect of 
poor ground conditions at project sites. 
However, it is also recognised, as cognitively mapped out, that there exist a multitude of 
contextual barriers to the adequacy of geotechnical input in highway projects, which in turn 
constitute cost overrun drivers: 
Circle of Concern (Geologic Setting) 
Circle of Influence (Best Practices) 
Decision Interface (Practice) 
Random Exogenous Ground 
Related Variables 
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 Psychological Traps as used in the cognitive map, refer to those subconscious 
attitudes of client’s and contractors, largely defined by their level of enlightenment on the 
financial implications of geotechnical risks containment as well as social conditioning, 
which may effectively serve as mental traps, and impede the realisation of the evident 
‘Value for Money’ benefits of geotechnical input in highway projects. Typically, as noted 
from the responses, these include: level of ‘Risk Perception (RP); relating to the lack of 
knowledge and understanding of geo-risk management in estimates and awareness of 
their benefits (IA); Adversarial Stance (AS) and demotivation.  
 
 Pressure Emitters refer to those external elements/stakeholders in the institutional set 
up of highway agencies, which radiate compressive pressure on professional 
obligations, thereby constricting the potentials for ensuring technical requirements of 
geotechnical best practice. Typically, in the context of the Niger Delta, these include 
Political Pressures (PLP), Community Pressures (CMP), and all other forms of unethical 
pressures, such as from contractors (CNP).  
 
 Organisational Catalysts are the adverse non-project specific ‘Organisations’ and 
‘people’ related variables in the highway agencies which represent the deficient 
institutional arrangements within the highway agencies labelled as ‘Organisational 
Structure’ (OS), Pre-contract Phase Configuration (PPC) and Geotechnical Presence 
(GP), Mismatched Qualifications and Roles (MQR), which can serve to speedily diminish 
or impede the progressive flow of geotechnical input in projects. 
 
 Skills Gap refer to the individual specific knowledge deficiencies of professionals 
working on highway projects, such as low level of technical competence in design, and 
low level of enlightenment about issues related to the financial risk management of 
geotechnical issues in highway projects, which can be overcome by adequate training 
and enlightenment. 
 
 Dichotomies are those inequalities and preferential practices of highway agencies, 
which result in uneven management of geotechnical risks in projects, such as the 
Major/Minor Dichotomy (MMD) in pre-contract preparation and the upland/riverine 
Dichotomy (URD) in post contract management of projects   
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 Unethical Facilitators represent those subtle unprofessional and unethical practices of 
the key actors in highway projects, primarily geared at personal gains, such as those by 
contractors, consultants and highway officials, as well as other forms of organisational 
and institutional irregularities in the procurement of highway projects. 
 
It can thus be inferred that cost overruns experienced in highway projects executed in the Niger 
Delta, can be accounted for by a multiplicity of contextual variables, which have not been 
identified and explained in previous empirical studies on cost overruns in highway projects. It is 
also evident from the comprehensive analysis, that geotechnical explanations account for the 
majority of the variance in cost overruns recorded on highway projects executed in the Niger 
Delta. Thus the untested assertions of Flyvbjerg et al. (2002): that geology and geotechnical risks 
does not matter in explaining cost overruns, does not hold in the case of highway projects 
executed in the Niger Delta. It is thus the major corroboration of this study that, in the geologic 
setting of the Niger Delta, cost overruns recorded on highway projects are principally triggered 
by geotechnical factors, amidst a wide array of other contextual socio-politico-cultural factors, 
and not the outcome of strategic misrepresentation. 
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Chapter 11 
Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendations 
11.0 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the research process, and reviews the extent to which the aim of the 
study and its objectives have been achieved. It also discusses the wider implications of the study, 
in generalizing theory on the explanation for the phenomenon of cost overruns in public projects, 
and its more specific implication for highway development in the Niger Delta region. 
Recommendations for aligning highway delivery in the Niger Delta region, with geotechnical best 
practice are also made, based on relevant referrals to the literature. The chapter further outlines 
the originality of the study and its contribution to knowledge in the spheres of academe, practice 
and policy. The chapter is concluded by the researcher’s reflection on the learning curve 
undergone in embarking on this research, and how this has shifted the researcher’s positionality. 
Recommendations for further studies implicit in the findings from this research are also 
forwarded. 
11.1 Review of the Research Process in Achieving the Study’s Objectives  
The research set off with the rationale of understanding the cause of the unusually high cost 
overruns experienced in highway projects, which as the local literature evidences, accounts for 
the state of highway development in the tropical wetland setting of the Niger Delta. A review of 
the scholarly literature on explanations to cost overruns, revealed a strong dialectical debate 
between the theoretical and technical schools of thought, as to what propagates relatively higher 
cost overruns in public infrastructure projects. The theorists are of the opinion that psychological 
issues, optimism bias and deliberate misrepresentation by project planners, largely accounted 
for cost overruns in transportation infrastructure projects. Principally, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) 
challenged the validity of geology and geotechnical risk, tendered by the technical school in 
accounting for cost overruns in highway projects. Yet the literature continues to report, 
inadequate use of geotechnical risk containment in highway projects, resulting in considerable 
post-contract cost overruns. As a result of this controversy within the existing literature, and the 
lack of a robust empirical analysis to this effect, this research was carried out to explore the 
statistical validity of geotechnical risk factors in explaining cost overruns in highway projects, 
contextualised in the geologic setting of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The Niger Delta, was 
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thus used as a case study site to test the validity of geotechnical risk factors in explaining cost 
overruns, due to its peculiar wetland geology.  
Against this backdrop, the aim of the study was to explain the propagation of cost overruns in 
highway projects using a geotechnical narrative predicated on the financial risk implications of 
the heterogeneous geology of the Niger Delta wetland. To this end, seven objectives were set to 
achieve this aim, using the research process diagrammatically represented in Figure 11.1 
 
Figure 11.1: Summary of the Research Process 
 A reflective account of how well the predefined objectives of the study have being achieved 
using this research process is thus revisited:  
 
375 
 
11.1.1 Objective one: To synthesize the background literature on investment in highway 
development in Nigeria and the prevalence of delays and abandonment in project delivery, 
with emphasis on the Niger Delta region due to its peculiar geologic setting.  
 
The study was commenced by synthesizing the geo-institutional background of investment in 
highway development in the Niger Delta, as the first objective of the study. Objective one was 
relevant to set the scene, and highlight the current trend of incessant project delays and 
abandonment, which created an impetus for the research.  Objective one of the study has been 
achieved in chapter two of the thesis, which provided a detailed description of the regional and 
socio-economic background of the Niger Delta region, within the wider context of highway 
development in Nigeria as a developing country. The historical antecedent to the current 
institutional structure of highway administration in the Nigeria was thus chronologically and 
analytically traced, to serve as a backdrop to the existing framework for transportation 
infrastructure in the Niger Delta. This showed the significant level of investment channelled to 
infrastructural development through several foiled bodies, which were specifically set up in 
recognition of the physical environmental constraints of the Niger Delta. The historical 
background, also revealed the prevalence of project delays and abandonment, as an ongoing 
legacy from the past to the present. This thus served as a retrospective context to understanding 
the cycle of short funding, delays and incessant abandonment of highway projects, currently 
reported in the Niger Delta region.  
Empirical literature sourced from both the wider context of developing countries, and more 
specific to the Niger Delta region, were further critically analysed to understand the significant 
causes of project delays and abandonment. The few studies specific to the Niger Delta region, 
repeatedly highlighted themes which revolved around funding shortfalls and technicalities 
associated the terrain. The findings led the researcher to hypothesize that the peculiar geologic 
setting coupled with the other underlying technical issues in practice, may be fundamental to the 
prevailing menace of delays and abandonment, leading to excessive cost overruns in the Niger 
Delta region. This set the background of the study, and created the impetus for probing further 
into what technical issues in the organisations responsible for procuring highway projects, have 
remained unresolved, from the past to present institutional arrangements. 
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11.1.2 Objective Two: To critically evaluate the theoretical and methodological lenses that 
have been used in previous studies, to explain the propagation of cost overruns in 
highway projects, as a platform for highlighting significant gaps which have implications 
for this study.  
 
To achieve objective two, chapter three of the study analysed the various strands of the scholarly 
literature analysing cost overruns in highway projects, all of which were unanimous in stating that 
public infrastructure projects face significantly higher levels of cost overrun than those 
experienced by other construction industry sectors. The literature search revealed an expansive 
range of research identifying theoretical and technical explanations for this negative trend. A 
strongly contested debate, between the theoretical and technical schools of thought, was shown 
to dominate most of the discussion on cost overruns in highway projects. The theorists suggest 
that optimism bias and deliberate deception by clients and their professional advisors, due to 
corruption or politically induced malpractice, is the cause of the consistent cost overruns reported 
on public infrastructure projects. Whereas, proponents of the technical school suggest that cost 
overruns, most likely result from technical shortcomings in practice, referred to as ‘Latent 
Pathogens’, which often lying dormant in the complex interactive processes of infrastructure 
projects, are unintentionally triggered, leading to a series of events culminating in cost overruns. 
This latter argument, was supported in this study, based on the geotechnical risk perspective 
adopted to explaining cost overruns in the Niger Delta. A chief rival explanation to this stance, 
was however advanced by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), a seminal author and leading theorist, 
specifically disputing the validity of geology and geologic risks in explaining transportation 
infrastructure cost overruns. 
Further to this, chapter three took a comprehensive and critical outlook at the various approaches 
that have been used to explain the phenomena of cost overruns in public projects, with a view to 
establish the methodical lenses through which these wide proliferation of studies vying for 
explanatory supremacy, have been conducted. The outcome of the critical analysis revealed that 
several gaps in the literature exist in terms of: the lack of robust statistical evidence to support 
the assertions that geotechnical risks impact on cost overrun levels; the lack of contextual 
specificity in most studies, the predominance of mono-method studies, with a paucity of 
methodologically rigorous explanatory approaches; and the exclusivity and cluster in the 
geographical spread of in-depth qualitative narratives, to the developed world, which is mostly 
not reflective of developing nations such as those on the African continent.  
377 
 
Objective two of this study was thus achieved by identifying the knowledge gaps, which formed 
the basis on which this research was structured, as a distinctive and significant departure from 
previous studies on cost overruns. In the light of the literature findings, the study was 
conceptualised to significantly differ from previous cost overrun studies, by providing and 
analysing project data to argue the impact of geologic risk factors in the context of Nigeria, a 
developing country which relies mostly on technical assistance from developed countries, and 
particularly with respect to the peculiar wetland conditions of the Niger Delta region.Two 
complementary theories were further deduced from the literature as having significance in this 
study: Love et al. ’s (2012) latent pathogen theory alongside Morris (1990)  ‘Vicious cycle of 
delays and short-funding’ theory. These theories were adopted as the theoretical framework to 
strengthen the study argument, against the counter theory of strategic misrepresentation argued 
by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002). This was considering the limitations in Nigeria’s engineering practice, 
and the historical trend of short funding, delays and abandonment by past and present 
institutional bodies in the Niger Delta, highlighted in the local literature. 
To overcome the methodological limitations of previous studies in the literature, the study used 
a robust multi-method analysis to convergently provide in-depth geotechnical and geologic 
explanations to the prevailing trend of high cost overruns, using: Thematic analysis of 16 
interviews; Documentary/Archival Analysis; and Spatial analysis of geotechnical data sets on 
sub-soils approximated at project locations. The multiple strands of the analysis were further 
triangulated, using regression modelling technique, to account for the variance in cost overruns 
experienced in 61 highway projects, executed by the three highway agencies operating in the 
Niger Delta. This was complemented by a quantitatively weighted cognitive map. Furthermore, 
the explanation proffered in this study, unlike previous studies, used a geotechnical narrative 
contextualised in the real life organisational setting of the highway agencies, supplemented by 
the views of contractors and consultants, external to but registered with the highway agencies. 
 
11.1.3 Objective Three: To critically evaluate and select an adequate 
philosophical/methodological orientation relevant to provide rich insights into the 
phenomena of unusually high cost overruns experienced in highway projects delivery in 
the Niger Delta.  
Chapter four of this thesis, critically evaluated and selected a philosophical/methodological 
orientation relevant to provide rich insights into the phenomena of unusually high cost overruns 
experienced in highway projects, executed in the Niger Delta. Based on an evaluation of the 
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different philosophical orientations, the critical realist philosophical position, was rationalised and 
argued as most suited to achieve the research objectives. The critical realist philosophical 
underpinnings of the study, therefore informed the specification of the research methods that 
were deployed in the investigation of the phenomena of highway project cost overruns in the 
Niger Delta.  Having adopted this philosophical orientation, a mixed method approach was 
considered the most practical methodological alternative, needed to achieve the research 
objectives. This was because it straddled the qualitative and quantitative frontiers, considered 
necessary to provide robust explanations beyond those evident in previous studies. Issues of 
reliability and validity were thus resolved along these lines, by incorporating relevant criteria from 
both the qualitative and qualitative strands.  
Several potential research strategies were evaluated, and the case study approach, was selected 
to provide an in-depth contextual explanation to the unusually high cost overruns in the Niger 
Delta, due to its wholesomeness for investigating the study phenomena and its compatibility with 
the critical realist stance adopted. The appropriateness of using of the case study approach, was 
further enhanced due its capacity to simultaneously incorporate multiple methods. The 
applicability of the dialectical debate in the literature, to explaining the unusually high levels of 
cost overruns, experienced in Niger Delta’s highway projects, was tested. As such this further 
constituted the study’s core and counter propositions, in adopting a case study approach. The 
case study approach, was thus used to test the pathogenic effect of geotechnical risks in pre-
contract preparation, and how these accounted for increased cost overruns, using a technical 
narrative predicated on the heterogeneous geologic setting of the Niger Delta region.  
Objective three was thus achieved in chapter four, which outlined the research methodology of 
this study, where a coherent flow of well-articulated philosophical arguments was used to position 
the study, and choose a methodological route which served as an overall research design 
framework, that guided the practical deployment of the case study. The research design thus 
conceptualised, guided all aspects of this study, specifically targeted at understanding the 
contextual technical issues propagating cost growth and how these have resulted in the cost 
overruns reported in highway projects.  
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11.1.4 Objective Four: To analyse the heterogeneous configuration of the Niger Delta 
terrain, and the peculiar practicalities necessary for highway construction, as a case 
study justification of its inherent geologic distinctiveness for triggering cost overruns.  
 
The achievement of objective one (background literature) was the basis that led to the researcher 
to speculate that the geology of the Niger Delta, and related geotechnical issues accounting for 
the excessive cost overruns, leading to the series of delays and project abandonment in the 
Niger Delta. However, the findings from objective two (targeted at understanding how previous 
studies have explained the phenomenon of cost overruns in public projects) revealed an 
unresolved debate between the technical and theoretical schools on the role of geology and 
geotechnical risk in accounting for cost overruns. This unresolved argument led the researcher, 
to propose a set of hypothesis, using the Niger Delta as a case study, due to its embodiment of 
geologic difficulties implicit in a wetland terrain. Chapter five of the thesis was thus structured to 
achieve objective four, by exploring the geologic peculiarities of the Niger Delta region, as test 
bed to show the potential of geology to trigger cost overruns.  
An exploratory geo-statistical analysis was thus undertaken in Chapter five, to provide an 
empirical view of how the geologic variability of the terrain of the Niger Delta, implicit in the 
disparity of ground conditions across three physiographically synthesised geologic zones, fosters 
the potential for highway projects to run over budgeted cost estimates. Chapter five thus 
geotechnically described the difficult terrain of the Niger Delta region, in terms of the 
predominance of subgrade soils with poor engineering index properties, and statistically explored 
this geotechnical undertone as a potential trigger which creates a propensity for cost overruns. 
A descriptive geotechnical analysis of the engineering suitability of the subgrade soils 
approximated for project locations was carried out, based on available local literature, 
supplemented by the researcher’s geotechnical field work data. Exploratory statistical tests of 
significant difference (ANOVA), and correlation analysis were further used to analyse recorded 
cost overrun data for 61 completed highway projects, in tandem with the spatially dispersed 
geotechnical index data.  
The geo-statistical analysis established a high degree of association, between the 
heterogeneous geologic setting of the Niger Delta, and the cost overrun trends evident in the 
sample of highway projects. Significant differences in the levels of cost overruns experienced in 
the highway projects was inferred, between the three disparate geo-zones of the Niger Delta, 
synthesised from the local literature, based on the Analysis of Variance test conducted. The 
findings from further Turkey-Kramer Multiple comparisons tests, revealed that percentage cost 
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overruns were significantly higher in the wetland areas with inherently worse soil conditions, 
particularly the swamps. The researcher’s positionality at this point in the research, was that that 
the significant differences in cost overruns, might be primarily triggered by issues relating to 
ground conditions, which ideally ought to be clearly tackled, but were left unresolved early on in 
the project at the pre-tender stage, thereby spilling into the contractual and construction phase, 
leading to a significant disparity in cost overruns between the uplands and the risk laden wetland 
zones. Also several parameters of expansivity and compressibility of subsoils at spatially 
dispersed areas, indicative of problematic soils, correlated positively with the cost overruns 
recorded in the highway projects. The general trend evident in the data, was indicative that the 
level of cost overruns increased correspondingly with poorness and adverse nature of ground 
conditions at project locations.  
These findings from the geostatistical analysis, achieved objective four, and reinforced the 
researcher’s pre-conceived assertions, that the unusually high level of recorded cost overruns in 
completed highway projects, was strongly correlated with the peculiar geologic setting of the 
region. It thus provided an empirical justification of the need for a further in-depth investigation 
of geotechnically induced cost overrun drivers, in the practices of the three highway agencies 
that executed the sampled projects, which may have triggered this trend. This conclusion was 
drawn in tandem with the maxim of geotechnical risk management: ‘the worse the ground 
conditions, the greater the risk’ (ICE, 1991:12). Identifying the geotechnical 
shortcomings/deviations from the dictates of best practice, was thus considered the next logical 
step towards achieving the study aim.  
11.1.5 Objective Five: To identify the specific mediums of ground related risk containment, 
from best practice, which emphasize the need for adequate geotechnical input in highway 
projects as potential triggers to cost overruns.  
 
Chapter six explored best practices in the literature, requisite to accommodate financial risks due 
to ground conditions, in designs and estimates, a lack of which was latter inferred as accounting 
for the unusually high cost overruns in the sampled highway projects. The exploratory analysis 
of the literature revealed various mediums of financial risk containment, via ensuring adequate 
geotechnical input in: conceptual cost estimation; designs; and contracting, and explicitly 
illuminated best practices necessary to curtail cost overruns in highway projects. Recommended 
best practices for clients of highway projects at the pre-contract phases, were by implication 
deduced as: 
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 Use of differentiated costing profiles as opposed to uniform historical rates at the 
conceptual phase; 
 Carrying out adequate levels of ground investigations: Desk studies; preliminary 
reconnaissance; and detailed explorations, as a basis of designs and detailed estimates; 
 Inclusion of Ground Investigation Reports (GIR) in contract documentation and provision 
for Differing Site Condition (DSC) clauses; 
 Ensuring an adequate geotechnical criterion in contractor selection.  
 
The researcher thus used the findings from this exploratory literature analysis of geotechnical 
best practices, as a logical theoretical perspective to understanding the propagation of cost 
overruns, recorded in the sample of 61 highway projects, previously analysed in chapter five. 
The significance of poor ground conditions at project locations, and what a lack of geotechnical 
risk management therof, portends for triggering costoverrun, was used to develop a conceptual 
model of the pathogenic impact of geotechnical risk in the phases of highway projects. The 
conceptual model thus highlighted various mediums of geotechnical input, that have implications 
for the accuracy of initial budgeted funds, detailed design estimates, contractor’s tender 
estimates and final outturn cost of project. Findings from chapter six thus achieved objective five. 
These findings set the structure of the subsequent interview analysis, which sought to investigate 
the level of adherence to geotechnical best practices by the highway agencies, necessary to 
validate the earlier outlined suspected gaps in knowledge.  
 
11.1.6 Objective Six: To examine the level of adherence/deviations in the design/costing 
practices of highway agencies in the Niger Delta, in line with the precepts of the identified 
geotechnical best practices, as a basis of ascertaining the suspected gaps in knowledge 
presupposed as the underlying cost overrun drivers. 
 
Further to the identification of geotechnical best practices, the scale of the problem of inadequate 
geotechnical risk management, suspected as prevailing in the organisational dynamics of the 
three highway agencies which executed the sampled projects, was further established in the 
interview analysis. The identified mediums of geotechnical input were conceptualised to serve 
as a guide in designing a template for the Interview analysis. The field work was thus structured 
to specifically investigate: how well configured the phases of highway development were; the 
technical details of how funds budgeted for proposed highway projects are estimated; what levels 
of ground investigations are carried out as a basis for designs; and the modalities of contractor 
selection/contract documentation.  
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Chapter 7 served as a prelude to the interview analysis, setting out the background information 
on the highway organisations in the Niger Delta, and providing a detailed breakdown of the 
analysis procedure. The presentation of the findings in the interview analysis followed the 
hierarchical structures of the geotechnical themes set out in the conceptualised model of cost 
drivers. The interviews elicited information on the budgetary, design, and procurement practices 
of the highway agencies, and to what extent geotechnical input was ensured in highway projects 
at the different phases. The analysed interview data was generated, based on the responses of 
the various groups of respondents, within and affiliated to the respective highway organisations: 
Civil engineers; Quantity Surveyors; Consultants; and Contractors. Also related issues on the 
post contract impact of geotechnical risks on highway projects were elicited from the responses, 
and supported by available documentary evidence. 
Chapter eight thus investigated the practices of the highway agencies and the various practical 
geotechnical issues evident, in relation to the predetermined themes, thus providing a descriptive 
snapshot of the design and costing practices of the highway agencies in the Niger Delta. The 
interview data was thematically analysed for the prevailing level of geotechnical input, in relation 
to their post-contract implications in the projects executed by each of the three agencies. The 
evaluation revealed the poor levels of pre-contract geotechnical evaluation, and the consequent 
post-contract impacts on highway project delivery. From the analysis, an array of factors 
predicated on the need for geotechnical input were identified as contributing to the unusually 
high levels of cost overruns experienced by the highway agencies in the Niger Delta. This served 
to achieve objective six, and confirmed the suspected gaps in knowledge, which were pre-
supposed as existing in the practices of the highway agencies.  
However, a further reflexive inductive analysis of the interview data was carried out in chapter 
nine, in response to unanticipated themes, and revealed the role of the organisational settings, 
people, and external factors in determining the level geotechnical input. The findings from the 
inductive analysis of the interviews, thus created an awareness of the socio-cultural settings as 
factors in the management of geotechnical risk. These induced themes were thus identified as 
the barriers to adequate geotechnical input, which equally represented the range of contextual 
issues evident in the practices of highway agencies, driving cost overruns in the region. The 
induced themes further reinforced the local literature evidence, which alludes to the poor 
procurement practices of highway agencies in Nigeria, as one of the fundamental causes of 
project delays and abandonment. 
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11.1.7 Objective 7: To develop a statistically valid model and cognitive map of 
geotechnical best practice based drivers to cost overruns, predicted on the 
heterogeneous geologic configuration of the Niger Delta region, as basis of accounting 
for the level of variance induced by geotechnical triggers. 
 
Based on the findings of all previous findings, it was inferred that a counter factual chain of latent 
geotechnical pathogens, entrenched in a complex web of contextual dynamics, with all existing 
in a state of mutual interactivity, accounted for the unusually high level of cost overruns recorded 
on the sample of highway projects. As it could not be easily isolated, which of the identified issues 
accounted for the highest variance in the cost overruns experienced, an attempt to weight them 
was made via quantitative analysis. To explain and thus account for the recorded level of cost 
overrun, the researcher triangulated all the findings from the various strands of the case study. 
This was achieved quantitatively and qualitatively via regression analysis and content analysis 
respectively. Chapter ten of this thesis thus achieved objective 7, by using regression modelling 
to explain and account for the variance in cost overruns of the sampled highway projects, induced 
by the geotechnical themes, with content analysis used to rank the emergent contextual themes.  
Regression modelling was used to statistically analyse how much variation in the recorded 
project cost overruns, was directly triggered due to the variation in the core geotechnical factors. 
Multiple regression analysis, was thus used to deduce the proportion of variance in cost overruns, 
that was explained by latent geologic factors, and the proportion that was explained by 
shortcomings in the geotechnical practices of the highway agencies.  A log transformed 
regression model was developed, representing an exponential expression of the relationship 
among the variables, whereby small changes in the cost overrun drivers would result in 
disproportionately large changes in the levels of cost overruns recorded on highway projects.  It 
was inferred that improved budget estimates and appropriate designs that reflect the geologic 
heterogeneity of the Niger Delta terrain, will counteract the cost overrun propensity of projects, 
due to effect of poor ground conditions at project sites    
The regression modelling of the core geotechnical variables, however explained only 79% of the 
variance in cost overruns recorded in the highway projects, with 21% of the variation in cost 
overrun remaining unexplained. The findings of the inductive analysis in chapter 9, had however 
revealed a multitude of contextual barriers to geotechnical input, which were inferred as 
accounting for the unexplained variation in the level of cost overrun. As such, other than the core 
group of geotechnical cost drivers which defined the initial focus of the study, other emergent 
groups of explanatory themes were discernible: organisational, human and skills related, as well 
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as political and socio-cultural Influence, which directly and indirectly impact on the geotechnical 
explanations.  
Cognitively mapping was further used to visually conceptualise the multiplicity of variables and 
context, which are directly relevant to explaining why cost overruns experienced by the highway 
organisations in the Niger Delta are so unusually high. The cognitive mapping thus 
conceptualised the core geotechnical themes, which interplay within bulbs of organisational 
catalyst’, ‘Pressure Emitters’, ‘Psychological Traps’, ‘Skills Gaps’, ‘Dichotomies’ and ‘Unethical 
Facilitators’, of various scales (as ranked), entrenched within the macro social value system and 
geo-political climate of highway development in the region. The intricate complexity of this 
interplay was evident in ties and phase dependent connectivity, between the technical and 
socially constructs, driving the high level of cost overruns experienced on highway project in the 
Niger Delta. 
 
11.2 Extent of Achievement of the Study Aim 
In achieving objective one to seven, an array of factors predicated on the need for geotechnical 
input had being identified, as latent pathogens and contextual drivers, contributing to the current 
state of highway infrastructure delivery in the Niger Delta. The robustness of the findings has 
thus clarified the mechanism of the build-up of unusually high cost overruns in highway projects, 
executed in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. By virtue of the findings, the aim of the study, which 
is to provide an explanation for the propagation of cost overruns in highway projects, using a 
geotechnical narrative predicated on the financial risk implications of the heterogeneous geology 
of the Niger Delta wetland, has been accomplished. 
 
11.3 Main Findings of the Research 
The study has highlighted several technical issues in practice, which need to be resolved to align 
highway project delivery in the Niger Delta, with geotechnical best practices identified from the 
literature: 
 The inconsistency in the phase configuration of highway project development in the 
Niger Delta, primarily for community projects; 
 The lack of adequate geotechnical evaluation for the planning of highway projects; 
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 The lack of in-house geotechnical presence in some of the highway agencies, 
throughout the phases of highway development;  
 The use of non-differentiated costing platforms in budgetary provision for proposed 
highway projects at the preliminary phases of highway development; 
 The non-adherence of highway designs to the appropriate engineering sections, as 
recommended by the nationally adopted highway design standard in Nigeria, the TRRL 
(1993), despite the heterogeneous sub-soil profile of the Niger Delta region; 
 The predominant lack of preparation of adequate and comprehensive designs for 
community highway projects;  
 The lack of adequate geotechnical risk containment measures, in contracts awarded by 
the highway agencies, necessary to lessen the magnitude of geotechnical risk borne by 
contractors in bidding for highway contracts;  
 The primarily subjectively and politically driven mode of contractor selection during the 
award of highway contracts, which is not based on any form of geotechnical criteria 
requisite to ensure efficiency of project execution. 
 
All these technical shortcomings, latent in the everyday practices of the highway agencies, 
revolve around inadequate management of financial risks, due to ground conditions in the Niger 
Delta. These latent pathogens occur, however, amidst the wide array of socio-cultural issues 
concomitantly identified. The findings thus highlight the fact, that the high level of cost overrun 
evidenced in highway project execution in the geologic setting of the Niger Delta, are not purely 
triggered by technical factors. Non-technical factors, such as: human psychology; the 
organizational setting; socio-political factors; knowledge gaps; procurement irregularities; also 
playout to culminate in the unusually high levels of cost overruns. Also the current practice of 
prioritizing projects according to size or location, implies a preferential management of ground 
related and other financial risks, which is correspondingly reflected in the disparities in the levels 
of cost overruns. Consideration thus has to be given to not only the geotechnical factors evident 
in the development phases, as they relate to ground conditions, but also to the prevailing 
organizational configuration, the external socio-political climate of the highway agencies, and the 
psychological interplay between the principal technical and non-technical actors.  
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11.4 Implications of the Research Findings for the Current State of Highway Development 
in the Niger Delta Region 
The reality of the situation in highway project delivery in the Niger Delta, as deduced from the 
findings of the case study, depicts a far departure from the theory of good practice, relevant for 
the cost effective management of highway projects. The findings provide strong empirical 
evidence on the current state of practice, consequently accounting for the high levels of cost 
overruns recorded in highway projects executed in the Niger Delta. The study has shown that 
the various geotechnical issues identified from the study, have to a large extent contributed to 
increasing the levels of claims and variations, leading to lengthy project delays and 
abandonment.  
Different combinations of ground related issues due to poor geotechnical risk management, have 
affected project delivery by the highway agencies, for major and community projects. These 
negative trends, are however, generally more evident in community projects, where pre-contract 
preparation and geotechnical input is mostly lacking, than in major projects designed by 
consultants. This interesting finding emanating from this research, explains why percentage cost 
overruns, are much higher among smaller scale projects when compared to larger ones. A finding 
which stands in contradiction to the notion, that cost overruns varies directly proportional to 
project size, as reported in several empirical studies.  
The generally poor level of pre-contract preparation by the highway agencies, reinforces local 
literature evidence on the technical shortcomings in highway project delivery in the Niger Delta. 
The findings of the study also corroborate the views of earlier technical scholars in the literature 
on the Niger Delta, such as those offered in the work of Akpokodje (1987,1989); Abam and 
Okogbue (1993), Oguara, (2002) and Teme (2002). Collectively, these scholars have 
acknowledged that the geologic setting of the Niger Delta, has high technical and financial 
undertones, under-scoring the need for adequate geotechnical input in designs based on 
adequate geotechnical and geologic information. Akpokodje (1987), almost three decades ago, 
had emphasised the need for a thorough understanding of the geomorphology of the Niger Delta 
region, to serve as a backdrop to engineering designs of infrastructural projects, in recognition 
of its peculiar terrain, which is also prone to flooding. It was asserted: “The need for necessary 
precautions, commencing with appropriate steps in site investigation and exploration to reveal 
the presence of the aforementioned poor soil conditions, before the execution of any project 
cannot be over emphasized” (Akpokodje, 1987. P 195).  
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Findings from the case study, suggest that despite Akpokodje’s (1987) calls for the adoption of 
a more comprehensive and geotechnically inclined pre-construction evaluative stage for all 
highway projects in the Niger Delta, community projects, which are mostly situated in riverine 
areas, still exhibit an almost complete lack of planning and geotechnical input. This is typified by: 
(1) the inconsistency of phase configuration; and (2) the use of ad-hoc pre-contract preparation 
and design processes, by two out of the three highway agencies evaluated.  These findings have 
also revealed the generally low level of technical competence of the highway agencies 
responsible for highway development in the Niger Delta region, which may be typical of highway 
development in the wider context of Nigeria. Collectives these failings reinforce the assertion 
that, low level of in-house pre-contract preparation and geotechnical input are still considered 
normal practice, despite the calls in the literature for a step change in practice. The study findings 
clearly have significant implications for the current state of highway development in the Niger 
Delta, as it shows that the greatest potential for cost savings, lies in maximising the justifiable 
benefits of adequate geotechnical risk containment in highway projects, via the consistent 
adoption of best practice from inception to completion.  
In an attempt to further understand the barriers to the paradigm shift in practice called for by 
several scholars, who have researched the geology of the Niger Delta and its developmental 
implications, the research has uncovered the significant institutional and political barriers to 
change within the highway organisations. The research shows that the inherently poor levels of 
geotechnical input in highway projects, is a reflection of the trickle-down effect of non-technical 
factors, such as human and organizational factors, as well as due to knowledge deficiencies in 
geotechnical risk management, which inherently trigger the geotechnical pathogens to actively 
escalate budgeted cost, over the lifespan of projects.  
Of particular concern however, are the unethical practices and procurement irregularities evident 
within the highway agencies, which would inevitably negate any gains achievable, in resolving 
all other technical issues. The findings show that there are several internal organisational 
loopholes, which creates a viable ground for such unethical practices, where they do occur, to 
thrive. The apparent lack of rigorously enforced organisational platform for ensuring transparency 
in project execution by the highway agencies, creates avenues for unethical practices by 
consultants, contractors and highway officials alike, to exploit the porosity of the prevailing 
organisational system to their advantage. The findings have thus revealed several forms of 
procurement irregularities, implicit in the mode of delivery of highway projects in the Niger Delta, 
which previous qualitative narratives have not uncovered. These include issues of: 
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Emergency/politically dictated procurement of highway projects; Unplanned budgetary practices; 
Heightened security risk to highway officials overseeing highway projects; Subjective award of 
contracts to unqualified contractors; Hushed and unrealistic bidding timelines; and Multiple 
contract re-award, without any apparent form of accountability. 
The multiplicity of issues uncovered in this study, represent the festering contextual drivers 
underlying the immense infrastructural backwardness evident in the region, despite its wealth of 
oil reserves. These findings are thus timely, as the critical issues facing infrastructural 
development in the Niger Delta, which is topical on the international frontier. Having become a 
cause for public concern, triggering violent agitation and an armed struggle by communities, 
currently making headlines in the media. The aftermath of these issues, is evident in the war-
front like landscape of the Niger Delta region, following repeated bombings and explosions, 
reported in numerous media publications. These findings may also explain why the significant 
budgetary funds that have been allocated to several foiled institutional bodies, set up by 
successive administrations in Nigeria, to address infrastructural backlog in the Niger Delta, have 
not ended up producing any meaningful development in the region. But rather the continuing 
legacy, is the series of delayed and abandoned projects, that have been left in the wake of their 
collapse. 
 
11.5 Broader Implications/Contributions of the Study 
The cost overrun explanation provided is this study, is contextual to the tropical wetland setting 
of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. However, it has direct theoretical, academic, practice based 
and policy implications, which contributes to the wider body of knowledge.   
11.5.1 Contributions to Theory: Analytic Generalizability  
Yin (2014), prescribed that achieving analytic generalisation, as opposed to statistical 
generalisation, is the primary purpose of a case study research. Identifying and addressing rival 
and complementary explanations, as well as explicitly outlining new theories emerging from this 
case study, is thus the basis on which analytic generalisation is made, necessary to explicitly 
show the study’s contribution, to the body of existing theory on the phenomena of cost overruns 
in public projects. Several theoretical contributions, are thus implicit in the findings of this 
research. 
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A key theoretical contribution from this case study, is that it has shown that the rival explanation 
of strategic underrepresentation of actual project cost, leading to cost overruns, argued by 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), does not play out in the specific context of the Niger Delta. Although 
political motives, strongly underlie the planning and approval pattern of projects executed in the 
Niger Delta, the theory of deliberate underestimation, advanced by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) has 
little explanatory power in the case of highway development in the Niger Delta. The findings show 
that in reality, no apparent form of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), which should mandatorily form 
the basis of approval in choosing from competing alternatives, is even carried out. Therefore, the 
elaborate machiavellian theories of politico-economic motives and power, underlying the theory 
of strategic misrepresentation by planners and highway officials posited in developed countries, 
is not evident in the data, and fundamentally does not connote any significance in explaining cost 
overruns in the Niger Delta.  
Rather, the study findings further reinforce the generalisability of Love et al. (2012) latent 
pathogen theory, from the Australian context of building infrastructure, to highway projects in the 
Nigerian context. The series of evidence from the analysis has thus provided context specific 
qualitative explanations, about how the prevailing poor levels of geotechnical input constitute 
latent pathogens, which have triggered a chain reaction effect, right from the conceptual phase, 
and contributed to the increasing the levels of claims and variations, at the post-contract phase. 
This has consequently escalated cost and impacted on project delivery in the Niger Delta, leading 
to lengthy project delays and abandonments in highway projects. Poor geotechnical risk 
management by the highway agencies, has created a propensity for highway projects to run over 
budget, considering the financial risks inherent in the wetland geologic setting of the Niger Delta. 
In addition to the presence of latent geotechnical pathogens at the various stages of project 
planning, an emergent theory from the data, is that project approval and execution for highway 
projects executed in the Niger Delta have no definite criteria, and are largely determined by the 
urgency induced from political and community quarters. The theory of: Pressure induced 
urgency, due to political and community emitters, which creates psychological traps and a 
repressive atmosphere for highway officials, leading to an adhoc, preferentially dichotomised and 
dictatorial type of project planning, with evidence of unethical practices in project execution and 
governance, seems to be an emergent strand of theoretical explanation to cost overruns in 
highway projects. This is suspected as possibly the strongest theoretical explanation holding in 
the wider context of Nigeria, which complements the presence of geotechnical pathogens 
triggered by a predominantly low level of technical-know how. The combination of these technical 
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and social vices, in essence leads to a vicious cycle of short funding and delays, a theory earlier 
forwarded by Morris (1990) in the Indian setting.  
To this end, a major theoretical contribution from this research is that, it blurs the boundaries of 
the dialectical debate in the literature, between the theoretical and technical schools of thought, 
competing as explanations for cost overruns in highway projects. A stance which had been 
previously advocated by Ahiagu Dugbai (2015), in stating: 
“Existing theories on causes of overruns… from an engineering and technical 
perspective…and from an economic/psychological/strategic perspective are views both 
critical to holistically dealing with the problem of cost growth, and therefore should be 
seen as complimenting, rather than opposing sides of the same issue” (p 52). 
The level of technical competence, the socio-psychological manifestations of project actors, as 
well as the distinct organisational and institutional of settings in highway agencies, matter in 
providing a holistic understanding of what drives cost overruns in public infrastructure projects. 
This was an assumption overlooked by Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), in globally generalising his rival 
explanation on cost overrun, contesting and rejecting the validity of technical explanations to cost 
overruns. The fundamental concern raised by this research in this regard therefore, is the 
question of the generalisability of knowledge created in similar positivist studies on cost overruns. 
As such, studies primarily seeking to provide generalizable explanations for the phenomena of 
cost overruns, are not plausible, and will therefore be subject to rebuttal.  
This study, has therefore demonstrated the plausibility of incorporating and linking both strands 
to the argument on cost overruns (Theoretical and Technical) in highway projects, relevant to 
provide more comprehensive contextual explanations to cost overruns in public infrastructure 
projects. The acknowledgement that, various methodologically valid explanations on cost 
overruns in public projects, can co-exist due to their context specificity, without the need to 
disprove each other, and without having to generalise beyond the study setting, is a major 
contribution to knowledge uncovered by this research.  
The findings from the case study further reinforces to various extents, several of the existing non-
technical theories on cost overrun. Typically, Cantarelli et al. (2013) had mapped out an untested 
hypothetical model, of how both parties to a contract anticipate each other’s behaviour in setting 
price margins, during contractor selection and contract award phase of infrastructure projects, in 
an intricately psychological game of political and economic motives. Elements of this theory of 
game signalling between the principal actors in public projects, namely the contractor and client, 
seem to play out in the scenario of price setting, in the geologic context of the Niger Delta.  The 
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poor geotechnical risk allocation mechanism, has led to strategic adversarial behaviour of both 
the highway agencies and the contractors, with incompetent contractors winning contracts, 
based on tactically deflated tender figures, and often times abandoning them, leading to multiple 
contract re-awards. 
The findings from this study also reinforces Johansen (2015) uncertainty framework, which 
shares the characteristics of Gil and Lundriganm (2012; 2013) Relay Race versus Core and 
Periphery theories, in emphasizing the multiplicity of unforeseeable risks and often 
competing/clashing interest groups in public projects, as accounting for cost overruns. This is 
evident in the multiplicity of political and community stakeholders in the Niger Delta region. 
Political pressure at upper helms of the hierarchy of power dictate to the highway agencies, while 
community stakeholders at the grass root level, exert their influence via bombings, hostage 
taking and violent agitations. The issue of high cost overruns in highway projects, thus cannot 
be divorced from the geo-political dynamics of the Niger Delta, and the agitations for the 
development of the backward region, which exerts clashing socio-political pressure on the 
highway officials. Therefore, despite the increased funding for the construction of new roads to 
open up the swamps in the region, the pressure from the various clashing interest groups, has 
impacted on the agencies’ ability to properly plan for and manage highway projects. 
However, irrespective of the case study findings upholding and supporting the validity of a scant 
number of qualitative narratives, carried out in the setting of developed nations, it has also shown 
that several others are not adequate to holistically explain the scenario of highway project 
delivery in the developing world. Typically, in the Netherlands, Cantarelli et al. (2010:793) tested 
the theory of lock as “a form of psychological coping associated with the inability to withdraw 
from obligations made during the decision-making process”. From the findings of this research, 
the theory of lock-in reported in the Netherlands does not necessarily apply to the Nigerian 
setting. Cantarelli et al. (2012:50) however recognised this and emphasised the need for context 
based studies, specifically in relation to individual countries, stating that:  
“With a general tendency in country specific studies towards lower or higher average 
cost overruns…, it remains difficult to make inferences about individual countries ... This 
therefore supports the need for further research into country specific cost performance 
of transport infrastructure projects”. 
 
There are thus several distinguishing features in the narrative offered from this study, which 
represent its distinct theoretical contributions, unprecedented in previous qualitative narratives 
explaining cost overruns from the perspective of developed nations. These include: 
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 Knowledge and skills gap between the developed and developing world 
The findings from this research has validated the researchers preconceived notion, of 
the wide knowledge and skills gap between the developed and developing world, in the 
management of geotechnical risk, inherent in highway projects. The study has 
empirically confirmed the observations of two seminal authors: Millard (1993) and 
Oguara (2002), from past international and local literature, respectively, to the present 
day settings.  Millard (1993), commented on the difficulties experienced by ex-colonial 
countries in tropical areas, in designing roads suitable for their terrain, and setting up 
technical organisations to adequately manage funds allocated to highway development. 
Oguara (2002), speculated that the shortcomings in the technical practices of the 
highway agencies, were responsible for the underdeveloped state of road network in the 
Niger Delta. This was in view of the several foiled developmental efforts, whereby 
Oguara (2002), called for more geotechnical ingenuity in the delivery of highway projects 
in the region. 
 
The study has revealed that at present times, there still exists apparent knowledge 
deficiencies, with respect to geotechnical risk management principles, and current 
highway design best practices, within the highway agencies in the region. This was 
evident from the responses of the agencies’ in-house design professionals, who 
exhibited very low levels of familiarity with the basic technical terminology of highway 
pavement designs and standards. These significant knowledge deficiencies 
demonstrated the worryingly low levels of awareness amongst in-house civil engineers, 
of the fundamental tools of their profession, or other internationally recognised best 
practice design standards. 
 
The study further revealed the poor level of technical competence and the prevalence of 
poorly qualified professionals employed by highway agencies in the region. The highway 
agencies clearly lacked qualified technical manpower, with the requisite qualifications, 
as a result they were badly under staffed. This is evident, as typically quantity surveyors 
and civil engineers worked in dual capacities, often interchangeably, within the various 
departments, with no clear cut definition of professional roles within the highway 
organisations. Consequently, most professionals serve in multiple capacities. The study 
further reveals instances of job descriptions not matching the qualifications of staff 
working on road projects, with completely unrelated (non-construction) professionals 
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working in the capacity of project managers and supervisors. Cases of medical doctors, 
accountants, marine engineers and even petroleum engineers heading departments in 
charge of road projects, were cited.  
 
 Oppressive Demotivating Organisational Climate in Highway Procurement 
The case study has revealed the ill structured and inconsistent organisational processes 
and project management practices in the highway agencies, entrenched in a suffocating 
cocoon of geo-political and communal pressures. The impact of political interference on 
the in-house professional roles, in the procurement of highway projects, and the 
cautiousness and demotivation it arouses in professionals in the performance of their 
duties, is a distinctive major finding from this research, which previous studies have not 
uncovered. Political authority thus appears to have usurped the professional role of 
project leadership in the Niger Delta, compared to the dynamics of the developed world, 
where project governance by delegated professionals, ideally determine the motivation 
and performance of team members in highway projects. The subjugation of professional 
obligations and ethics, in deference to political dictates, and its impact on the motivation 
of highway officials, is a major theoretical finding emerging from this case study.  
 
 Dichotomous and Preferential Execution of Projects 
Several forms of preferential treatment of projects are evident in highway project delivery 
in the Niger Delta, even after the projects have been approved for execution. These 
include: Planned versus adhoc procurement practices for major versus community 
projects; Politically motivated selective project management practices; Unequal priority 
status in the post contract management of upland vs riverine projects. These 
dichotomous practices stand in sharp contrast to the assumptions of equality in the 
efforts and approach to managing approved public projects.  
 
11.5.2 Contribution to Academe: Originality of the Research 
Research is a systematic and organised effort to investigate a specific problem in the pursuit of 
a solution (Sekaran, 2007; Grey, 2009). The originality of such solutions however, is a 
prerequisite in a PhD research, as demonstrative of its academic contribution to the existing body 
of knowledge. Variants to the form of originality are thus tenable in various fields of study. These 
are listed by Philips and Pugh (1994) to include geographic, methodological, evidential, 
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paradigmic, cross-disciplinary, field specific originality etc. This PhD research demonstrates 
originality in its contribution to knowledge, implicit in the empirical approach used to research the 
problem of cost overruns in highway projects, executed in the setting of a developing nation, and 
traversing cross-disciplinary realms, with the robust use of multiple methods.  
The academic contribution of this research is evident, in the robustness and transdisciplinary 
nature of the theoretical under-pining used to understand the propagation of cost-overruns and 
ground related risk in highway projects.  This study has used a comprehensive theoretical 
approach to understanding the propagation of cost growth in highway project estimates, based 
on an analysis of the geotechnical intricacies in highway development, which lies between the 
borderline of several fields of knowledge. One can readily identify three of such fields with the 
necessary scientific principles: Engineering Geology; Highway Engineering, and Quantity 
Surveying (Figure 1.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.2: Interlocking Fields in this Study’s Approach to Explaining Cost Overruns                                                    
 
By combining these different but converging fields of study, geotechnical risks and the associated 
cost-overrun implications have been captured, in estimates prepared during the budgetary, 
design and contractual phases. This thus shifts the emphasis of the cost overrun debate from 
just the more superficial arguments between technical and theoretical schools, to a more in-depth 
evaluation of a major financial risk variable underlying all forms of transportation infrastructure 
projects.  
Equally distinctive is the fact that the case study setting, has been framed within the lenses of an 
organisational perspective, as opposed to the more common approach of using only project level 
characteristics to quantitatively account for cost overruns, as evident in the empirical literature. 
The distinctiveness of this approach is evident as it adds an in-depth measure of texture and feel 
of the hierarchical intra-organisational functions and processes in highway agencies, which is 
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unprecedented in previous quantitative studies on cost overrun. The use of cognitive mapping 
based on empirical data, further tries to visually conceptualise how technical and non-technical 
variables, within and outside highway organisations, impact on cost overruns experienced on 
highway projects. The tangent taken by the researcher to explain cost overruns in this study, is 
therefore demonstrative of its originality, as it is unchartered in the body of scholarly literature, to 
provide context specific and in-depth geotechnical/geologic explanations to cost overruns, within 
the broader socio-cultural setting of highway organisations in the developing world. 
 
A further academic contribution of this study is methodological. The methodology used, has 
established the practicality of adopting a critical realist orientation, as a philosophical lens, to 
frame a mix method case study investigating the phenomena of cost overruns in highway 
projects. The mix of methods deployed in this case study, is evident in: 
 
 The use of spatial statistical analysis of geotechnical index data on subgrade soils, as a 
form of contextual definition of risks inherent at project sites. This represents a novel 
approach to understanding ground related risks in highway projects. The deployment of 
this approach was useful as a relevant starting point of the case study, to draw attention 
to the magnitude of the cost-overrun deferential induced by the geologic heterogeneity 
of the Niger Delta terrain, due to poor geotechnical practices; 
 
 The geotechnical characterisation of cost overrun drivers in the estimate preparation 
phases of highway projects, as a narrative form of qualitative analysis, with the reflexive 
inductive analysis of unanticipated social constructs. This approach charts out a mostly 
overlooked methodological orientation for carrying out research in the engineering and 
quantitative disciplines, which often cling to purely positivists methodologies to 
understand technical issues in construction projects; 
 
 The use of regression analysis, represents an innovative use of a quantitative approach, 
as a basis of achieving triangulation, necessary to tie and link up the various qualitative 
and quantitative strands of the technical explanation generated. This approach adopted, 
served to explicitly define the magnitude of financial risk borne by highway agencies, 
implied by latent geotechnical pathogens. The use of regression analysis thus moved 
Love et al. ’s (2012) latent pathogen theory to a further degree of statistical integrity, 
higher and above the untested assertions of Flyvbjerg et al. (2002).  
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 The use of cognitive mapping to further represent the complex interconnectivity, between 
the multiplicity of technical and social constructs, portrays the usefulness of visual 
conceptualisation to concisely relate linked qualitative data, a fundamental tenet of the 
hermeneutic circle. The cognitive map provided a snapshot of the contextual 
organisational, human and institutional barriers accounting for cost growth in highway 
projects executed in the peculiar geologic context of the region, based on empirical data. 
This showed the weightiness in the dynamics of forces, simultaneously at play in 
highway organisations, which inherently trickle down to trigger cost growth on a project 
specific basis.  
 
This study therefore methodologically demonstrates the logicality of mixing methods: Archival 
data modelling technique, in tandem with a contextual narrative built from qualitative data, to 
develop an explanatory quantitative model and weighted cognitive map of cost overrun drivers. 
The findings therefore serve to fill in a major gap in the existing literature by providing specific 
contextual backing, which significantly expands the findings from previous empirical research on 
cost overruns. It has furnished the more holistic picture missing in the disjointed findings of 
previous empirical studies on cost overruns. This sets the methodological agenda for post-2016 
research on cost overruns in construction projects.  
The methodological robustness of this study, is further evident against the backdrop of mono-
method studies, evident in the bulk of previous empirical cost overrun studies, which either 
provide qualitative theoretical explanations or quantitatively analyse project data and recorded 
cost overrun outcomes in projects. Of particular concern is the predominance of artificialised 
questionnaire survey based on positivist approaches, which can only give pointers in the general 
direction of where the problem may lie, but cannot adequately explain and provide understanding 
of the phenomena of cost growth in highway projects. As Ahiagu Dugbai (2014: 40) succinctly 
puts it: “Most studies on cost overruns only begin to scratch the surface of this complex 
phenomena plaguing highway projects, often more generating questions than answers” . The 
methodological validity of such studies is thus put to question, as such studies may almost 
completely miss out the contextual drivers that can only be revealed from a qualitative narrative. 
This study thus reinforces the need for more comprehensive and context based qualitative 
approaches, to compliment the analysis of project data, as a basis of inferring causality in cost 
overrun research. 
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The critical realist stance adopted in this study, has further implications for resolving current 
paradigmic arguments in the construction management research community, beyond the specific 
knowledge domain of cost overrun research. This is against the backdrop of the strongly debated 
arguments in cost overrun research, outlined earlier in the critical analysis of the literature, which 
showed isolated schools of thought vying for ultimate supremacy in providing generalizable 
explanations for the propagation of cost growth in public projects. This is analogous of the 
philosophical and paradigmic debates in the wider construction management research 
community. As this study demonstrates, critical realism presents itself as a valid philosophical 
position, relevant to carry out rigorous and methodologically robust research on construction 
phenomena, which can withstand the critique plaguing the use of mono methods in construction 
management research. This is considering the dialectical philosophical debate on construction 
phenomena, as being mostly social constructs, which can be also objectively studied. The 
robustness of the findings from this study, thus reinforces the call for methodological pluralism 
advocated by Dainty (2008), who argued that the research methods used by the construction 
management community should be more adventurous, and seek to incorporate a more diverse 
mix of methods, outside the confines of positivism traditionally embraced by the industry.  
 
11.5.3 Contribution to Practice 
The study has established the fact that the dominant factor accounting for the cost overruns in 
highway projects executed in the Niger Delta region, is the poor levels of geotechnical risk 
management, exacerbated by the difficult terrain. The explicit definition of the magnitude of 
financial risk borne by highway agencies, implied by the lack of adherence to geotechnical best 
practices, is a motivation requisite to catalyse change in the procurement environment of highway 
projects across the Niger Delta. This brings to the fore, the need for a geotechnical risk based 
transformation framework, to urgently address the current issue of unusually high cost overruns 
recorded on highway projects. More specifically, several tangible deliverables are implicit in the 
research findings, further underscoring its direct contributions to practice within the geographic 
setting of the study area: 
 A descriptive qualitative snapshot, providing a narrative of the current design, estimating 
and contractual scenario prevailing in highway development in the Niger Delta, which is 
unprecedented in the body of scholarly literature.  
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 A synthesized Geotechnical Best Practice Evaluation Criteria (GBPEC) implicit in the 
geotechnical characterisation of cost overrun drivers, that can be used in inferring 
adherence to geotechnical best practices, necessary to minimise cost overruns. This 
can thus serve in the dual capacity of a risk management tool for highway agencies. 
 
 A geo-spatial multiple regression based model of geotechnical pathogens, that can be 
developed to serve as a useful input in Reference Class Forecasting/Case Based 
Reasoning (CBR) models relevant for geotechnical decision making of future highway 
projects in the Niger Delta.  
 
 A cognitive map of contextual drivers, which draws attention to the weighty issues 
dragging and slowing down the pace of highway project delivery in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria, and whose resolution is critical for any meaningful progress to be made in the 
infrastructural development of the backward region. 
 
However, although the findings of this study is considered relevant to address the identified 
knowledge gaps, in the practice of the highway agencies operating in the developing setting of 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, such practice based geotechnical shortcomings may also be 
evident in other settings.  As the literature reveals, there are still current arguments in the practice 
of highway organisations, surrounding:  
 The use of off-the-shelve historical data for conceptual cost estimating, with several 
scholars advocating that adequate expenditure should be devoted to carrying out more 
rigorous and comprehensive desk studies, to enable the use of more deterministic 
costing methods;  
 The justifiable level of expenditure to be allocated to carrying out detailed ground 
exploration, and whether there is need to incorporate Ground Investigation Reports 
(GIR) and Differing Site Condition (DSC) clauses in engineering contracts, as a 
mechanism of geotechnical risk containment;  
 The relevance of geotechnical presence, right from project inception and feasibility 
studies, and not just for design purposes.  
This empirical study of highway delivery in the Niger Delta, thus depicts a case in hand showing 
how these widely contested issues in geotechnical practice and cost estimation, still currently on 
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going to various degrees on highway projects, can have significant financial impact on project 
completion cost. 
The study has further revealed that a multiplicity of contextual sociocultural issues exists within, 
and external to the organisational setting of highway agencies. The implication of these findings 
for practice is that, it has drawn attention to how non-technical drivers in projects can have a far 
reaching impact in determining the success or failure of highway projects, in achieving the 
financial objective of subverting cost overruns. It is thus clear that tackling the phenomenon of 
cost growth, leading to overruns in public infrastructure projects, is not as simplistic as previously 
portrayed in the literature, but is a multi-hydra headed monster, whose tackling should go much 
deeper than the scientific deployment of technical tools in estimating and risk management. 
11.5.4 Contribution to Policy 
Achieving value for money is a recurrent theme and a fundamental principle that resonates 
across all forms of investment decisions. For this principle to be operative in highway investment 
in the Niger Delta region, would require a change in the existing approach to geotechnical risk 
management. This is critical to minimising avoidable cost overruns due to adverse ground 
conditions,  This study has provided clients for road projects (highway agencies), and who 
therefore constitute the primary target audience, with the necessary empirical justification that: 
Value for public funds expended on highway development may be achieved and justifiably 
expended, if the appropriate estimating, design and contractual principles that reflect 
geotechnical best practices, are incorporated into projects, to subvert ground related cost-
overruns.  
The policy implication of this research work therefore, lies in creating an awareness of the need 
for the adoption of a more substantiated geotechnical basis, by relevant organisations and 
institutional authorities, via: 
 Establishing differentiated costing platforms during budgeting for highway development, 
in cognisance of the heterogeneous ground profile of the Niger Delta region; 
 
 Addressing and accounting for the vagaries of varying subsoil profiles in designs for all 
proposed highway projects by adequate expenditure on ground investigations;  
 
 Enforcing the implementation of all contractual measure, necessary to ensure adequate 
containment of geotechnical risks in the procurement of highway projects; 
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 Minimising external political and community interference to maintain a conducive 
geotechnical platform for relevant professionals to ensure geotechnical input in highway 
projects;  
 
 Providing adequate technical, human and financial resources, necessary for the highway 
organisations to adhere to best practice. 
 
There is thus an evident need for a radical re-orientation of the policy objectives of highway 
infrastructure delivery in the Niger Delta, to focus more on geotechnical perspectives, in other to 
achieve value for money in highway investments. Effective appraisals and costing of the 
geotechnical intricacies associated with the wetland terrain of the Niger Delta, is therefore a 
crucial factor, on which the successful and economic development of highway infrastructure in 
the region needs to be pivoted. There is therefore considerable potential for achieving value for 
money, via ensuring adherence to geotechnical best practises, to generate appropriate designs 
and estimates reflective of ground conditions in the Niger Delta. This will be financially expressed, 
in terms of a reduced disparity between initial budgetary estimates and final cost figures, for 
highway projects in the Niger Delta.  
However, to achieve this goal, the identified socio-cultural issues, which represent the human, 
organisational and institutional barriers to geotechnical input, would also need to be tackled 
conscientiously by relevant highway authorities. This is necessary to create a conducive platform 
for a highway investment strategy, that is closely linked to the terrain of the Niger Delta, as a 
mechanism to ensure cost effective delivery of highway infrastructure in the region. 
11.6 Recommendations of the Study 
The findings from this research call for a step change by the highway agencies, to ensure 
adequate understanding of the geomorphology of the Niger Delta, based on rigorous 
geotechnical evaluation, before the design and construction of highways in the region. Such 
prescriptive measures necessary to entrench geotechnical principles, for the efficient 
development of road infrastructure, have been identified from best practices in the literature, as 
a synthesis of solutions, which have direct relevance and applicability to enhance the practises 
of highway agencies in the Niger Delta.  The researcher thus makes relevant referrals to the 
literature advocating for geotechnical best practices, to serve as technical recommendations 
necessary to align the practices of the highway agencies, at various phases of project 
development. The recommendations are derived from the selective documentary analysis of 
international best practice guidelines for cost estimating, commissioned government reports, 
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highway standards and professional guidelines for managing geotechnical risks, some of which 
have being discussed in the literature. These include: 
 The British Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (DMRB, 2006) guidelines for 
managing geotechnical risks;  
 The Evans and Peck (2008) Report and recommended standards of best practice for 
cost estimation on highway projects, commissioned by the Australian Federal 
Government; 
 The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2009) best practice 
estimating guidance; 
 The Association of Cost Engineers (AACE, 1997) International recommended 
professional practice guide to construction cost estimating; 
 The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE; 1991;1999) recommendations for geotechnical 
Practice  
 The Transportation and Road Research Laboratory (TRRL, 1993) Over Seas Road Note 
31, for the design of bituminous highways in tropical countries: 
 The DFID Project Report R6898: Guidelines on the selection and use of road 
construction materials in tropical countries. 
The fundamental tenet of geotechnical best practice requires that geotechnical input is ensured 
in highway projects from the earliest point of project planning, feasibility studies and 
conceptualisation, down to project completion. The recommendations forwarded, are thus 
chronologically articulated, in response to the geotechnical issues uncovered at the progressive 
phases of project development by the highway agencies in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
11.6.1 Planning Phase 
The findings from this study has revealed a non-existent planning/feasibility phase for 
highway projects in the Niger Delta. Of primary significance at this phase of highway 
development in the Niger Delta, is the impact of political and communal influences which 
serve as the basic consideration in planning for road projects to be executed. However, 
the practice by highway agencies in the developed world shows that the 
planning/feasibility phase of highway development is considered a crucial phase, and 
more steeply inclined towards technical and environmental details in mapping out 
alternative layouts. Typically, In the United States, Chou (2002) explained that this stage 
of project development is referred to as the investment/corridor planning stage, used to 
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analyse the feasibility of proposed schemes, with high feasibility projects given higher 
priority, subsequent to which conceptual estimates are prepared. In the Australian 
context, this phase, referred to as the project identification phase, is also used to map 
out network and corridor objectives as a basis on which a rapid Benefit Cost Analysis 
(BCA) is carried out to obtain funding approval.   
 
Highway agencies and relevant authorities in the Niger Delta, thus need to be 
enlightened about the general objective of geotechnical evaluation, right from the 
planning phase of highway projects. At the planning phase of highway projects, the 
researcher recommends the use of terrain mapping supported by a terrain attribute 
database. As such geographical information systems, can be used to analyse such data, 
as a basis of generating a geotechnical land classification system for use in the planning 
of highway routes in the Niger Delta. Such data is also necessary for carrying out desk 
studies at the preliminary design phase for the approved highway projects in Niger Delta. 
 
Accessibility to such data, is however a primary hurdle that needs to be overcome. This 
is because, although there are currently various studies on the geology and geotechnical 
properties of sub soils in the Niger Delta, these are mostly not disseminated. The few 
available are scattered in privately owned reports and in the scant published literature. 
This was a problem faced by the researcher during the field work. Also from, the 
response pattern of the consultants to the highway agencies, the researcher inferred 
that this may be why only preliminary site reconnaissance are carried out, by visiting the 
site to identify locations for drilling boreholes, before the detailed ground investigations. 
Desk studies which should ideally entail studying other geologic information related to 
the project site and its location were often not carried out. This is not surprising since 
there is no comprehensive and readily accessible geotechnical data base on the Niger 
Delta, unlike in developed countries, were such information, as well as a wealth of other 
relevant documented historical data, are available. Typically, in the UK, such data can 
be readily accessed at the appropriate regional offices, highways engineering division, 
or ground engineering division at the Transport and Road Research Laboratory (TRRL) 
and at the British Geological Survey. As such making readily available technical 
resources for carrying out desk studies, typical of developed countries, is a necessary 
first step to ensure adequate geotechnical evaluation. 
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The Transportation Research Laboratory (TRL), in a technical report prepared under the 
Department for International Development(DFID), identified several potential sources of 
information for desk studies that can be assessed by developing countries. More 
specifically, the researcher proposes that geological field maps, aeromagnetic maps and 
aerial photographs and topographic maps maintained by the Geological Survey of 
Nigeria, as well as the use of remote sensing techniques to interpret satellite images for 
the Niger Delta, can be combined with site specific investigations to produce more 
detailed and comprehensive geotechnical mapping of subgrade soils in the region. A 
further technical data needed would be reliable piezometric level data, which should be 
consistently monitored in order to gauge groundwater levels and movement in the Niger 
Delta.  
 
To pool together the various sources of geographic, geotechnical and geologic data, for 
use in engineering and costing applications, necessitates the setting up of a 
geotechnical/geological information unit specifically for the Niger Delta. Expenditure 
devoted to this can be justified in the long term by a corresponding reduction in the 
preliminary design and estimating effort required for highway development. Forming of 
geological engineering co-operatives can also be formally instituted to provide 
geotechnical data for engineers, planners, designers and contractors who may require 
data on soil in the area for use as engineering materials, as well as help in developing a 
clear vision for new researches. The effective management of information gathering and 
collation procedures is therefore of critical importance to ensuring adequate 
geotechnical evaluation for highway development in the Niger Delta. 
11.6.2 Design Phase 
Subsequent to the planning phase, there is a need for highway agencies in the Niger to 
consistently ensure geotechnical input in projects, by maintaining in-house geotechnical 
presence throughout the design and costing phases of smaller scale community project 
execution. However, the findings have revealed that apart from not maintaining 
geotechnical presence internally, there are no explicit design and estimating unit for two 
out of the three highway agencies in the region. On this issue, there is an apparent need 
to reflect better clarity and definition of professional roles in the organisational structure, 
with provision made for distinct design and estimating units. Furthermore, the statutory 
laws establishing the agencies, should stipulate and enforce the basic criteria, for 
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defining the minimum qualifications of staff working in specific technical departments of 
highway agencies. Ensuring this, is of particular significance, to improving the adequacy 
of designs and estimates, as well as ensure the efficient post-contract management of 
geotechnical risks. 
 
Reference in this instance, can be made to the UK, where apart from the having relevant 
qualified professionals in projects, two key personnel are responsible for the adequate 
management of geotechnical risk in designs. These personnel are the Designer’s 
Geotechnical Advisor (DGA) and the highway agency’s in-house Geotechnical Advisor 
(GA), both of who have to work closely from the early stage of the project. The 
geotechnical advisor is employed by the consultant as a professional who works with 
the in-house geotechnical personnel. The DMRB (2006:22) thus stipulates: “Each 
overseeing organization shall have on its staff, or shall appoint, a GA with responsibility 
for the geotechnical aspects of the work of the Overseeing Organization”. The DGA is 
also required to be certified, as having the relevant experience appropriate to the project 
being undertaken, and with the matching qualifications.  
 
Based on the stipulations of the British DRMB (2006), the in-house geotechnical 
personnel are thus responsible for the procurement and supervision of the consultant 
specialism in the geotechnical aspects of a project, with a further provision made for 
independent geotechnical audit by the highway agencies from time to time. Checks of 
this nature would be particularly useful, for highway agencies in the Niger Delta, as the 
level of detailed geotechnical investigations carried out by consultants, based on which 
designs for major roads are prepared, were apparently not verified. On this issue, 
contradictory responses from the chief consultants, their lower cadre staffs and the 
highway officials. Reports of unethical professional practices by consultants, were 
however filtered from the responses as a possibility which needs to be checked.   
 
Explicit provision should be made to rigorously enforce the compliance of geotechnical 
requirement in projects, within the organisational framework of the highway agencies. 
Highway agencies in the Niger Delta therefore need to employ geotechnical 
professionals as part of their in-house project management team, to ensure consistency 
in the management of geotechnical risks, throughout the sequential phases of project 
development. As the ICE (1999:9) advocates:  
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“engaging geotechnical presence at the earliest opportunity, will ensure that, 
appropriate remedial measures or design changes are carried out; accurate 
records are obtained of the ground actually encountered; a supplementary 
investigation to mitigate the problems is implemented”. 
To ensure that the geotechnical risks in the design of highway projects are identified, 
and then adequately managed throughout a project, Volume 4 of the British DRMB 
(2006), further sets out standard procedures for the planning and reporting of 
geotechnical works in highway projects, necessary to ensure that geotechnical risk is 
correctly managed by geotechnical personnel. The DMRB (2006) outlines key stages to 
be followed, as an integral part of geotechnical risk management by highway agencies, 
in the overall project progression, which the researcher considers adaptable to the Niger 
Delta: 
 
Key Stage 1: Initial Review of Project and Geotechnical Risks to determine its 
Geotechnical Classification and thus the requirement for Geotechnical Certification:  
 
This phase is useful to identify potential geotechnical risks, at the conceptual phase. The 
complexity of the geotechnical requirements of the project is therefore assessed at this 
stage. Set criteria for classifying geotechnical risks in projects is provided, using 
geotechnical categories, one to three, with increasing levels of complexity: With one, for 
projects satisfiable on the basis of routine geotechnical assessments; two, for those 
requiring detailed quantitative assessments; three, for complex geotechnical risks 
requiring a high degree of specialization. 
 
Key Stage 2: Preliminary Assessment referred to as a Preliminary Sources Study Report 
(Desk Study) and preparation of the Ground Investigation Report.  
 
This stage is useful to ensure the procurement of relevant geotechnical information, 
necessary to undertake an accurate assessment of project risks, for preliminary and 
detail design purposes. It is thus a pre-requisite that desk studies and preliminary 
reconnaissance surveys are carried out, to serve as baseline data, necessary to gain 
background geotechnical information on project sites in the Niger Delta, which should 
logically precede and not be substituted for detailed ground investigation. This should 
be a mandatory requirement for all highway projects in the Niger Delta, prior to detailed 
design preparation and construction of highway projects. To this effect, the British DRMB 
provides advice on carrying out GI in Note HA 34/87. 
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Key Stage 3: Geotechnical Design and Construction Certification  
At this stage, information on the detailed project design is provided, for the contractor to 
prepare and carry out construction. However, the study reveals that for community 
projects executed by the highway agencies in the Niger Delta, detailed designs are 
mostly not prepared by the in-house professionals. Survey layout plans, rough sketches, 
and sometimes even verbal instruction are considered sufficient for the award of 
contracts. Furthermore, the general pattern of the responses from the interviews, 
showed that most of the agencies’ in-house professionals exhibited very low level of 
familiarity with the basic technical terminology of highway pavement designs and 
standards.  
 
In view of these findings, the study recommends that highway agencies need to 
periodically carry out staff development programmes, trainings, workshops and 
seminars for their technical staff and professionals, to keep abreast with current 
practices and developments in highway designs. Of particular importance is the need to 
enforce the adoption of the TRRL (1993) design guide as required by the Federal 
Ministry of Works, by professionals in state and regional highway agencies. The TRRL 
(1993) Overseas Road Note 31, which is now widely used in other developing countries, 
provides guidance on the structural design of roads within tropical regions, and defines 
the construction material requirements.  
 
Increased networking between the highway agencies in the Niger Delta, as well as with 
other highway agencies in tropical areas, and in the developed world, would provide an 
excellent opportunity for highway professionals in the Niger Delta to meet with each 
other, and those in other tropical regions.  The clear benefits derivable, would thus be 
knowledge transfer from more advanced technical organisations with relevant skills, and 
relating to the current experiences of geotechnical risk management in similar 
hydrogeological environments.  
 
 
Key Stage 4 Geotechnical Feedback 
At the final phase, a Geotechnical Feedback Report is prepared by the DGA and the 
GA, reporting on the general progress of the construction work, and particularly any 
407 
 
unexpected ground conditions requiring changes to design, that occurred. The ICE 
(1999:5) on this note, recommends: 
“It would be useful if completed projects, both successful and those which have 
incurred significant claims related to unforeseen site conditions, could be 
analysed to ascertain their technical and contractual elements. The technical 
problems could be categorized to establish particular areas of site investigation 
deficiency, and study of the contractual aspects might highlight the conditions 
and procedures which are unhelpful to successful construction”. 
 
The entirety of the documentation required for geotechnical risk management, from 
project inception to completion, based on the stipulations of the DRMB (2006), are thus 
the: Geotechnical Classification Report; Preliminary Sources Study Report; Ground 
Investigation Report; Geotechnical Design Report; Geotechnical Feedback Report. It is 
thus the researcher’s belief that highway agencies in the Niger Delta, stand to make 
positive changes to the delivery of highway infrastructure, if these guidelines deduced 
from more advanced practices, are adopted. This could constitute a starting point, 
necessary to resolve most of the current geotechnical shortcomings in the design of 
highway projects.  
 
11.6.3 Costing Phase 
Considering the heterogeneous ground profile of the Niger Delta, the implications of 
carrying out adequate geotechnical evaluation for highway projects, has far reaching 
impact beyond the generation of appropriate designs. This is because, it will over the 
project life span, further improve the accuracy of estimates, particularly during 
conceptual costing phase of budget preparation. Typically, the DRMB (2006) states:  
“The properties of engineering soils and rocks vary not only from one geology 
to another, but within the same geology and it should not be assumed, without 
full supporting evidence, that the ground conditions are identical”.  
 
This has been shown to have severe implications for the accuracy of conceptual 
estimates, used in budgeting for highway projects. As the study findings reveal, the 
method of cost per kilometre averages based on similar past projects, has led to 
significant disparities between budgeted and final outturn costs.  
There is thus an evident need to improve the accuracy of conceptual cost estimates in 
the Niger Delta, requiring that geotechnically differentiated cost estimates are prepared 
for proposed highway projects, predicated on adequate information on ground 
408 
 
conditions. The GAO (2009) Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, recommends best 
practices, for developing and managing capital program costs, and provides 
comprehensive guidelines for the selecting costing methodologies most suited to the 
different elements in a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), in tandem with the level of 
scope definition. In this vain the GAO (2009:34) stated: 
“A project cost estimate may comprise separate estimates of differing 
classifications. Certain portions of the design or work scope may be well defined, 
and therefore warrant more detailed cost estimating techniques and 
approaches, while other areas are relatively immature and therefore 
appropriately estimated using parametric or other less definitive analytical 
techniques”.  
 
The AACE (1997) equally recommended that the estimate corresponding to the 
conceptual phase should be expressed at level-1(unit rate) or Level-2 (elemental) rather 
than on a more generic level-4 cost per length of road length basis, which is a rough 
order of magnitude estimate type, typically adopted by highway agencies. The GAO 
(2009:35) guideline in this vain asserted that:  
“Because it is developed from limited data and in a short time, a rough order of 
magnitude analysis should never be considered a budget-quality cost estimate”. 
Emphasis should therefore be placed by the highway agencies in the Niger Delta, on 
getting geotechnical information via desk studies, carried out on time, as a basis of 
getting the project scope defined to the best possible degree at this phase. This should 
be with applicable contingency allowance provided, depending on the level of confidence 
in the information gathered. As such at budget preparation stage, geologic mapping and 
case histories from desk studies in the area can be deployed to characterize geologic 
conditions. Since pavement cost in highway projects account for the highest percentage 
of the total cost of road works, it can be discerned that the level of definition of design of 
the road pavement, should be sufficiently developed, to permit using a level-1/2 
approach. Evans and Peck (2008) best practice guidance further showed that getting 
the conceptual estimate defined to this best possible degree, increases the probability 
of not exceeding 10-15% and 25-40% range in variations, at 50% and 90% confidence 
limits respectively.  
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11.6.4 Contractual Phase 
At the contractual phase, appropriate forms of engineering contracts such as the NEC 
or FIDIC should be used. The inclusion of Ground Investigations Reports is also 
necessary. This is in view of the findings, which show that highway agencies in the Niger 
Delta still use the JCT form of contract which is applicable only to building contracts, and 
do not include Ground Investigation Reports as part of the standard contract 
documentation provided for tenderers. This poor geotechnical risk containment, has led 
to adversarial behaviour and the strategic pricing of contracts by inefficient contractors, 
who often times abandon the projects, leading multiple contract re-awards by the 
highway agencies. Contract documentation for highway contracts awarded in the Niger 
need to further incorporate Differing Site Condition clauses, to provide financial relief for 
contractors in the event of unforeseen ground conditions, to cover for unplanned cost 
associated with geotechnical intricacies in the heterogeneous terrain of the Niger Delta.   
 
For riverine locations in the Niger Delta region, the geomorphology and other physical 
attributes of the terrain would compel a construction firm to step up its profit margin, if it 
is to efficiently execute a project there. The contractor in estimating for the works will 
have to incorporate these geographic and subsoil factors which directly or indirectly 
affect the cost of construction works in the swampy and coastal areas in the Niger Delta. 
As such, the overheads of any efficient construction firms carrying out construction work 
in riverine areas will likely increase, leading to a corresponding increase in tender 
figures. In this vain, the lowest bid criterion currently adopted in contractor selection by 
the highway agencies, will therefore likely stifle the competitive advantage of the more 
efficient contractors.  
 
Awarding contracts to inefficient contractors, without any form of geotechnical selection 
criteria, is clearly a gamble which has ‘boomeranged’ and undermined the long run cost-
efficient procurement of highway projects executed in the Niger Delta. Contractor 
selection criteria, against the background of the difficulties typically associated with 
construction works in the swamps and coastal zones, is apparently a key success factor 
for highway projects. Highway construction in the Niger Delta clearly requires a high level 
of geotechnical experience and expertise by contractors, who should be familiar with the 
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rigours and uncertainties of construction works in the area, for a project to be 
successfully completed under budget and in time.  
 
During contract execution, geotechnical specialists should also be more closely involved 
in the supervision of construction.  To curtail the high incidents of claims, justified on the 
basis of unexpected ground conditions, logically requires that monitoring of projects 
should be carried out by a team, including qualified geotechnical personnel. As such 
consultants employed to post-contract monitoring of projects and the highway agencies, 
should ensure that their staff are not only qualified, but jointly and closely monitor 
progress of work by contractors. To this end, the issue of short staffing reported in the 
highway agencies, needs to be addressed. Adequately qualified professionals, in 
sufficient numbers, should be employed to improve staff strength in the post contract 
management of highway projects. The joint inspection/measurement of works by the 
agency and the consultants, should therefore constitute the basis for the approval of 
interim certificate of payment.  Ensuring the technical adequacy of staff, responsible for 
the post-contract management of highway projects in the Niger delta, represents another 
crucial issue which needs to be addressed to guarantee project success. 
 
11.7 Conclusion 
The study, has revealed the prevailing geotechnical risk management practices of the highway 
agencies in the Niger Delta, based on which broader inferences have drawn by the researcher, 
in relation to the scholarly literature, and the literature on geotechnical best practice. Several 
unanticipated social constructs in the organisational and institutional settings of the agencies 
operating in the Niger Delta have also emerged, as factors impacting on the level of geotechnical 
input inherent in the practices of the agencies. Recommendations have thus been proffered with 
a view to achieving best practice in the Niger Delta region, comparable to other more technically 
advanced highway organisations in developed countries.  This is to create a supportive technical 
organisational platform, to ensure that value for money in investment in highway development is 
achieved. The study has thus shown that to better manage the risks inherent in the wetland 
conditions of the Niger Delta, the highway agencies need technical capacity in geotechnical risk 
management.  Geotechnical aspects of highway delivery must therefore be strengthened, and 
the poor risk perception attitude and culture surrounding the procurement of highway projects, 
need to be changed, to give geotechnical concerns a higher priority status.  
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11.8 Study Reflections and Positionality of the Researcher 
The researcher started off this study, having concluded a Bachelor’s degree in Quantity 
Surveying, and an MPhil degree in Environmental Management, based on a dissertation work 
titled ‘A bioclimatic study of building design and cost in Nigeria’. The researcher’s academic 
interest has thus been largely defined by cross-disciplinary research via the interface between 
the financial and technical aspects of construction and the natural environment. As a follow up 
on the M. Phil dissertation, which basically dealt with the financial and physiological impact of 
climate on building construction in Nigeria, the researcher was motivated to extend this line of 
interest to the engineering/geotechnical aspect of the interfaces between the built and the natural 
environment, for a PhD. This was enabled by a background in environmental geotechnics, 
sedimentology, and hydro-geology courses, undertook as part of the M. Phil course work. 
 
In furtherance of this line of research, the PhD study was initially focused on developing a 
mathematical costing model, as an artifact to improve the accuracy of estimates at the conceptual 
costing phase of highway projects in the Niger Delta, due to its heterogeneous ground profile. 
The research was thus initially targeted to quantitatively model the significant disparities in cost 
that arise from design adaptations to suit the peculiar problematic terrain and subsoils of the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria, and further develop an engineering geologic mapping based 
costing prototype, using a Geographic Information System interface.  
 
The methodology proposed at this point was heavily influenced by the researcher’s inherently 
quantitative inclination, as a Quantity Surveyor. This was because the researcher had a narrow 
view and understanding of the issue of cost overruns, and mostly related it to the limitations in 
the techniques used in preparing estimates. In common with other built environment 
professionals, the researcher conception of research was a purely positivist approach. The 
research focus was however latter redefined to probe wider into the range of geotechnical issues 
which underlie the unusually high level of cost overruns experienced in completed highway 
projects. This realignment of the research focus, resulted in a shift in the researcher’s 
positionality from a purely positivist orientation to a mix method paradigm.   
 
The researcher at the start of the research was also narrowly focused on understanding the 
purely technical shortcomings, due to the perceived discrepancies between the theory of best 
practice and the practice of the highway agencies, in terms of their approach to the containment 
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of ground related risks in highway projects. As such, only the technical issues principally 
revolving around subsoil conditions of the Niger Delta region, constituted the primary emphasis 
of the study. These were presupposed as being the more profound underlying factors that 
needed to be investigated, to understand the propagation of significant cost overruns in the Niger 
Delta. With this technical orientation, the potential geotechnical cost drivers were identified from 
the geotechnical literature. The study was thus limited to statistically validating that poor 
geotechnical practices were the primary cost overrun drivers contributing significantly to spate of 
project delays and abandonment in the geologic context of the Niger Delta.  
However, as the research evolved, a reflexive adaptation of the research was warranted by the 
emerging socio-cultural trends in the data, which widened the researcher’s pre-conceived 
technical perspective, to understanding the role that the wider contextual setting of highway 
organisations played in propagating cost overruns in highway projects. Whilst these additional 
findings did not necessarily negate the researcher’s technical stance, the researcher’s personal 
and professional beliefs and understanding of the phenomena of cost overruns in public projects, 
significantly widened. As a result, the researchers’ positionality shifted from one focused only on 
technical issues, through the lens of geotechnical risk management, to a wider prospective, of 
how less tangible theoretical social constructs concomitantly interplay with technical factors in 
organisations, leading to cost growth. 
 
11. 9 Scope for Further Research 
The poor level of Geotechnical Risk Management (GRM) in highway projects, executed in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria, has been identified from this research.  Particularly, the adverse 
non-project specific ‘Organisations and People’ related variables in the highway agencies, has 
been shown to speedily diminish, and impede geotechnical best practice. This is typically evident 
in the low level of technical competence and skills in the design and costing of highway projects, 
and the deficient institutional arrangements within the highway agencies. This emergent view of 
geotechnical practice, calls for further research, necessary to develop a risk-based 
transformation improvement framework, in other to align best practice into highway project 
delivery in the Niger Delta region. Such transformation framework should therefore be targeted 
at addressing four fundamental areas of GRM identified in this study: 
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1. Training to acquire/sensitize an awareness of the value for money benefits of GRM, and 
the application of such knowledge within transportation projects.  
2. Tools, methods and conventions, essential for the highway agencies to practise 
geotechnical risk management.  
3. Rousing the in-house technical professionals to apply GRM 
4. Policy direction for non-geotechnical decision makers in the highway agencies, who 
ultimately determine the amount of resources, such as money and time, to be allocated 
to geotechnical concerns.  
 
Also implicit in the findings of this research, is the need to tackle the social vices plaguing the 
procurement system for highway infrastructure in the Niger Delta, which necessitates a major 
culture shift. This is necessary to create a viable socio-economic platform for the meaningful 
development of the much needed highway infrastructure in the backward Niger Delta region. The 
findings from this study has thus opened up a whole ‘can of worms’, on the critical and 
fundamental issues plaguing highway development in the Niger Delta, which provides several 
leads for future research.  
However, although the theory generated from this study is mostly limited to explaining the 
propagation of unusually high cost overruns in the geo-political and socio-cultural setting of 
highway development in the wetland terrain of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, there is scope 
for further research to test the generalisability of theory forwarded in this study to other 
developing nations. This is against the backdrop of the paucity of organisational studies on 
highway projects in developing countries, which go beyond the artificiality of questionnaire 
studies, that mostly sample the general opinions of construction professionals.  
The insider perspective of the highway organisations provided in this study, also serves as a lead 
for carrying out further related empirical research on highway projects, outside the confines of 
the developing world, to explore the interdisciplinary links between the social and technical risk 
aspects of construction projects. This research has thus pointed out new directions for further in-
depth mix method studies, needed to investigate and get a close feel of the technical dynamics 
of public infrastructure projects, as products of the social settings prevailing in public agencies. 
This is against the backdrop of the current renewed emphasis on trans-disciplinary construction 
management research, to ensure value for money and better management of project risks.  
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Appendix A: Pilot and Final Drafts of Interviews 
Appendix A1: Civil Engineers Initial Interview Guide 
1. Does your agency use the Transportation and Road Research laboratory (TRRL) 
(1993) guidelines which are adopted as the Nigerian Highway design standard (was 
deleted to assess the level of awareness of the respondents) for the design of your 
flexible pavements? (YES/NO) 
2. If No, is there a recognised national or international standard of design that your 
agency uses to develop their road designs? 
3. What is the approach to designing your road projects: do you prepare designs for 
individual road projects or do you use standard designs? 
4. What are the key variables that are used as a basis for preparing road designs in your 
agency? 
5. What are the standard dimensions and lane width of roadways for road projects 
executed by your agency? 
6. What traffic class and loading are the roads designed for? 
7. In the Niger Delta, ground conditions have been recognised as a major factor affecting 
designs. What are the issues relating to ground conditions of the Niger Delta terrain 
that are principally reflected in your designs? (Was deleted as it was a repetition of Q4) 
8. How does your organisation prepare designs when a road project traverses various 
soil types?  
9. How does your organisation identify the varying subsoil conditions along a road route? 
10. What level of site investigation does your organisation carry out? 
 Desk study; 
 Preliminary site reconnaissance; 
 Detailed ground investigations. 
 
11. At what point during the design of projects are the services of geotechnical consultants 
engaged? (Moved upwards to be more logical and coherent) 
 
12. Do you include ground investigation reports as part of your contract documentation? 
(Deleted as the question was deemed as being more appropriate for quantity 
surveyors) 
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Appendix A2: Final Interview Civil Engineers Guide (AA- DIG1-Nov’ 14) 
Overview 
1. What is your job description, experience and professional qualifications? 
2. Please could you describe the organisational structure of your agency and the job 
description of the functional units responsible for the execution of road projects? 
(Q1 and 2 included to gain demographic information, also order of questions was reshuffled 
to achieve a more logical flow) 
 
Design Unit 
3. Do you prepare your road designs within the internal structure of your organisation or 
are your road designs prepared by external consultants? 
 
4. What is the approach to designing your road projects: do you prepare designs for 
individual road projects or do you use standard designs? 
 
5. What are the standard dimensions and lane width of roadways for road projects 
executed by your agency? 
 
6. What traffic class and loading are the roads designed for? 
 
7. What are the key variables that are used as a basis for preparing road designs in your 
agency? 
 
8. Do you use the Transportation and Road Research laboratory (TRRL, 1993) Overseas 
Road Note guideline, for the design of your flexible pavements? (YES/NO) 
 
9. If no, is there a recognised national or international standard of design that your 
agency uses to develop their road designs? (Included to further explore the level of 
awareness of the respondents) 
 
10. How does your organisation prepare designs when a road project traverses various 
soil types?  
 
11. How does your organisation identify the varying subsoil conditions along a road route? 
 
12. If yes, at what point during project development are the services of a geotechnical 
professional deployed and what is their role in the project development?  
 
13. What level of site investigation does your organisation carry out? 
 Desk study; 
 Preliminary site reconnaissance; 
 Detailed ground investigations. 
 
      Please could you further explain your response? 
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Appendix A3: Initial Draft Quantity Surveyors Interview Guide 
1. What are the phases of highway development that road projects have to go through 
before construction? Please could you give any time scales? (Redrafted to using more 
appropriate terminologies) 
2. What are the functions of different units in your agency responsible for highway 
projects and how are funds budgeted for proposed schemes? 
3. How are road costs estimated in your agency at the preliminary phase? 
4. What is the level of accuracy achieved based on your initial project estimates? 
5. What factors based on your working experience typically cause projects to run over 
budget? 
6. Whereby road projects traverse various soil types how does your organisation reflect 
this in the initial and detailed estimates? (Redrafted to using more appropriate 
terminologies)   
7. Do you think the ground conditions encountered at project site is a major cost factor 
that can affect the ability of your projects to be carried out within budget? (Redrafted to 
using more appropriate terminologies) 
8. What contractual provision is made in the event that different soil conditions are 
encountered after contract award? 
9. Are there any failed or abandoned projects that occurred on the grounds of unexpected 
ground conditions? 
10. If yes, what was the magnitude of financial undertone involved? 
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Appendix A4:  Quantity Surveyors Final Interview Guide (AA- DIG1-Nov’ 14) 
1. What is your job description, experience and professional qualifications? 
2. Please could you describe the organisational structure of your agency and the job 
description of the functional units responsible for the design, costing and execution of 
road projects?      (Q1 and Q2 included to build up demographic information) 
3. Please could you describe the various phases of project development from the 
budgetary phase to the commissioning of projects by your organisation? 
 
4. How are road costs estimated in your agency at the preliminary phase of road 
projects? 
 
5. What level of accuracy is achieved based on your initial project estimates? Do the final 
cost of construction of your projects normally within the initial budgeted funds?  
 
6. What factors based on your working experience typically cause projects to run over 
budget? 
 
7. Has your agency experienced a significant number of abandoned or delayed projects 
due to ground conditions? 
 
8. Whereby road projects traverse various soil types how does your organisation reflect 
this in the initial and detailed estimates? 
 
9. What procurement system is adopted in the award of road contracts: Traditional or 
Design and Build? (Included)  
 
10. What conditions of contract is used by your agency? (Included as a lead-in question) 
 
11. What contractual provision is made in the event that different soil conditions are 
encountered after contract award? 
 
12. Do you include ground investigation reports as part of your contract documentation? 
 
13. Do you think the level of site detail provided for ground conditions affects project 
delivery in terms of the level of claims, delays, cost overruns occurring for your road 
projects? (Included to further explore the issue) 
 
14. Are there any failed or abandoned projects that have occurred on the grounds of 
unexpected ground conditions? 
 
15. If yes, could you give a few isolated instances and the magnitude of financial 
undertone involved? 
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Appendix A5: Road Contractors Initial Draft Interview Questions 
1. What is the basic documentation that are usually used in the award of road contracts 
executed by your firm?  
2. Are ground Investigation reports included as part of this documentation for road 
contracts in the Niger Delta? 
3. Do you think that the nature of the ground at the site of any road project is a major risk 
factor for road contracts executed by your firm in the Niger delta? 
4. How does your firm assess the nature of the soils prevailing at road sites when 
tendering for contracts? 
5. How do you compute your rates to reflect the risk of encountering poor soil conditions?  
6. Does the inclusion or exclusion of ground investigation reports affect the bid values 
submitted during tender? 
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Appendix A6: Final Road Contractors Interview Guide 
1. What forms of procurement have been used in the projects handled by your 
organisation? (Included based on observations from pilot respondents) 
2. What is the basic documentation that is provided as a basis of bidding for road 
contracts and how adequate is it in terms of information required for preparing your bid 
estimates? Question further clarified to better relay meaning. 
3.  Is ground Investigation reports included as part of this documentation for road 
contracts awarded to your organisation? Yes/ No 
 If no, does your firm carryout Ground Investigations before bidding for contracts. 
(Deleted as the question was noted during the piloting phase as too obvious and was 
also a repetition of Q6) 
4. Do you think that the nature of the ground at the site of any road project is a major risk 
factor for road contracts in the Niger delta? 
5. How does your firm assess the nature of the soils prevailing at road sites when 
tendering for contracts? 
6. What are the specific technical ground related risk factors you have encountered 
during contract execution? (Added from response pattern in piloting) 
 
7. Has your firm ever opted out of bidding for jobs on the basis of risk perceived due to 
ground conditions? Added based on comments from pilot phase as to the possibility of 
this scenario occurring. 
8. How do you compute your rates to reflect the risk of encountering poor soil conditions?  
9. Does the inclusion or exclusion of ground investigation reports affect the bid values 
submitted during tender? 
10. What are your pricing strategies in bidding for highway contracts executed in upland as 
compared to riverine areas? Added based on comments from the piloting phase.  
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Appendix A7: Initial Draft of Consultants Interview Guide (AA-FIG1- Feb’ 15) 
1. Please could you give a brief introduction to your professional background, experience 
and qualifications? 
Designs 
2. What are the major variables that have the most significant impact on road designs 
prepared by your firm?  
  
3. What are the standard dimensions and lane width of roadways for state road projects? 
 
4. What traffic class and loading are the roads designed for? 
 
5. Do you use the Transportation and Road Research laboratory (TRRL, 1993) Overseas 
Road Note 31 guideline, which is currently adopted as the Nigerian Highway design 
standard, for the design of flexible pavements? (YES/NO) 
 
6. If no, is there a recognised national or international standard of design that your 
organisation uses to develop road designs? 
 
Soils 
 
7. In the Niger Delta, ground conditions have been recognised as a major factor affecting 
designs. What are the issues relating to ground conditions of the Niger Delta terrain 
that are principally reflected in your designs? 
 
8. How does your organisation prepare designs and cost estimates when a road project 
traverses various soil types?  
 
9. How does your organisation identify the varying subsoil conditions along a road route? 
 
10. At what phase of project development are the services of geotechnical professional in 
your firm deployed and what is their role in the project development?  
 
11. Does your organisation carryout ground investigation prior to the design of roads? 
Yes/No 
 
12. If yes, what level of site investigation your organisation carries out before the design of 
road projects? 
 Desk study; 
 Preliminary site reconnaissance; 
 Detailed ground investigations. (Deleted as too obvious) 
 
13. Please could you further explain your response (Deleted, as merged in 12) 
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Appendix A8: Final Consultants Interview Guide (AA-FIG1- Feb’ 15) 
1. Please could you give a brief introduction to your professional background, experience 
and qualifications? 
Designs 
2. What are the major variables that have the most significant impact on road designs 
prepared by your firm?  
  
3. What are the standard dimensions and lane width of roadways for state road projects? 
 
4. What traffic class and loading are the roads designed for? 
 
5. Do you use the Transportation and Road Research laboratory (TRRL, 1993) Overseas 
Road Note 31 guideline, which is currently adopted as the Nigerian Highway design 
standard, for the design of flexible pavements? (YES/NO) 
 
6. If no, is there a recognised national or international standard of design that your 
organisation uses to develop road designs? 
 
Soils 
 
7. In the Niger Delta, ground conditions have been recognised as a major factor affecting 
designs. What are the issues relating to ground conditions of the Niger Delta terrain 
that are principally reflected in your designs? 
 
8. How does your organisation prepare designs and cost estimates when a road project 
traverses various soil types?  
 
9. How does your organisation identify the varying subsoil conditions along a road route? 
 
10. At what phase of project development are the services of geotechnical professional in 
your firm deployed and what is their role in the project development?  
 
11. Does your organisation carryout ground investigation prior to the design of roads? 
Yes/No 
 
12. If yes, please could you describe the procedures of site investigation your organisation 
carries out before the design of road projects? 
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Appendix B: Organisation Management Consent/Agreement Letter (AA- 
OMC1-Nov’14) 
 
Research Title:  Explaining Cost overruns in Highway Projects 
Researcher:       xxx (PhD candidate, University of Salford, School of Built Environment) 
          
The project investigates the financial implications of differing ground conditions that are typically 
encountered in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria as a basis for which improvement in the existing 
approach to road cost estimation can be predicated. It is therefore hoped that your organisation 
could benefit from the study to be able to generate more accurate cost forecasts during the 
planning and contractual phase of road works.  
 
 In order to meet the objectives of the study named above, the researcher needs to collect 
information required to carry out the research. The researcher therefore seeks your permission 
to access past road project information as well as to recruit delegates who could provide useful 
information on the basis of designs and estimation in your agency. The anonymity of delegated 
respondents and the organisation would be maintained within the research. The researcher 
wishes to emphasize that the information provided by your organisation could determine the 
ultimate outcome of the research. Study findings would be communicated back to your 
organisation.  
 
Your requested contribution to the study is based on your granting access to your project records 
and delegating the appropriate personnel. Signing this form acknowledges your permission. 
Thanks for your kind consideration of my request. 
 
 
---------------------------------                                                                    ------------------- 
Management Signature                                                 Date 
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Appendix C: Consent Form   
 
Improving the Accuracy of Conceptual Estimates in the Costing of Bituminous Paved 
Highway Routes in the Niger Delta 
 
 
 
Having taken the time to read the information sheet provided, please tick the relevant boxes as part of your consent 
to take part in the study. 
 
 
 Yes No 
Taking Part   
I have read and understood the project information sheet dated DD/MM/YYYY.  
   
  
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project.  
 
  
I agree to take part in the project.  Taking part in the project will include being interviewed and recorded 
(audio). 
 
I understand that the interview transcripts would be made available to me to ascertain its accuracy.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study at any time and I do not have to 
give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part. 
 
 
 
 
  
Use of the information I provide for this project only   
I understand my personal details such as phone number and address will not be revealed to people outside 
the project. 
 
  
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs. 
 
 
 
  
Please choose one of the following two options: 
I would like my real name used in the above  
I would not like my real name to be used in the above. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ _____________________ ________  
Name of participant [printed]                    Signature              Date 
 
________________________ __________________ ________  
Researcher                   [printed] Signature                 Date 
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Appendix D: Participant Invitation/information Sheet 
 
Explaining Cost Overruns in Highway Projects: A Geo-Spatial Regression Modelling and 
Cognitive Mapping of Latent Pathogens and Contextual Drivers 
Invitation 
You are invited to be part of an academic research study. The above named project is carried 
out as part of a PhD research programme at the University of Salford, United Kingdom by Amadi 
Alolote Ibim under the School of built environment. Below is a brief outline of the research for 
your perusal to inform you on the purpose of the research. You are urged to read the information 
provided below as basis on which you can decide to partake in the study. 
 
Project Details 
The project investigates the financial implication of differing ground conditions that are typically 
encountered in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. The Niger delta is one of the largest wetlands 
in Africa and like all deltas is crisscrossed by a myriad of streams interwoven with patches of 
relatively dry lands. This gives rise to a complex and heterogeneous set of sub-soils. Highway 
routes in the region typically span across various soil types with differing engineering properties 
with should ideally imply a corresponding variation in the design of road sections and resultant 
cost. The study against this background investigates the practice of highway agencies in Rivers 
State as case studies in comparison to the theoretical requirements of good practice in 
estimating. The researcher embarks on this study due to the significant impact that ground 
conditions, which is considered to be the primary variable shaping the cost profile of road works 
in the Niger delta, has on the accuracy of preliminary cost estimates. The potential outcome of 
the study would be the development of an approach to costing that could be used to improve the 
costing of bituminous pavements traversing different soil types in the region. It is therefore hoped 
that highway agencies could benefit from the study to be able to generate more accurate cost 
forecast during the planning phase of road works.  
 
Your Role in the Study 
To embark on this study therefore, the researcher requires access to individuals within the 
highway agencies in Rivers State which has been chosen as a typical instance of the various soil 
types that are typically encountered in the Niger Delta. Also the researcher would seek expert 
opinions from highly experienced consultants to gain their perspectives on the technical details 
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of how the problematic terrain of the Niger delta region affects the costs of pavement construction 
for road works.  
 
The researcher kindly solicits your cooperation to be participants in this study as highly valued 
inputs for the successful conduct of the research. The researcher wishes to expressly state that 
the anonymity of respondents would be maintained at all times. Information disclosed in the 
course of the interview would be treated with the utmost level of confidentiality as part of the 
ethical requirements of conducting research at the University of Salford.  Information sought 
would be used for purely analytical purposes as part of this academic exercise which would be 
subsequently published. There would be no reference to names or any personal details of the 
participants in any research publication arising from the study. 
 
The researcher also wishes to inform potential participants that participation in the research is 
purely voluntary and that at any point during or after the conduct of the interviews participants 
are free to withdraw from the study. Under such circumstance the researcher is thus ethically 
bound not to use such information as may have been provided. No undue influence should 
therefore be perceived as a basis for participating in the study as participant’s willingness to be 
part of the study is strongly advocated for. 
 
The researcher would thus appreciate if a convenient time can be arranged for the conduct of 
telephone interviews which would last for an approximate duration of thirty minutes. The 
researcher also wishes to inform the respondents that the interview conversation would be audio 
recorded for the purpose of the research. The taped conversations would be securely kept and 
destroyed after it has served its purpose of analysis.  Taped interview conversation would be 
transcribed and made available for your viewing. As such all necessary measures to safeguard 
any information received and its accuracy would be taken. 
 
Thanks for taking time to read this information.  Any potential queries regarding the study should 
be directed to 
 Amadi Alolote 
 PhD candidate 
 School of Built Environment 
 University of Salford 
 a.i.amadi@edu.salford.ac.uk 
 Tel No: 07466762469 
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Appendix E: Ethical Approval 
Academic Audit and Governance Committee 
 
College of Science and Technology Research Ethics 
Panel  
(CST)  
 
 
To  Amadi Alolote (and Prof David Eaton) 
 
cc:  Professor Hisham Elkadi, Head of School of 
SOBE 
 
From  Nathalie Audren Howarth, College Research 
Support Officer 
 
 
Date  12/01/2015 
 
 
Subject:  Approval of your Project by CST 
 
Project Title:  Improving the Accuracy of Estimates in 
the Costing of Bituminous Paved 
Highway Routes in the Niger Delta 
 
 
REP Reference:  CST 14/66 
 
 
Following your responses to the Panel's queries, based on the 
information you provided, I can confirm that they have no 
objections on ethical grounds to your project.  
 
If there are any changes to the project and/or its methodology, 
please inform the Panel as soon as possible.  
 
 
Regards, 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM 
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